



United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control

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Common Abbreviations

| Abbreviation | Term |
|--------------|---|
| APEC | Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| AFRICOM | U.S. Military Command for Africa |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| ATS | Amphetamine-Type Stimulants |
| CARICC | Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center |
| CARSI | Central America Regional Security Initiative |
| CBP | U.S. Customs and Border Protection |
| CBSI | Caribbean Basin Security Initiative |
| DARE | Drug Abuse Resistance Education |
| DEA | U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration |
| DHS | U.S. Department of Homeland Security |
| DOJ | U.S. Department of Justice |
| DTO | Drug Trafficking Organization |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EU | European Union |
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FIU | Financial Intelligence Unit |
| ICE | U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement |
| ILEA | International Law Enforcement Academy |
| INCB | International Narcotics Control Board |
| INCSR | International Narcotics Control Strategy Report |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| INL | U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs |
| JIATF-S | Joint Interagency Task Force South |
| JIATF-W | Joint Interagency Task Force West |
| MAOC-N | Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics |
| MLAT | Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NIDA | National Institute of Drug Abuse |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| OAS/CICAD | Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission |
| ONDCP | Office of National Drug Control Policy |
| NPS | New Psychoactive Substances |
| SELEC | Southeast European Law Enforcement Center |
| SIU | Special Investigative Unit |
| SOUTHCOM | U.S Military Command for the Caribbean, Central and South America |
| TOC | Transnational Organized Crime |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNCAC | United Nations Convention against Corruption |
| UNTOC | United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| USCG | U.S. Coast Guard |
| UTC | Universal Treatment Curriculum for Substance Use Disorders |
| WACSI | West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative |
| Ha | Hectare |
| HCL | Hydrochloride (cocaine) |

Kg Kilogram

MT Metric Ton

International Agreements

- **1988 UN Drug Convention** – United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988)
- **UN Single Drug Convention** – United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol)
- **UN Psychotropic Substances Convention** – United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)
- **UNCAC** – UN Convention against Corruption (2003)
- **UNTOC** – UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and its supplementing protocols:
- **Trafficking in Persons Protocol** – Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
- **Migrant Smuggling Protocol** – Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
- **Firearms Protocol** – Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Parties to UN Conventions

Table 1: Parties to UN Conventions. *Dates ratified/acceded.*

As of 22 January 2024

| Country | Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime | 1988 UN Drug Convention | Convention Against Corruption |
|---------------------|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Afghanistan | 24 September 2003 | 14 February 1992 | 25 August 2008 |
| Albania | 21 August 2002 | 27 June 2001 | 25 May 2006 |
| Algeria | 7 October 2002 | 9 May 1995 | 25 August 2004 |
| Andorra | 22 September 2011 | 23 July 1999 | N/A |
| Angola | 1 April 2013 | 26 October 2005 | 29 August 2006 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 24 July 2002 | 5 April 1993 | 21 June 2006 |
| Argentina | 19 November 2002 | 28 June 1993 | 28 August 2006 |
| Armenia | 1 July 2003 | 13 September 1993 | 8 March 2007 |
| Australia | 27 May 2004 | 16 November 1992 | 7 December 2005 |
| Austria | 23 September 2004 | 11 July 1997 | 11 January 2006 |
| Azerbaijan | 30 October 2003 | 22 September 1993 | 1 November 2005 |
| The Bahamas | 26 September 2008 | 30 January 1989 | 10 January 2008 |
| Bahrain | 7 June 2004 | 7 February 1990 | 5 October 2010 |
| Bangladesh | 13 July 2011 | 11 October 1990 | 27 February 2007 |
| Barbados | 11 November 2014 | 15 October 1992 | 10 October 2023 |
| Belarus | 25 June 2003 | 15 October 1990 | 17 February 2005 |
| Belgium | 11 August 2004 | 25 October 1995 | 25 September 2008 |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Belize | 26 September 2003 | 24 July 1996 | 12 December 2016 |
| Benin | 30 August 2004 | 23 May 1997 | 14 October 2004 |
| Bhutan | 20 February 2023 | 27 August 1990 | 21 September 2016 |
| Bolivia | 10 October 2005 | 20 August 1990 | 5 December 2005 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 24 April 2002 | 1 September 1993 | 26 October 2006 |
| Botswana | 29 August 2002 | 13 August 1996 | 27 June 2011 |
| Brazil | 29 January 2004 | 17 July 1991 | 15 June 2005 |
| Brunei | 25 March 2008 | 12 November 1993 | 2 December 2008 |
| Bulgaria | 5 December 2001 | 24 September 1992 | 20 September 2006 |
| Burkina Faso | 15 May 2002 | 2 June 1992 | 10 October 2006 |
| Burma | 30 March 2004 | 11 June 1991 | 20 December 2012 |
| Burundi | 24 May 2012 | 18 February 1993 | 10 March 2006 |
| Cambodia | 12 December 2005 | 7 July 2005 | 5 September 2007 |
| Cameroon | 6 February 2006 | 28 October 1991 | 6 February 2006 |
| Canada | 13 May 2002 | 05 July 1990 | 2 October 2007 |
| Cabo Verde | 15 July 2004 | 8 May 1995 | 23 April 2008 |
| Central African Republic | 14 September 2004 | 15 October 2001 | 6 October 2006 |
| Chad | 18 August 2009 | 9 June 1995 | 26 June 2018 |
| Chile | 29 November 2004 | 13 March 1990 | 13 September 2006 |
| China | 23 September 2003 | 25 October 1989 | 13 January 2006 |
| Colombia | 4 August 2004 | 10 June 1994 | 27 October 2006 |
| Comoros | 25 September 2003 | 1 March 2000 | 11 October 2012 |

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Republic of the Congo | N/A | 3 March 2004 | 13 July 2006 |
| Cook Islands | 4 March 2004 | 22 February 2005 | 17 October 2011 |
| Costa Rica | 24 July 2003 | 8 February 1991 | 21 March 2007 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 25 October 2012 | 25 November 1991 | 25 October 2012 |
| Croatia | 24 January 2003 | 26 July 1993 | 24 April 2005 |
| Cuba | 9 February 2007 | 12 June 1996 | 9 February 2007 |
| Cyprus | 22 April 2003 | 25 May 1990 | 23 February 2009 |
| Czechia | 24 September 2013 | 30 December 1993 | 29 November 2013 |
| Democratic People's Republic of Korea | 17 June 2016 | 19 March 2007 | N/A |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 28 October 2005 | 28 October 2005 | 23 September 2010 |
| Denmark | 30 September 2003 | 19 December 1991 | 26 December 2006 |
| Djibouti | 20 April 2005 | 22 February 2001 | 20 April 2005 |
| Dominica | 17 May 2013 | 30 June 1993 | 28 May 2010 |
| Dominican Republic | 26 October 2006 | 21 September 1993 | 26 October 2006 |
| Ecuador | 17 September 2002 | 23 March 1990 | 15 September 2005 |
| Egypt | 5 March 2004 | 15 March 1991 | 25 February 2005 |
| El Salvador | 18 March 2004 | 21 May 1993 | 1 July 2004 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 7 February 2003 | | 30 May 2018 |
| Eritrea | 25 September 2014 | 30 January 2002 | N/A |

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|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Eswatini | 24 September 2012 | 3 October 1995 | 24 September 2012 |
| Estonia | 10 February 2003 | 12 July 2000 | 12 April 2010 |
| Ethiopia | 23 July 2007 | 11 October 1994 | 26 November 2007 |
| European Union | 21 May 2004 | 31 December 1990 | 12 November 2008 |
| Fiji | 19 September 2017 | 25 March 1993 | 14 May 2008 |
| Finland | 10 February 2004 | 15 February 1994 | 20 June 2006 |
| France | 29 October 2002 | 31 December 1990 | 11 July 2005 |
| Gabon | 15 December 2004 | 10 July 2006 | 1 October 2007 |
| The Gambia | 5 May 2003 | 23 April 1996 | 8 July 2015 |
| Georgia | 5 September 2006 | 8 January 1998 | 4 November 2008 |
| Germany | 14 June 2006 | 30 November 1993 | 12 November 2014 |
| Ghana | 21 August 2012 | 10 April 1990 | 27 June 2007 |
| Greece | 11 January 2011 | 28 January 1992 | 17 September 2008 |
| Grenada | 21 May 2004 | 10 December 1990 | 1 April 2015 |
| Guatemala | 25 September 2003 | 28 February 1991 | 3 November 2006 |
| Guinea | 9 November 2004 | 27 December 1990 | 29 May 2013 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 10 September 2007 | 27 October 1995 | 10 September 2007 |
| Guyana | 14 September 2004 | 19 March 1993 | 16 April 2008 |
| Haiti | 19 April 2011 | 18 September 1995 | 14 September 2009 |
| Holy See | 25 January 2012 | 25 January 2012 | 19 September 2016 |
| Honduras | 2 December 2003 | 11 December 1991 | 23 May 2005 |
| Hungary | 22 December 2006 | 15 November 1996 | 19 April 2005 |
| Iceland | 13 May 2010 | 2 September 1997 | 1 March 2011 |
| India | 5 May 2011 | 27 March 1990 | 9 May 2011 |

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|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Indonesia | 20 April 2009 | 23 February 1999 | 19 September 2006 |
| Iran | N/A | 7 December 1992 | 20 April 2009 |
| Iraq | 17 March 2008 | 22 July 1998 | 17 March 2008 |
| Ireland | 17 June 2010 | 3 September 1996 | 9 November 2011 |
| Israel | 27 December 2006 | 20 May 2002 | 4 February 2009 |
| Italy | 2 August 2006 | 31 December 1990 | 5 October 2009 |
| Jamaica | 29 September 2003 | 29 December 1995 | 5 March 2008 |
| Japan | 11 July 2017 | 12 June 1992 | 11 July 2017 |
| Jordan | 22 May 2009 | 16 April 1990 | 24 February 2005 |
| Kazakhstan | 31 July 2008 | 29 April 1997 | 18 June 2008 |
| Kenya | 16 June 2004 | 19 October 1992 | 9 December 2003 |
| Korea, Republic of | 5 November 2015 | 28 December 1998 | 27 March 2008 |
| Kiribati | 15 September 2005 | N/A | 27 September 2013 |
| Kuwait | 12 May 2006 | 3 November 2000 | 16 February 2007 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 2 October 2003 | 7 October 1994 | 16 September 2005 |
| Laos | 26 September 2003 | 1 October 2004 | 25 September 2009 |
| Latvia | 7 December 2001 | 24 February 1994 | 4 January 2006 |
| Lebanon | 5 October 2005 | 11 March 1996 | 22 April 2009 |
| Lesotho | 24 September 2003 | 28 March 1995 | 16 September 2005 |
| Liberia | 22 September 2004 | 16 September 2005 | 16 September 2005 |
| Libya | 18 June 2004 | 22 July 1996 | 7 June 2005 |
| Liechtenstein | 20 February 2008 | 9 March 2007 | 8 July 2010 |
| Lithuania | 9 May 2002 | 8 June 1998 | 21 December 2006 |

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|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Luxembourg | 12 May 2008 | 29 April 1992 | 6 November 2007 |
| North Macedonia | 12 January 2005 | 13 October 1993 | 13 April 2007 |
| Madagascar | 15 September 2005 | 12 March 1991 | 22 September 2004 |
| Malawi | 17 March 2005 | 12 October 1995 | 4 December 2007 |
| Malaysia | 24 September 2004 | 11 May 1993 | 24 September 2008 |
| Maldives | 4 February 2013 | 7 September 2000 | 22 March 2007 |
| Mali | 12 April 2002 | 31 October 1995 | 18 April 2008 |
| Malta | 24 September 2003 | 28 February 1996 | 11 April 2008 |
| Marshall Islands | 15 June 2011 | 5 November 2010 | 17 November 2011 |
| Mauritania | 22 July 2005 | 1 July 1993 | 25 October 2006 |
| Mauritius | 21 April 2003 | 6 March 2001 | 15 December 2004 |
| Mexico | 4 March 2003 | 11 April 1990 | 20 July 2004 |
| Micronesia, Federated | 24 May 2004 | 6 July 2004 | 21 March 2012 |
| Moldova | 16 September 2005 | 15 February 1995 | 1 October 2007 |
| Monaco | 5 June 2001 | 23 April 1991 | |
| Mongolia | 27 June 2008 | 25 June 2003 | 11 January 2006 |
| Montenegro | 23 October 2006 | 23 October 2006 | 23 October 2006 |
| Morocco | 19 September 2002 | 28 October 1992 | 9 May 2007 |
| Mozambique | 20 September 2006 | 8 June 1998 | 9 April 2008 |
| Namibia | 16 August 2002 | 6 March 2009 | 3 August 2004 |
| Nauru | 12 July 2012 | 12 July 2012 | 12 July 2012 |
| Nepal | 23 December 2011 | 24 July 1991 | 31 March 2011 |
| Netherlands | 26 May 2004 | 8 September 1993 | 31 October 2006 |

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|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| New Zealand | 19 July 2002 | 16 December 1998 | 1 December 2015 |
| Nicaragua | 9 September 2002 | 4 May 1990 | 15 February 2006 |
| Niger | 30 September 2004 | 10 November 1992 | 11 August 2008 |
| Nigeria | 28 June 2001 | 1 November 1989 | 14 December 2004 |
| Niue | 16 July 2012 | 16 July 2012 | 3 October 2017 |
| Norway | 23 September 2003 | 14 November 1994 | 29 June 2006 |
| Oman | 13 May 2005 | 15 March 1991 | 9 January 2014 |
| Pakistan | 13 January 2010 | 25 October 1991 | 31 August 2007 |
| Palau | 13 May 2019 | 14 August 2019 | 24 March 2009 |
| Panama | 18 August 2004 | 13 January 1994 | 23 September 2005 |
| Papua New Guinea | | | 16 July 2007 |
| Paraguay | 22 September 2004 | 23 August 1990 | 1 June 2005 |
| Peru | 23 January 2002 | 16 January 1992 | 16 November 2004 |
| Philippines | 28 May 2002 | 7 June 1996 | 8 November 2006 |
| Poland | 12 November 2001 | 26 May 1994 | 15 September 2006 |
| Portugal | 10 May 2004 | 3 December 1991 | 28 September 2007 |
| Qatar | 10 March 2008 | 4 May 1990 | 30 January 2007 |
| Romania | 4 December 2002 | 21 January 1993 | 2 November 2004 |
| Russia | 26 May 2004 | 17 December 1990 | 9 May 2006 |
| Rwanda | 26 September 2003 | 13 May 2002 | 4 October 2006 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 21 May 2004 | 19 April 1995 | N/A |
| St. Lucia | 16 July 2013 | 21 August 1995 | 25 November 2011 |

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|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 29 October 2010 | 17 May 1994 | N/A |
| Samoa | 17 December 2014 | 19 August 2005 | 18 April 2018 |
| San Marino | 20 July 2010 | 10 October 2000 | |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 12 April 2006 | 20 June 1996 | 12 April 2006 |
| Saudi Arabia | 18 January 2005 | 9 January 1992 | 29 April 2013 |
| Senegal | 27 September 2003 | 27 November 1989 | 16 November 2005 |
| Serbia | 6 September 2001 | 12 March 2001 | 20 December 2005 |
| Seychelles | 22 April 2003 | 27 February 1992 | 16 March 2006 |
| Sierra Leone | 12 August 2014 | 6 June 1994 | 30 September 2004 |
| Singapore | 28 August 2007 | 23 October 1997 | 6 November 2009 |
| Slovakia | 3 December 2003 | 28 May 1993 | 1 June 2006 |
| Slovenia | 21 May 2004 | 6 July 1992 | 1 April 2008 |
| Solomon Islands | N/A | N/A | 6 January 2012 |
| Somalia | N/A | N/A | 11 August 2021 |
| South Africa | 20 February 2004 | 14 December 1998 | 22 November 2004 |
| South Sudan | N/A | 20 October 2023 | 23 January 2015 |
| Spain | 1 March 2002 | 13 August 1990 | 19 June 2006 |
| Sri Lanka | 22 September 2006 | 6 June 1991 | 31 March 2004 |
| Sudan | 10 December 2004 | 19 November 1993 | 5 September 2014 |
| Suriname | 25 May 2007 | 28 October 1992 | 18 November 2021 |
| Sweden | 30 April 2004 | 22 July 1991 | 25 September 2007 |
| Switzerland | 27 October 2006 | 14 September 2005 | 24 September 2009 |

| | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Syria | 8 April 2009 | 3 September 1991 | N/A |
| Tajikistan | 8 July 2002 | 6 May 1996 | 25 September 2006 |
| Thailand | 17 October 2013 | 3 May 2002 | 1 March 2011 |
| Tanzania | 24 May 2006 | 17 April 1996 | 25 May 2005 |
| Timor-Leste | 9 November 2009 | 3 June 2014 | 27 March 2009 |
| Togo | 2 July 2004 | 1 August 1990 | 6 July 2005 |
| Tonga | 3 October 2014 | 29 April 1996 | 6 February 2020 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 6 November 2007 | 17 February 1995 | 31 May 2006 |
| Tunisia | 19 July 2003 | 20 September 1990 | 23 September 2008 |
| Türkiye | 25 March 2003 | 2 April 1996 | 9 November 2006 |
| Turkmenistan | 28 March 2005 | 21 February 1996 | 28 March 2005 |
| Tuvalu | N/A | N/A | 4 September 2015 |
| UAE | 7 May 2007 | 12 April 1990 | 22 February 2006 |
| Uganda | 9 March 2005 | 20 August 1990 | 9 September 2004 |
| Ukraine | 21 May 2004 | 28 August 1991 | 2 December 2009 |
| United Kingdom | 9 February 2006 | 28 June 1991 | 9 February 2006 |
| United States | 3 November 2005 | 20 February 1990 | 30 October 2006 |
| Uruguay | 4 March 2005 | 10 March 1995 | 10 January 2007 |
| Uzbekistan | 9 December 2003 | 24 August 1995 | 29 July 2008 |
| Vanuatu | 4 January 2006 | 26 January 2006 | 12 July 2011 |
| Venezuela | 13 May 2002 | 16 July 1991 | 2 February 2009 |
| Vietnam | 8 June 2012 | 4 November 1997 | 19 August 2009 |
| Yemen | 8 February 2010 | 25 March 1996 | 7 November 2005 |

| | | | |
|----------|------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Zambia | 24 April 2005 | 28 May 1993 | 7 December 2007 |
| Zimbabwe | 12 December 2007 | 30 July 1993 | 8 March 2007 |

**Not included on this list is the “State of Palestine,” which, according to the United Nations, has purportedly acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption (2014), to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2015), and to the 1988 UN Drug Convention (December 29, 2017). The Government of the United States of America notified the United Nations, in its capacity as depositary for these Conventions, that it does not believe the “State of Palestine” qualifies as a sovereign state and does not recognize it as such. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America believes that the “State of Palestine” is not qualified to accede to the Conventions and does not believe that it is in a treaty relationship with the “State of Palestine” under the Conventions.*

Introduction

Overview

After years of record increases in drug overdose deaths fueled by fentanyl, the United States experienced a significant reduction in such deaths in 2024, following a moderate decline in 2023, although this and other positive news was tempered by a number of troubling trends in global drug control. In December 2024, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimated a striking 17 percent decline in deaths during the 12-month period August 2023 to July 2024, relative to the same period the previous year (from 113,000 to 94,000 deaths). Provisional data from the CDC for calendar year 2023 reflected an estimated 108,000 drug overdose deaths, about a two percent decrease from the approximately 110,000 in 2022.

The reasons for the decline are complex, likely reflecting multiple intersecting factors possibly including a decrease in the overall illicit supply of opioids; a reduction in the potency of those drugs; greater availability of the overdose-reversal medication naloxone; increasingly successful law enforcement efforts; greater public awareness of risks; a trend toward smoking rather than injecting fentanyl; and better access to treatment and other public health interventions.

In another positive development, the People's Republic of China (PRC) took significant steps in 2024 to reduce the export of precursor chemicals used to produce synthetic drugs as part of cooperation through the U.S.-PRC Counternarcotics Working Group launched in 2023, following the resumption in November 2023 of U.S.-PRC cooperation to combat global illicit drug trafficking. These included scheduling 55 synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals, closure of online platforms and companies that supply precursor chemicals, and arrests connected to the illicit chemical industry. In June 2024 the PRC announced the arrest of an individual indicted in the United States for involvement in a money laundering scheme on behalf of the Sinaloa Cartel (Mexico). However, companies in the PRC remain the largest source of precursor chemicals and equipment used to manufacture illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs in Mexico and other countries, and sustained and expanded PRC action on scheduling, law enforcement, and illicit finance is needed to counter the flow of synthetic drugs in 2025 and beyond.

International cooperation is essential to tackling the multiple and overlapping challenges of global drug control, as no one country can do so alone. A series of initiatives, including the

U.S. Call to Action on the World Drug Problem at the United Nations (UN) in 2018, have helped galvanize the international community to share the immense burden, advancing both U.S. objectives and the world's collective ability to reduce the demand for and supply of illicit drugs. A significant recent initiative is the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, an international partnership which the United States launched in mid-2023. In September 2024 the United States hosted a Leaders' Summit at the UN General Assembly to mark the first year of the Global Coalition, which now has 164 participating member states and 15 international organization partners working to disrupt the supply chain for synthetic drugs; detect emerging drug threats; and prevent and treat drug use through effective public health interventions. U.S. leaders highlighted the unprecedented decrease in overdose deaths, U.S. efforts to disrupt synthetic drug supply chains, and their further commitment to increase the availability of life-saving overdose medicine. With the Summit as a motivating force, 15 countries - Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, India, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom - committed to enhance the global response to the synthetic drug threat by leading several new initiatives.

The United States also spurred new global action against the synthetic drug crisis at the High-Level Segment of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in March 2024, which marked the first time a U.S. Secretary of State attended a meeting of the UN's drug policymaking body. Years of U.S. advocacy and engagement with other countries resulted in the CND recognizing synthetic drugs as an urgent international priority, including in the high-level declaration adopted by consensus. Additionally, the CND proactively placed controls for the first time on substances not yet used in the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs but with chemical properties similar to those used for that purpose, a landmark achievement intended to anticipate and counter traffickers' likely next moves. The U.S.-sponsored resolution on overdose prevention led the CND to address the growing number of overdose deaths associated with synthetic drug use and sparked productive exchanges between countries on the challenges related to overdoses and the tools available to respond.

The United States continued its support in 2024 to international resources designed to foster international cooperation, information-sharing, and uptake of good practices. One instance is the UN Toolkit on Synthetic Drugs, a technical resource organized into topical modules with multimedia information and guidance. The Toolkit continued to grow with

hundreds of resources from across the UN system. Available in the six official UN languages, 200,000 worldwide users accessed the over 500 resources from 2021 to 2024 and in 2024 the Toolkit launched a Safe Handling and Disposal module.

The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy outlines a whole of government approach encompassing harm reduction, reducing the demand for drugs, and providing treatment to those with substance use disorders, and the United States took many steps in 2024 to expand access to public health services and remove barriers to treatment. The United States continued to expand over-the-counter access to the life-saving overdose reversal medication naloxone. At the international level, in March, the Colombo Plan launched the U.S.-funded International Consortium for Alternatives to Incarceration, focused on support for the global development of treatment, care, and accountability as alternatives to incarceration. In June 2024 the United States, through the Global Coalition, launched two networks providing improved access to substance use treatment: the Global Women's Network for clinicians providing such treatment to women and children, and the Global Recovery Network for recovery peers and allies.

Despite these positive developments, the international picture on drug control was mixed. One of the most striking trends has been that, while the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) noted cocaine use in the United States has remained relatively steady over the past two decades, the demand for cocaine in Europe has surged, likely even exceeding that in the United States. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain reported the highest volumes of seizures, reflecting their importance as entry points for cocaine trafficked to Europe. This trend has brought a corresponding increase in cross-border criminal activity, with European organized crime groups expanding their footprint in Mexico and South America and vice versa. Albanian-led criminal groups in particular have played a significant and increasingly sophisticated role in supplying international markets with illicit drugs, expanding trafficking routes from Latin America to European Union countries, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and exploiting aspects of the Albanian economy to fuel corruption and financial crime. Albanian law enforcement agencies have coordinated with authorities in Europe, South America, and the United States to help dismantle international organized crime groups responsible for drug trafficking and money laundering, but sustained efforts are needed to counter organized crime groups' influence. In addition to Europe, transnational criminal networks have also expanded cocaine trafficking and consumption to parts of Asia, Africa, and Australia. These developments dramatically underscore the

importance of greater coordination and burden-sharing with the United States' European and other international partners.

Cocaine production and trafficking in the Andean region continued a multi-year expansion trend. In 2023, Colombia experienced record levels of coca cultivation while Peru remained the second largest producer of cocaine after Colombia. Colombia also reported its forces and international partners, relying on Colombian information, seized a record 960 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and cocaine base in 2024, surpassing the then-record 846 MT interdicted in 2023. Ecuador has emerged as not only a key transit point for cocaine from Colombia but also as an increasingly important base for trafficking to both the United States and Europe. Ecuador's record levels of homicides, extortion, kidnapping, and other drug-fueled crimes were top public concerns in 2024. While all three countries remain among the most committed partners of the United States, each should do more to address gaps in drug control, especially by strengthening law enforcement presence in the remote rural areas where criminal groups operate.

The United States once again determined that Venezuela (along with Bolivia and Burma) failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international drug control agreements. The Maduro regime failed to make any meaningful efforts to stem drug production or trafficking and in fact created conditions that allow drug traffickers and other transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to operate with impunity.

TCOs in Mexico continued to pose one of the greatest threats to the United States. The United States determined that Mexico was again the most significant source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States in 2024, with the Sinaloa Cartel and New Generation Jalisco Cartel the primary distributors of those drugs in North America. Mexico is also the source of most methamphetamine and heroin seized in the United States and a transit point for South American cocaine. Disturbing reports of experiments by TCOs to produce fentanyl using new synthesis methods, and to cruelly test it on animals and individuals to determine sufficiently strong or lethal doses, highlight the extreme lengths to which criminal organizations go in producing their deadly products.

The new administration of Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo announced a strong new National Security Strategy in October 2024, which prioritizes better investigations, information and intelligence sharing, coordination among law enforcement

entities, and efforts to reduce impunity and corruption. However, the government's 2025 budget cuts on security may limit its capacity to achieve these objectives. The government announced the largest fentanyl seizure in Mexico's history on December 3, 2024, a significant achievement in combating drug trafficking. In a coordinated effort by several Mexican agencies in the state of Sinaloa, authorities reportedly seized 1,100 kilograms of fentanyl pills – equivalent to more than 20 million doses – as part of a long-term investigation that benefited from U.S. support, including equipment donations, infrastructure enhancements, and specialized training.

2024 saw a continuation of the dramatically shifting cultivation and production patterns across Central, South, and Southeast Asia. UNODC estimates that opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan declined by 95 percent after the Taliban's 2022 poppy ban, although the reduction in global supply was partially offset by an estimated 36 percent increase in production in Burma between 2021 and 2024. Global opium production was down by 74 percent in 2023 (the latest available estimate), according to UNODC. The full effects on neighboring countries were not clear, as government data is unreliable, but a few trends were apparent. Despite the Taliban ban, opium production remained high in Badakhshan province in northern Afghanistan, which shares a long border with Tajikistan. While trafficking through Iran and Pakistan remained the primary route for Afghan origin opiates, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs, Tajikistan remained the primary transit route of drugs bound for Central Asia, Russia, or Europe via the northern (Eurasian) route. Uzbekistan is also a transit country for illicit narcotics from Afghanistan bound for Russia and Europe, with methamphetamine and synthetic drugs originating from Afghanistan a growing concern in 2024.

Burma is now the world's largest opium producer. Advances by ethnic armed organizations and other anti-regime groups resulted in further loss of regime control over portions of the country in 2024, leading to increased lawlessness, including along its border with the PRC. This contributed to increased illicit import of precursor chemicals from the PRC, which fueled the surge in production of synthetic drugs in Burma.

The Middle East continued to be plagued with high production and use of the amphetamine-type stimulant captagon which, with support of elements within the former Assad regime in Syria, became one of the most in-demand illicit drugs in the Middle East in less than six

years with production escalated to an industrial scale. Since the fall of the Assad regime, illicit production still reportedly spans areas formerly controlled by the regime.

While the international community took important steps in 2024 to target drug traffickers, reduce the demand for illicit drugs, address corruption, and strengthen the rule of law, many challenges remain. The Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats in particular renewed momentum on these fronts, and there is reason for optimism given signs of concrete measures taken at the country level and the high number of country commitments to continued steps made within that framework in 2024. The United States will continue to lead efforts to address these shared challenges and to encourage partner nations to take additional concrete actions to share that burden.

Legislative Basis for the INCSR

The Department of State's 2025 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is one of several annual reports on foreign policy and foreign assistance that the United States Congress has mandated and one of the Department's principal public reports on international narcotics control issues. Its two volumes are Volume I, Drugs and Chemical Control, and Volume II, Money Laundering. It also includes reporting requirements established by the Combat Methamphetamine Enforcement Act (CMEA), and the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) for Fiscal Years 2022 and 2023, as described below. This report, released in March 2025, covers calendar year 2024.

A number of statutory provisions provide reporting requirements for the INCSR. The broad requirements are set forth in section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2291) which requires, among other things, reporting on countries designated by the President as major illicit drug producing or drug transit countries (the "Majors List") and those that have received foreign assistance under section 489. Sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of the FAA and section 804 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, set forth additional matters to be addressed in the report on a range of narcotics control issues.

The Majors List: The INCSR serves as one of the factual bases for the designations in the President's annual report to Congress of the major drug transit or major illicit drug-producing countries. This requirement of a "Majors List" was initially included in section 591 of the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs

Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). It was made permanent by section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228). That section requires that the President submit an annual report no later than September 15 of each year that identifies each country determined by the President to be a major drug transit country or major illicit drug-producing country.

The Majors List must identify any country on the list that has "failed demonstrably . . . to make substantial efforts" during the previous 12 months to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements and to take certain counternarcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. U.S. assistance under the current foreign operations appropriations act may not be provided to any country designated as having "failed demonstrably" unless the President determines that the provision of such assistance is vital to U.S. national interests or that the country, at any time after the President's initial report to Congress, has made "substantial efforts" to comply with the counternarcotics conditions in the legislation. This prohibition does not affect humanitarian, counternarcotics, and certain other types of assistance that are authorized to be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law.

Precursor Chemicals: Congress expanded the requirements of the INCSR in 2007 to include reporting on the five countries that export the largest amounts of methamphetamine precursor chemicals and the five countries importing the largest amounts of these chemicals. This requirement was set forth in the Combat Methamphetamine Enforcement Act (CMEA) (the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act 2005, Title VII, P.L. 109-177), amending sections 489 and 490 of the FAA (22 USC 2291h and 2291), sec. 722. This reporting includes efforts to control methamphetamine precursor chemicals and estimates of legitimate demand for them, prepared by most parties to the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN Drug Convention) and submitted to the International Narcotics Control Board. The CMEA requires a Presidential determination by March 1 of each year on whether the five countries that legally exported and the five countries that legally imported the largest amount of precursor chemicals (under FAA sec. 490) have cooperated with the United States to prevent these substances from being used to produce methamphetamine or have taken adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention. This determination may be exercised by the Secretary of State pursuant to Executive Order 12163 and by the Deputy Secretary of State pursuant to State Department Delegation of Authority 245-2.

FAA and 1988 UN Drug Convention: The FAA requires a report on the extent to which each country or entity that received assistance under chapter 8 of Part I of the FAA in the past two fiscal years has "met the goals and objectives of the [1988 UN Drug Convention]." Although this Convention does not list specific goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations that the parties agree to undertake. Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering; to control chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs; and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends. The relevant statute (FAA sec. 489) specifies actions by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to evaluating performance under the 1988 UN Drug Convention: illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

In attempting to evaluate whether countries and certain entities are meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Department has used the best information it has available. The 2023 INCSR covers countries that range from major drug producing and drug-transit countries, where drug control is a critical element of national policy, to small countries or governments where drug-related issues or the capacity to deal with them are minimal. As a result, the reports vary in the extent of their coverage. Comprehensive reports are provided for significant drug-control countries for which considerable information is available. Where only limited information is available for countries or governments, reports may be less comprehensive. The Department invites and frequently receives submission of relevant information from the governments of foreign jurisdictions themselves, for potential inclusion after evaluation and analysis by the Department.

The country chapters report upon actions taken – including plans, programs, and, where applicable, timetables – toward fulfillment of 1988 UN Drug Convention obligations. Reports often include discussion of foreign legal and regulatory structures. However, while the Department strives to provide accurate information, this report should not be used as the basis for determining legal rights or obligations under U.S. or foreign law.

Some jurisdictions are not yet parties to the 1988 UN Drug Convention; some do not have status in the United Nations and cannot become parties. The Department has nonetheless considered actions taken by these jurisdictions in areas covered by the Convention as well

as plans (if any) for becoming parties and for aligning their legislation with the Convention's requirements. Other countries have taken reservations, declarations, or understandings to the Convention or other relevant treaties; these are generally not detailed in this report. For some of the smallest countries or entities that have not been designated by the President as major illicit drug producing or major drug-transit countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are being met.

Unless otherwise noted in the relevant country chapters, the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) considers all countries and other entities with which the United States has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those agreements. Information concerning counternarcotics assistance is provided, pursuant to section 489(b) of the FAA, in the section entitled "U.S. Government Assistance."

Fentanyl and Law Enforcement Units (New in 2023):

The President signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law 117-81, into law on December 27, 2021, with additional reporting requirements for the INCSR. Section 5102 provides for a "separate section that contains an identification of all United States Government-supported units funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and any Bureau-funded operations by such units in which United States law enforcement personnel have been physically present."

Section 6610 requires the INCSR to identify, to the extent feasible, the countries that are the most significant sources of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year. This reporting must include (in summary), whether each of these countries cooperated with the United States to prevent export of fentanyl and its analogues to the United States; has and uses scheduling or other procedures for illicit drugs similar to the procedures under U.S. law set forth in 21 U.S.C. 811 et seq.; is taking steps to prosecute individuals involved in the illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substance analogues as defined under specified U.S. law; and requires registration of tableting and encapsulating machines or other measures similar in effect to those set forth in specified U.S. regulations and has not made good faith efforts to improve regulation of such machines.

Fentanyl Results Act (New in 2024):

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023, Public Law 117-263, was signed into law on December 6, 2022; sections 5551 – 5558 comprise the Fentanyl Results Act. Section 5555 provides for additional reporting in the INCSR on synthetic drugs and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). It requires (in summary) reporting on countries significantly involved in the manufacture, production, transshipment, or trafficking of synthetic drugs, as defined in the Act, to include (to the extent possible to determine) the scale of production, law enforcement assessment of lab capacity, methods of synthesis, and country's policies to regulate licit manufacture and interdict illicit manufacture. It further requires, with respect to governments' responses to NPS, to report to the extent practicable on governments which have articulated policies on scheduling NPS and the impacts of those policies.

Xylazine (new in 2025):

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025, Public Law 118-159 (the Act), was signed into law on December 23, 2024. Section 7808 of the Act added xylazine to the list of substances identified in 22 U.S.C. section 2291h(a)(11), which now requires the INCSR to identify the countries, to the extent feasible, that are the most significant sources of xylazine significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year (amending 22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)(11), summarized above, by adding to the existing requirement to identify countries that are significant sources of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year).

Due to the timing of NDAA Section 7808's enactment in December 2024, it was not possible to include reporting pursuant to this requirement in the 2025 INCSR delivered to Congress on March 1, 2025. The Department of State will include this information in the 2026 INCSR.

Demand Reduction

Policy and programmatic efforts to promote drug demand reduction (DDR), which focuses on drug use prevention, treatment, and recovery support services, are critical tools for addressing the interconnected threats of drugs, crime, and violence. Access to effective prevention, treatment, and recovery programs reduces global demand for illicit drugs,

disrupts markets that facilitate the proliferation of transnational organized crime, and reduces associated instability and violence. Additionally, DDR programming assists drug supply reduction efforts by supporting countries' efforts to collect, analyze, and share consumption data, which in turn inform policy and programs. Effective demand reduction efforts promote a comprehensive, balanced approach to counternarcotics efforts. The Department of State, through the INL Bureau, works closely with international partners to develop and implement technical assistance such as training and technical resources for service providers in drug prevention, treatment, and recovery support professions.

Substance use disorder is a major public health and safety threat. The global drug trade threatens country stability, yet drug use is a preventable and treatable disease. Many countries are requesting U.S.-supported technical assistance to improve and develop effective policies aimed at reducing drug use and its consequences. The INL drug demand reduction program has three strategic components: (1) promote the adoption of recovery-oriented and evidence-based drug policies and internationally recognized standards, (2) support drug data collection and analysis to accurately support and inform drug policy and to assure the quality of drug treatment services, and (3) implement programs that effectively prevent and reduce drug use disorders and crime. To achieve these objectives, INL supports the following:

- Develop professional networks of drug prevention, treatment and recovery experts, educators, and practitioners by providing training, mentoring, and credentialing based on evidence-based practices;
- Development of drug-free community coalitions internationally, involving law enforcement and public/private social institutions, aimed at preventing drug use and its consequences;
- Research, development, and outcome-based evaluation efforts to determine and improve the effectiveness of drug prevention and treatment programs and systems.

Significant completed and ongoing INL-funded demand reduction projects for 2024 included:

Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats: As a part of the Global Coalition launched in July 2023 three sub-working groups that addressed drug demand reduction

issues: 3.1 Preventing Drug Use, Strengthen and expand evidence-based prevention activities; 3.2 Engaging People with Substance Use and Substance Use Disorders; and 3.3 Addressing Populations in Contact with the Criminal Justice System, including Alternatives to Incarceration that focuses on access to drug treatment and social support services. - The public health working groups agreed on 48 recommendations and supported over 50 initiatives. In addition, Coalition members launched a Global Women's Network (GWN), the Global Recovery Network (GRN), and the International Consortium for Alternatives to Incarceration (ICATI) focused on access to drug treatment over incarceration. Specific Coalition lines of effort for the second year include expanding prevention programs, workforce training and legislative support for alternatives to incarceration options.

Universal Curriculum Training and Credentialing: Through international organizations such as the Colombo Plan (CP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Organization of American States (OAS), in 2024 INL trainings helped prevent the initiation of drug use, improve treatment outcomes, and lowered relapse rates, thus generating greater confidence in drug demand reduction and treatment systems. With the promotion of online self-led training, the access to professional level training in drug demand reduction is global.

Universal Treatment Curriculum (UTC): INL's treatment curriculum, based on the International Standards for the Treatment of Drug Use Disorders developed by UNODC and the World Health Organization, consists of eight basic and 14 advanced courses that provide knowledge and skills development for treatment professionals. As of December 2024, 10 UTC self-led online courses are available globally in English and eight in Spanish on the ISSUP website. The last course in the basic series on screening and assessment remains to be converted to an online format to be posted in English by the end of 2024. An online instructor-led version of the Women's Interventions for Substance Exposure (WISE) courses is also available for use by Colombo Plan approved trainers. The self-led online UTC will vastly increase access to training and the subsequent use of best practices for treating those with substance use disorders. To further the improvement in treatment, INL established the International Consortium on Quality Assurance in Substance Use Treatment and has provided technical assistance to several countries that wish to improve their treatment centers. As a result of the UTC trainings and credentialing program, at the end of 2023, there were 2208 credentialed professionals worldwide, a total of **179** tests were administered by Colombo Plan's Global Centre for Credentialing and Certification in 2023.

Universal Prevention Curriculum (UPC): INL’s UPC offers innovative evidence-based approaches to substance use prevention in a variety of settings such as family, school, workplace, media, and the community. To greatly expand training opportunities for substance use prevention professionals around the world, the online adaptation of nine UPC courses for Managers and Supervisors and the introductory course for Implementers were completed in Spanish and English in 2022. Online trainer-led versions of three of the Practitioners series of courses that focus on Prevention in School, Family, and Monitoring and Evaluation programs were completed in Spanish and piloted in 2024. The English versions will be completed in 2025. In 2025, prevention training will be adjusted to align with the evaluation of the school-based prevention programs that INL completed.

Alternatives to Incarceration: Alternatives to incarceration (ATI), conviction, or punishment – including an emphasis on gaining access to drug treatment and care – can occur before an arrest, at an initial court hearing, within the jail, at re-entry, and through community corrections such as probation. With INL support, in 2024 UNODC continued to work with policymakers in Kenya and Nigeria to pilot alternative to incarceration programs. INL through the Colombo Plan and CICAD Organization of American States supported policymakers in Peru to develop action plans for ATI for the adult population. One of the successes of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats was the launch of the International Consortium of Alternatives to Incarceration (ICATI) on the margins of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs with 78 countries and 478 participants in March 2024. ICATI is now working with over 15 countries to learn about developing ATI systems.

The International Consortium of Universities for Drug Demand Reduction (ICUDDR): INL continued its support for the ICUDDR, a network of universities working together to promote academic programs in addiction studies, to further the dissemination of evidence-based practices, and to develop the drug demand reduction workforce. In 2024, ICUDDR membership grew to 459 universities in 86 countries. Beginning with the new grant in 2025, ICUDDR will manage the 12 International Technology Transfer Centers.

The International Society of Substance Use Professionals (ISSUP): INL continued to support ISSUP, a global professional society for those who work in substance use prevention, treatment, and recovery services. In 2024, ISSUP passed the benchmark of over 41,000 members worldwide with over 40 national chapters. ISSUP supports professionals to provide training and share knowledge of evidence-based treatment

practices through webinars, online training events, and a web forum. All INL online training, recordings from webinars and the 2024 global training workshop in Thessaloniki, Greece are available online at [ISSUP.net](https://www.issup.net).

Drug-Free Communities: INL assists civil society and grassroots organizations to form and sustain effective local-level anti-drug coalitions aimed at preventing substance use disorders in their communities, currently in cooperation with the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA). As of March 2024, INL support has resulted in the establishment of 382 active coalitions consisting of over 12,200 volunteers in 29 countries around the world, some of which have continued to operate following the conclusion of INL funding.

Drug Demand Reduction Evaluation: Building on previous outcome evaluations of individual demand reduction programs, INL launched in May 2022 a comprehensive evaluation of the collective impact of INL's drug use prevention, treatment, and recovery support programming on drug consumption and drug related-crime trends for a city-wide population. This evaluation, the most comprehensive study of demand reduction interventions to date, will be implemented through 2027 in partnership with the Government of Colombia, municipal stakeholders, international organizations, and experts in the cities of Pereira and Dosquebradas.

Major Illicit Drug Producing, Drug-Transit, Significant Source, and Precursor Chemical Countries

Section 489(a)(3) of the FAA requires the INCSR to identify:

- (A) major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries;
- (B) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; or
- (C) major money laundering countries.

Major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries, and major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics, are identified below. Major money laundering countries are identified in Volume II of the INCSR.

Major Illicit Drug Producing and Major Drug-Transit Countries

A major illicit drug producing country is one in which:

- (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
- (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
- (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States. [FAA § 481(e)(2)]

A major drug-transit country is one:

- (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or
- (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances. [FAA § 481(e)(5)]

The following major illicit drug producing and/or drug-transit countries were identified and notified to Congress by the President on September 15, 2024, consistent with section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228):

Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, the People's Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

Of these 23 countries, **Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela** were designated by the President as having “failed demonstrably” during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. The President determined, however, in accordance with provisions of Section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that continued support for bilateral programs in both countries, including for democracy assistance, is vital to the national interests of the United States.

Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries

The following countries and jurisdictions have been identified to be major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:

- Afghanistan
- Belgium
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Burma
- Canada
- People's Republic of China
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Germany
- Guatemala
- Honduras
- Hong Kong
- India
- Republic of Korea
- Mexico
- Netherlands
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Peru
- Poland
- South Africa
- Taiwan
- Thailand
- the United Arab Emirates
- the United Kingdom
- Venezuela

Information is provided pursuant to section 489 of the FAA in the section entitled "Chemical Controls."

Presidential Determination

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 15, 2024

Presidential Determination No. 2024-12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2025

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries (including countries that are a significant direct source of precursor chemicals used in the production of certain drugs and substances significantly affecting the United States): Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country's presence on the foregoing list is not necessarily a reflection of its government's counterdrug efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. The list is not a sanction or penalty. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or major illicit drug producing country set forth in sections 481(e)(2) and 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (Public Law 87-195) (FAA), the reason countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs or precursor chemicals to be transited or produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control and law enforcement measures. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) amended the definition of major drug source countries to include source countries of precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs significantly affecting the United States.

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as having failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to both adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the measures required by section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Included with this determination are justifications for the designations of Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA. I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that United States programs that support Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.

Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicate there were an estimated 107,543 drug overdose deaths in the United States during 2023 — a decrease of 3 percent from the 111,029 deaths estimated in 2022. This is the first annual decrease in drug overdose deaths since 2018 and a sign that my Administration's historic investments are having an impact. Federally funded State Opioid Response grant programs have contributed to the prevention of over 600,000 potentially fatal overdoses and delivered nearly 10 million naloxone kits since 2020. Naloxone is available over-the-counter for the first time, thanks to actions taken by the Food and Drug Administration. Our workforce of addiction professionals continues to grow, providing the essential prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and recovery support services the American people need.

We are also taking unprecedented action to disrupt the supply of fentanyl, other deadly drugs, and precursor chemicals. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has stopped more fentanyl at ports of entry over the last 2 years than in the previous 5 years combined, keeping tens of millions of fentanyl-laced pills and thousands of pounds of fentanyl powder away from our communities. In 2023 alone, CBP seized approximately 1.2 billion doses of fentanyl. In just the last 5 months, over 442 million potentially lethal doses of fentanyl were seized at United States borders. In 2021, I signed an Executive Order targeting foreign persons engaged in the global illicit drug trade and have since sanctioned more than 300 persons and entities under this authority, thus cutting them off from the United States' financial system. The Department of Justice has successfully arrested and prosecuted high-level drug cartel leaders, drug traffickers, and money launderers — placing dangerous traffickers behind bars.

While we expand our efforts at home, we also recognize this problem as a global one that requires a coordinated international response.

For this reason, my Administration launched a Global Coalition in July 2023 uniting more than 150 countries from every region of the world to address synthetic drug threats. Participation in this group has tripled in the past 12 months — evidence that every continent is experiencing an alarming increase in the manufacturing, trafficking, and consumption of dangerous illicit synthetic drugs. I have also engaged with leaders across the world to spur additional global action in the fight against synthetic opioids, negotiated the resumption of bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with the PRC, and established a Trilateral Fentanyl Committee with the Governments of Mexico and Canada.

While the challenges we face are more significant than ever, increased global awareness has yielded enhanced international action. In March, the United Nations (UN) Commission on Narcotic Drugs adopted a United States-sponsored resolution on preventing and responding to overdoses to drive international data collection and information sharing on this issue that remains deeply personal to the American people. The Commission also voted to place international controls on chemicals used to manufacture illicit fentanyl, methamphetamine, and MDMA, making it harder for trafficking networks to use these substances to create and distribute these dangerous synthetic drugs.

Fostering robust, long-term partnerships with crucial allies such as Mexico is imperative for effectively combating the fentanyl epidemic and dismantling the sophisticated criminal organizations that exploit it for financial gain. The U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities is the foundation for our bilateral efforts to protect our people, prevent trans-border crime, and pursue criminal networks. Through trilateral mechanisms such as the North American Drug Dialogue and the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee, the United States, Mexico, and Canada have strengthened cooperation to address illicit drug production, advance public health, increase collaboration on the control of precursor chemicals, and engage with the private sector to combat the production of illicit synthetic drugs. Our security cooperation has led to significant interdiction efforts in Mexico. For example, United States-donated canines supported the seizure of more than 3 million fentanyl pills in Mexico in 2023 alone. We will continue our close partnership with Mexico to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals and drug-related equipment; improve interdiction, investigations, and criminal justice outcomes; disrupt illicit finance; advance border integration; and build public trust in security and justice institutions.

In South America, coca cultivation and cocaine production have reached record highs, necessitating urgent action by countries in the region. Colombia, a strong partner, continues to work closely with the United States to reduce cocaine production, conduct drug smuggling interdiction operations, and dismantle the criminal organizations involved in cocaine trafficking. United States assistance has led to increased interdictions, with the Colombian National Police seizing more than 841 metric tons of pure cocaine and cocaine base in 2023 — a 10 percent increase from the previous year. The new metrics for measuring progress agreed upon during the U.S.-Colombia High Level Dialogue in May 2024 demonstrate our renewed bilateral commitment to a holistic approach to address the production and trafficking of cocaine, while providing security, justice, and licit economic opportunities for Colombia's vulnerable rural populations. We are also collaborating to combat crimes that wreak havoc on Colombia's environment and provide significant funding to criminal organizations, including those involved in cocaine production and illegal mining. The United States welcomed the release of Colombia's 10-year drug strategy in 2023 and now urges the Colombian government to resource it adequately and expedite its implementation.

Peru also remains a committed partner in reducing the production and trafficking of cocaine, and our first High Level Dialogue in May 2024 marked a positive step in our bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.

While the Government of Bolivia has taken positive steps to address coca cultivation, it must do more to safeguard the country's licit coca markets from criminal exploitation, reduce illicit coca cultivation that continues to exceed legal limits under Bolivia's domestic laws for medical and traditional use, improve efforts to locate and interdict chemicals diverted through black market channels for processing cocaine, and expand cooperation with international partners to disrupt transnational criminal networks.

Opium poppy cultivation for the production of illicit opioids and methamphetamine in Afghanistan continues to require global attention and action. This past year has seen continued steps from Afghanistan to strengthen drug control and curb the production of illicit opioids and methamphetamine, including through the maintenance of an existing ban on poppy cultivation and efforts to reform drug policies. However, I will reconsider Afghanistan's status in each annual review to assess whether it is upholding its international drug control commitments.

The PRC has worked with the United States to coordinate efforts to counter the global manufacturing and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, including fentanyl, since the Woodside Summit between President Biden and President Xi in November 2023. Over the last year, the PRC took significant steps to reduce the flows of precursor chemicals to illicit drug producers known to be trafficking synthetic drugs, such as illicit fentanyl, into the United States. These steps included the PRC issuing a public notice to the PRC chemical industry warning against illicit trade in precursor chemicals and pill press equipment; taking public law enforcement actions against illicit precursor chemical suppliers; removing web-based advertisements; and scheduling 46 synthetic drugs effective July 1, 2024, some of which had been controlled internationally by the UN. The United States and the PRC also launched the U.S.–PRC Counternarcotics Working Group, a valuable mechanism for sharing law enforcement information, tackling the illicit financing of illicit drugs, and ensuring ongoing coordination on shared challenges. That said, sustained enforcement and regulatory action will be necessary to significantly reduce the PRC’s role as a source of precursor chemicals used in the production, sale, and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs significantly impacting the United States.

You are authorized and directed to submit this designation, with the Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela memoranda of justification, under section 706 of the FRAA, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

/S/

Joseph R. Biden

U.S. Government Assistance

U.S. DEPARTMENT *of* STATE

**Table 2: U.S. Department of State FY 2024-2025 Budget;
Counternarcotics Program Area**

\$ in thousands for all items

| Location | FY 2024 Request | FY 2025 Request |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Africa Total | 1,100 | 1,100 |
| Liberia | 850 | 850 |
| Nigeria | 250 | 250 |
| East Asia and Pacific Total | 2,554 | 3,880 |
| Indonesia | 624 | 950 |
| Laos | 500 | 500 |
| Philippines | 430 | 930 |
| Vietnam | 1,000 | 1,500 |
| State NEA Regional | 0 | 2,000 |
| South and Central Asia Total | 9,517 | 9,217 |
| Afghanistan | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Kazakhstan | 367 | 367 |
| Pakistan | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Tajikistan | 1,000 | 700 |
| Uzbekistan | 200 | 200 |
| Central Asia Regional | 1,950 | 1,950 |
| Western Hemisphere Total | 175,125 | 144,200 |
| Colombia | 73,900 | 61,200 |
| Mexico | 9,000 | 14,000 |

| | | |
|--|----------------|----------------|
| Peru | 38,700 | 34,400 |
| State Central America Regional | 47,075 | 22,800 |
| of which, CARSI | 47,075 | 22,800 |
| State Western Hemisphere Regional | 6,450 | 11,800 |
| of which, CBSI | 6,450 | 6,800 |
| of which, other | 0 | 5,000 |
| INL - International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Total | 155,073 | 187,653 |
| INL - Demand Reduction | 15,000 | 29,830 |
| INL - Drug Supply Reduction | 20,000 | 55,000 |
| INL - Global Crime and Drugs Policy | 3,095 | 3,095 |
| INL - Inter-regional Aviation Support | 60,400 | 39,900 |
| INL - Program Development and Support | 56,578 | 59,828 |

International Training

Bilateral and Regional Training as Component of Broader Foreign Assistance

The counternarcotics assistance programs supported by the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) typically include, among other components, capacity-building aimed at improving the skills of host country law enforcement personnel, such as training on counterdrug matters. These efforts build counterdrug capacity, strengthen the administration of justice, and enhance cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials on addressing illicit drug production and trafficking.

By integrating capacity building, including training, into INL's assistance programs – rather than focusing on the provision of equipment or infrastructure - INL aims to sustain long-term organizational change. Building the capacity of U.S. partners is an evolving challenge as drug traffickers develop more sophisticated means to evade detection and especially as

synthetic drugs, a significant driver of overdose deaths, have become prominent in the illicit drug trade. INL's overarching goal is to help U.S. partners develop law enforcement institutions that are able to effectively confront new threats with minimal or no U.S. assistance, thus be better equipped to confront new threats, disrupt criminal networks, and seize illicit drugs before they reach the United States. To advance this goal, INL supports training that aligns with the priorities, legal frameworks, and criminal justice systems of partner governments; targets performance gaps; and is accompanied by related non-training efforts such as relevant policies and procedures, necessary equipment, and leadership support. INL codified these and other recommended training practices in 2021 in its Guiding Principles for Training, a set of seven standards with accompanying checklists and a distance-learning training module for INL personnel and partners overseeing foreign assistance training.

The United States engages with its allies to understand their goals and programs with the intention of creating mutually reinforcing programs that do not duplicate or inadvertently contradict one another. U.S.-supported training can take a number of forms, including as part of a bilateral assistance program in a partner country, or as training that convenes international participants from multiple countries, like that provided through the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs). INL engages with implementing partners to carry out the bureau's training and other programs that are the best fit for the specific need. Some programs are implemented by U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations, including the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard, while others involve collaboration with international organizations, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Others draw trainers from host country partners that have themselves been the recipient of U.S.-funded programs, to train other law enforcement forces in their region.

Colombia – USCAP Program

The latter model is one of the most promising for several reasons: trainers are already conversant with the regional culture and language; they likely have experienced common region-specific challenges in addressing illicit drugs; and both trainers and trained staff gain valuable regional contacts that bolster regional and transnational anti-crime cooperation. Further, teaching others not only instills a sense of leadership and pride in the trainers, but

also fosters better thematic understanding and problem-solving skills, thus building capacity on both sides. A successful example of this model is the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation (USCAP). The program was created in 2013 to address and combat the detrimental regional effects of narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime by drawing on Colombia's growing expertise in countering these threats. Through USCAP, the Colombian National Police and Colombian Navy have supported 3,089 capacity building activities as of July 2024 and trained more than 50,000 law enforcement and security officials from 14 countries – 10,000 in the last year.

Other Regional Training

INL has also found success in offering training programming on a regional basis in response to the growing synthetic drug threat. For example, Guatemala hosted a regional INL-funded fentanyl detection training for K9 handlers August 5-September 6, 2024, with handlers from Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras.

Other examples include the INL-funded project "Improving Forensic Capacities in Uzbekistan – Phase III," for which UNODC organized a 5-day training course on "Identification of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (including new psychoactive substances and synthetic drugs) in seized materials" from December 9-13, 2024 in Vienna, Austria. Five Uzbek forensic experts participated in the training which covered the entire forensic workflow from sample reception to the issuance of certificates. The course enhanced participants' laboratory skills, including sample preparation, data analysis, and quality management principles, equipping them with the knowledge for effective narcotic and psychotropic substance identification.

UNODC also led trainings December 9-14, 2024 for over 50 Uzbek law enforcement personnel on investigating synthetic drugs and detecting clandestine laboratories. Experts provided an overview of synthetic drug trends in Central Asia and detailed instruction on synthetic drug production, detection of synthetic labs, and precursor chemical investigations. The training was a direct response to rising synthetic drug interdiction rates in Uzbekistan, as well as to an increase in the quantity of synthetic drug labs identified in 2024.

In September and October, 2024, INL and DEA hosted the first-ever U.S.-led synthetics drug-related training in Morocco for participants from the General Directorate of National

Security and the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie. DEA officials trained participants on synthetic drug identification, analysis, and the basics of clandestine laboratory investigations. As a key transit point between Europe and Africa, Moroccan security forces are increasing efforts to address synthetic drugs transiting Moroccan airports and seaports. This training represented a key step in INL's efforts for regional synthetics training.

International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)

The INL-funded International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) are regional training centers at which U.S. law enforcement experts train criminal justice sector officials from partner nations around the world. ILEA's core mission is countering transnational organized crime (TOC). To achieve this mission, ILEA focuses on establishing relationships between the U.S. and partner nation law enforcement and criminal justice institutions that lead to operational cooperation, strengthening cooperation among partner countries to counter crime, and delivering high-quality training. Courses are designed for mid- to senior-level managers, and topics cover both general law enforcement issues and specialized topics in combatting TOC, including counternarcotics, anticorruption, cybercrime, financial crime, and border control matters. INL sponsors, funds, and administers the program in partnership with host governments and 16 federal law enforcement partners.

The ILEAs help build the capacity of the United States' foreign criminal justice partners to effectively confront transnational criminal threats before they impact the United States and connect these partners to one another and to U.S. law enforcement to address shared threats. The Department of State works with the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Interior, Energy, Commerce, and Treasury, as well as with state and local partners and foreign government counterparts.

Since its inception in 1995, the ILEA program has grown to six facilities in Botswana (opened in 2001), El Salvador (2005), Ghana (2012), Hungary (1995), Thailand (1998), and the United States (New Mexico - 2001). It has provided training to more than 77,000 students from 160 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The ILEA program hosts approximately 180 courses per year and delivers a combination of in-person and virtual trainings. Training at the five overseas academies includes leadership and specialized skill development and tactics in law enforcement areas to combat TOC, trafficking in persons, and cybercrime. The ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico provides

symposiums for senior and executive level personnel to develop leadership skills and address critical policy areas.

The ILEA trainings have resulted in an extensive network of alumni who exchange information with their regional and U.S. counterparts in order to collaborate in combating TOC. Many ILEA graduates have become leaders and decisionmakers in their respective law enforcement organizations. Following participation in ILEA courses, participants become a part of the ILEA Global Network and have access to the global ILEA Alumni Portal, which provides a platform for practitioners to identify and discuss emerging trends and issues of mutual interest. The portal connects users with one another and with U.S. law enforcement instructors through blogs, networking events, resources, and discussion boards. ILEA Alumni are also invited to participate in ILEA alumni events, which help connect past participants to the broader law enforcement community in their country and region. Alumni events include networking opportunities and targeted follow-on training and collaboration with U.S. law enforcement agencies. For example, in October 2024 ILEA San Salvador hosted a symposium for ILEA alumni and regional leaders on combatting the spread of fentanyl.

In 2024 the ILEA program trained over 6,200 law enforcement partners from 129 countries on issues directly supporting key priorities of combatting TOC, including counternarcotics, financial crime, cybercrime, human trafficking/smuggling, and corruption. In 2023/2024, ILEA alumni reported seizures of over \$2 billion in illicit goods over approximately the last five years as a direct result of the knowledge and skills they acquired during their ILEA training.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

Background

The Drug Enforcement Administration's mission is to save American lives by defeating the drug cartels responsible for flooding the United States with illicit drugs, including fentanyl and methamphetamine. Since 2021, DEA has strategically aligned resources to singularly focus on this mission. The global criminal networks that are harming Americans have shifted their operations; today, they harness technology, cryptocurrency, and the tools of globalization to create a supply chain that is faster and deadlier than it has ever been. In

this new world of synthetic drugs, fentanyl is the deadliest drug threat we have faced as a country and can be made much faster, cheaper, and easier than plant-based drugs.

As the lead law enforcement agency for the U.S. government's counternarcotics efforts, DEA works to defeat the most significant drug trafficking networks affecting the United States by strategically targeting their entire network and supply chain.

DEA employs approximately 9,000 personnel throughout the world including Special Agents, Diversion Investigators, Intelligence Research Specialists, Forensic Chemists, and Administrative Support Specialists across 241 domestic offices and 91 foreign offices in 68 countries. DEA uses data-driven policing to ensure the safety, security, and well-being of the American people.

DEA's Operations Division

In order to defeat the most significant criminal drug networks affecting the United States, DEA has transformed how data and technology are used in investigations by establishing interagency Counter Threat Teams and the Trident Directorate.

Counter Threat Teams

In 2022, DEA built Counter Threat Teams (CTTs), whose mission is to combine DEA information with external data and employ innovative analytic techniques to map and strategically target DEA's top priority threat networks. By proactively mapping these networks and identifying their key vulnerabilities, the CTTs have established a common operating picture and deliver network targeting packages used to drive effective action against the cartels and their entire global supply chain.

The CTTs are three cross-functional units, each with a specific target set: the Sinaloa Cartel; the Jalisco New Generation Cartel; and Illicit Finance. These multi agency teams are led by senior DEA Special Agents and consist of Special Agents, Intelligence Research Specialists, Diversion Investigators, Technology Specialists, Program Analysts, contracted Targeting Subject Matter Experts, contracted Data Scientists, and contracted financial experts. Joint partners include Department of Defense, Internal Revenue Service, United States Marshals Service, and Customs and Border Protection.

Trident Directorate

In January 2024, DEA launched Trident, a unified tactical center that operationalizes the counternarcotics resources, authorities, and capabilities of U.S. law enforcement, the Intelligence Community (IC), and the Department of Defense for synchronized action against the cartels and their supply chain.

Trident currently consists of two DEA-led joint operational task forces - Trident North (New York) and Trident South (El Paso) - staffed with personnel from U.S. law enforcement, military, and the IC. These individuals work side by side to bring all the tools of the United States government, including classified intelligence, to bear on critical cartel nodes and networks. Trident uses every available tool to disrupt, degrade, and defeat the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels, and other international criminal drug trafficking networks that threaten the United States.

DEA's Foreign Presence

As most illicit drugs originate from outside the United States, approximately 10 percent of DEA's Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists are assigned to foreign countries. DEA's foreign presence supports proactive investigations where drugs are produced and warehoused before being transported to the United States. DEA's foreign offices work with domestic offices and prosecutors, and host nation counterparts, to identify, target, and prosecute the most significant drug trafficking networks that affect the United States.

DEA's foreign offices are tasked with the following principal objectives:

- Support DEA domestic offices by conducting bilateral and multilateral investigations with host country law enforcement partners into drug trafficking networks and their supply chain that affect the United States
- Identify emerging drug threats, methods of production, and drug transportation routes and produce written reports for the DEA and United States interagency
- Develop and expand strategic partnerships with host nations to increase their capacity and capabilities in drug law enforcement
- Facilitate and encourage information sharing with foreign counterparts

- Coordinate and provide training programs for foreign law enforcement agencies and prosecutors

DEA's Partnership with the Department of State

The DEA has 14 Sensitive Investigative Units (SIU) and seven Vetted Units (VU) throughout the world. These units receive funding from the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and train, equip, and build the capacity of host country counternarcotic components. SIU and VU foreign counterparts undergo rigorous background checks, polygraph examinations, and thorough vetting. These units work closely with DEA to target, dismantle, and prosecute transnational criminal organizations.

During Fiscal Year 2024, INL provided funding for 17 Interagency Agreements (IAAs) to build capacity, train, and equip DEA's host nation counterparts. DEA works side by side with foreign counterparts to develop and deliver relevant training, promote intelligence sharing, conduct bilateral investigations, and support joint counterdrug operations.

DEA partnered with INL to establish support to a newly established Vetted Unit for Trinidad and Tobago in FY 24. Additional newly supported programs funded by INL during FY24 included training and mentorship support to the West Africa Corridor (Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia); training support for Ukraine; training, support, and equipment for Algeria, and training support for Guyana. DEA also continues to work with INL Mexico City on a new Train the Trainer Synthetic Drugs Training and Protection Initiative.

DEA's Diversion Control Division

DEA's Diversion Control (DC) Division's mission is to prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals from legitimate channels, while ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply to meet legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs.

DC regulates over 2.1 million DEA registrants, such as physicians. DC is involved in drug scheduling and oversees compliance with international treaty obligations, drafts and promulgates regulations, liaises with industry, conducts drug trend analysis to forecast potential new diversion drug trends, and oversees the importation and exportation of controlled substances and listed chemicals.

DEA's International Training

DEA's International Training Office (TRI) has conducted international counternarcotics training, mentoring, and capacity building for almost 50 years. DEA trainers consult with international law enforcement agencies and foreign governments to develop high-quality narcotics law enforcement programs, organizational infrastructures, and judicial reforms.

TRI offers domestic, in-country, and regional training programs conducted by four dedicated mobile training teams. The major objectives of DEA's international training programs are to enhance foreign law enforcement capabilities, develop self-sufficient narcotics investigation training programs, and foster cooperation and communication between foreign and domestic law enforcement personnel in international drug trafficking operations. TRI conducts training across the globe throughout the year, with 90 percent funded by INL. During FY24, TRI conducted 85 training events funded by INL, which included training held at INL's ILEA Training Academies, located in Ghana, Hungary, Thailand, Botswana, and El Salvador.

International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC)

IDEC was established in 1983 as an important global forum for high-ranking drug law enforcement leaders and prosecutors working together to develop a cooperative vision and establish strategies for combating transnational criminal networks. The IDEC's multilateral enforcement approach has had a cumulative effect, as member nations increasingly coordinate their law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute major drug trafficking organizations and their leaders and to seize and block their assets. Since 1983, IDEC has grown to the largest drug law enforcement conference in the world – this year's meeting, which was held in Athens, Greece, included participants from more than 130 countries.

DEA's Forensic Sciences Division

The DEA's Special Testing and Research Laboratory (STRL) maintains a Methamphetamine Profiling Program and Fentanyl Profiling Program that determines the synthetic routes and precursor chemicals used in producing methamphetamine and fentanyl as well as signature programs to determine the geographic origins of heroin and cocaine. These programs use in-depth analysis to provide science-based forensic information to the United States interagency and U.S. policymakers.

During the 2024 IDEC conference, DEA's Forensic Sciences Division held the inaugural DEA Forensic Science Initiative conference in partnership with the Colombo Plan (a regional intergovernmental organization based in South Asia). The theme "Sharing the Science: The Changes to Forensic Science Presented by Novel Psychoactive Substances" focused on the impact of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) on forensic science and convened 30 forensic experts and scientists from 18 countries across the globe. With the ongoing rise of NPS, the event was an essential platform for sharing knowledge, advancing forensic techniques, and fostering international collaboration to combat the global drug threat.

DEA's Global Uniform Analysis and Reporting of Drug-Related Substances (GUARDS)

Through GUARDS, DEA's STRL develops and provides analytical methods and capabilities to state, local, and foreign counterparts through a uniform method of analysis for over 300 chemical compounds, including various fentanyl-related substances and nitazenes. DEA's GUARDS is available to forensic chemist counterparts throughout the world to assist in standardized identification and reporting of compounds in seized drug samples that allows for the early reporting of emerging new psychoactive substances and the monitoring of evolving drug trends. Since March 2024, GUARDS has been adopted in Singapore, Australia, Mauritius, Italy, and Greece.

Joint Intelligence National Threat Response El Paso Illicit Drug (INTREPID) Laboratory

The INTREPID laboratory represents an unprecedented whole-of-government approach to fentanyl/emerging threat profiling by leveraging the combined expertise and unique skillsets of DEA, Customs and Border Protection, and the Food and Drug Administration to develop a comprehensive and holistic picture of the illicit drug supply chain. INTREPID is designed to address emerging drug threats in the United States by quickly analyzing exemplars from drug seizures made at the Southwest border and throughout the United States. INTREPID's National Opioid and Fentanyl Attribution Intelligence Learning (NO FAIL) Team of scientists use their combined expertise and state-of-the-art analytical methodologies to provide research, scientific support, and actionable intelligence on the nature and source of rapidly evolving illicit drug threats. INTREPID enhances cooperation and communication among multiple agencies working on the advanced analysis and attribution of fentanyl/emerging threats by eliminating redundancies and providing

enforcement support and actionable intelligence to investigations across the United States government.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays a vital role in the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to implement the United States' National Drug Control Strategy to reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States. As the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdictions, the USCG deploys cutters, boats, aircraft, and unmanned systems in a layered approach to combat transnational criminal organizations (TCO) as they attempt to transport illicit drugs through the western hemisphere into the United States. By collaborating with U.S. interagency and partner countries and leveraging the USCG's unique authorities and capabilities, the USCG engages the threat beyond our land borders on the high seas where traffickers are most exposed and illicit drug shipments are most vulnerable to law enforcement interdiction.

Combating the national security threat posed by TCOs and their manufacturing and trafficking of illicit drugs requires robust interagency partnerships. The USCG works collaboratively with U.S. combatant commands including U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; Joint Interagency Task Force – South; Joint Interagency Task Force – West; and other federal, state, and local agencies. The Department of Defense, Customs and Border Protection, and other partners provide maritime and aerial platforms with sophisticated surveillance capabilities to facilitate interdiction efforts and enable USCG operations. The USCG's most capable interdiction platforms include ships with embarked helicopters, unmanned aviation systems, and pursuit boats capable of operating far from their ship. Additionally, USCG Law Enforcement Detachments routinely deploy on U.S. Navy and partner nation ships (e.g., Royal Dutch Navy and United Kingdom Royal Navy), supplementing a limited inventory of USCG cutters.

Strong international relationships ensure the USCG can conduct interdiction operations far from U.S. borders. In collaboration with the Departments of State and Justice, the USCG maintains more than 46 bilateral agreements and operational procedures with partner nations, focused on countering illicit transnational maritime activities. These agreements

enhance the USCG's effectiveness by enabling U.S. law enforcement authorities to board suspect trafficking vessels on the high seas and in partner country territorial waters to deter and disrupt illicit maritime trafficking.

Counternarcotics Operations:

Suspected illicit drug trafficking vessels are principally detected through interagency intelligence, international collaboration, and information obtained from multi-domain sensors. Actionable intelligence combined with persistent air and maritime surveillance are essential to maximize interdiction success.

In Fiscal Year 2024, the USCG's surface and air presence to support drug interdiction missions was still below historic norms due to resources being diverted to address irregular seaborne migration. The USCG augmented allied nation deployments, provided intelligence support to partner nations, and relied upon partner nations' maritime drug interdiction capabilities. These operations resulted in increased interdiction successes including partner nation drug interdictions and seizures, particularly along transatlantic routes.

International Cooperative Efforts:

In 2024, USCG personnel were permanently assigned overseas as USCG Liaison Officers, Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés, Coast Guard Attachés, Maritime Advisors, and USCG Section Chief (Mexico). These personnel enhanced interoperability, boosted regional security assistance programs, increased intelligence cooperation, and strengthened prosecutorial support for maritime drug trafficking cases.

The North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI) provides a forum for the United States, Canada, and Mexico to "develop and refine maritime operations, and to synchronize training and operational interoperability amongst deployed forces of the member nations." The Letter of Intent, signed in 2008 by USCG, U.S. Northern Command, and the Mexican Navy (SEMAR), was revised in 2011 to include Canada Joint Command. NAMSI includes working groups, a communications plan, and exercises to improve cooperation. The NAMSI Observer Program enables sharing of best practices, primarily in shipboard operations at sea on NAMSI partner vessels.

The Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), a joint initiative between the USCG, U.S. Army, and U.S. Southern Command, develops the maintenance and logistics capabilities of Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) partners, increases operational readiness, enhances maintenance/logistics skill absorption, and shifts the organizational focus of our partners toward self-sufficiency.

In partnership with U.S. Southern Command and the Department of State, the USCG executes the maritime training exercise TRADEWINDS. TRADEWINDS focuses on CBSI partner countries, offering a venue to build tactical-level relationships and conduct scenario-based exercises to validate regional capabilities.

In February 2024, a bilateral Maritime Law Enforcement Agreement with Ecuador entered into force. The agreement has provisions for boarding of Ecuadorian flagged vessels; embarking Ecuadorian Navy shipriders on U.S. ships; pursuit and entry to Ecuador's territorial sea; aircraft overflight of Ecuador's airspace; and technical assistance to Ecuador's law enforcement and military. The agreement widely encompasses counterdrug and other enforcement missions. Such bilateral agreements exemplify the cooperation and interoperability required to close gaps in law enforcement presence exploited by TCOs. Resourcing U.S. assets as far south as the Galapagos can be a challenge due to other mission priorities that can strain resource availability. Enabling partners with routine joint operations helps close gaps by sharing resources and expanding regional maritime law enforcement proficiency.

To counter transatlantic drug flows and other illicit maritime activity, including piracy, weapons trafficking, and illegal fishing, the USCG works with U.S. Africa Command to expand maritime training and combined maritime law enforcement operations with West and East African countries through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) program.

International Training and Technical Assistance:

The USCG's Security Assistance Program offers resident training programs, subject matter exchanges, mobile training teams (MTTs), and technical assistance to partner nation maritime services around the world to enhance their interdiction capacity. This includes two enlisted advisor billets in Costa Rica that are helping to establish curriculum,

qualification/training standards, and processes for their engineering schoolhouse to support keeping their cutters and small boats operational.

In Fiscal Year 2024 the USCG deployed 76 MTTs to 30 countries, training 912 students in subjects including law enforcement boarding officer procedures, small boat engineering, and leadership. Through the USCG's international training program, 214 international students from 57 countries graduated from 30 different resident courses at USCG training centers. The international training program supplements geographic combatant commanders' theater security cooperation objectives, while deepening the USCG's partnerships with foreign nations combatting shared maritime security challenges.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of the Department of Homeland Security, processes all goods, vehicles, and people entering and exiting the United States and is charged with passport control and agriculture inspections. Specific to CBP's counternarcotics mission, CBP Officers, Border Patrol Agents, Air and Marine interdiction agents, and other personnel are charged with intercepting illicit drugs at the United States' 328 international ports of entry (POEs); 135 US Border Patrol Stations and five Substations; and 74 Air and Marine Operations Branches, Centers, and Units.

CBP also supports international narcotics control efforts led by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), including the U.S.-funded Project Ion Incident Communication System (IONICS), by sharing incidents involving the trafficking or manufacture of illicit drugs. This cooperation fosters global partnerships with United Nations Member States, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

The CBP Fentanyl Campaign Directorate (FCD) was established to enhance communication and unite efforts against the trafficking, distribution, and production of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs. Operating within the National Targeting Center, the FCD develops and advocates for policy and legislative changes that bolster CBP's capabilities to combat fentanyl. It prioritizes intelligence sharing, data integration, and operational collaboration among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, international, and industry partners to achieve strategic disruption through a unified, whole-of-CBP approach. Additionally, the FCD coordinates the goals of the National Security Council's Strategic

Implementation Plan, ensures the effective execution of the 2023 CBP Strategy to Combat Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Drugs, and oversees the agency's response to the 2024 National Security Memorandum on prioritizing efforts to disrupt the illicit fentanyl and synthetic opioid supply chain.

Training

Port of Entry Interdiction Training: In addition to training at POEs, CBP provides training in techniques of smuggling contraband across lightly patrolled borders rather than at official POEs.

International Bulk Currency Smuggling Training: CBP assists foreign government personnel in identifying techniques used by bulk currency smugglers and developing programs to counter this crime and seize its proceeds.

Overseas Enforcement Training: This training includes Border Enforcement; Supply Chain Security; Detection, Interdiction, and Investigation; Concealment Methods; Bulk Currency Smuggling; False and Fraudulent Documents; Presumptive Field Test Kit Training for Controlled Substances; Synthetic Drugs and Fentanyl Awareness Training; Train-the-Trainer; Anti-Corruption; Targeting and Risk Management; Hazardous Materials; and X-ray Systems.

Relevant Components and Associated Counternarcotics Functions

Office of Field Operations (OFO) is the largest operational office in CBP with 34,000 employees responsible for securing U.S. POEs. OFO safeguards, facilitates, and expedites legitimate trade and travel, while concurrently detecting and preventing unauthorized travel, illegitimate trade, smuggling, and protecting U.S. agriculture and natural resources from invasive plant pests and animal diseases. OFO utilizes a multifaceted approach that integrates advanced detection capabilities, such as specialized canine units and non-intrusive inspection technology, laboratory testing, scientific analysis, fostering domestic law enforcement and foreign government partnerships, and emphasizing intelligence and information sharing.

Office of Field Operations, National Canine Enforcement Program (NCEP): NCEP provides expert guidance on the use of canines in the ports of entry for detecting fentanyl, other

dangerous drugs, concealed humans, firearms, and ammunition. Operating at POEs across the United States, canine teams offer a highly reliable and unparalleled mobile detection capability. In addition to these efforts, NCEP has collaborated with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components to introduce canines with the ability to detect fentanyl precursors, aiming to interdict the substances used in the production of fentanyl. NCEP continues to work with the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Department of State to identify international partners who could benefit from these advanced canine detection programs involving fentanyl.

Office of Field Operations, International Operations and Advisory Directorate (IOAD): IOAD is OFO's "Global Frontline" and houses all of OFO's international operational programs. IOAD was established in January 2023 to bring together international operations from across OFO and co-locate them under one directorate. The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Preclearance operations are two of IOAD's "frontline" programs. The IAP Division supports international drug control efforts from 20 permanent sites around the globe. The first of its three models is the division's namesake IAP, which engages with air carriers and airlines' security companies at foreign airports to prevent terrorists, criminals, and other high-risk passengers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. The Joint Security Program (JSP) model, in addition to U.S.-bound flights, identifies high-risk air travelers and contraband arriving and departing the host foreign country and partners CBP Officers with the local law enforcement counterparts. The third model deploys Police Liaisons to partner with foreign law enforcement agencies and U.S. government law enforcement partners to enhance real-time information exchange related to terrorist and criminal activities and smuggling threats and support investigative efforts. Liaisons are posted at foreign partners' fusion centers or at U.S. diplomatic missions.

Preclearance Operations: Preclearance operations enhance aviation security by stationing CBP personnel overseas to inspect travelers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights. They conduct the same immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections of international air travelers typically performed upon arrival in the United States, serving as a visible deterrent to those looking to conduct illicit activities within the United States before they set foot on U.S. soil.

OFO Special Response Team (SRT): DHS and CBP use the SRT to support CBP international initiatives, including International Affairs International Training and Assistance

Division; CBP Advisors and Special Customs' Programs; CBP Preclearance; IAP/JSP; and various other special mission requests. SRT provides advanced tactical enforcement training; threat and vulnerability assessments in host countries prior to deployment; and conducts site surveys identifying vulnerabilities in the host country to identify capacity building needs. SRT also provides training to CBP employees prior to deployment to foreign assignments.

United States Border Patrol (USBP): USBP agents are responsible for securing the 8,000 miles of land and coastal border between the POEs against smugglers, other criminals, potential terrorists, and persons seeking to avoid inspection at the POEs. The USBP conducts border operations including line watch conducted near international boundaries and coastlines, city patrol and transportation checks, and operates immigration checkpoints on major U.S. highways and secondary roads, generally between 25 and 100 miles of the southwest and northern borders. An estimated 50 million vehicles are estimated to pass through these checkpoints each year. USBP maintains 35 permanent and 189 tactical checkpoints, the purpose of which is to detect and apprehend persons seeking to enter the country in violation of immigration law; smugglers of persons or contraband, including drugs; and suspected terrorists attempting to travel into the interior of the United States after evading detection at the border.

USBP Headquarters (HQ) Intelligence Division (ID): The USBP HQ ID outlines key principles and processes for intelligence activities while providing situational awareness to the executive-level leadership decision making process. The USBP HQ ID delivers these capabilities by providing objective, timely, and relevant intelligence, supporting a risk-based, counter-network, intelligence-driven border security decision-making methodology.

USBP Foreign Operations Division (FOD): USBP Foreign Operations are part of CBP's comprehensive international security efforts to extend border security beyond U.S. territory. USBP FOD enhances information sharing with law enforcement and other relevant agencies by monitoring indicators of irregular migration and reporting to DHS and CBP for situational awareness and preparedness.

Air and Marine Operations (AMO): AMO addresses security threats through aviation and maritime law enforcement from more than 70 locations with over 200 aircraft and over 300 vessels from Maine to Florida, Washington to California, Northern and Southern borders,

and an approximately 42 million square mile area which includes more than 40 nations and the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches to the United States.

AMO Foreign Operations conducts operations, training, program assessments, and capacity building to foreign partners in collaboration with U.S. partners throughout the world. AMO collaborates with CBP International Affairs, CBP Attachés, and other international partners to strengthen its ability to counter transnational crime. In the source and transit zones, AMO has collaborated with the Departments of State and Defense to develop initiatives that build aviation and maritime capacity of partner nations in Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico.

AMO National Air Security Operations (NASO) regularly schedules airborne operations using surveillance aircraft in the 42 million square miles of Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Ocean known as the transit zone. These operations are coordinated with numerous U.S. and international law enforcement and military partners who cooperate in combating transnational organized crime. NASO has successfully integrated AMO's Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) into their foreign operations and is actively working to expand UAS operations throughout the source and transit zone.

Office of Trade (OT): OT facilitates legitimate trade and protects the American economy and national security. Collaborating with industry and government partners, it develops streamlined processes that provide certainty for legitimate importers, while combating transnational organized crime and safeguarding environmental standards and human rights.

Office of International Affairs: CBP's Office of International Affairs (INA) works with other U.S. government agencies and foreign government partners to share information and intelligence and promote CBP international programs on counterterrorism, border security, nonproliferation, export controls, and building partner capacity. INA leads CBP's international efforts by strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships, enhancing foreign partners' border security capacities, and programs that identify high-risk travelers, cargo, and non-citizens that pose security risks.

CBP INA Attachés, Representatives and Advisors, and Special Customs Programs: CBP Attachés and Advisors are posted in U.S. Embassies and Consulates where they advise mission leadership on CBP programs and capabilities. In 2023, CBP had 25 Attachés,

three Deputy Attaches, seven CBP Representatives, and 12 partner-funded Advisors in 30 countries. Attachés exchange information with foreign counterparts to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement activity; negotiate international agreements (e.g., CMAAs- Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements providing for mutual assistance in the enforcement of customs-related laws); promote initiatives to deter and dismantle transnational criminal organizations; and educate stakeholders about CBP's many international programs such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Immigration Advisory Programs (IAP), Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), and various trade and capacity building programs. As of Fiscal Year 2023, the United States had 74 CMAAs signed and entered into force.

Operations Support Laboratories and Scientific Services: Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) is the scientific and technical arm of CBP. LSS provides comprehensive laboratory analyses at the eight regional laboratories and rapid, on-site presumptive analyses at 16 Forward Operating Laboratories located at ports of entry. In collaboration with INA, LSS works with foreign counterparts to share information about laboratory analytical results and trends, best practices, and methodologies for the analysis of controlled substances.

Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT): CTPAT is a voluntary public-private sector partnership to enhance cargo security with partners including importers/exporters, U.S./Canada and U.S./Mexico highway carriers; rail and sea carriers; licensed U.S. Customs brokers; U.S. marine port authority/terminal operators; U.S. freight consolidators; ocean transportation intermediaries and non-operating common carriers; Mexican and Canadian manufacturers; and Mexico long-haul highway carriers.

Container Security Initiative: The Container Security Initiative Division (CSI) in the Office of Field Operations works alongside host country government and industry partners in 35 countries to enhance cargo security through targeting shipments of high-risk goods destined to the United States. CSI supports CBP international cooperation through development of strong relationships and support through technical assistance, capacity building and training efforts.

National Targeting Center: The National Targeting Center (NTC) collaborates with international partners to identify, disrupt, and manage cargo and passenger risks – including

terrorism, drug trafficking, and other criminal activity - through information sharing and joint targeting operations in accordance with memoranda of understanding and CMAAs. The NTC hosts and works with participating foreign agencies and other U.S. government agencies to detect and disrupt terrorism, threats to national security and public safety, and transnational criminal activity including drug smuggling and trafficking. It also provides training and technical assistance in risk assessment to foreign customs, immigration, and other border enforcement agencies through several partnership programs.

- NTC International Targeting Center (ITC): The ITC is a multinational targeting cell within the CBP NTC. It was established as a unified hub to coordinate and connect Border 5 (B5) agencies (an informal forum on border management between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) with a principal role to compile, analyze, share, and disseminate border related threat information to support efforts in anticipating, identifying, preventing, and monitoring criminal border related target related activity. The center hosts intelligence and targeting SMEs from each represented agency from all B5 countries. ITC members are co-located within the NTC, alongside fellowship members from other countries including Germany, France, Spain, Brazil, and Colombia.
- The ITC jointly undertakes targeting projects supporting the Border 5 / Migration 5 Heads of Intelligence Joint Strategic Threat Assessment aiming to align resources, enhance partnerships, and build on successful enforcement intelligence and data-driven operations, while leveraging CBP's vast expertise and data holdings.
- NTC International Fellowship: The Fellowship program, with the same aims as the ITC, hosts Intelligence and targeting personnel from all B5 countries, along with CBP representation.

Department of Defense (DOD) Preclearance: The Customs Border Clearance Agent (CBCA) program permits cargo consigned to the care of DOD, as well as returning military personnel, to be pre-cleared for import/entry into the United States by DOD personnel who have been trained by CBP. CBCA personnel conduct Customs and Agricultural inspections and certify personnel and cargo have met all entry requirements and Defense Travel Regulations prior to departing to the United States.

Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP): BITMAP is a host country-led initiative in which DHS/Homeland Security Investigations and USBP train and equip foreign counterparts to collect biometric and biographic data on persons posing potential national security risks, gang members, and other persons of law enforcement interest. Foreign partners share this data with ICE and CBP to enhance U.S. efforts to target criminal networks and individuals and identify illicit pathways and emerging crime trends.

Office of Intelligence: The Office of Intelligence (OI) plays a critical role in providing timely, actionable, and relevant intelligence to frontline operators that supports CBP's strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence needs. OI collaborates with the customs intelligence offices across the world to exchange information and increase awareness of criminal trends.

Chemical Controls

U.S. DEPARTMENT *of* STATE

Introduction

A continuing challenge in countering the illicit drug trade is controlling the chemicals used to produce them. Almost all drugs require the use of precursor chemicals to transform them into a final product. For plant-based drugs such as cocaine and heroin, those chemicals are one of a number of ingredients; for synthetic drugs, which are rapidly proliferating in illicit drug markets, they constitute the essential components. In both cases, keeping precursor chemicals away from criminals is vital to the control of drugs. But because many such chemicals have legitimate uses in industry and medicine, preventing their theft or diversion to illicit ends is extremely challenging. Doing so requires continued vigilance and cooperation among law enforcement officials, industry, governments, and international organizations. Strong domestic laws are necessary to control the production, transport, sale, and storage of these substances, together with continued cooperation with the private sector and information sharing with the international community.

Robust control systems are in place in the domestic laws of many countries and within the international community as well, with drugs and precursor chemicals placed into categories or “schedules” to control their availability depending on their acceptable industrial or medical use. However, these systems are continually challenged as criminal organizations adapt to evade these controls and as the non-scheduled chemicals and drug analogues known as new psychoactive substances (NPS) continue to rapidly increase and evolve. As synthetic drugs are so easily manufactured without the need for elaborate infrastructure, and because the chemicals needed to produce them vary so greatly, they are much harder to control. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified over 1,200 different forms of NPS from 141 countries and territories and estimates that potential fentanyl analogues alone number in the thousands. In contrast, the main chemicals used to produce plant-based drugs - potassium permanganate for the production of cocaine and acetic anhydride for the production of heroin - have remained quite constant and are more readily controlled if a country has strong internal controls and adheres to international regulatory efforts such as the ones managed by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).

The reports below describe the chemical control situation in countries that are key sources of precursor chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. Afghanistan, although it remains the world’s second-largest supplier of opiates, is not included due to the United

States' withdrawal of its military forces, the closure of its embassy, and the Taliban takeover in 2021. As a result, it is currently not possible to obtain reliable information on chemical controls in Afghanistan, although the United States believes it remains a significant importer of precursor chemicals from other countries in the region.

The International Framework

The UN Drug Conventions

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1954 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Convention) underpin the international drug policy architecture. The 1988 Convention additionally provides the legal framework for international cooperation to prevent precursor chemical diversion. Article 12 requires UN member states that are party to the Convention to monitor their international trade in the chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the Convention. These chemicals, which currently number 36, often have legitimate industrial uses, and the tables are updated to newly bring chemicals under international control when necessary. Under the treaty, the INCB is responsible for assisting governments in monitoring controlled chemicals and preventing their diversion. State parties are obligated to share information with one another and with the INCB on their international transactions involving these chemicals to identify and prevent diversion for illicit purposes. Article 12, Sections 8 and 9 of the Convention require licensing or similar control of all persons and enterprises involved in the manufacture and distribution of listed chemicals.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) is the treaty body within the international drug control framework with responsibility for deciding whether substances shall be included in the schedules or tables and is the entity within the UN system with primary responsibility for international drug policy. Resolutions adopted by the CND provide additional guidance to state parties, including on best practices to implement their obligations.

In 2017, the CND voted to include two of the key precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl in Table I of the Convention: 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-

phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP). This scheduling decision reduced the ability of illicit drug manufacturers to obtain these chemicals. However, it also led some criminals to adjust production methods, including the use of alternative chemicals that are widely available for commercial purposes and not controlled under the UN system. Illicit drug manufacturers have also turned increasingly to the use of so-called “pre-precursors” (chemicals which while not precursors themselves can be used to produce precursors) and “designer” precursors (chemicals intentionally produced to use in manufacturing scheduled precursors and evade international and domestic control measures), using more advanced processing techniques. The INCB has identified these trends as major concerns.

In 2022, the CND decided to internationally control six substances under the 1988 Drug Convention, including three fentanyl precursor chemicals (4-AP, boc-4-AP, and norfentanyl) requested for international control by the United States, extending the scope of control outlined in the Convention to those substances. In 2024, the CND voted unanimously to place 18 precursors for synthetic drugs under international control, thus obligating countries to share information about those chemicals and take domestic measures to prevent their diversion and trafficking. Two of these precursors, which the United States had proposed for international control, have been used to illicitly manufacture fentanyl (4-piperidone and 1-boc-4-piperidone). The remaining substances placed under international control in 2024 are not currently used in the illicit manufacture of drugs but share chemical properties with substances currently being used for that purpose, such that they could easily be substituted into illicit drug manufacturing processes if the parent chemical became more difficult to acquire. This proactive scheduling action, the first of its kind at the international level, was a direct result of a U.S.-tabled resolution in the 65th CND in 2022. The resolution, which focused on precursor chemicals, encouraged the INCB to undertake a proactive effort to anticipate the alternative and substitute precursors traffickers could be expected to turn to after international and domestic controls were placed on chemicals currently used in illicit drug manufacturing.

International Narcotics Control Board

The INCB is an independent, treaty-based body responsible for assisting states in their efforts to achieve the aims of the three UN drug control treaties. Under the Convention, the INCB has a treaty-mandated function to assist governments in preventing the diversion of controlled chemicals. State parties are obligated to share information with one another and

with the INCB on their international transactions involving these chemicals to identify and prevent diversion for illicit purposes. Article 12, Sections 8 and 9 of the 1988 Convention require licensing or similar control of all persons and enterprises involved in the manufacture and distribution of listed chemicals.

The INCB plays a critical role in preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals. Under the Convention, the INCB is charged with assessing precursors and making recommendations on appropriate monitoring measures to the CND. The Board's assessment as to scientific matters is determinative, but the CND considers other relevant factors in deciding appropriate measures to adopt. Decisions of the CND are binding on parties to the Convention, which, with 191 parties, is nearly universal in its application. The United States provides funding to the INCB to carry out the measures called for in the UN conventions and to improve detection and tracking of chemicals subject to diversion. This has included support to the Global Rapid Interdiction of Dangerous Substances Programme (GRIDS), which uses platforms to exchange real-time operational information as well as provide practical tools to enhance international cooperation on NPS.

The INCB has implemented several programs to address the challenges of precursor chemicals:

The Pre-Export Notification Online system (PEN Online) is an online database system that enables the exchange of information between member states on the import and export of chemicals for legitimate industrial uses that could be diverted for the illicit manufacture of drugs. It is the only global system for monitoring international legitimate trade in precursor chemicals controlled under the Convention and provides importing state authorities with an early alert system to verify the legitimacy of pre-export chemical shipments. Data conveyed by PEN Online has proved very useful in both stopping suspect shipments and facilitating intelligence, with follow-up investigations leading to the dismantling of international drug trafficking networks. Since the Pen Online system was launched in March 2006, 169 governments have registered to use it. Of those, 145 are using the system nearly daily to send notifications about planned exports and/or acknowledge proposed imports. In 2024, some 2,700 notifications were exchanged every month through PEN Online. From November 2023 to November 2024, approximately 34,000 pre-export notifications were exchanged through PEN Online by 65 governments.

The Pre-Export Notification Online Light system (PEN Online Light) is a new web-based tool that INCB launched in October 2022. Similar to PEN Online, PEN Online Light enables exporting government authorities to exchange, on a voluntary basis, information about planned exports of drug precursors that are not under international control but which may be nationally controlled in one or more countries or included in special surveillance lists due to their potential use in the illicit manufacture of drugs. This will help address the growing problem of non-controlled and "designer" precursors that are being used in place of controlled chemicals in the illicit manufacture of drugs. All users of the PEN Online system automatically have access to PEN Online Light. Since its launch, PEN Online Light has registered almost 1,700 pre-export notifications by 15 exporting to 66 importing countries. Asian and North American institutions are the most frequent users of the system. To date, notifications have mostly reported international movements of gamma-butyrolactone (GBL) and glacial acetic acid.

The Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS) is another INCB tool that facilitates real-time communication exchange among law enforcement officials worldwide. The secure online system supports intelligence sharing on seizure incidents and suspicious shipments involving precursor chemicals as well as clandestine laboratories and drug manufacturing equipment. Additionally, it facilitates direct coordination and collaboration among national authorities to advance investigations on chemical trafficking. PICS also provides authorities with information on newly emerging precursor chemicals. During the period November 1, 2023 – November 1, 2024, over 500 new incidents were communicated through PICS that involved 147 distinct substances, of which only 18 are internationally controlled. Among these incidents were 130 incidents involving equipment. As of December 1, 2024, over 4,800 incidents have been shared through PICS since its launch. The system has more than 700 active users from 130 countries and territories, representing 325 agencies in all regions.

The International Special Surveillance List (ISSL) is an INCB mechanism that tracks chemicals not regulated by the Convention but for which substantial evidence exists of their use in illicit drug manufacture. The CND has urged governments to make wider use of ISSL and take voluntary measures to apply greater oversight of the supply chain of chemicals listed by it.

In addition to PEN Online, PICS, and ISSL, the INCB coordinates multinational law enforcement task forces to monitor and intercept diverted chemicals used to illicitly manufacture drugs, specifically synthetic drugs (Project Prism), heroin and cocaine (Project Cohesion), and NPS (Project Ion). These mechanisms facilitate coordination between international law enforcement authorities for coordinating targeted, time-bound intelligence-gathering operations.

Regional Bodies

The regulatory framework codified by the UN operates in concert with regional bodies, such as the European Union and the Organization of American States (OAS), which partner with the United States on multilateral chemical control initiatives, including the implementation of CND resolutions. The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) and its Group of Experts on Chemical Substances and Pharmaceutical Products works to advance voluntary cooperation to prevent the diversion and criminal misuse of non-controlled chemicals. Its model guidelines, published in 2019, serve to address such diversion.

Major Chemical Countries and Territories

Belgium

The law regulating Belgium's significant chemical industry limits the production and use of many chemical precursors required for producing illegal synthetic drugs. This includes controlling all substances listed in the 1988 UN Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and controls on substances in accordance with European Union regulations. Overall, Belgium enforces robust reporting requirements for the import and export of precursor chemicals (for example, bulk pseudoephedrine/ephedrine, safrole oil, acetic anhydride, and benzyl methyl ketone). Nevertheless, Belgian authorities acknowledge that importers occasionally circumvent these restrictions by way of false or misleading labelling. The Belgian Federal Police and Belgian Customs & Excise authorities lead enforcement of precursor chemical controls, whereas the Ministry of Safety and Public Health is responsible for regulatory control of pharmaceutical medications.

Belgium is a significant transit country for shipments of precursor chemicals, mostly from China and India and destined for clandestine synthetic drug laboratories in the Netherlands and other European countries. A small percentage of those shipments end up in illegal labs in Belgium.

Bolivia

Bolivia's Controlled Substances Law, enacted in March 2017, regulates precursor chemicals in coordination with the INCB. Despite these regulations, precursor chemicals continue to be diverted into Bolivia through illegal channels for use in cocaine production. Although the Chemical Substances Investigations Group (GISUQ) did not release information on chemical control measures in 2024, other reports suggest that most of these chemicals originate from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and China.

The most common chemicals seized match those commonly found in drug factories (where base paste is prepared) and cocaine labs (where base paste is transformed into cocaine). Bolivia is both a transit country for illicit drug shipments and a source country for coca and cocaine processing. The number of labs in Bolivia that process base paste into cocaine has significantly increased over the last 15 years. The most common chemicals found in those labs are sulfuric acid; hydrochloric acid; sodium carbonate; caustic soda; potassium permanganate and ethyl ether; phenacetin; sodium metabisulfite; activated carbon; ethyl acetate; and levamisole. The last five products were added to the list of controlled substances under Bolivian law in 2019, and GISUQ believes drug producers use them as alternative chemicals to avoid law enforcement controls. No additional products have been added to the list since 2019. Traffickers use activated carbon to deodorize and discolor water and other liquids. Phenacetin, a highly toxic analgesic, is used to increase the volume of cocaine.

The GISUQ is charged with locating and interdicting chemicals used in the traditional cocaine process, such as sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, and gasoline. As of December 11, 2024, GISUQ reported the seizure of 712.8 metric tons of solid precursor chemicals, 721,950 liters of liquid precursor chemicals, and 374,280 kilograms of illicit coca leaf. The GISUQ coordinates activities with the Special Force for the Fight against Narcotics Trafficking (FELCN) and the Vice Minister of Social Defense and Controlled Substances, which administers and licenses the commercialization and transport of controlled

substances listed under Bolivian domestic law. In February 2024, GISUQ participated in a Cooperation program between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. In response to concerns from international partners about increases in synthetic drugs, FELCN and the Vice Ministry of Social Defense are now tracking synthetic drug seizures. As of October, 930 grams of methamphetamine, 68 doses of LSD, 4,004 MDMA tablets have been seized. The 2017 Controlled Substances Law indicates that violation of controlled substances could result in penal action against all participants and provides the legal framework for GISUQ, in coordination with other agencies, to add or eliminate chemical substances controlled under Bolivian law.

Brazil

Brazil is the top chemical producing country in Latin America. Brazil's main regulatory framework includes the Controlled Chemical Law, which governs the control of precursor substances. It licenses, controls, and inspects precursor chemicals including potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride in conformity with its obligations under the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention. The Federal Police (PF) Chemical Division controls and monitors 146 chemical products in conjunction with 27 PF regional divisions and 97 resident offices. The Chemical Division includes a Chemical Control Division and a Criminal Diversion Investigations Unit. Both routinely coordinate and share information when conducting administrative inspections and criminal investigations.

The Brazilian Federal Revenue Agency (RFB) monitors imports and exports of controlled substances and works closely with other Brazilian government entities to conduct investigations on illicit precursor chemical trafficking. The Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) oversees precursor chemicals used in the pharmaceutical industry, including 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP), which are on the list of controlled chemical substances but not banned. Regulatory guidelines require chemical handlers to be registered and licensed to conduct activities such as manufacturing, importing, exporting, storing, transporting, commercializing, and distributing chemicals. The PF uses a national computerized system of chemical control to monitor all chemical movements in the country, which requires all companies to register all precursor chemical activity including monthly reports for all chemical-related movements and existing chemical inventories.

Brazil reports to the INCB its annual estimates of legitimate requirements for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine quantities above 10 grams and P-2-P in any amount using the INCB's Pre-Export Notification Online system. The PF routinely uses PEN Online in cases of international trade and in coordination with UN member states to alert importing countries on details of an export transaction.

Burma

Burma does not have a major chemical industry and does not manufacture ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, acetic anhydride, or other substances used as precursor chemicals for illicit drug production. However, it shares porous land borders with the PRC and India, two of the world's largest pharmaceutical and chemical producing countries.

UNODC's May 2024 Report on Synthetic Drugs in East and Southeast Asia stated that Burma remains the top source of methamphetamine in the region, with Shan State the predominate source of synthetic drugs. The report specified that the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Burma, and Thailand seized 139 tons of illicit drugs in 2023, which was 73 percent of the total.

Lack of information on the chemical profiles of seized drugs and weak precursor regulatory frameworks fuel the trafficking and manufacture of large quantities of illicit drugs, particularly in the growing non-regime-controlled areas. Organized crime groups divert precursor chemicals from legitimate and illicit sources and hire expert chemists to produce large quantity of synthetic drugs.

The Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) is Burma's sole interagency coordinating mechanism for legal and illegal drug control. Under the CCDAC, the Supervision Committee for the Control of Precursor Chemicals (SCCPC) monitors the possession, use, sale, production, and transportation of chemical precursors. Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention but has not instituted laws to meet all UN chemical control provisions.

In early 2024 the regime's precursor regulatory group launched a nationwide campaign called "Operation 39/24" dedicated to preventing the importation and diversion of 39 controlled precursor chemicals.

On the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on June 26, 2024, the regime's CCDAC destroyed approximately \$350 million in seized narcotics. The seized drugs included 77 types of narcotic drugs and precursor chemicals including over 239 million stimulant tablets, over 23.39 metric tons of crystal methamphetamine and over 4.16 metric tons of ketamine.

The regime has deployed interdiction equipment to several major checkpoints and plans to deploy similar equipment throughout the country. Official precursor seizure statistics from January to May 2024 included 11,680 kg sodium cyanide, 560 liters (L) hydrochloric acid, 19,600 liters of benzyl cyanide, and 5,000 kg caffeine powder, among others.

Canada

While Canada has strong legislative and regulatory controls over its large chemical industry, the diversion of chemicals by organized criminal groups for illicit drug production remains a problem. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) established a National Chemical Precursor Diversion Program in 2001 to address the issue. Canada's Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the Narcotics Control Regulations (NCR) promulgated under that act, and the Precursor Control Regulations (PCR) implemented by the RCMP provide a legislative framework for the control of substances and chemical precursors. Health Canada submits an annual report to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) with respect to its obligations under the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.

The scheduling of precursors under the CDSA provides law enforcement agencies with the authority to act against illicit activities by allowing search and seizure, prosecution of offenders, forfeiture of illicit substances, and prohibitions on unregistered importation of materials. The PCR authorizes Health Canada to communicate information collected from government sources and international stakeholders (e.g., about non-compliance monitored by its inspectors and submission of complaints) to law enforcement agencies, border control officers, international partners, and the INCB.

Regulatory amendments made to the NCR and PCR in 2019 gave the government greater control over precursor chemicals, derivatives, analogues, and salts of derivatives and analogues, to help combat the illegal production and distribution of fentanyl and amphetamines. In 2024, the Government of Canada undertook new regulatory measures to

limit the sales of products solely containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine marketed as “natural health products,” restricting non-pharmacists from retailing the product. The Minister of Health undertook this step to prevent misuse of these products or redirection of contained ephedrine or pseudoephedrine for illicit methamphetamine production.

People’s Republic of China

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a massive chemical industry, which includes approximately 160,000 chemical companies. The PRC has implemented a licensing regime for the production, sale, and transport of drug precursor chemicals. However, due to insufficiently staffed and equipped oversight of this enormous industry, illicit drug manufacturers directly source chemicals from the PRC that they use to manufacture illicit drugs in Mexico and Southeast Asia. The National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) is the agency with primary responsibility for drug precursor chemical control. The PRC maintains a list of controlled precursor chemicals called the “Catalogue of Precursor Chemicals,” which currently includes 38 drug precursor chemicals.

The supply of PRC-produced drug precursors to illicit manufacture is a significant U.S. concern. U.S. law enforcement reports that the most common diversion tactic used by traffickers is the intentional mislabeling of shipments containing precursors. Perpetrators caught mislabeling precursor shipments often only face civil penalties and small fines rather than criminal charges. The challenge of preventing precursor diversion is exacerbated by the PRC’s inability to effectively screen the high volume of goods exported via land, air, and sea. Traffickers also skirt chemical control laws by selling and distributing chemicals that are not yet regulated by the PRC that are avenues to the production of fentanyl and methamphetamine, including on e-commerce platforms. Many PRC-based traffickers have shifted to sending non-controlled chemicals to Mexico and other countries that are one step earlier in the chemical process for making fentanyl – so-called “indirect precursors” or “pre-precursors.”

The PRC in 2018 controlled 32 new substances, and in 2019 controlled fentanyl as a class. In 2021, the PRC controlled 18 new substances and synthetic cannabinoids as a class. In March 2022, the PRC voted to schedule 4-AP, boc-4-AP, and Norfentanyl at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna. In September 2024, the PRC domestically scheduled 4-AP, boc-4-AP, and Norfentanyl. In July 2024, the PRC revised

the list of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to include 46 new substances, including nitazines. The same month, the PRC also prohibited online sales and advertisements of veterinary anesthetics and psychotropic drugs, including xylazine. In September 2023, the PRC revised the list of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances to include tilidine in the catalog of narcotic drugs, include imidazole and etomidate into the Category II psychotropic drugs, and to reschedule Modafinil from a category 1 psychotropic drugs to a category 2 psychotropic drug.

Beginning in the second half of 2023, PRC police began publishing reports of increased regulation of precursor chemicals for synthetic narcotics. For example, police in the Jilin Public Security Bureau and the Anti-Narcotics Department reported that they had “improved management systems of precursor chemicals, such as license application procedures, annual inspections, and security inspections.” Police in Shandong province reported additional screening measures at highway inspections to target the transport of “drug-making raw materials and fentanyl-like substances” with possible administrative penalties. In April 2024, the Anti-Drug Brigade of the Public Security Bureau of Huzhu County in Qinghai conducted a special inspection of five medical institutions involved in illicit activities related to fentanyl-related substances, while in September 2024 Qumarlei County Public Security Bureau in Qinghai carried out an inspection targeting fentanyl and other narcotic drugs. PRC police also employed new technologies in chemical control efforts, such as in September 2024, when Jiangsu province issued guidance on using big data analysis, cloud computing, and advanced technology to monitor precursor chemicals.

Colombia

Diversion of precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs is a serious problem in Colombia that the government is addressing through import controls and seizures. Since 2015, the government has regulated precursor chemicals used for drug production and expanded its enforcement efforts related to these chemicals. In 2015, the government began implementing the Information System for the Control of Substances and Chemical Products (SICOQ), a real time tracking tool that the police and the Ministry of Justice developed to strengthen the control of chemicals and has trained companies in the correct use of chemicals to avoid diversion.

The Colombian government has various controls on coca-processing chemicals, though traffickers still import them illicitly and build illicit labs to produce them. Overall seizures decreased during the first nine months of 2024 as the Colombian government deprioritized seizures of mass-use substances (e.g., gasoline and cement) used in narcotics production, which made up most overall seizures, to focus instead on essential precursor chemicals (e.g. sulfuric acid). From January to September 2024, police and military forces seized 3,046 metric tons (MT) of solid precursors and 4,738,178 gallons of liquid precursors.

Seizures during the first nine months of 2024 included acetone (182,696 gallons – down 16 percent from the same period in 2023), sulfuric acid (139,841 gallons – up 268 percent), hydrochloric acid (18,503 gallons – down 31 percent), sodium hydroxide (118 MT – up 33 percent), and potassium permanganate (193 MT – up 83 percent). The government limits production, distribution, and storage of precursors nationwide and prohibits gasoline and other chemicals in certain zones with high levels of narcotics production. Further, Colombian companies are not authorized to export ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in bulk form. Colombian law bans the domestic distribution of all pharmaceutical products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine.

In December 2024 the United States and the United Nations launched a program to assist Colombian government technical processes in identification, safe handling, management, and proper disposal of precursor chemicals.

While the Colombian government has strengthened chemical control legislation and conducts seizures, traffickers import precursors clandestinely into Colombia. Chemical companies require government permission to import or export specific chemicals and controlled substances. Additionally, traffickers and clandestine laboratories recycle controlled chemicals and are increasingly able to replace controlled chemicals with non-controlled chemicals.

Through Resolution 0001 of the 2015 National Narcotics Council, the use of 33 chemical substances is controlled in illicit drug production. As of October 25, 2024, a total of 2,639 "Certificates of Lack of Reports for Drug Trafficking" have been issued to companies that distribute, commercialize, and use the 33 authorized chemical substances, including 1,589 gasoline and diesel industry firms. As of September 30, 2024, a total of 518 Prior Export Authorizations, which allow entities to produce and export certain controlled chemicals were

issued, and the Ministry of Justice and private companies signed three voluntary cooperation agreements, which facilitate information sharing to track precursor chemicals.

A U.S.-supported Colombian National Police (CNP) port unit in Cartagena, the U.S.-supported CNP container targeting center, and a U.S. chemical verification and validation unit seized a total of approximately 89,500 gallons of sulfuric acid during two seizures on March 1 and March 15, 2024 – enough to produce approximately half of Colombia’s estimated annual cocaine production. These operations constituted the largest seizures of this cocaine precursor in Colombian history. CNP reports the containers came from Australia and were destined to a fictitious company in Colombia. The police created a special unit tasked with the interdiction of precursor chemicals. The Colombian Marines conducted operations against precursor chemicals transported via rivers by covering riverine chokepoints – areas through which traffickers must cross to move controlled chemicals. The United States supports a dedicated enforcement group and a special investigations unit within the CNP anti-narcotics directorate focused on targeting the criminal organizations involved in supplying chemicals to cocaine labs. U.S. special agents, intelligence analysts, and their Colombian counterparts work in concert with colleagues in Ecuador to interdict these chemicals in transit, thereby denying trafficking organizations, heavily armed criminal groups, and terrorist organizations the financial resources needed to expand, purchase illegal weapons, and commit attacks against the Colombian government and civilians.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica has a stringent licensing process for the importation and distribution of precursor chemicals. In 2010, it adopted recommendations from the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Costa Rica has controls for Table I and Table II precursor and essential chemicals as defined in the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Costa Rica’s National Drug Plan for 2020-2024 notes the problem of production and trafficking of chemical precursors. Costa Rica has not seized large amounts of the substances compared to elsewhere in the region. It has a robust registration process and is responsive to requests regarding suspicious shipments of precursors. The Costa Rican Institute on Drugs (ICD) has a special unit dedicated to the control and regulation of precursor chemicals, and this unit has broad powers to monitor and respond to illegal

activity. In June 2024, the ICD updated the list of regulated substances and chemical products in Costa Rica to include precursors of fentanyl and its analogues, ecstasy, amphetamine, and methamphetamine.

By law, importers and businesses that handle chemical precursors or certain types of prescription drugs are required to submit monthly reports through an online tracking system. Between January and September 17, 2024, there were 4,327 authorized import transactions licensed to 244 registered importers of chemical precursors. The system tracks the movement of chemical precursors and solvents and generates alerts. Costa Rica did not receive any alerts during that period related to possible irregular import activity.

Ecuador

Ecuadorian law designates potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride as controlled chemicals. Buying, selling, or importing such chemicals requires the permission of the Ministry of Interior, the primary agency responsible for precursor chemical control in Ecuador. Article 219 of the Criminal Code prohibits the use of precursor chemicals to produce, manufacture, or prepare illicit materials, such as cocaine or heroin, punishable by three to five years in prison.

The police's National Chemical Unit enforces the laws that govern the importation of listed chemicals, and targets organizations diverting these chemicals to criminal organizations through investigations and intelligence operations. Although the National Chemical Unit is a highly competent entity, its small size and lack of resources hinders its ability to tackle the problem on a large scale.

Ecuador imported large quantities of potassium permanganate in the past decade. According to the Ministry of Interior, during the first nine months of 2024, Ecuador imported 46 metric tons (MT) of potassium permanganate, compared to 82 MT during the same period in 2023. As a controlled chemical, potassium permanganate requires a license to be imported into the country. More than 99 percent of 2024 imports of potassium permanganate originated from the People's Republic of China. During the first nine months of 2024, Ecuador imported 19.94 MT of acetic anhydride, compared to 19.83 MT imported in 2023. Approximately 98 percent of 2024 imports of acetic anhydride originated from Mexico and the other two percent comes from the United States. Traffickers also continue

to smuggle liquid chemicals, including ether, from Ecuador to Colombia and Peru for cocaine processing.

El Salvador

El Salvador has regulated psychotropic drugs and other precursor chemicals since 1998 and has established regulations for all controlled substances entering El Salvador. The National Medicine Directorate publishes annually a list of medications and controlled substances. The 2024 list includes 162 narcotics, 176 psychotropic drugs, 99 precursor chemicals, and 76 substances related to fentanyl with no legitimate use or known therapeutic or scientific use. El Salvador is a party to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. As such, El Salvador's National Medicine Directorate authorizes all importations or exportations of precursor chemicals or other controlled substances, requires businesses to submit import estimates annually, and mandates businesses maintain records of controlled substances kept on hand.

Only authorized medical professionals may prescribe medication or controlled substances on the Salvadoran-defined controlled substances list. Pseudoephedrine has been prohibited in El Salvador since 2009 and cannot be imported or exported without the National Medicine Directorate's prior approval and authorization.

The National Civilian Police (PNC), with substantial U.S. support, trained and equipped the Chemical Unit to oversee regulation, identification, and investigation of potential diversion or production of illicit synthetic drugs. This unit began performing audits in 2024 on licit pharmaceutical production entities. El Salvador has a growing licit pharmaceutical production industry, expected to generate more than \$196 million in revenue in 2024. Precursor chemicals potassium permanganate (for cocaine) and acetic anhydride (for heroin) are used in this sector. The National Medicine Directorate oversees the use, movement, and storage of these substances. The Anti-Narcotics Division (DAN) of the PNC coordinates with the United States to stay apprised of any precursor chemicals imported into El Salvador and investigates every notice it receives. None of the resulting investigations in 2024 identified diversion of precursor chemicals to produce illicit narcotics. El Salvador adopted a preventative posture to illicit synthetic drug production in 2023, beginning work with the pharmaceutical industry to ensure proper storage and

inventory of pharmaceuticals and precursors and training regulatory and enforcement bodies on proper handling, response, and control of these substances.

El Salvador regularly responds to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) surveys on precursor chemicals and participated in Operation Backup 2024, an INCB intelligence-gathering exercise that collected information regarding identification, interdiction, and investigation of diverted precursor chemicals. El Salvador provides and receives precursor shipment data to the INCB's Pre-Export Notification system.

El Salvador's engagement with the INCB and adherence to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention demonstrates a commitment to supporting international efforts to counter drug abuse and narcotics trafficking. The United States has not identified any specific weaknesses in El Salvador's efforts to control precursor chemicals.

Germany

Germany remains the largest exporter in the world of legal pharmaceuticals by dollar value. Germany manufactures and/or sells the majority of the 33 scheduled substances under international control as listed in Tables I and II of the Drug Convention, as well as other chemicals that can be used for the illicit production of narcotic drugs.

According to its Federal Office of Statistics, Germany was the second largest exporter of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in 2023. Its exports included 32.6 metric tons (MT) of ephedrine and its salts – a nearly 22 percent decrease from 2022 (41.8 MT). The total 2023 export share of ephedrine to the United States amounted to 0.3 percent. Exports of pseudoephedrine and its salts in 2023 totaled 302.1 MT – an increase of 14 percent over 2022 – and the total export share to the United States went up to 38 percent from 35 in 2022. Germany was a net importer of potassium permanganate (365.2 MT) and acetic anhydride (70,306.5 MT) in 2023; its exports of potassium permanganate increased to 75.2 MT in 2023 (from 70.5 MT in 2022), and exports of acetic anhydride (352.7MT) decreased by 35 percent from 2022.

Germany's highly developed chemical sector is tightly controlled through a combination of national and European Union (EU) regulations, law enforcement action, and voluntary industry compliance. The EU and Germany have taken significant steps to implement the UN's 2017 decision to control the two primary chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl and

fentanyl analogues – 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP). Both ANPP and NPP are category 1 precursors since 2019, with EU regulation 2018/729. Germany's National Precursor Monitoring Act complies with EU regulations, including Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 on trade in drug precursors between EU and third countries and Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 on trade in drug precursors within the EU. In 2023, Germany brought its domestic legislation in compliance with EU Regulation 2023/196 that added N-Phenyl-N-(piperidin-4-yl) propanamid (Norfentanyl) and tert-Butyl-4-anilinopiperidin-1-carboxylat (1-boc-4-AP) to the list of category 1 controlled substances. In 2024, Germany added Isopropylidene (2-(3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl)acetyl)malonate (IMDPAM), seven esters of 2-methyl-3-phenyloxirane-2-carboxylic acid (BMK glycidic acid), and six esters of 3-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-methyl-oxirane-2-carboxylic acid (PMK glycidic acid) to the list of scheduled substances in accordance with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1331.

Germany works closely with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and is an active participant in chemical control initiatives led by the INCB, including Project Prism and Project Cohesion. U.S. authorities work closely with Germany's chemical regulatory agency, the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices, on chemical control issues and exchanges bilateral information to promote transnational chemical control initiatives.

On the law enforcement side, as of October 8, 2024, Germany seized 839.75 kg of pseudoephedrine in 2024, most of which originated from Egypt, with Slovakia and the Czech Republic as primary destinations. Additional 2024 seizures include 250 liters of hydrochloric acid, 3500 liters of hydrogen gas, and 4040 liters of chemical waste. Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office reported seizing 1.47 kilograms (kg) of ephedrine and 1.5 kg of pseudoephedrine in 2023, as well as 1.934 kg of amphetamine, including 3.6 million amphetamine-containing tablets and 136 liters of liquid amphetamine.

Guatemala

Guatemala is a party to the United Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Guatemala is also a participant in the U.S.-sponsored Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. The Government of Guatemala updated its list of controlled substances in 2023 for the first time in 10 years, when it previously left many fentanyl-linked precursors uncontrolled. Guatemala is due to make

additional updates in early 2025, including multiple chemicals scheduled in 2024 by the UN Commission on Narcotics Drugs.

Under Guatemalan law, the Ministry of Health controls the import, export, and end use oversight of precursor chemicals. However, the ministry does not have the personnel or resources to effectively monitor this traffic. The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) started work with the Ministry of Health in 2024 to modernize its processes for licensing and controlling chemical and pharmaceutical importers. Guatemala's U.S.-supported interinstitutional precursor investigation group made multiple seizures in 2024, including a November 23 seizure of fentanyl precursor 1-Boc-4 Piperdone at Guatemala's main international airport, and the June 11 seizure of 550 pounds of solid controlled chemicals and 356 gallons of liquid controlled chemicals (including two chemicals capable of producing methamphetamine). According to the Ministry of Health and Guatemalan customs (SAT), 2,091 kilograms of fentanyl and 9,737 kilograms of fentanyl precursors were legally imported into Guatemala in the first nine months of 2024.

The Ministry of Interior oversees the destruction of seized chemical precursors under the supervision of the Public Ministry. By the end of 2024, Guatemala had mostly eliminated its 3,000 metric ton precursor chemical stockpile (consisting of primarily methamphetamine precursors), leaving only small stockpiles that are subject to litigation holds. A U.S.-donated chemical incinerator was critical to this effort.

Honduras

On February 20, 2024, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through its Regional Program for the Safe Management and Disposal of Seized Drugs and Chemical Precursors (STAND), conducted a mission in Honduras. This U.S.-supported mission focused on providing technical assistance to evaluate seized chemicals, specifically assessing their physical condition, quantity, and quality, and accurately classifying them. The goal was to support a future disposal plan and reduce chemical inventories.

In November 2023, the STAND Program shared its "National Diagnostic of Capacities for the Safe Management and Disposal of Seized Drugs and Chemical Substances – Honduras." The report highlighted that most of the temporary storage facilities are improvised and lack proper infrastructure for storing hazardous chemicals. It concluded

these facilities cannot reliably meet necessary environmental and biosafety standards, which increases risks for leaks, spills, and contamination. This inadequate storage presents hazards to local ecosystems and the health of personnel who manage these sites. As a result, immediate action is critical to protect biodiversity and human health from potential long-term damage.

During the February field mission, STAND's technical team held multiple training and coordination meetings with officials from the Honduras Public Prosecutor's Office, the National Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation, Forensic Medicine, Anti-Narcotics Police, and the Armed Forces. These sessions aimed to strengthen skills in risk management, personal protective equipment use, and chemical classification. The team also trained officials on advanced equipment for identifying chemicals, with paramedics monitoring all activities to ensure safety.

Following the mission, the STAND team produced a comprehensive report with findings, recommendations, and a short- and medium-term action plan. This plan will help guide decision-making for future disposal efforts, ensuring cost-effective and environmentally responsible disposal methods that adhere to high biosafety standards to protect personnel and public health.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, is neither a drug manufacturing nor chemical producing economy. Hong Kong maintains well-developed logistics connectivity to mainland China, one of the largest precursor chemical exporters. Therefore, Hong Kong's chemical trade is mostly in the form of imports and subsequent re-export or transshipments, or for local consumption for medical and industrial use. Some precursor chemicals transshipped from mainland China are bound for the illicit drug trade in the Americas.

The Control of Chemicals (COC) Ordinance of 1996 is Hong Kong's basic legislation for regulating possession, manufacture, transport, and distribution of controlled chemicals. A total of 36 substances are subject to statutory control under the COC Ordinance. In October 2022, COC Order 2022 added 4-anilinopiperidine ("4-AP"), tert-butyl 4-(phenylamino)piperidine-1-carboxylate ("1-boc-4-AP"), and norfentanyl to Schedule 2 of the COC (Cap. 145). Precursor chemicals for methamphetamine, cocaine and heroin – such as

ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, potassium permanganate, and acetic anhydride – are also controlled under the COC.

The COC Ordinance establishes a licensing regime for importers, exporters, dealers, traders, manufacturers, and handlers of designated chemicals, and applies equally to imports, exports, and transshipments. Permits for every shipment are mandatory, as is approval for premises and containers used to store such chemicals. The maximum penalty for illicit chemical trafficking is 15 years imprisonment and a fine of \$130,000. The Controlled Chemicals Group of the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department's Drug Investigations Bureau administers and enforces the Ordinance.

Hong Kong does not control sales of over-the-counter medicines containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine but does investigate reports of possible diversion or parallel trading. While Hong Kong supports global actions to prevent illicit chemical diversion, it tends to place a lower priority on cases where transiting chemicals are not controlled in Hong Kong.

India

India's chemical industry is the sixth largest in the world and third largest in Asia, according to an industry association, and expected to grow by as much as 12 percent a year through 2027. The sector supports India's large pharmaceutical manufacturing industry.

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS), last amended in 2022, establishes the legal framework to prevent and combat the use and illicit trafficking of drugs in India. The Narcotics Control Bureau under the Ministry of Home Affairs has primary responsibility for drug-related law enforcement at the central level. The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), which falls under the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue, issues licenses for the production of legal synthetic drugs and enforces laws against illicit opium production and trade. CBN also interacts with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and foreign governments to supervise international transactions of regulated substances. The Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers regulates the pharmaceutical sector and the production of precursor chemicals.

India regulates 27 of 33 precursor chemicals scheduled in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Convention. It classifies seven of these chemicals as Schedule A, subject to the most

stringent controls, requiring a unique registration for sale or distribution. India has yet to regulate the most recent precursors added to Tables 1 & 2 of the 1988 UN Convention at the most recent meeting of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). The export of chemicals from India which are not prohibited under Indian law but are intended for uses prohibited under the laws of the destination country, including the United States, is a large and growing problem. Indian regulators lack the authority to impose class-wide controls on fentanyl analogues.

In September 2024, the CBN issued a Public Notice encouraging voluntary private sector reporting on domestic consumption, imports, and export of high-risk precursor chemicals on the UN International Special Surveillance List (ISSL). Multiple fentanyl precursors added to the 1988 UN Convention, and frequently purchased by Mexican cartels, appear on this list (e.g. 4-Piperidone, N-Boc-4-Piperidone, etc.). Nonscheduled chemicals are used to produce illicit drugs in India and exported to global production hubs.

India participates in other international precursor control initiatives, such as the INCB Precursor Task Force, contributing to international efforts to identify and address new trends in precursor trafficking.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea's (ROK) proximity to precursor production hubs and large role in the logistical flow of legitimate cargo, along with its generally advanced industrial capabilities, make it attractive to criminals seeking to obtain and transship precursor chemicals. Precursor chemicals used for the manufacture of illicit drugs such as acetic anhydride (heroin) are likely imported from the United States, Japan, India, and China and then either resold within the ROK or smuggled into other countries. While acetic anhydride remains the chemical of greatest concern, there are increasing concerns about the use of legal and less monitored chemicals such as sodium cyanide to evade authorities and produce illicit drugs such as methamphetamine. The ROK imports acetic anhydride for legitimate use, such as film production, cigarette filters, and other industrial and medical applications. The ROK placed 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP) under regulatory control after the UN's 2017 decision to control these precursors.

The ROK's efforts to control diversion of regulated chemical precursors are largely effective. The United States and other international bodies enjoy strong cooperation from both the Korea Customs Service and Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) when it comes to monitoring imports of potassium permanganate (cocaine) and chemicals used to produce amphetamine-type stimulants. ROK authorities participate in International Narcotics Control Board-coordinated monitoring and regulating task forces, including projects Cohesion and Prism. ROK law enforcement authorities also cooperate with Southeast Asian countries to verify documents and confirm the identities of importing businesses, including by on-site inspection.

The MFDS is responsible for enforcing a 2011 law requiring manufacturers, importers and exporters of precursor chemicals to register with the government and renew registration every two years. It also provides training and updates to Korean businesses to keep them from unknowingly exporting precursor chemicals to fraudulent importers. Smugglers exploit Korean customs and chemical regulations to hide precursor chemical shipments in containerized cargo shipments. Current regulations, which have different reporting thresholds for different chemicals, could allow smugglers to purchase multiple small quantities from different retail outlets to avoid detection and then combine them for shipment. Korean authorities work closely with U.S. counterparts to track suspect shipments.

Mexico

Government of Mexico agencies authorize permits and monitor the import of controlled precursor chemicals, but such monitoring has not significantly deterred local production of synthetic drugs. Mexico controls many precursor chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, including potassium permanganate (cocaine precursor) and acetic anhydride (heroin precursor). Of those listed, Mexico does not control tert-Butyl 4-(phenylamino)piperidine-1-carboxylate (1-boc-4-AP), 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidate ("PMK glycidate"), 3,4-MDP-2-P methyl glycidic acid ("PMK glycidic acid"), methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA), norephedrine, norfentanyl, and alpha-phenylacetoacetamide (APAA). The Mexican Health Secretariat's Federal Commission for the Production Against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS) is responsible for regulating many chemicals required for illicit drug production. COFEPRIS works with the

National Guard, Mexican Navy, Customs Agency (ANAM), and Attorney General's Office (FGR) to enforce the law.

Mexico controls eight fentanyl precursors: 4- Anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP), N-Phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), N-phenyl-4-piperidinamine (4-AP), propionic anhydride, propionic chloride, hydrochloric acid, ethyl ether, and toluene. In 2021, Mexico published a chemical watchlist to flag dual-use chemicals to government and private sector entities. Mexico has not amended its chemical control watchlist since 2022, when it expanded its chemical watchlist from 14 to 69 (15 fentanyl precursors, 28 methamphetamine precursors, and 26 essential chemicals). These controls force transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to mislabel or conceal shipments or seek chemical alternatives. The controls also provide regulatory and law enforcement agencies a legal basis to seize these substances and file criminal or civil charges.

Netherlands

The Netherlands is home to 19 of the world's top 25 chemical companies and has Europe's third-largest chemicals industry. The chemical industry netted 68 billion euros in 2023, and it is a strategically designated "top sector." The Netherlands maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework for the chemical industry, ensuring compliance with EU regulations and standards. The Netherlands has established strict legislation and oversight for the industry through the Law for Prevention of the Misuse of Chemicals (WVMC).

The Ministries of Justice and Security and Health, Welfare, and Sport are responsible for domestic narcotics issues. The chemical industry is required by law to report suspicious transactions, and the Customs Administration monitors the production, distribution, and trade of chemicals. The Financial Investigative Service (FIOD) is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the WVMC and leads law enforcement efforts targeting precursor chemical criminal enterprises.

Most methamphetamine is produced using the phenyl-2-propanone, aluminum, methylamine, and mercuric chloride (P2P) method, known in the Netherlands as the benzyl methyl ketone (BMK) method. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are generally not utilized for methamphetamine production. Manufacturers often rely on precursors to create P2P/BMK. As restrictions have tightened, the use of these precursors has evolved, shifting from alpha-phenoacetyl nitrile (APAAN) to alphaphenylacetoacetamide (APAA), and from

methyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA) to ethyl alpha-phenylacetoacetate (EAPA). Captagon is also produced using BMK. MDMA is produced using variants of 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenylpropan-2-one, also known as piperonyl methyl ketone (abbreviated MDP2P or PMK). In 2023, PMK glycidate was seen most frequently.

The national-level synthetic drugs unit of the National Police of the Netherlands (NPN) is comprised of teams from both FIOD and NPN which work together to investigate synthetic drugs and precursors. The extent of the illegal production exceeds the NPN's ability to effectively investigate and disrupt it. Bilateral meetings with Dutch law enforcement frequently highlight capacity constraints to act on leads sent from U.S. law enforcement agencies or collaborate on U.S. investigations. Further, the strict privacy and information-sharing laws in the Netherlands prohibit the NPN from proactively sharing case-specific information with U.S. law enforcement agencies. Absent a mutual legal assistance request, it can be difficult for U.S. agencies to proactively assist their Dutch counterparts. U.S. law enforcement agencies hope to expand cooperation within the respective Dutch and U.S. judicial systems.

Nigeria

Precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs are a crucial concern in Nigeria's drug control strategy. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) has adopted measures to track and regulate these substances, cooperating with legitimate drug manufacturers, importers, and distributors to ensure accountability. The NDLEA has undertaken various steps aimed at preventing precursor chemicals diversion. These include ensuring that importers have the required documents for the importation of controlled substances; conducting regular visits to companies and monitoring stock records to ensure compliance; strengthening partnership with the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) to monitor compliance on allocated import quotas; training to help officers at major points of entry to properly identify and report on precursors and controlled substances; training companies on monitoring distribution, maintaining proper records, and filing cases regularly with the NDLEA for effective monitoring; and strengthening partnership with Precursor Identification Control System (PICS) and Pre-Export Notification (PEN) on digital tracking of precursors being moved transnationally and domiciled with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The

gap in forensic detection of substances has been reduced to an extent due to the U.S.-supported strengthening of the NDLEA forensic laboratory.

Pakistan

In 2022, Pakistan amended its 1997 Control of Narcotics Substances Act (CNSA) to adapt to the evolving nature of illicit drug manufacturing, transit, and trade. The Pakistan Ministry of Narcotics Control (MNC) and Drug Regulatory Authority (DRA) maintain overall control and oversight of the chemicals used in narcotics formulation. The MNC and DRA enforce a quota system for all chemicals entering Pakistan, controlling the type, quantity, and recipient. However, limited resources for inspection controls, outdated administrative systems for tracking import requests, and scarce training opportunities hamper authorities' efforts to control the chemicals used for synthetic drugs.

In 2017, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) recommended international control for the two primary chemicals used to produce fentanyl analogues: 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP); and N-Phenethyl-4-piperidinone (NPP). Since then, traffickers have adapted by seeking alternative precursor chemicals for fentanyl production. In March 2024, bromazolam, a chemical used to adulterate drugs such as fentanyl or alprazolam (Xanax) was added to Schedule IV of the 1971 UN Convention; however, Pakistan's government has yet to enforce this change. According to the INCB, Pakistan's legal use of fentanyl remains minimal, and Antinarcotics Force reports corroborate this assessment. Additionally, Pakistan drug enforcement agencies are aware that acids, iodine, red and white phosphorus, potassium and sodium permanganate, and acetic anhydride are used in the manufacture of various synthetic drugs. Besides the quota system in place, MNC works to ensure customs and law enforcement agents can identify these chemicals. This coordination resulted in seizure of 3,200 Diazepam tablets, 218 kg of morphine, and the arrest of multiple criminal targets in 2024.

Peru

Peru's National Superintendency of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT) and the Forensic Bureau of the Peruvian National Police (PNP) are equipped with the technical expertise to analyze chemical substances, precursors, pharmaceutical products, and synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive substances. However, the nation's regulatory

framework remains outdated, particularly in the control of key fentanyl precursors listed under Table I substances.

In Peru, medical-grade fentanyl is legally dispensed through prescriptions in authorized pharmacies, hospitals, and clinics. However, there have been unconfirmed media reports of diversion from these regulated supplies into the black market, where fentanyl is allegedly being distributed illicitly. In response to these concerns, since August 2024 the United States has supported a comprehensive assessment to evaluate the current threat posed by fentanyl in Peru, focusing on its distribution networks, supply chains to users, and potential diversion from medical sources to illicit markets, particularly in Lima. This assessment, scheduled for completion in January 2025, will provide critical insights for the United States to formulate strategies aimed at preventing the proliferation of fentanyl in Peru.

From January 1 to October 17, 2024, Peruvian authorities reported the seizure of over 77,750 metric tons (MT) of 25 different chemical precursors, the majority of which was calcium hydroxide. This significant volume underscores the scale of precursor trafficking in the region, which presents a growing challenge for law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

Poland

The 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction prohibits production, import, and marketing of precursor chemicals in Poland; the State Sanitary Inspector heads enforcement. An October 2011 Memorandum of Understanding between the Chief Sanitary Inspector, National Police Commander, Customs Service Chief, and Chief Pharmaceutical Inspector divides chemical control responsibility. Poland's laws on precursor chemical controls also implement United Nations and European Union mandates, including the Act of July 20, 2018, (amending the 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction and the Act on the State Sanitary Inspection) and the Minister of Health's August 21, 2019 amended regulation on the list of psychotropic substances, intoxicants, and new psychoactive substances.

The State Sanitary Inspector and State Pharmaceutical Inspector lead in implementing drug and chemical controls. The Sanitary Inspector controls category 2 and 3 drug precursors (such as potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride) and supervises manufacturing, importation, and commercial entities that handle them. The State Pharmaceutical Inspector has the same responsibilities for category 1 drug precursors (such as ephedrine and

pseudoephedrine). In suspected cases of illegal precursor handling, Chief Inspectors notify the Central Bureau of Investigation Police (CBSP). The law also requires any manufacturer, importer, or distributor of pharmaceutical substances to be licensed by the State Pharmaceutical Inspector in compliance with EU-Directive 2011/62/EU.

The two most important regulatory bodies involved in the export of chemicals include the Bureau for Chemical Substances and the Main Inspectorate of Environmental Protection. The Bureau for Chemical Substance oversees the implementation of chemical regulations, ensuring compliance with national and EU chemical laws, including CLP (Classification, Labelling and Packaging) regulations. The Main Inspectorate of Environmental Protection (GIOS) plays a significant role in monitoring and protecting the environment against harmful chemical substances and ensuring that chemical exports align with environmental safety standards by imposing restrictions or providing guidelines on those exports. Additionally, other Polish and EU institutions may also be involved, depending on the type of chemical and its intended use.

Exporters of chemicals in Poland must obtain necessary permits, adhere to safety and labeling standards, and remain aware of restrictions on chemical exports to specific jurisdictions, especially those with stringent controls under their domestic frameworks.

Poland has faced challenges related to precursor chemicals used in synthetic drug production. There have been instances in which unlawfully obtained precursor chemicals intended for legal purposes were diverted for illicit drug production. Additionally, as a transit country, Poland has uncovered cases of illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals. Polish authorities have been working to address precursor chemical control through enhanced monitoring, intelligence sharing, and cooperation with international partners.

Poland enters information into the International Narcotics Control Board Pre-Export Notification (PEN) system for all exports and imports of drug precursors. Key legislation regulating the trade in drugs and drug precursors are the 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction and Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament on drug precursors.

South Africa

South Africa is a leading regional importer of chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs. South Africa has a strong infrastructure of roads and rail, telecommunication, airports, and seaports facilities, all of which are also used to transit illicit drugs, particularly cocaine, heroin and methaqualone.

The South African Police Service (SAPS) has a trained, dedicated clandestine laboratory team, which operates under the South Africa Narcotics Enforcement Bureau (SANEB). SAPS conducted at least 10 operations in the first seven months of 2024 to dismantle clandestine drug laboratories. Notable seizures included the raid on a farm in Limpopo province in July, where large quantities of chemicals used in the manufacturing of illicit drugs including acetone as well as crystal meth with an estimated street value of \$110 million were recovered. On the farm, SAPS arrested four individuals including two Mexican nationals. In July in Northern Cape, police raided a drug house and arrested four suspects, seizing crystal meth, marijuana, and methaqualone (mandrax).

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, used in South Africa to synthesize methamphetamine, largely originate in Nigeria and India. South African authorities periodically report newly identified precursor substances used in illicit drug production to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). South Africa also submits information on seized precursor shipments to the INCB's Precursors Incident Communication System. Controlling and analyzing the trade of precursors is mandated by the South Africa National Drug Policy, which requires the establishment of computerized inventory control systems for scheduled chemicals and regulating and monitoring the purchase of medicines containing precursors via a registry system. Such inventory and regulatory measures have not been fully implemented, however.

U.S. law enforcement collaboration with South Africa on investigations is productive but sporadic, and U.S. authorities regularly share information on container shipments suspected of containing possible illicit materials with South African counterparts.

The United States is working closely with SAPS Chemical Monitoring Program (CMP) to develop and strengthen South Africa's SOP on chemical monitoring to include onsite inspections, records review, and precursor chemical diversion investigations.

South Africa is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and has expressed interest in leading a subcommittee under the Global Coalition framework. South Africa supports the member pledge and seeks to work with the United States and international community to combat this growing problem.

Taiwan

According to the International Trade Administration (ITA) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, for the first nine months of 2024 Taiwan exported 2,450 kilograms (kg) of pseudoephedrine and its derivative salts (market value \$182,464), compared to 1,290 kg in the same period in 2023. There were no exports of ephedrine or its derivative salts in the first nine months of 2024, similar to the same period in 2023. Taiwan's Food and Drug Administration (TFDA) allows exports of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine for medical purposes.

The Industrial Development Administration (IDA) under Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act, continues to impose strict reporting requirements in tracking the production, distribution, sale, storage, and export/import of 25 precursor chemicals (17 items in Category A and eight items in Category B) including acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate. MOEA continues to control the flow of 25 industrial precursor chemicals in accordance with the Categories and Regulations Governing Inspection and Declaration of Industrial Precursor Chemicals. There are few cases involving the use of precursor chemicals such as acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate for cocaine and heroin production, as amphetamine-type stimulants and ketamine are more prevalent among illicit drug users in Taiwan.

According to the latest data, as of the end of the third quarter of 2024, approximately 896 companies had reported Category A chemical-related activities (involved in reactions and becoming part of the chemical structures of narcotics or classified as chemicals used in production of narcotics as announced by the competent authorities). Taiwan Customs data showed that as of September 2024, 142 Taiwanese companies reported trading activities in Category B chemicals (involved or not involved in reactions and not becoming part of the chemical structures of narcotics). IDA maintains a secure database, "Precursors Info Taiwan," which requires companies to self-report chemical-related activities online.

Under the Controlled Drugs Act (CDA), the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration (TFDA) under the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) supervises the trade and use of controlled drugs for pharmaceutical and scientific purposes, including end-users such as hospitals and pharmacies. From 2023 annual data (the latest available), TFDA inspected 12,063 cases involving the manufacture, sale, and use of drugs subject to the CDA and found 356 violations, mainly due to administrative errors or failure to report the income and expenditure balances of controlled drugs in a timely manner. The violation ratio was 2.95 percent.

Taiwan has documented a rise in the use of several pharmaceutical substances. These include etomidate, metomidate, and isopropyl 1-(1-phenylethyl)-1H-imidazole-5-carboxylate. Similar to the United States Controlled Substance Act, Taiwan divides narcotics into four categories based on their extent of causing habitual usage, abusive usage, and danger to society; Category 1 is the most dangerous and likely to be abused, while Category 4 is the least likely to be abused. Recently, Taiwan's MOHW and the Ministry of Justice added etomidate, metomidate, and isopropyl 1-(1-phenylethyl)-1H-imidazole-5-carboxylate to their list of Category 3 controlled drugs and implemented more robust measures to prevent their sale and importation into Taiwan. However, there has been some discussion by Taiwan legislators that the control measures of the aforementioned substances should be increased to Category 2 drugs in order to combat drug abuse among young people. Taiwan law enforcement and the Taiwan Food and Drug Administration have ruled out the possibility of domestic production of etomidate, metomidate, and isopropyl 1-(1-phenylethyl)-1H-imidazole-5-carboxylate and believe that the substances are being smuggled illegally into Taiwan.

Due to Taiwan not being party to the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board or INTERPOL, and to the lack of official political ties with other countries, Taiwan does not have the ability to directly engage countries that might be sourcing these types of substances. Thus, Taiwan law enforcement must use other countries, such as the United States, to communicate with law enforcement from the source countries in order to exchange investigative intelligence on international drug trafficking organizations. This lack of a communication channel in many cases impedes the timely sharing of investigative information and intelligence that can be used to disrupt or dismantle these organizations.

Thailand

Thailand's domestic drug production is relatively limited, and it is not a major source country for drug precursor chemicals, but Thailand remains a significant transit country for chemicals destined for Burma, Laos, and Cambodia. Thai authorities assert that most chemicals are imported for legitimate medical or industrial purposes, but the true quantity of diverted chemicals is unknown. Thai regulatory agencies do not yet have the staff, resources, and training to conduct inspections, investigations, and audits to detect and prevent diversion. Thailand has maintained a legal and regulatory framework for preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals since the Commodity Control Act of 1952. Additional laws include Thailand's Narcotics Act, Psychotropic Substances Act, Hazardous Substances Act, and Export and Import of Goods Act.

In 2016, Thailand introduced new regulations (Order of the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order 32/2599, 2016) to monitor the import, export, production, trafficking, and possession of precursors. The Precursor Chemical Control Committee, in place since 1993, formulates national strategy on precursor chemical control. Thailand has scheduled all chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Drug Convention, in addition to many other precursor and essential chemicals not included under the Convention. Pre-export notification is conducted to mitigate diversion as required under the Convention. Thai law enforcement does not currently have jurisdiction to investigate chemicals listed on the Hazardous Substance Act and is required to coordinate with regulatory entities such as the Department of Industrial Works.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministries of Interior, Economy, Health and Prevention (MOHAP), and its Federal Authority for Identity, Citizenship, Customs, and Ports Security oversee the import and export of internationally recognized chemicals. Under Federal Law by Decree No. 30 of 2021 on Combating Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, the UAE criminalizes the production, import, export, transport, purchase, sale, possession, and storage of narcotic and psychotropic substances unless the substances are part of a supervised and regulated medical or scientific activity.

MOHAP administers the process for industrial and commercial companies to obtain approval to import precursor chemicals. The requirements include a valid MOHAP

registration certificate and trade license; a permit and detailed information about the material required by the authorized and accredited officer; and the Ministry of Interior's prior approval for chemical precursors. Businesses must obtain trade licenses from the Department of Economic Development in the emirate where they will be doing business.

The UAE is a signatory to several international conventions on narcotic and psychotropic substances, including the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which placed 23 additional precursor substances under international control. While the UAE has implemented stringent controls for the import and export of chemicals, the UAE has 46 free trade zones (FTZ) that are subject to the rules, regulations, and oversight of the free trade zone authority for that area. Companies set up in an FTZ can use their trade licenses to import goods into that FTZ.

Due to the proximity to major drug source countries in Asia, and the vulnerabilities created by the varying levels of control in FTZs, the UAE is a transshipment point for illicit drugs and precursor chemicals throughout the world. To stem the illicit diversion of precursor chemicals, in early 2024, the Dubai Police Department established a Precursor Unit, the first such unit in the UAE. While UAE law enforcement focuses on controlled substance seizures, both synthetic and narcotic, the UAE has continued to see increased amounts of captagon, mainly transiting, and methamphetamine. The UAE engages well with operational counterparts and works with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the UAE. UNODC experts observe countering narcotics and narcotics trafficking is a high priority of the UAE, especially in recent years.

The National Rehabilitation Center (NRC) in Abu Dhabi, a quasi-governmental treatment program, remains a leader throughout the Middle East in addiction prevention, treatment of substance use disorders, and rehabilitation services. After earning accredited certification from the UNODC, the NRC continued its efforts in combating addiction and psychotropic substances. For example, an NRC leader built a training team in addiction counseling that disseminated INL-funded training materials throughout the Middle East. Most of the members of this training team continue to work in the UAE as consultants. At the Global Coalition Middle East Drug Dialogue in Budapest in October 2024, a UAE representative stated that UAE leaders would consider positively requests from other governments for training and support for national master trainers in addiction counseling.

The UAE is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. In 2024, the UAE reaffirmed its commitment to the Coalition Pledge and global efforts to combat this crisis and announced a new joint initiative with Canada to expand public health interventions and increase access to life-saving medications. UAE experts have presented to the Global Coalition as well. For example, a Drug Department director, who manages multiple divisions responsible for drug regulations in the UAE, including the import and export of medical products and precursor chemicals division, quality control lab for medical products, drug registration, and pharmacovigilance, presented to the Global Coalition in 2024. The UAE hosts multiple government and private sector workshops and conferences, including the World Police Summit and the Joint Workshop on Disrupting Falsified, Substandard, Unauthorized Illicitly Sourced Pharmaceutical Trafficking, which demonstrate the UAE's advocacy for global partnership in combating illicit narcotics.

United Kingdom

The UK is not a source country for illicit drugs but is a leading producer of precursor chemicals. The UK applies a strict regulatory regime to the production and trade of precursor chemicals, including mandatory licensing and reporting obligations. Although drug precursors have legitimate commercial uses, the UK Home Office controls them because they can be used in illicit drug production. The UK government classifies precursor chemicals into four categories, which determines how the Home Office regulates them. Precursor chemicals also are imported to the UK, primarily from China, India, Germany, and the Netherlands; however, the UK occasionally is used as a transshipment point for precursor chemicals bound for countries in Africa, Central America, and Mexico.

The Home Office Drug Licensing and Compliance Unit is the regulatory body for precursor chemical control in the UK; however, the NCA and the police have the responsibility to investigate suspicious transactions. Licensing and reporting obligations are required for the commercialization of listed substances, and non-compliance is a criminal offense. HM Revenue and Customs monitors imports and exports of listed chemicals. The United States and UK continue to cooperate closely in international bodies to promote global regulation of precursor chemicals.

Venezuela

Due to the Maduro regime's lack of information sharing on drug control issues writ large, the United States has little information to evaluate precursor chemical diversion or diversion control efforts. The Single National Registry of Operators of Controlled Chemical Substances (Spanish acronym RESQUIMC), which was created in 2010, is responsible for chemical control along with the National Anti-Drug Superintendency (SUNAD) and other agencies. In 2016, the former National Antidrug Office (now SUNAD) created the Network Against the Diversion of Chemical Substances (Network) to promote institutional cooperation to prevent the diversion of chemical substances. Annex 1 of the Organic Law Against Drugs of 2010, which establishes the mechanisms and measures of control, surveillance, and inspection for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as well as chemical, precursor and essential substances, includes two lists containing 62 and 17 substances.

According to Venezuelan law, the existence and use of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and controlled chemical substances used by the pharmaceutical industry, as well as their derivatives, salts, preparations, and pharmaceutical specialties, are strictly limited to the quantities necessary for medical treatment, the legal production of medications, or scientific investigations. In July 2016, the Ministry for Industry and Commerce declared Alpha-phenylacetonitrile (APAAN) and its optical isomers to be substances subject to state control, given their links to the production of drugs. In 2019, the Ministry of Industries and National Production designated the chemical substances 4 Anilino-N-Fenetilpiperdina (APP) and N-Fenetil-4-Piperidona (NPP) as chemical substances subject to control of the state. By law, all persons handling controlled chemical substances are to register with the RESQUIMC.

In April 2024, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced it sought to unify security control criteria to avoid diversion of chemical substances for illicit drug production and carried out a training activity in Anzoategui state.

In June 2024, SUNAD organized an "International Forum on the Importance of Bilateral Cooperation in the Fight Against Illicit Drug Trafficking." Without providing specifics, SUNAD said members of the diplomatic and consular communities and international organizations accredited in Venezuela attended the event. Major General Richard López

Vargas cited a UNODC World Drug Report in noting an increase in global consumption of illicit substances and the Report's finding that in 2022, cannabis remained the most used drug worldwide. SUNAD in June also organized the first "Strategic Police Meeting for the Combating of Illicit Drug Trafficking" in Caracas, where SUNAD said attendees evaluated strategic plans to combat drug trafficking.

In September 2024, representatives from SUNAD and RESQUIMIC met to discuss coordinated actions they could take in overseeing operations to control chemical substances in the country through the strengthening of the Network. Both entities committed to continuing to build capacity for handlers of controlled chemical substances in Venezuela to minimize the risk of diversion.

Major Exporters and Importers of Pseudoephedrine and Ephedrine

(Section 722, Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA))

This section of the INCSR responds to the CMEA's Section 722 requirement to report on the five major importing and exporting countries of the identified methamphetamine precursor chemicals. In meeting these requirements, the Department of State and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) considered the chemicals involved and the available data on their export, import, worldwide production, and the known legitimate demand. The available data does not address illicit trafficking and production.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are no longer preferred chemicals for methamphetamine production shipped to the United States, since traffickers are increasingly using substitutes or pre-precursors. The phenomenon of substitute chemicals used in methamphetamine production is particularly observed in Mexico, where the nitrostyrene method is used to produce phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), which starts from benzaldehyde and nitroethane, or from the intermediary product 1-phenyl-2-nitropropene.

Phenylpropanolamine, a third chemical listed in the CMEA, is not a methamphetamine precursor, although it can be used as an amphetamine precursor. In 2000, the FDA issued warnings concerning significant health risks associated with phenylpropanolamine. As a result, phenylpropanolamine is no longer approved for human consumption.

Phenylpropanolamine is still imported for veterinary medicines, and for the conversion to amphetamine for the legitimate manufacture of pharmaceutical products. As phenylpropanolamine is not a methamphetamine precursor chemical, and trade and production data are not available, phenylpropanolamine has not been included in this section.

The Information Handling Services (IHS) Markit's Global Trade Atlas (GTA), a commercial compendium, is the only data source on import and export available to produce the CMEA report. Given the reporting cycles by participating countries, data often lags behind one year. The most recent year for which full-year data is available is 2023. The data, including from previous years, is continually revised as countries review and revise it. GTA data analysis and a chart identifying the sources of the data are in the tables at the end of this section.

The most recent International Narcotics Control Board's (INCB) Annual Legitimate Requirements (ALR) report available is from October 2024.

<https://www.incb.org/incb/en/precursors/alrs.html>. Data on exports and imports of pharmaceutical preparations containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are commercial and proprietary and are not available, nor is data on legitimate demand for these substances, whether in bulk or processed pharmaceutical form. Thus, this list of the top five importers does not necessarily demonstrate that these countries have the highest levels of diversion. Instead, it demonstrates the rank position of each country compared to the overall exporters and importers of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine worldwide, as reported by the GTA.

For purposes of this determination, the United States has been excluded from these lists. However, U.S. exports and import data of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine is included, citing divergent estimates from both GTA and DEA. For the purposes of this report, the Department of State relies on data provided by DEA.

Overall, the accuracy of this trade data should be viewed with caution, as some countries have less sophisticated infrastructure and methodologies at their disposal than others for measuring the volume, overall trends, and commodities involved in legitimate trade. Furthermore, this data cannot accurately identify the specific trends of smuggling or diversion involving subterfuge.

The trade data source employed in this determination and certification does not reflect illicit smuggling or production around the globe that has been detected by law enforcement and other reporting. Nor does it reflect an accurate disparity between requirements and imports. Available trade data from GTA is also silent on legitimate commercial sales of alternative precursor chemicals used in methamphetamine production, which comprise a growing proportion of chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, particularly for the U.S. market.

Thus far, the economic and compliance analyses required by the CMEA remain challenging. Often the collection and reporting of such data requires a regulatory infrastructure that is beyond the means of some governments. Further, not all countries are familiar with the methodology and data sources used by the GTA to report the final numbers, and some countries dispute the accuracy of the data. This increases the difficulty of comparing import or export totals across years.

Nevertheless, the United States will continue to urge countries in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and technical forums to report on their licit domestic requirements for methamphetamine precursor chemicals to the INCB. The United States will also continue to work with the INCB and with authorities in the reporting countries to secure explanations for anomalies between reported imports and reported licit domestic requirements, and to follow the development of other chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine.

CMEA Trade Data. Top Five Exporting Countries or Economies, and the United States

Table 3: Ephedrine 2021-2023 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2023)

| Reporting Country | Unit | 2021 Quantities | 2022 Quantities | 2023 Quantities |
|-------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| India | kg | 47,728 | 56,251 | 46,085 |
| Germany | kg | 10,185 | 50,620 | 35,262 |
| Czechia | kg | 3,310 | 6,510 | 2,954 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----|--------|---------|--------|
| Denmark | kg | 525 | 450 | 1,028 |
| United Kingdom | kg | 1,326 | 726 | 776 |
| Top Five Total | kg | 63,074 | 114,557 | 86,105 |
| United States (GTA) | kg | 429 | 114 | 164 |
| United States (DEA) | kg | 1.9 | 2.6 | 16.7 |

Analysis of Export Data:

The top five exporters of ephedrine in 2023 were India, Germany, Czechia, Denmark, and the UK. According to the Global Trade Atlas (GTA) database, ephedrine exports decreased 24.83 percent in 2023 compared to 2022 mainly due to a substantial decrease in exports from India, Germany, and the Czechia. In 2022, India's exports decreased by 18.07 percent from 56,251 kg in 2022 to 46,085g in 2023. India continued to rank as the top global exporter of ephedrine during this reporting period. Germany's exports decreased from 50,620 kg in 2022 to 35,262 kg in 2023, a 30.33 percent decline. Czechia ranked third with a decrease on its exports from 6,510 kg in 2022 to 2,954 kg in 2023, a 54.62 percent decline. Exports increased from Denmark and the UK compared with the previous year – in the case of Denmark going from 450 kg in 2022 to 1,028 kg in 2023, representing a 128.44 percent increase, and in the case of the UK from 726 kg in 2022 to 776 kg in 2023, representing a 6.88 percent increase respectively. In both instances the reason for such increases is unknown.

According to the most current information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. exports of ephedrine were 1.9 kg in 2021, 2.6 kg in 2022, and 16.7 kg in 2023

Table 4: Pseudoephedrine 2021-2023 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2023)

| Reporting Country | Unit | 2021 Quantities | 2022 Quantities | 2023 Quantities |
|-------------------|------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| India | kg | 260,897 | 451,854 | 515,780 |
| Germany | kg | 161,656 | 263,640 | 302,710 |
| Switzerland | kg | 46,540 | 27,227 | 33,545 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----|---------|---------|---------|
| Singapore | kg | 18,876 | 28,868 | 24,085 |
| Denmark | kg | 6,030 | 12,220 | 11,400 |
| Top Five Total | kg | 493,999 | 783,809 | 887,520 |
| United States (GTA) | kg | 72 | 5,782 | 99 |
| United States (DEA) | kg | 2,438 | 9,241 | 4,376 |

Analysis of Export Data:

According to GTA data, the aggregated volume of worldwide exports of pseudoephedrine from the 2023 top five exporters increased from 783,809 kg in 2022 to 887,520 kg in 2023, representing a 13.23 percent increase. The top five exporters of pseudoephedrine in 2023 were again India, Germany, Switzerland, Singapore, and Denmark. India, Germany, and Switzerland increased their pseudoephedrine exports in 2023 from 451,854 kg to 515,780 kg, 263,640 kg to 302,710 kg, and 27,227 kg to 33,710 kg, or a 14.14 percent, 14.81 percent, and 23.20 percent increase, respectively. The reason for such increases is unknown. Singapore's and Denmark's exports decreased between 2022 for unknown reasons, from 28,868 kg to 24,085 kg, and from 12,220 kg to 11,400 kg, respectively.

According to the most current information provided by DEA, exports of pseudoephedrine from the United States decreased from 9,241 kg in 2022 to 4,376 kg in 2023, a 52.6 percent decrease.

Top Five Importing Countries or Economies, and the United States

Table 5: Ephedrine 2021-2023 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2023)

| Reporting Country | Unit | 2021 Quantities | 2022 Quantities | 2023 Quantities |
|-------------------|------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Republic of Korea | kg | 3,502 | 36,903 | 36,302 |
| Ghana | kg | 2,654 | 1,931 | 2,662 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----|--------|--------|--------|
| France | kg | 1,525 | 4,202 | 2,583 |
| UK | kg | 656 | 1,075 | 1,598 |
| Singapore | kg | 3,600 | 1,630 | 1,100 |
| Top Five Total | kg | 11,937 | 45,741 | 44,245 |
| United States (GTA) | kg | 33,566 | 21,931 | 8,266 |
| United States (DEA) | kg | 2,061 | 2,507 | 923 |

Analysis of Import Data:

According to GTA data, the aggregated amount of ephedrine imported by the top five countries and economies in 2023 was 44,245 kg, a 3.27 percent decline from 2022. The reason for such decrease is unknown. The top five ephedrine importers in 2023 were the Republic of Korea, Ghana, France, the UK, and Singapore. The Republic of Korea – also the top ephedrine importer in 2023 – had a 1.62 percent decrease in ephedrine importation from 36,903 kg to 36,302 kg. The reason for this decline is unknown. Ephedrine imports from Ghana increased by 37.85 percent. The reason for this increase is also unknown. Comparatively, ephedrine imports decreased from both France and Singapore, dropping from 4,202 kg in 2022 to 2,583 kg for France, and from 1,630 kg in 2022 to 1,100 kg for Singapore, decreases of 38.52 and 32.51 percent, respectively. In the case of the UK, ephedrine imports increased by 37.72 percent, from 1,075 kg in 2022 to 1,598 in 2023. The reason for this increase is unknown.

According to the most current information provided by DEA, U.S. ephedrine imports decreased from 2,507 kg in 2022 to 923 in 2023, a 63.2 percent decrease.

Table 6: Pseudoephedrine 2021-2023 (GTA Annual Series Ending Dec 2023)

| Reporting Country | Unit | 2021 Quantities | 2022 Quantities | 2023 Quantities |
|-------------------|------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Türkiye | kg | 14,884 | 54,587 | 74,453 |
| Switzerland | kg | 55,440 | 35,106 | 58,369 |
| Republic of Korea | kg | 11,750 | 42,301 | 54,652 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|----|---------|---------|---------|
| Indonesia | kg | 25,471 | 47,439 | 47,700 |
| Egypt | kg | 37,949 | 49,900 | 41,301 |
| Top Five Total | kg | 145,494 | 229,333 | 276,475 |
| United States (GTA) | kg | 11,755 | 107,061 | 140,409 |
| United States (DEA) | kg | 100,292 | 116,045 | 137,049 |

Analysis of Import Data:

According to GTA data, the overall quantity of pseudoephedrine imported by the top five importers increased in 2023. The aggregated amount of pseudoephedrine imported by the top five economies in 2023 was 276,475 kg, a 20.55 percent increase compared to 2022. Except for Egypt, all other top four importers in this category increased their pseudoephedrine importation in 2023. Türkiye's imports increased from 54,587 kg in 2022 to 74,453 kg in 2023, a 36.39 percent increase. Switzerland, the Republic of Korea, and Indonesia also increased imports by 66.26, 29.19, and 0.55 percent, respectively, for unknown causes. Lastly, Egypt decreased its imports from 49,900 kg in 2022 to 41,301 kg in 2023, a 17.23 percent decrease. The reason for this decrease is also unknown.

According to the most current information provided by DEA, U.S. imports increased from 116,292 kg in 2022 to 137,049 kg in 2023, an 18.1 percent increase. It should be noted that the United States no longer bulk manufactures pseudoephedrine.

Fentanyl

Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 - Fentanyl

The following is provided pursuant to Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by section 6610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA), requiring a separate section in the INCSR identifying countries that are “the most significant sources of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year,” and providing other specified information as described below. The Department of State, in consultation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other relevant agencies, has identified Mexico as the only significant source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues significantly affecting the United States during the preceding calendar year. The following describes Mexico’s cooperation with the United States, utilization of scheduling or other procedures to prevent trafficking of illicit drugs, actions to prosecute individuals involved in the illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substance analogues, and registration requirements or other similar measures for tableting machines and encapsulating machines.

(A) Significant source countries for fentanyl and fentanyl analogues: Consistent with Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by section 6610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA), the Department of State consulted the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, and other relevant agencies to estimate the most prevalent source countries of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues trafficked into the United States. Based on seizure data and law enforcement investigation information, the consensus among U.S. authorities is that Mexico was the only significant source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues trafficked into the United States in 2024.

(B) Cooperation with the United States: The United States and Mexico adopted the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities during the 2021 High-Level Security Dialogue (HLSD). The Framework guides bilateral security assistance and collaboration through three main efforts: Protect Our People, Prevent Transborder Crime, and Pursue Criminal Networks. Under the Framework, both countries

have broadened security cooperation, including disrupting the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs such as fentanyl.

The United States supports Mexico through training, equipment donations, and technical assistance to enhance the tracking and analysis of chemical imports and exports. Collaboration with the Mexican Navy (Marina) aims to strengthen port control, security, and the identification and dismantling of clandestine labs. In August 2023, the United States, Marina, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) launched the Container Control Program (CCP) in Manzanillo, which has contributed to increased seizures of illicit goods, including narcotics, precursor chemicals, and counterfeit products at Mexico's busiest maritime port. In August 2024, the Government of Mexico approved the CCP's future expansion to the ports of Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacán, and Veracruz tentatively scheduled to begin January 2025.

The United States also promotes Mexico's ability to seize fentanyl and its precursors through training, equipment donations, and awareness campaigns. Support extends to Mexican forensic laboratories for analyzing chemical substances to aid criminal investigations and prosecutions involving synthetic opioids. U.S.-donated canines and Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE) assisted in significant seizures of illicit synthetic drugs in 2024. In the first nine months of 2024, U.S.-donated canines and NIIE in Mexico assisted in the seizure of 62.7 kilograms (kg) of fentanyl powder, 489,389 fentanyl pills, 2.5 metric tons of methamphetamine, 63 methamphetamine doses, \$512,384 in currency, and 410 illicit firearms. The United States also works with Mexico's Attorney General's Office (FGR) and other agencies, including military units that perform counternarcotics work, to create judicial records of seizures and establish protocols for reporting a central database to improve investigations and prosecutions.

Beyond bilateral efforts, Mexico engages with the United States and Canada in the North American Drug Dialogue and the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee to foster drug policy alignment. Mexico is also a voting member of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

(C) Controlled substances scheduling procedures: Under U.S. law, the Drug Enforcement Administration's authority to schedule substances on an emergency basis falls under Title II of the Controlled Substances Act. Mexico has comparable capacity to schedule new

psychoactive substances under its domestic framework. Mexico's Interagency Synthetic Drug Control Technical Working Group – comprising multiple federal agencies – proposes substances for control to the cabinet-level General Health Council, which formally publishes the updated list of controlled substances in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial). Mexico's "Precursor Chemicals" list is similar to the U.S. List I designation and requires permit approval for imports, while the "Essential Chemical" list is similar to the U.S. List II designation and requires only notification of imports.

Mexican laws regulate the production, distribution, and prescription of controlled substances to prevent abuse and illicit trafficking. Mexico's Federal Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS) is responsible for regulating precursor and essential list chemicals, working with the Secretariat of the Navy, the National Guard, Customs Agency (ANAM), and FGR to enforce the law. In May 2021, Mexico published a chemical watchlist to flag dual-use chemicals of concern to government and private sector entities to reduce diversion to illicit drug production. In April 2022, Mexico expanded its chemical watchlist from 14 to 69.

(D) Steps to prosecute individuals involved in illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substances: The Mexican government has the authority to prosecute individuals involved in the illicit manufacture or distribution of controlled substance analogues. Mexico is party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In accordance with its obligations under those convention, Mexico has laws in place comparable to that of the United States that criminalize trafficking in controlled substances. Mexico's legislation enabling criminal prosecution of controlled substances is under Federal Criminal Code, Title Seven, Chapter 1, which criminalizes criminal conduct related to narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and other substances provided for in the General Health Law Title 12, Chapters 5 and 6. Additionally, Mexico passed a law in May 2023 stipulating possession without authorization or permits of listed precursor chemicals, essential chemicals, and tableting machines as federal offenses. Altering or diverting of these items by a company are also federal offenses.

(E) Requirements to register tableting machines and encapsulating machines: Similar to the United States, Mexico requires documentation on the importation of tableting and

encapsulating machines under Chapter 3, Article 17 of the Federal Law for the Control of Chemical Precursors, Essential Chemicals and Machines to Prepare Capsules, Tablets and/or Tablets. This law provides for the Economy Secretariat to implement control and verification measures pertaining to all persons or entities that produce, dispose of, acquire, import, export, and/or store tableting and encapsulating machines (as well as precursor chemicals) to prevent their diversion for illicit drug production. On an annual basis, pill press owners are responsible for reporting the status of the press to the applicable government institution (the Economy, Health, or Communications and Transportation Secretariats). Under a law passed in May 2023, the possession of or falsifying importation documents for a tableting or encapsulating machine without authorization are federal crimes subject to prison sentencing and heavy fines.

The Mexican government has not consistently acknowledged synthesis of illicit fentanyl in Mexico despite seizures of chemical precursors and finished fentanyl in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border. Strong cooperation for narcotics control exists under the Bicentennial Framework; however, the volume of illicit and dangerous narcotics entering the United States remains high. Criminal groups continue to profit from the drug trade and foment violence on both sides of the border while the lack of a comprehensive and adequately resourced fentanyl strategy and investment into security and justice sector institutions challenge progress. The United States continues to press the Mexican government on more aggressive action to disrupt the production and trafficking of illicit fentanyl and supports Mexican efforts through capacity building and law enforcement cooperation under the Bicentennial Framework.

Synthetic Drugs and New Psychoactive Substances

U.S. DEPARTMENT *of* STATE

Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 – Synthetic Drugs and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS)

The following is provided pursuant to Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by section 5555 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (FY 2023 NDAA), requiring additional reporting in the INCSR on covered synthetic drugs and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS). It requires (in summary) reporting on countries significantly involved in the manufacture, production, transshipment, or trafficking of synthetic drugs, as defined in the Act, to include (to the extent possible to determine) the scale of production, law enforcement assessment of lab capacity, methods of synthesis, and country's policies to regulate licit manufacture and interdict illicit manufacture. It further requires, with respect to governments' responses to NPS, to report to the extent practicable on governments which have articulated policies on scheduling NPS and the impacts of those policies.

The Department of State has identified the countries listed below as those that may be significantly involved in the manufacture, production, transshipment, or trafficking of synthetic drugs.

Introduction

The significant threat posed by synthetic drugs continues to rise globally, and synthetic opioids remain the primary drug threat to the United States. However, the types of synthetic drugs and scale of their impact vary from country to country and region to region. Provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicated that approximately 70 percent of drug overdose deaths in the United States in CY 2023 involved synthetic opioids, principally illicitly manufactured fentanyl.

Although opioids are still legally prescribed in the United States to treat severe pain, the nature of illicitly manufactured synthetic drugs introduces a significant set of risks. They are sufficiently potent that even small amounts can be fatal. Further, when illicitly manufactured opioids are mixed with other illicit narcotics such as heroin or cocaine, or added to counterfeit tablets, they are often ingested unknowingly, with deadly results. The mixing of these substances, often alongside additional adulterants, may itself increase potency or toxicity.

Further, synthetic drugs are easy and inexpensive to produce, and do not require lengthy cultivation periods as with plant-based drugs. There is no need for large or elaborate infrastructure; a lab can be set up in one's home, and synthetic drugs are often easily trafficked through the mail, resulting in a smaller smuggling footprint.

Almost no fentanyl or fentanyl analogues have been detected directly entering the United States from the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the PRC implemented controls over fentanyl-related substances as a class in 2019. Production of most illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues detected in North America has since shifted to Mexico, although the precursor chemicals required to produce fentanyl still largely originate from the PRC. Mexican criminal organizations produce fentanyl in both powder form and pressed into tablets – most often counterfeit tablets that resemble licit prescription pills -- and, less frequently, into unmarked pills. Many precursor chemical sales in the PRC are apparently legal, involving chemicals not controlled by the PRC or under the UN framework, but are purchased for the purpose of illicitly manufacturing fentanyl.

Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are the most common synthetic opioids seized by U.S. authorities. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized over 53.5 million fentanyl pills and 7,536 pounds of fentanyl powder in 2024 (totaling over 354 million deadly doses of fentanyl). The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seized over 12,257 kilograms of fentanyl from October 2, 2022 to September 30, 2023, an 84 percent increase over the same period in 2022. CBP fentanyl seizures alone increased more than 860 percent from Fiscal Year 2019 to FY 2023. In FY 2024, fentanyl seizures were down for the first time since 2019, with a 19 percent decrease from FY 2023. In FY 2024, CBP seized more than 9.9 MT of illicit fentanyl and more than 2,200 pill presses and arrested more than 1,900 individuals connected to fentanyl seizures. CBP seized more illicit fentanyl in FY 2023 and FY 2024 than in all prior years combined in CBP history. CBP seized 1,634kg of illicit fentanyl in FY 2025 to date (October 1, 2024 through December 12, 2024).

NPS also pose a significant threat. As of October 2024, a total of 1,250 NPS have been reported to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Most are stimulants, and there has been a significant increase in synthetic opioids in recent years. UNODC defines NPS as "substances of abuse, either in a pure form or a preparation, that are not controlled by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs or the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic

Substances, but which may pose a public health threat.” The term “new” does not necessarily mean newly developed, but refers to new uses, or to substances that have recently become available on the market. Such substances mimic the effects of those that are under international control such as cannabis, cocaine, heroin, LSD, MDMA (ecstasy), or methamphetamine.

With respect to reporting on NPS, the Department has limited access to information aside from information obtained from foreign governments and its engagement with international drug control entities such as UNODC and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).

In July 2023, the United States launched the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, aimed at unifying, strengthening, and accelerating the global response to these deadly threats. The goal was to spur greater attention, inform the international policy environment, and galvanize action, including through international cooperation efforts. Encouragingly, that has taken place in important ways. As of December 2024, 164 countries and 15 international organizations are participating, with representatives from a wide cross section of countries’ agencies – ranging from law enforcement to public health. By fostering international cooperation and sharing data, lessons learned, practical tools, and best practices, the Global Coalition created a new framework for cooperation across the many challenges posed by the proliferation of synthetic drugs. Participating experts generated 68 recommendations to reflect key measures for countries’ consideration. Recognizing the need for collective action, many countries have stepped up to lead new initiatives that will advance the work of the Coalition. For example, at the Summit for the Global Coalition held at the UN General Assembly in September 2024, 11 countries made public commitments to lead initiatives consistent with Global Coalition recommendations focused on themes such as disrupting the supply chain for fentanyl and other synthetic drugs; detecting emerging drug threats; and preventing and treating substance use disorders through effective public health interventions. These countries also signed a Coalition Pledge agreeing to take additional actions to regulate relevant drugs and precursor chemicals, take needed steps to fill gaps in their domestic law, and expand public-private partnerships to combat the supply chain for illicit fentanyl. In the weeks and months since the Summit, several additional countries have similarly made commitments to lead initiatives and agreed to signed on to the Pledge.

Countries Significantly Involved in the Manufacture, Production, Transshipment, or Trafficking of Synthetic Drugs

Afghanistan

The United States has not had a presence in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, thus independent verification of Taliban claims on seizures and enforcement activities are difficult to obtain. Seizure data from neighboring countries demonstrates continued methamphetamine production in Afghanistan, but the scope of its production has not been verified. Reports indicate ephedrine labs have moved to remote mountainous areas, but verification efforts are limited to satellite imagery. There are reports of Afghan-origin methamphetamine being found in the Indian Ocean region and part of Southern Africa. It is difficult to determine the means of methamphetamine production in Afghanistan, and in what combination: from the naturally occurring ephedra plant, with ephedrine or pseudoephedrine originating from pharmaceutical products like cold medicines, or from bulk grade ephedrine/pseudoephedrine diverted from licit markets or smuggled into the country. Reports of synthetic narcotic seizures along the Afghan border have also been documented by neighboring countries; it is unclear if the synthetic narcotics were manufactured in or transiting through Afghanistan.

Belgium

Belgium's policies to regulate licit manufacture and disrupt illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs follow the European Union's (EU) uniform system for handling the import, export, and transit of goods (the Union Customs Code). Belgium's implementation of these policies for licit goods is effective. Belgian law and regulations prohibit the sale, possession, import, export, and manufacture of illicit synthetic drugs. The customs implementation of policies for illicit goods is primarily focused on large quantity shipments received from outside the EU.

Since 2002, Belgium has included NPS on its list of controlled drugs. Belgium regularly adds to the list as new substances emerge and the threat evolves. This includes continually adding various synthetic cannabinoids and cathinones.

Belgium has disrupted both mid-sized and large-scale methamphetamine labs, usually found close to the Dutch border. Belgium also reported dismantling small-scale ketamine and N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) laboratories, and for the first time in 2023, seized a lab producing synthetic cathinones. Authorities seized 40 labs in 2023, up from 25 labs in 2022. Authorities also located 28 dumping sites for drug production waste and equipment in 2023, compared to 42 in 2022.

Belgian authorities reported a significant increase in 2024 in seizures of synthetic stimulant drugs alpha-PVP and MDPV, all discovered in packages bound for the United Kingdom. In the first half of 2024, authorities seized 1,844 grams of alpha-PVP, compared to 16 grams in all of 2022, and 1,737 grams of MDPV (the equivalent of tens of thousands of doses).

Belgium is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, has adopted the Coalition Pledge, and has committed to lead a year two initiative to advance the Coalition's core lines of effort.

Burma

Burma borders both the PRC and India, the second and third largest pharmaceutical and chemical-producing countries. The 2021 military coup intensified internal conflicts, especially along the border areas, allowing criminal networks to more easily evade detection for trafficking and diverting precursor chemicals from both legitimate and illicit sources. In May 2024, UNODC reported that Burma's Shan State continues to be the epicenter for synthetic drug manufacturing and trafficking in the region, impacting neighboring countries, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia, and New Zealand.

Southeast Asia overall has experienced a surge in synthetic drug production and trafficking. According to Thai law enforcement reports, Burma's internal conflicts have had a significant impact on cross-border drug trafficking, particularly on the illicit manufacturing of methamphetamines, which increased by 284 percent since the 2021 coup.

Drug syndicates are expanding their use of non-controlled substances to produce methamphetamine and its precursors in Burma. According to UNODC's 2024 report, law enforcement in the region is challenged by the diversion of precursor chemicals, often

ordered and paid for through online channels, including by the use of crypto-currency transactions.

The DEA continues to share narcotics information with regime law enforcement and has identified ketamine as the most seized controlled substance.

In February, drug police seized 16,400 liters of methylamine, 1,200 liters of sulphuric acid, 560 liters of hydrochloric acid, and 12,400 liters of benzyl cyanide in a compound in Mandalay. In February, police seized 1.5 metric tons (MT) of methamphetamine and consequently of controlled chemicals. Police seizures of ammonium nitrate have also increased, with 63 MT seized as of October 2024.

The regime's Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) is the only interagency coordinating mechanism on narcotics under the regime's administration. The committee is responsible for regulating and monitoring imported chemicals to prevent precursor chemical diversion and trafficking. The CCDAC formed a precursor regulatory group in 2023 and continued "Operation 39/24," a nationwide campaign to regulate and counter the illicit trade in 39 controlled precursor chemicals. In June 2024, the CCDAC Chairman stated that foreign chemists are working with ethnic armed organizations to produce drugs.

The main challenges for Burmese law enforcement in determining the chemical profile of seized drugs are interagency coordination, capacity of law enforcement personnel, and forensic capabilities to identify precursor chemicals. Counternarcotics authorities have a limited supply of test kits used to identify new psychotropic substances and primarily relies on software updates to chemical scanners previously donated by the United States government to the former civilian government.

The lack of information on seized chemicals and Burma's inability to control synthetic drug production highlight significant knowledge gaps and a need for a more comprehensive assessment to inform effective regional approaches to precursor trade issues.

The social, economic and governance crises caused by the 2021 coup limit access to reliable data on regime activities to counter illicit drug manufacturing. Despite record seizures by law enforcement, the falling price of drugs in the region indicates an increase in production. As a result, illicit drugs remain accessible to Burma's most vulnerable communities.

Cambodia

Cambodia is increasingly becoming a major transshipment point for methamphetamine, heroin, and ketamine, as well as a large-scale production center for ketamine and other designer drugs. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have exploited limited regulation, poor oversight, and the lack of cooperation and coordination among customs and law enforcement authorities to expand their networks. Further, weak inspection procedures and recordkeeping systems, limited chemical regulations, and corruption among inspection officials contribute to large amounts of precursor chemicals being transported into Cambodia from the PRC. Chemical companies operating in Cambodia are known for their skill in developing legal chemical substitutes and diverting these chemicals for production of illegal drugs to evade regulations.

Starting in 2020, Cambodian Anti-Drug Police (ADP) began seizing quantities ranging from hundreds of kg to multiple MT of precursor chemicals used for the manufacture of illicit narcotics. As a result, multiple clandestine laboratories for ketamine and large quantities of ketamine and precursor chemicals for ketamine were seized throughout Cambodia, which reveals that Cambodia is currently one of the countries in the region which manufactures ketamine for exportation. Methamphetamine and heroin are transiting through Cambodia from Lao and Thailand for importation to other countries. Since 2023, ADP has occasionally seized small amounts of cocaine (1-3 kg) that were transited through Cambodia from Latin America, specifically Brazil, to Thailand and Taiwan. Prime Minister Hun Manet created a minister-level National Authority for Countering Drugs in late 2023 and consistently publicly raises awareness about the issue.

Cambodia is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Canada

In 2023, law enforcement authorities identified fentanyl production in Canada but have estimated that, as of 2024, Canadian fentanyl is primarily produced for domestic consumption. In FY 2024, U.S. CBP seized approximately 16 kilograms of fentanyl at the U.S. northern border. TCOs in Canada receive the bulk of fentanyl precursor chemicals from the PRC, which are imported through consolidated shipments and commercial air cargo. The Canadian Border Services Agency estimated that 98 percent of Canada's fentanyl-making materials seized in western Canada originated in the PRC. The U.S.

Department of Treasury did not announce any new sanctions actions against Canadian entities in 2024.

Canada undertook multiple law enforcement actions in 2024 to disrupt and diminish the supply of illicit synthetic drugs. In August, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) dismantled clandestine laboratories in Quebec, seizing 300,000 counterfeit pills thought to contain N-pyrrolidino protonitazepyne, a synthetic opioid. In October, the RCMP seized more than 30 MT of chemicals believed to be used for methamphetamine production in British Columbia. The same month, the Toronto Police Service conducted a set of raids and arrests on a network of opioid traffickers that resulted in the arrest of multiple suspects and the seizure of fentanyl production equipment. In October, the RCMP announced a series of coordinated raids in Vancouver, Falkland, and Surrey in British Columbia, dismantling a “superlab” and seizing 54 kg of fentanyl (approximately 95.5 million lethal doses), large amounts of precursor chemicals, 390 kg of methamphetamine, and smaller amounts of cocaine, MDMA and cannabis, and arresting a known member of an organized crime network. The RCMP stated that the responsible organized crime network used the facility to produce methamphetamine for export to other countries; the RCMP referred to the lab as “the largest and most sophisticated drug superlab in Canadian history.”

Canada is the world’s second largest consumer of prescription opioids per capita. The Public Health Agency of Canada reported 1,906 opioid-related deaths between January and March 2024. Health Canada, the government’s department for health policy, highlighted multi-drug toxicity as a contributing factor to the opioid crisis, as 48.61 percent of overdose deaths during the same period in 2024 involved a stimulant. Health Canada has listed sedatives or hypnotics, stimulants, and opioid class drugs as the most common co-occurring substances in fentanyl.

Fentanyl and its analogues are listed as Schedule I drugs under the 1996 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). In 2017, Parliament amended the CDSA to simplify the application process for supervised consumption sites, allow alternative pharmaceutical therapy, prohibit unregistered importation of pill presses, and enable border officers to open mail under 30 grams. The amendments also allowed temporary scheduling of substances and faster drug disposition by law enforcement. In 2024, Parliament further amended the CDSA to roll back permissions granted in 2017, by tightening ministerial authority for

supervised consumption site permits, repealing alternative therapy provisions, extending cabinet regulatory authority, and broadening the range of activities covered by licenses and authorizations to include possession, transportation, delivery, and other dealings in controlled substances.

In 2023, the latest year for which data is available, Health Canada's Drug Analysis Service identified 11 NPS. These included four opioids, three cannabinoids, two stimulants, one hallucinogen, and one sedative/hypnotic. The opioid methylfentanyl was identified as the most common NPS. Methylfentanyl is a novel opioid analgesic that is an analog of fentanyl and is estimated to be between 400 and 6000 times more potent an analgesic than morphine. Out of the 11 NPS, seven of them are subject to control under the CDSA.

Canada is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as a co-chair of a sub-working group focused on data collection, analysis, and trends, including early warning. Canada has adopted the Coalition Pledge and has committed to lead a year two initiative to advance the Coalition's core lines of effort.

People's Republic of China (PRC)

The PRC is one of the world's top producers and exporters of precursor chemicals. Precursor chemicals produced in the PRC are used to produce illicit drugs around the world, including heroin, ketamine, and methamphetamine in Asia, Latin America, and Mexico. Due to the volume of these precursor shipments, the United States designated the PRC as a Major Drug Transit or Drug Producing Country in September 2024.

In May 2019, the PRC took the important step of controlling all fentanyl-related substances as a class. This significantly reduced the amount of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances being shipped from the PRC to the United States. The PRC National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) has made no statements about the scale of fentanyl consumption within the PRC, and PRC authorities continue to stress publicly that fentanyl use and distribution are not domestic concerns in China. However, despite the reduction in the volume of finished fentanyl being shipped from the PRC, fentanyl and other synthetic precursor chemicals remain an area of concern.

The PRC's enforcement of its counternarcotics regulations remains uneven and opaque. PRC law enforcement has in many instances not acted against companies selling

non-scheduled fentanyl and other precursor chemicals used by drug cartels to illicitly manufacture narcotics. As a result, there remains significant room for further U.S.-PRC counterdrug cooperation, especially as regards precursor chemical production. The United States secured a PRC commitment to counternarcotics cooperation in November 2023, along with several other important PRC actions. Notably, the PRC's November 2023 notice to its domestic industry advising on the enforcement of laws and regulations related to trade in precursor chemicals and pill press equipment addressed both scheduled and non-scheduled precursors, and it outlined the responsibilities of shipping and delivery companies. The notice also cautioned against the sale of chemicals not scheduled in the PRC to the United States and Mexico.

The PRC also began taking law enforcement action against synthetic drug and chemical precursor suppliers. In June 2024 the PRC announced several arrests. These included a case in Shangqiu, Henan province where the Public Security Bureau destroyed a large-scale NPS drug manufacturing and trafficking network and arrested 94 individuals, seized 53.7 kg of NPS containing ketamine, and seized and froze more than \$5.4 million of funds involved in the case. In another case, Henan and Jilin authorities jointly seized 61.5 kg of etomidate, discovered a clandestine lab and storage site, and seized about \$7.6 million of property. Shandong province authorities dismantled a clandestine lab making 1-bromo-1-phenylpropan-2-one and ephedrine and arrested 18 individuals, seizing 3 MT of finished and semi-finished ephedrine, 14 MT of chemical materials, and equipment including glass reactors.

Also In June, coordinated action by the PRC, United States, and Mexico targeting the trafficking of illicit fentanyl resulted in the arrest of one individual and in Mexico arresting an additional person indicted by the United States for their roles in a money-laundering scheme on behalf of the Mexican Sinaloa cartel. Continued and sustained law enforcement action, along with coordinated U.S.-PRC and multilateral efforts, remains necessary to combat the trafficking of synthetic drug precursor chemicals and equipment for illicit narcotics production.

There has been an overall decline in drug use in the PRC, according to the NNCC. The PRC also reports reductions in the use of heroin and methamphetamine. However, the NNCC notes that there has been a diversification in the types of drugs abused and increased use of NPS, etomidate, fluoroketamine, and synthetic cannabinoids, as well as

other psychotropic substances such as tramadol and diclazepam. In addition to an increase in domestic consumption of NPS, PRC-based entities continue to produce these substances.

India

India continues to rank third in the world for pharmaceutical production by volume, after the United States and the PRC, generating \$50 billion in sales during 2023-24, according to the most recent annual report of the Department of Pharmaceuticals in the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers. The country is home to the largest number of facilities registered with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration outside the United States. It is the world's largest source of generic medicines and the source of the majority of UN Children's Fund vaccine supplies.

Though the government lacks data on the scale of illegal production and illegal lab capacity, anecdotal information on drug seizures indicates such activity is widespread and growing. Authorities discovered multiple labs over the course of 2024 that were producing large quantities of mephedrone for export through Gujarat. In April 2024, police raided a lab producing methamphetamine in the New Delhi suburbs, run by four Nigerian nationals. In February 2024, police arrested nine people, including three Mexican nationals, for allegedly manufacturing methamphetamine, pseudoephedrine, and other drugs for export. Indian officials believe this group is connected to an international drug trafficking cartel.

In February 2024, to align with UN scheduling India controlled multiple designer drugs including the non-fentanyl synthetic opioids 2-methyl AP-237, protonitazene, and etonitazepyne. From 2019-2024, India was the source country for a number of designer drugs, most notably of the synthetic cathinone, often mislabeled as legitimate pharmaceutical company exports.

India is a signatory to multiple UN conventions and strives to be consistent with UN schedules. In practice, however, scheduling NPS is a lengthy process and the substances often remain readily available, including for purchase online.

India is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as a co-chair of a working group to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs, and as co-chair of two sub-working groups on illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs

and their precursors and engaging people with substance use and substance use disorders. India has committed to lead a year two initiative to advance the Coalition's core lines of effort. Additionally, the U.S.-India Counternarcotics Working Group includes broad collaborative efforts towards the prevention of illicit manufacturing and trafficking of synthetic drugs.

Kazakhstan

Both the number and production volume of detected clandestine laboratories producing synthetic drugs in Kazakhstan is growing. An analysis of criminal cases determined that it takes seven days to manufacture synthetic drugs in laboratories. One laboratory produces an average of 50 kg of drugs a month. Thus, the disruption of 64 clandestine laboratories in the first nine months of the year resulted in preventing approximately 3.2 MT of drugs from being produced. One dose of mephedrone is 0.2 grams, or 1 gram is 5 doses, and one kilogram makes 5,000 individual doses. According to the Agency for Financial Monitoring, drug users purchased over 1.5 MT of synthetic drugs.

There has been a strong increase in synthetic cathinones and synthetic cannabinoids, among which the most frequently submitted for analysis are mephedrone; Alpha-PVP, 3-methylmethcathinone; MDMA; methamphetamine; 4-F-MDMB-Butinaca; 4F-MDMB-BINACA; ADB-BUTINACA; 5-F-MDMB-Pica; and MDMB-4en-PINACA. In 2024, for the first time the forensic laboratory identified the existence of synthetic hashish. .

The Kazakh government formed an Interagency Working Group to prevent and combat drug crime and to study the feasibility and opportunities for establishing the Targeting Center for Control of Precursors and Synthetic Drugs. The Working Group examined current national precursor control capacities and discovered significant control gaps both at the border and inside the country. It developed recommendations for the customs risk assessment system to introduce new risk indicators. The assessment identified the need for stronger control over chemical and pharmaceutical diversion.

Kazakhstan classifies NPS according to recommendations of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). Kazakhstan studied the classification experience of Lithuania and the United States and will be classifying NPS internally and inform the CND on internal classifications accordingly. In 2021, Kazakhstan introduced emergency classification of NPS, a process which requires enactment by the Prime Minister's Office and now takes

only two months, as opposed to one year previously. Kazakhstan will closely work with the CND and INCB to keep the pace of scheduling NPS.

Kazakhstan is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as a co-chair to three sub-working groups on the manufacture of synthetic drugs and their precursors; data collection, analysis, and trends including early warning; and addressing populations in contact with the criminal justice system.

Laos

Laos is the largest land trafficking route for synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals in Southeast Asia. Methamphetamine and amphetamines produced in Burma are trafficked through Laos into Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and then onwards to markets across the region. Precursor chemicals, largely from the People's Republic of China, are also trafficked through Laos to Burma where they fuel synthetic drug production. U.S. law enforcement sources estimate there is likely production of methamphetamine bleeding over from Burma as well, but firm data is not available due to the remoteness of the drug producing regions and low government capacity. The small pharmaceutical industry in Laos has the capacity to manufacture licit synthetic drugs but in practice rarely does so. Under Lao PDR legislation and regulations, pharmaceutical companies may petition the Ministry of Health to produce controlled drugs, but in the last several years the ministry received only one request, to produce five kg of the opiate morphine hydrochloride.

There has been no evidence that legitimate pharmaceutical supplies are being diverted to illicit supply chains and neither law enforcement nor prosecutors reported illicit synthetic drug production in Laos in 2024. However, chemicals used for mining and other major industries, which have dual-use potential for synthetic drug production, move into and through Laos, and are likely diverted for illicit use. Some law enforcement experts believe at least small-scale illicit production is present in the country, pointing to the confiscation in 2022 of drug manufacturing equipment during a major methamphetamine seizure and the discovery in 2021 of a clandestine laboratory in Oudomxay Province. The Ministry of Health, in cooperation with the Ministries of Industry and Commerce and Public Security, formulate the import/export regime and regulatory framework for the movement of precursor chemicals in the country. Occasional seizures of precursor chemicals by Lao PDR authorities show a slowly growing understanding of their importance in curbing drug

trafficking, but further progress in tightening regulation and educating enforcement officers is required.

Laos is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Mexico

Mexico has a robust licit pharmaceutical industry, the second largest in Latin America. Many labs feature U.S. Food and Drug Administration or European Medicine Agency approval, strengthening Mexico as a pharmaceutical producer and exporter. However, Mexico faces regulatory challenges and a prevalence of counterfeit pharmaceuticals in the market, presenting reputational risks to pharmaceutical companies operating in Mexico and health risks to consumers on both sides of the border with the United States.

Most precursor chemicals used to produce synthetic drugs in Mexico come from producers in the PRC and India, including for licit and illicit manufacture. During 2024, the previous administration of President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador did not consistently publicly recognize illicit fentanyl synthesis in Mexico, though TCOs source precursor chemicals, including those used to synthesize fentanyl, through legal purchase from foreign companies and illicit diversion. Mexico maintains a registry of controlled chemicals known to be used in the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs, but authorities do not consistently inspect, target, or investigate importers. Evidence suggests illegal producers are using phenyl-2-propanone (P2P) and the Gupta method to produce methamphetamine and fentanyl, respectively.

While there are no reliable estimates of illicit synthetic drug production in Mexico, Mexican authorities reportedly seized nearly 181 MT of methamphetamine, 136 kg of fentanyl, and 233 clandestine labs in the first eight months of 2024. Most clandestine lab seizures are shifting closer to the U.S. border from the Pacific coast state of Sinaloa.

Mexico has established policies for scheduling NPS through its regulatory framework under the General Health Law, which empowers it to classify substances as controlled when novel NPS are identified. However, implementation challenges, resource limitations for enforcement, and the stigma surrounding drug use complicate the framework's execution and impact.

Mexico is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as co-chair to a working group on promoting public health interventions and services to prevent and reduce drug use. Mexico has adopted the Coalition Pledge and has committed to lead a year two initiative to advance the Coalition's core lines of effort.

Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the legal frameworks for the research and development of synthetic drugs primarily focus on scientific and medical applications. These frameworks are governed by regulations that ensure safety, efficacy, and ethical standards. Illegal domestic production is very advanced and compartmentalized. In 2023 there were 151 lab seizures, including numerous 'combination labs' capable of producing multiple drugs (such as methamphetamine, MDMA, cocaine conversion, or heroin) in the same location. Unofficial estimates by the National Police of the Netherlands (NPN) based on non-precursor chemical encounters could indicate the actual number of labs is between 400 and 1,000. Most labs are found in the southern and eastern parts of the Netherlands that border Belgium and Germany and significant synthetic drug production overlap occurs between the three countries.

Labs are often constructed in remote, rural areas. Local landowners may be paid off or coerced to allow traffickers the use of outbuildings. Lab equipment, chemicals, and precursors have also been found in storage units in remote and rural areas. Large-scale drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) may operate between two and five labs, and the lifespan of a lab is approximately three to six months in any one location. These labs are typically joint ventures between independent DTOs with compartmentalized sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution roles to evade detection. Precursors and necessary chemicals are generally procured following an order by a distributor; chemicals are not stockpiled.

Chemical waste sites ('dump sites') are an increasing environmental problem in the Netherlands and require significant effort to clean up. Used chemicals and containers are usually dumped in remote areas. Some evidence suggests that different organizations' chemical waste ends up at the same dump sites, which could indicate that disposal is another category of operation being coordinated by independent groups.

Amphetamine variants (methamphetamine, MDMA, captagon) and cocaine conversion make up the bulk of synthetic labs seized by the NPN. The NPN estimates that approximately 90 percent of the drugs manufactured in the Netherlands are exported, primarily to Europe and the Middle East. While Netherlands-produced captagon makes up only a small amount of the overall synthetic drug production within the Netherlands, the Netherlands is nonetheless one of the larger producers of captagon outside of the Middle East.

Under the Netherlands Opium Act, fentanyl is classified as a List I substance and its prohibition applies only to the specifically listed substance. As a result, analogues are not comprehensively regulated. However, a proposed legislative revision concerning NPS will strengthen restrictions on the production and trade of NPS by categorizing substance groups based on chemical structure rather than individual substances. Acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate are regulated under the Law for Prevention of the Misuse of Chemicals (WVMC), but when used to produce illicit substances, the Opium Act can also be applied in their regulation.

Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are rarely seen in the Netherlands. The NPN has not shared any indicators of domestic synthetic opioid production but does infrequently find them in the mail system. Dutch authorities have seized LSD-style blotters laced with synthetic opioids, counterfeit tablets, and synthetic opioid powders through postal interdiction. The PRC remains a significant source of precursor chemicals entering the Netherlands and continued efforts are being made to increase cooperation between U.S. authorities and the Dutch government to track and disrupt the import of Chinese precursor chemicals.

The Netherlands is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. The Netherlands has adopted the Coalition Pledge and has committed to lead a year two initiative to advance the Coalition's core lines of effort.

Nigeria

The emergence of synthetic drugs and NPS poses an evolving challenge for Nigeria's counternarcotics framework. With the global shift toward synthetic drugs and NPS, Nigeria has seen an increase in their availability and use. Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) is responding to this challenge through intensified monitoring and

regulation. Efforts include conducting regular assessments of drug trends as well as high level raid operations.

The United States provides assistance to the NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies combatting drug trafficking, including training, mentoring, adoption of standardized procedures, equipment, and rehabilitation of spaces to increase capabilities for drug interdiction, investigations, and eventual prosecutions of drug-related crimes. This includes support to the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) within the NDLEA. In addition to the SIU, the U.S. sustains a counternarcotics advisor position in U.S. Consulate Lagos to work with the NDLEA.

The NDLEA works closely with international bodies to share information and resources aimed at combating the spread of synthetic drugs, utilizing forensic technologies to identify new substances in circulation.

While fentanyl use in Nigeria is not yet widespread, the NDLEA is introducing preventive measures to limit its infiltration into the domestic market. The NDLEA is implementing training programs for officers on how to recognize and respond to fentanyl-related incidents. Within the period under review, the NDLEA's forensic laboratory analyzed and identified six cases of fentanyl. Also, NDLEA has begun collaborative efforts with international partners to create policies to address the prevention, interdiction, and treatment of synthetic opioid trafficking.

Nigeria is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Pakistan

Synthetic drug trafficking in Pakistan is increasing at a faster rate than that of traditional, plant-based illicit drugs. Methamphetamine, primarily sourced from Afghanistan, is the principal synthetic drug transiting through Pakistan. Limited data on drug use, production, and trafficking data challenges Pakistan's authorities as they grapple with formulating an adequate response.

Most synthetic drugs and associated precursors are destined for global markets. Many such precursors transit Pakistan from the PRC and India to Afghanistan, where groups use these inputs in synthetic drug production. Pakistan's law enforcement agencies reported

zero seizures of fentanyl during 2024, though authorities assess that traffickers may be moving fentanyl through the country.

According to UNODC reports, the use of NPS remains relatively low among Pakistan's general population. There is a notable increase in the use of certain categories of NPS among high-risk drug users and marginalized groups, including those who inject drugs, the homeless, and prison populations. These groups are more likely to use stimulants, synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists, synthetic opioids, and sedatives/hypnotics (primarily benzodiazepine-type NPS). The emergence of highly potent substances within these categories raises concerns regarding public health risks and unintentional overdose events. A central challenge associated with NPS is the user's limited knowledge of the purity and composition of products containing these substances, which puts them at significant risk.

Pakistan is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

The Philippines

The Philippines primarily imports licit dangerous drug preparations. However, there are some instances where raw materials are imported, and finished preparations are manufactured locally. Commonly produced dangerous drug preparations in the country include morphine sulfate tablets (10 mg), morphine sulfate ampoules (10 mg and 16 mg), zolpidem tablets (10 mg), illegal and non-medical alprazolam tablets (500 mcg), and phenobarbital tablets (30 mg, 60 mg, and 90 mg).

Reports from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency's (PDEA) Plans and Operations Service, as well as its regional offices, indicate no known presence of clandestine laboratories producing these dangerous drugs. However, illegal laboratories involved in the production of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) have been detected. These laboratories primarily use two chemical precursors: ephedrine/pseudoephedrine and phenyl-2-propanone (P2P).

To address the emerging challenge of NPS, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), in collaboration with its member agencies, has established a Technical Working Group (TWG). This group is tasked with developing regulations and monitoring mechanisms for

NPS. The DDB and the TWG are working on crafting guidelines for an early warning system for NPS, with finalization expected by December this year.

The Philippines is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as co-chair to a working group on promoting public health interventions and services to prevent and reduce drug use as well as a sub-working group focused on preventing drug use and strengthening and expanding evidence-based prevention activities.

Poland

Data on the scale of legal domestic production of synthetic drugs in Poland is not readily available, but Polish law enforcement partners have observed an increase in illicit synthetic drug production, trafficking, and use, noting an upward trend in the manufacturing of synthetic drugs such as cathinones (e.g., clophedrone and ephedrine) and stimulants (e.g., amphetamine, MDMA) in clandestine laboratories. In the period January - September 2024, the Polish Police Central Bureau of Investigation reported Poland seized 627.98 kg of amphetamine, up 11 percent from the same time period last year. It also seized 5.13 kg of MDMA (down 42 percent), 310,605 ecstasy pills (up 204 percent), 97.98 kg of mephedrone (down 35 percent), 6.25 kg of clophedrone (down 14 percent), 110.23 kg of methamphetamine (up 397 percent), 4.08 kg of Alpha PVP (no data from previous year), and 25 grams of fentanyl (no data from previous year).

Additionally, over the first nine months of 2024, Polish authorities dismantled approximately 58 synthetic drug laboratories, compared to 67 in 2023. Poland also reported an increase in recent years in the consumption and smuggling of various opiate derivatives.

Poland has enacted legislation to combat drug trafficking and prosecute offenders, including those involved in the synthetic drug trade. Current legislation provides law enforcement agencies with powers to seize illicit drugs and arrest individuals involved in their production, distribution, or trafficking. However, the effectiveness of these frameworks varies, and Polish authorities continue efforts to enhance legal measures, adapt to emerging challenges, and ensure successful prosecutions of synthetic drug traffickers, according to contacts.

In June 2024, the Ministry of Health began monitoring the issuing of prescriptions for drugs containing fentanyl, psychotropic, and narcotic drugs. Any irregularities are given to a

newly established unit consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Health, the National Revenue Administration, the National Prosecutor's Office, and the Police, which monitors the situation and takes appropriate actions. Additionally, the Chief Police Commander has asked all police officers to pay special attention to fentanyl possession and distribution while performing their duties as well as their work with the District Sanitary Inspection Stations or the Chief Pharmaceutical Inspector. Law enforcement agencies undertook operational activities related to the illegal distribution of psychotropic and narcotic substances in 2024.

Poland adopted a law on NPS in 2018. The legislation established a precise definition of families of substances, enabling the control not only of a specific substance and its salts, esters, or isomers, but of a wider group of substances that includes structural compounds similar to the controlled substances in which the components of the chemical compounds have been replaced. The law gives the Minister of Health the ability to more rapidly issue regulations adding new substances to the NPS list. First, the Minister designates a task force to assess the risk of threats to human health or life related to the use of NPS. The task force recommends substances for the Minister to add to the NPS list. The list of NPS includes not only the substances themselves but also defines their groups. The time necessary to generate a regulation is shorter than in the case of changing statutory regulations and enables more effective and faster protection of society against dangerous substances.

Poland's approach to NPS places them under similar regulatory and legal scrutiny as traditional drugs. Activities such as the production, processing, import, export, and transport of NPS are subject to criminal liability, aligning their legal treatment with that of controlled narcotics and substances. However, there is no data readily available on the impacts of these policies or any specific outcomes or effectiveness of this approach. Typically, the effectiveness of such policies would be evaluated through metrics such as changes in the availability and use of NPS, law enforcement and customs activities, health-related incidents, and judicial proceedings related to NPS offenses, but these are not available.

Poland is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as co-chair of a sub-working group on trafficking of synthetic drugs.

South Africa

Synthetic drugs and NPS represent a very small but growing percentage of the illicit drug market in South Africa, according to the South African Police Service (SAPS) Chemical Monitoring Program (CMP). These drugs would normally fall within the schedule of listed substances in the Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, or Medicine Control Act 101 of 1965, which have been updated on numerous occasions. South Africa does not have a specific policy pertaining to NPS.

The most frequently reported semi-synthetic drug in Southern Africa is nyaope – a cocktail of (usually synthetic) heroin, cannabis, and antiretroviral drugs that retails for less than R30 (\$1.60) per dose. Nyaope was classified as an illegal substance with the amendment of the Drugs and Trafficking Act of 2014. While some manufacturing of methamphetamine exists in South Africa, ephedrine and pseudoephedrine used to synthesize the drug largely originate in Nigeria and India. Recent South African police seizures point to an influx of methamphetamine from Afghanistan.

U.S. law enforcement is working closely with SAPS CMP to develop and strengthen South Africa's standard operating procedures on chemical monitoring to include onsite inspections, records review, and precursor chemical diversion investigations.

The SSAPS had not observed a significant trend of fentanyl within the region until 2024. Recently, the SAPS seized fentanyl in the Northern Cape, leading to further intelligence on the high-potent synthetic opioid in the region. The new threat of fentanyl slowly introducing its way into the region has been affected by various factors, including the increased availability of synthetic opioids and current changes in drug trafficking patterns. While traditional opioids like heroin have been most common, there has been a notable shift as drug traffickers introduce fentanyl and its analogs into the market.

This trend raises awareness and concern regarding overdose risks, given that fentanyl can be lethal even in small doses. The DEA is working closely with the SAPS in efforts to address this issue to include harm reduction strategies, public awareness, and law enforcement methods targeting Drug Trafficking Organizations.

South Africa is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, serving as a co-chair to two sub-working groups on the manufacture of synthetic drugs and their precursors; and data collection, analysis, and trends including early warning.

Syria

Since the fall of the Assad regime, the situation in Syria is rapidly changing. Over the last year, illicit synthetic drug production and distribution in Syria continued to increase, boosted by direct support of the Assad regime. While production, trafficking, and distribution of captagon was formally criminalized by the Assad regime, illicit production spans areas formerly controlled by the regime, including military bases, ports and populated areas in Damascus, Dara'a, Latakia, and Homs governorates, according to media reporting. With production based in areas formerly held by the regime, captagon became one of the most in-demand illicit drugs in the Middle East in less than six years with an estimated market value of \$5.7 billion. The Middle East and North Africa region is the largest market for captagon with primary destination markets in the Gulf region. The trade has escalated to an industrial scale, marked by the seizures of millions of pills across ports in the Mediterranean and Red seas, Levantine and Gulf state border crossings, and international airports.

Syria's established pharmaceutical industrial base and legal manufacturing industry that pre-dates the 2011 conflict presents a significant and materializing diversion risk. According to Syrian state-run media, around 70 licensed pharmaceutical factories and 96 laboratories operate in Syria, with 20 factories under construction as of 2021. The Ministry of Health and General Foreign Trade Organization oversaw commercial pharmaceutical regulation for the former regime, and they regulated distribution agreements between foreign firms and local distribution agents. The regime imported a substantial amount of captagon's main ingredient, pseudoephedrine. According to the United Nations, in 2020 Syria's anticipated imports of 49.85 MT of pseudoephedrine exceeded that of the UK; Syria's imports also amount to nearly half as much as Switzerland, a global pharmaceutical hub. Syria's industrial base and outsized imports of critical ingredients for captagon pose a growing threat for illicit production, and a resource diversion problem for its citizens and neighbors.

Media reports speculate that 80 percent of the world's captagon supply is produced in Syria. Local tribes, government-backed militias, and elements of the security services, including the Syrian Army's Fourth Armored Division, are widely reported to be involved in the production or smuggling of illicit drugs from government-held areas to neighboring countries. According to media reports, collaboration on the part of the Assad regime extended to elements affiliated with Hizballah, which facilitated trafficking for the regime and provided physical security for drug dealers' homes in southern Syria. UNODC reported

captagon seizures in Iraq rose from 118kg in 2019 to over four MT in 2023, a factor of 34. In 2023, Jordan's antidrug department arrested about 35,000 people on drug charges, a 24% increase from 2022. In June 2024, Jordanian authorities foiled two smuggling operations involving nearly 10 million illicit tablets, worth up to \$200 million, destined for Saudi Arabia. Since October 2023, the number of captagon seizures on the Jordanian-Syrian border have increased fourfold, often accompanied by illicit arms shipments, according to a reputable non-governmental organization. The growth in captagon trafficking poses security risks, as smugglers have become more militarized in response to growing interdiction efforts and geopolitical leverage with neighbors. In January 2024, Jordan arrested 15 in a day of clashes with armed groups of smugglers attempting to cross into Jordan from Syria, according to media reports.

While Syrian law criminalizes the production, trafficking, and distribution of illicit drugs, the former regime only took token actions to address the growing drug production and trafficking problem and used concerns about captagon for political leverage. Following Syria's readmission to the Arab League in May 2023, the former Syrian regime committed to form technical committees with Jordan and Iraq to address drug trafficking. The former regime also sought to participate in initiatives led by international bodies such as INTERPOL to address drug trafficking. Further, in 2023, it announced arrests of several drug traffickers in government-held areas in Qamishli, northeast Syria, including the seizure of "hundreds of kg of captagon tablets that were hidden in a fuel tank." However, these arrests did not include any reported lab seizures. The former regime continued to oversee a growing amphetamine trade as well. On October 16, 2024, Treasury sanctioned three individuals involved in the illegal production and trafficking of captagon that "have benefitted Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies, including Hizballah." In March 2024, the United States sanctioned five individuals and entities associated with the regime's production and trafficking of captagon.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan does not have legal domestic production of synthetic drugs or other pharmaceuticals. Although clandestine laboratories exist in all neighboring countries, Tajikistan did not identify any illicit production of synthetic drugs during the reporting period.

During the first six months of 2024, Tajik law enforcement agencies seized 84 kg and 13,731 tablets of synthetic drugs and NPS. Authorities seized nearly 81 kg of amphetamine and methamphetamine, an increase of 173 percent from the same period in 2023. MDMA seizures increased by 189 percent (1,749 tablets for the first six months of 2024 versus 605 tablets for the same period in 2023). Barbiturate seizures decreased 71 percent (50 tablets in 2024 versus 176 in 2023). Authorities seized 560 tablets of benzodiazepines in the first six months of 2024; no benzodiazepines were seized during the same period in 2023. Authorities tracked pregabalin and Lyrica seizures separately, though Lyrica is a brand name form of pregabalin. Combining the two, pregabalin seizures increased 423 percent from 2,174 tablets in the first six months of 2023 to 11,372 tablets in the first six months of 2024.

Drug control authorities insist Tajikistan is just a transit state for synthetics and other illicit substances. Nevertheless, a small but growing digitally-based market for synthetics and NPS exists. Narcotraffickers use Telegram and other social media applications to sell synthetic drugs. Customers pay with cryptocurrency, and the transactions are completed through a complex system of cutouts and dead drops to maintain anonymity of all parties. Authorities have arrested some couriers, but they have been unable to identify or arrest suppliers. Tajikistan's agent provocateur laws and lack of training and equipment further complicate investigations.

Off label use of tropicamide and pregabalin, particularly by schoolchildren, is the main concern for authorities in terms of synthetic drug use. These substances are inexpensive and widely available, despite being prescription drugs.

Tajikistan is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Thailand

Thailand faces significant challenges in fighting the trafficking of synthetic drugs and NPS. The Royal Thai Government has implemented initial steps to address these challenges, and the newly formed government has vowed publicly that narcotics law enforcement and demand reduction are priorities. Law enforcement has begun to target the trafficking of precursor chemicals transiting Thailand to curb production in neighboring Burma and Laos.

Thailand is a major transit hub for synthetic drugs and psychoactive substances in Southeast Asia. Methamphetamine is the most widely trafficked synthetic drug in the region. Thailand has historically been a producer of methamphetamine, but due to political instability in neighboring countries and efforts by Thai law enforcement, the bulk of synthetic drug production has moved to Burma and production in Thailand has steadily declined.

Despite this decline in production, the demand for these substances is at an all-time high. In fiscal year 2024, Thai authorities seized over 1 billion methamphetamine tablets and over 25.8 MT of crystal methamphetamine. The majority of this methamphetamine was produced in Burma and Laos.

Thailand faces several challenges that contribute to the increase in demand and trafficking of synthetic drugs and psychoactive substances, including a lack of public awareness, porous borders, and well-developed and established transportation networks. Many people in Thailand are not aware of the dangers of synthetic drugs and psychoactive substances, and this lack of awareness creates a highly vulnerable population. Thailand's long and unsecured borders with Burma and Laos create opportunities for drug traffickers to operate with relative ease.

The Royal Thai Government has taken some steps to address this growing problem. The newly formed government has publicized an ambitious anti-drug posture and advocated for the reversal in recent cannabis decriminalization, targeting in part the recent influx of dispensary businesses that have overrun many metropolitan areas. Additionally, the Royal Thai Police and the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) have increased resources and staffing to focus on the drug threat. ONCB has begun efforts to raise awareness of drugs in general and has formed new task forces in the Isan Region to focus on the trafficking of controlled substances, primarily synthetic drugs originating in Laos.

Thailand is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and has adopted the Coalition Pledge.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has seen a nascent but growing proliferation of domestic manufacturing capabilities in synthetic drugs. Authorities in Tashkent dismantled six clandestine synthetics labs and seized 68 kg of synthetic drugs during the raids. In total, authorities seized 130 kg

of synthetic drugs through September 2024. Specifically, in January 2024, authorities dismantled a clandestine lab registered as a logistics office, seizing 26 kg of mephedrone worth \$900,000. Synthetic drugs primarily enter the country from Kazakhstan for domestic consumption. Authorities have noted traffickers move synthetics from other neighboring countries, including Afghanistan, through Uzbekistan's territory for distribution further afield. Precursor chemicals are readily available, and the country faces challenges with addressing precursor chemical shipments. Law enforcement officials noted expertise for the manufacture and distribution of synthetic drugs often comes from neighboring countries, including Russia. Authorities expressed concern over increased seizures of new psychoactive substances.

Uzbekistan's pharmaceutical industry has been rapidly developing with the government allocating funds to support the industry's growth and leveraging U.S. support to diversify pharmaceutical supply chains. In January the president signed a decree to allocate up to \$600 million to fund pharmaceutical projects to stimulate growth and development of the industry. Uzbekistan currently relies heavily on imported medicines and raw materials. There are now 231 domestic companies which produce 2,300 types of pharmaceutical products. Over 15,000 pharmacies are engaged in wholesale and retail trade of medicines.

Uzbekistan is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Vietnam

Vietnam is a significant transshipment point for precursor chemicals, particularly methamphetamine and amphetamines from Burma, and ketamine from Cambodia. Precursors and finished product come into Vietnam primarily through land and seaports, though many of the precursor chemicals have licit uses and transit through Vietnam for illicit use in third countries. Vietnam is not a significant producer of synthetic drugs. The government of Vietnam has a strong focus on disrupting the flow of synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals into and through its territory. Vietnamese law enforcement has not identified major illegal production labs for synthetic drugs within the country. Vietnam has a small but growing pharmaceutical industry.

Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reported seizing methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs originating from the Golden Triangle of Burma, Laos, and Thailand and

entering Vietnam via its borders with Laos and the PRC, as well as ketamine produced in Cambodia. Synthetic drugs are trafficked to Vietnam for domestic consumption and onward transit to regional countries. Vietnam is revising its Chemical Law to deal in part with the growing threat of precursor chemical diversion as transnational criminals seek to utilize Vietnamese ports for the transit of precursor chemicals. MPS regularly updates control lists in accordance with relevant UN conventions.

Vietnam is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Country Reports

U.S. DEPARTMENT *of* STATE

Afghanistan

A. Introduction

Afghanistan has maintained a dominant share in global cultivation of opium poppy for decades. Despite this, recent reporting from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other sources confirmed significant decline in poppy cultivation for a second year since the Taliban's 2022 narcotics ban. While UNODC's cultivation estimate, 12,800 hectares (ha) in 2024, indicates a slight increase from 2023, cultivation remains significantly lower than 2022, when it exceeded 200,000 ha.

Reports from neighboring countries along the primary trafficking routes indicate Afghan-origin narcotics trafficking continues, signaling both continued production and trafficking of prior year harvest stockpiles. While difficult to quantify, stockpiles appear to have been large enough to insulate landed opium farmers in the south and southwest from the ban's initial economic effects. Afghanistan's role as a source of methamphetamine has increased in recent years.

Afghanistan is experiencing crisis-level substance abuse, with one of the world's highest rates of substance use disorders per capita. Anecdotal reporting reflects increased substance use among females that may be linked to the Taliban's increasing restrictions on the rights of women and girls. Despite this increase, women and girls represent a very small population of the Taliban-operated drug treatment centers.

Afghanistan remains designated as a major drug transit and producing country under the Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit and Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2025. Ongoing efforts to reform drug policies and counter production and trafficking of opium, heroin, methamphetamines and synthetic drugs were deemed sufficient for Afghanistan to avoid being designated as "failed demonstrably" to adhere to obligations under international drug control agreements.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Ministry of Interior's Office of Counternarcotics is responsible for drug control efforts, including enforcement. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock coordinates with the Ministry of Interior on alternative livelihoods. The Ministry of Information and Culture, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs also coordinate with the Ministry of Interior on drug demand reduction and substance use treatment.

In March 2024, the Taliban issued an appendix to the October 2023 narcotics penal procedure to provide more detail on penalties for drug offenses to better assist courts in adjudicating cases.

It is not possible to directly verify the Taliban's claims on eradication, seizures, interdictions, and narcotics-related arrests. The UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform (DMP) cited at least 1,367 arrests related to at least 492 narcotics seizures in Afghanistan since January 2024.

Taliban efforts to enforce the ban vary in effectiveness and consistency across provinces, as does violent resistance and protests against eradication. In late April and early May, protests against Taliban anti-narcotics forces occurred in Badakhshan following eradication attempts in Argo and Darayim districts. Media reports claimed Taliban forces used firearms to disperse protestors, resulting in the death of two protestors. Additional protests against eradication in Darayim occurred in July, with Taliban forces injuring at least three.

2. Supply Reduction

The United States continues counternarcotics assistance through the United Nations and other international organizations. This limited assistance is not coordinated with the Taliban and does not flow through the Taliban or through affiliated ministries.

The United States supports the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development-Access to Licit Livelihoods

project, which works with farmers and agribusinesses in six Afghan provinces to support the transition to licit crop production. The program has worked with over 30,000 individuals, including over 10,000 women farmers and agribusiness owners, and has established 776 commercial greenhouses and over 3,500 ha of orchards and grape trellises. The program will continue through 2025.

The United States is closely monitoring the reduction in poppy cultivation following the 2022 narcotics ban. UNODC estimates countrywide poppy cultivation at 12,800 ha – a slight increase from the prior year’s estimate of 10,800 ha – remaining drastically lower than pre-ban levels. Badakhshan continues to cultivate the highest levels of poppy post-ban, with UNODC citing 7,408 ha in the province, comprising over half of Afghanistan’s total poppy cultivation. UNODC found the next highest cultivation levels in Badghis with 1,255 ha and Kandahar with 884 ha. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan’s eastern and southwestern regions continued to decrease, with Nangarhar and Nimroz becoming “poppy-free,” which UNODC defines as a province with fewer than 100 ha of poppy cultivation.

In addition to UNODC estimates, alternative cultivation estimates were developed by Alcis, a UK-based company. Alcis estimated a further reduction of poppy cultivation in 2024, decreasing from its revised 2023 estimate of 22,642 ha to 7,382 ha. If accurate, this figure would represent a record low for Afghan poppy cultivation since data was first collected in 2001. Differences between UNODC and Alcis estimates are due to different methodologies. Although Alcis’ countrywide estimate is lower than UNODC’s, Alcis also identified Badakhshan as Afghanistan’s top poppy cultivating province, responsible for 3,646 ha out of a countrywide estimate of 7,382 ha.

Despite reductions in poppy cultivation, seizure data from Afghanistan’s neighbors suggest the Taliban was less successful in restricting overall narcotics production and trade. It is also possible that continued narcotics flows through Afghanistan’s neighbors may have been exported pre-ban or may have been produced outside of Afghanistan. The UNODC DMP noted at least 9.97 metric tons (MT) of heroin, methamphetamine, opium, and precursor chemicals interdicted at or near Afghanistan-Iran border crossings and at least 8.5 MT of heroin, methamphetamine,

opium, and precursor chemicals interdicted at or near Afghanistan-Pakistan border crossings in 2024.

The naturally occurring ephedra plant, which can be used to make ephedrine, continues to be harvested in Afghanistan's central highlands. Since 2022, the Taliban report having destroyed ephedrine labs and closed bazaars selling ephedra. As a result, methamphetamine production has shifted to more remote areas, where drugs are produced and trafficked in smaller quantities and sold via smaller markets.

Methamphetamine seizures in the region from April 2022 through December 2023 suggest an increase in both frequency and volume of methamphetamine shipments linked to Afghanistan. In May 2024, Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force interdicted a record-setting shipment of 224 kilograms of Afghan-origin methamphetamine en route to Belgium and interdicted a shipment of 360 liters of Afghan-origin liquid methamphetamine en route to Japan via Karachi.

After the Taliban takeover in 2021, the United States stopped supporting Afghanistan's Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and National Interdiction Unit (NIU). The status and work of these units cannot be evaluated at this time.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Afghanistan has one of the highest rates of substance use in the world, at approximately 10 percent of Afghanistan's population, or nearly four million people. To address this public health crisis, the United States continues to fund UNODC and Colombo Plan projects that increase access to drug use treatment in rural areas; support treatment centers for women, children, and adolescents; and support online continuing education and training for treatment service providers.

In addition to reports of increased substance use among women, anecdotal evidence from international organizations describes an uptick in methamphetamine use among Afghan returnees from Iran. Regarding drug treatment, the primary targets for Taliban-run drug treatment programs are unhoused men in urban areas who exhibit conspicuous drug use. These men are gathered into squalid, Taliban-run substance use treatment facilities, which implement harsh methods including

forced withdrawal.

The United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) counternarcotics public information programs, including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, continue in Afghanistan despite the Taliban's efforts to ban those media channels. The programs reach nearly 20 million Afghans weekly via radio and social media.

4. Corruption

The Taliban's policy is to neither encourage nor facilitate activity associated with drug trafficking. While this policy derives from both religious beliefs and convictions regarding harm reduction, the Taliban's history of profiting from the drug trade fuels accusations that Taliban officials continue to extract benefits from the drug trade – although validity of such claims is uncertain. Reporting suggests the Taliban have achieved some success toward their stated goal of eliminating corruption, although the United States has limited ability to quantify the impact. The international community continues to monitor whether the Taliban engage in corrupt practices related to the illicit drug trade since the ban.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States has not maintained an official presence in Afghanistan since August 2021. The United States Mission to Afghanistan, known as the Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU), was established in Doha, Qatar, following U.S. Embassy Kabul's suspension of operations. As noted above, the United States funds counternarcotics programs through international organizations, which prioritize alternative development, drug demand reduction, and anti-narcotics public information programming. The AAU has weekly engagements with the Taliban Political Commission in Doha and continues to solicit more data related to Taliban counternarcotics efforts.

D. Conclusion

Afghanistan's role in the international drug trade continues to pose major challenges, even with the second year of near record-low poppy cultivation. The United States continues to monitor the impact of the Taliban's narcotics ban, noting the Taliban's

failure to provide viable economic alternatives and the resistance the Taliban continues to face when trying to enforce the ban. This includes Taliban attempts to disrupt methamphetamine production and trafficking, which produced unclear results in 2024. The longer-term success of counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan will depend on the emergence of viable alternative livelihoods. For the time being, Afghanistan's weak economy has not provided those alternatives and there is the risk that Afghan farmers will return to poppy cultivation in the years ahead.

Albania

Albanian-led organized crime groups play a significant role in supplying international markets for cannabis, cocaine, and heroin, according to Albanian law enforcement authorities. These Albanian-led organized crime groups exhibit increasingly sophisticated crimes, communications, and money laundering techniques. They operate across the Balkans as well as in the European Union (EU), the United States, Canada, South America, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. Albanian criminal networks have direct access to cocaine production in South America and trafficking networks bringing cocaine into Europe and the United Kingdom. They use the Albanian economy, particularly the construction sector, to launder proceeds and contribute to corruption. Violent crime in Albania, including assassinations, is often associated with organized crime, and judges, prosecutors, police, politicians, journalists, and activists have been subjected to intimidation. Albania participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, but during this reporting period officials did not report seizing fentanyl or other synthetic drugs in significant amounts.

Albanian prosecutors and law enforcement agencies participated in joint investigative teams (JITs) important to EU accession requirements. These and other operations, often supported by U.S. and EU advisors, led to the dismantling of several important international organized crime and drug trafficking organizations in 2024. Albania's Special Prosecution Structure Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) participated in 35 JITs in 2023 and expanded their use in 2024. SPAK also sequestered and seized significant assets, including real estate vehicles businesses and cash. In one example, SPAK and the Albanian State Police coordinated with Eurojust, Europol, and other authorities to target an Albanian-led organized crime group trafficking cocaine and laundering proceeds through companies that supplied false invoices worth roughly \$400 million. The operation led to 66 arrests and seizure of 360 kilograms of cocaine, \$4.3 million in cash, and weapons and other assets worth \$65 million.

Albanian authorities continued to investigate domestic cannabis cultivation and international trafficking. For example, a joint operation in 2024 led to the dismantling of seven structured criminal groups and seizure of \$4.8 million in cash, firearms, vehicles, and other assets, as

well as 20 arrests on charges of murder, illegal possession of firearms, and drug cultivation and trafficking.

Corruption, weak rule of law, and unemployment drive Albania's drug trafficking problem. U.S. assistance includes advising SPAK on narcotics and organized crime cases; improving interagency cooperation on investigations; advising and training oversight agencies to investigate and punish corruption and organized crime within law enforcement agencies; and providing specialized equipment and training to enhance law enforcement capabilities. During the 12 months prior to October 2024, a U.S. and EU-supported Albanian independent commission dismissed 22 judges and prosecutors for unexplained assets, with some dismissals also based on contacts with organized crime. Albania should continue efforts to strengthen rule of law, tighten anti-money laundering regulations and oversight, and counter organized crime groups' influence throughout government and society. Albanian law enforcement should expand cooperation with international counterparts to proactively target Albanian transnational criminal networks.

The Bahamas

A. Introduction

The Bahamas' expansive island geography – an archipelago of 700 islands – makes it extremely difficult to detect and disrupt drug trafficking. Further, Bahamian law enforcement has limited resources to address crime and other issues throughout the archipelago. Criminal organizations primarily use small aircraft and boats to traffic cocaine and marijuana to and through The Bahamas.

Local gangs compete for the domestic drug market, which continues to focus primarily on marijuana and has led to significant gang violence. The primary source for marijuana is Jamaica. Cocaine originating from South America transits through the Dominican Republic or Haiti before arriving in The Bahamas. Traffickers divide larger cocaine loads into smaller ones for transport to South Florida aboard pleasure craft and other noncommercial vessels.

Commercial shipping of precursor chemicals from China, India, and Bangladesh transits The Bahamas enroute to Mexico. The U.S. government continues to engage local authorities to ascertain if traffickers divert these products to produce fentanyl after departing The Bahamas. However, law enforcement has not detected or reported any significant activities involving fentanyl, synthetic drugs, or new psychoactive substances (NPS) within The Bahamas. Small amounts of these substances may have been detected in isolated incidents.

The Bahamian government continues to cooperate with the United States to tackle drug trafficking and dismantle gangs, in part because drug trafficking and gangs contribute to high levels of homicides and violent crime. Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) employ local gangs in the drug trade, but local officials struggle to identify and arrest key figures. In 2024, The Bahamas agreed to establish a transnational criminal investigation unit (TCIU) to address this deficiency, which should be formed in 2025.

Operation Bahamas and Turks & Caicos (OPBAT), the primary counternarcotics enforcement operation in the region, is a long-standing tri-lateral operation between the United States, The Bahamas, and the Turks & Caicos. Several U.S. law enforcement agencies participate in OPBAT, working with the Royal Bahamian Police Force (RBPF),

Royal Bahamian Defense Force (RBDF), and the Royal Turks & Caicos Police Force (RTCIPF) on land, air, and at sea.

The Bahamas is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments Policies and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The United States provides equipment donations, training, and technical assistance to The Bahamas under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) to build the crime-fighting capabilities of The Bahamas.

Capacity building continues to focus on improvement in enforcement and interdiction capabilities. There is also a need to build capacity to prosecute and adjudicate narcotics trafficking cases. Interdictions and arrests sometimes do not result in convictions; this impunity can incentivize criminal networks to continue using The Bahamas as a transit location for drug trafficking.

In January 2024, the United States provided four SAFEBoats to the RBPF Marine Units for shallow water operations in support of OPBAT interdiction efforts. The United States also supports infrastructure improvements and communications equipment to enhance the RBPF Marine Units' response capabilities.

The Bahamas is collaborating with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Maritime Crime Program to harmonize their maritime operations center's operational protocols with Dominican and Jamaican maritime operations centers to increase interdiction successes and interoperability.

Criminal organizations use small aircraft and boats to smuggle shipments of cocaine to The Bahamas. Detection is challenging, given the dispersed nature of the archipelago and scarce law enforcement resources to detect and interdict. Aircraft fly low to avoid radar and then land on clandestine or isolated airstrips on remote islands.

The Bahamas tries low-level drug offenses through Magistrate courts, where police officers serve as prosecutors. Because they are not lawyers, the United States

provides them with technical assistance and mentorship. The Bahamian Supreme Court and the Bahamian Department of Public Prosecutions can elevate a low-level drug case to the Supreme Court if the investigation reveals higher-level drug offenses.

2. Supply Reduction

Bahamian and U.S. officials have collaborated for decades to stem the flow of illicit drugs. Daily patrols and interdiction operations resulted in the seizure of 473 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 1,241 kg of marijuana and made 32 arrests during the first nine months of 2024.

The RBDF is shifting some operations from the central island of New Providence to newly established bases on outlying islands in the North and South of the country's long archipelago in order to improve the interdiction of go-fast boats through more isolated islands of The Bahamas.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Sandilands Rehabilitation Center in Nassau is one of The Bahamas's three public hospitals and has 16 beds to support patients seeking treatment for drug and alcohol dependence. The Bahamas also has a small number of treatment centers operated by nonprofit organizations.

In 2024, the ruling Progressive Legal Party (PLP) introduced legislation to legalize medical marijuana and low-THC cannabis, and to expunge simple possession convictions. It is still pending with the House of Assembly.

4. Corruption

The Bahamian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. While drug-related corruption is not engaged in as a matter of policy, a November 2024 indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) of several RBPF and RBDF personnel, other

government officials, and Bahamian citizens indicated that proceeds from crime are used to solicit bribes.

Bahamian Freedom of Information Act laws were passed in 2017 providing criminal penalties for corruption by officials and the adoption of public accessibility to government records. As of 2024, The Bahamas has only partially implemented the laws, and the Bahamian administration has stated that full implementation was not a priority. In addition to the SDNY indictment in November, numerous media reports have alleged government corruption, officials engaged in cronyism, kickbacks, and other forms of bribery over the course of 2024. In July 2024, the Officer-in-Charge of RBPF's Criminal Investigation Department went on leave amidst allegations of bribery, corruption, and involvement in local gang activity. The November indictment led to the resignation of the RBPF commissioner and several changes in senior police staff positions.

While the government has generally established anticorruption laws effectively, laws to combat corruption by public officials have been inconsistently applied. The government has stalled full implementation of anticorruption legislation that would accelerate efforts to enhance transparency and accountability. The November SDNY indictment renewed interest from the Government of The Bahamas in advancing anticorruption initiatives.

The Bahamas would benefit from a more robust enforcement of rules to prevent conflicts of interest related to public procurement activities. There are allegations that government contracts have been directed to political supporters, isolated reports of officials accepting small-scale "bribes of convenience," and favorable treatment given to wealthy or politically connected individuals. The bribery of a government official is a criminal act carrying a fine of up to \$10,000, a prison term of up to four years, or both.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The Northern Caribbean Security Summit (NOCSS) has gained momentum as partners from the United States, The Bahamas and The Turks and Caicos Islands seek to

modernize OPBAT and improve interdiction capabilities through a more regional approach.

In March 2024, The Bahamas hosted the NOCSS regional partnership conference in Nassau. In addition to enhancing OPBAT counter-narcotics efforts, senior officials agreed to expand the NOCSS framework to combat firearms trafficking, illegal migration, illicit financial networks, and gang operations. The NOCSS participants also agreed to develop interoperable communication platforms to enhance interdiction efficiencies.

Bahamian authorities prefer civil recovery of TCO illicit assets to disrupt criminal enterprises. Its lower evidentiary threshold leads to more successful outcomes, and the seizures disrupt the TCO's networks. The Bahamian judiciary participated in a regional civil asset recovery workshop that reviewed case studies and examined legal frameworks to enhance its civil recovery efforts.

D. Conclusion

The United States and The Bahamas have a strong partnership in counter-narcotics enforcement, disrupting TCOs, and enhancing chemical control efforts. Success will require more dedicated Bahamian drug enforcement resources, better Bahamian operational coordination between its Police and Defense forces, increased focus on countering corruption, and stronger prosecutions leading to convictions.

Belgium

Belgian customs authorities seized a record 116 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in 2023 at the Port of Antwerp, which has become a major gateway for the drug entering Europe. Half of those seizures were found in shipments from Ecuador, having transited the country but originating elsewhere. Europe's second largest port by trade volume, the Port of Antwerp's non-contiguous terminals spread over an area twice the size of Manhattan, making it particularly vulnerable to smuggling.

Cocaine seizures during the first half of 2024 were down to 22 MT, half of what was intercepted in the same period in 2023. The top three countries of shipment origin for cocaine seized in Belgium for the first half of 2024 were Sierra Leone, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. Officials noted that despite lower volumes, the total number of seizures at the port had not decreased. While the reason for the decrease in volume was unclear, most observers agreed that smugglers were adapting with measures that included smaller shipments, using alternative routes, and employing new smuggling methods, such as chemical mixtures that alter cocaine's smell, color, and appearance, making it harder to detect while allowing for cocaine extraction in specialized labs at the destination.

Belgian customs began using newly deployed mobile scanners in 2024 to screen high-risk containers, with the goal of deploying nine mobile scanners by the end of the year. Law enforcement officials continued to estimate that the vast majority of cocaine trafficked through the Port of Antwerp was immediately transferred to the Netherlands for onward distribution in Europe. Rising levels of cocaine trafficking led to increased levels of violence in the City of Antwerp in recent years, though violent crimes were down slightly in the first half of 2024.

Established in 2023, Belgium's National Drug Commissioner oversees federal drug policy. In May, Belgium enacted a law streamlining implementation of a ban of up to 20 years preventing convicted drug offenders from both access to and employment at the country's ports. On the international level, Belgium's efforts to combat drug trafficking included launching the European Ports Alliance, a public-private partnership under Belgium's EU presidency in January, bringing together multiple stakeholders to protect ports from drug trafficking and criminal infiltration. In July, Belgium joined the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics), a grouping of eight EU member states and the United

Kingdom that combats drug trafficking in the Atlantic and Mediterranean maritime domains. Belgium also participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and has committed to lead a line of effort to enhance port security and disrupt maritime transit routes. In 2024, Belgium participated as an observer in the North American Drug Dialogue. The United States and Belgium have fully operational extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements.

Belize

A. Introduction

Belize is not a major drug producing country and does not import significant quantities of precursor chemicals or synthetic drugs. However, due to geography, remote and inaccessible borders, and low technical capacity Belize is vulnerable as a transshipment point for drugs, particularly cocaine moving from South America to the United States.

In 2024, there was a decrease in reported drug plane landings, but the absence of systematic international and Belizean inter-agency data sharing and limited maritime and air domain awareness and interdiction capability impedes a full understanding of drug trafficking in Belize. Domestic consumption remained stable with cannabis as the primary drug used domestically and a small population suffering from crack cocaine addiction. Belize is working to improve its investigative and surveillance capacities through training, digital investigation technology, and mentorship. However, law enforcement faces challenges with maintaining equipment and sharing intelligence, which are crucial for successful operations and prosecutions.

Belize seeks to continue developing its capacity to secure its borders, investigate and prosecute crimes, and reduce corruption. Working closely with the United States and regional partners, Belize implements best practices and has committed to a “zero tolerance policy” in holding police officers accountable for corruption.

Belize is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Belize Police Department (BPD) is a willing partner of the United States and has a U.S.-vetted Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU) that collaborates with the Mobile Interdiction Team and Customs and Excise Department to conduct interceptions along borders. Led by the ANU, the BPD strengthened its capacity to investigate and interdict drug crime through increased focus on proactive investigative methods, enabled by U.S.-funded investigative trainings. In addition, Belize agreed to increase the ANU

member capacity by 20 percent. The Mobile Interdiction Team is a specialized border security unit that receives U.S.-funded equipment and training to support their efforts to target transnational criminal organizations. However, due to funding constraints, the BPD struggles to procure and maintain equipment to support operations.

The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) investigates and prosecutes financial crimes and performs the functions of the Supervisory Authority under the Money Laundering & Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2008. It shares information and cooperates with foreign financial intelligence units in the fight against financial crimes. It established a Civil Asset Recovery Unit to expand its investigative capacity to include narcotics-related crimes. The National Forensic Science Service certified 12 forensic experts, the first in the region, and can support evidence-based prosecution of drug cases.

The Belize Coast Guard (BCG) conducts maritime operations involving surveillance, protection, and deterrence of maritime drug trafficking. The United States supported joint training with the Anti-Narcotics Unit on two commercial off the shelf (COTS) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) drones to assist with building detection and response capacity within the BCG. Belize also implemented a Primary Surveillance Radar for aircraft detection with the Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services, a specialized intergovernmental agency delegated with air navigation services in Central American air space. To facilitate joint police and military operations in southern Belize where plane landings have been detected, the United States is supporting the Belize security forces' initiative to establish a forward operating base near Dolores. The United States also provides IT infrastructure to Belize's Joint Intelligence Operations Center to enhance detection capabilities and planned operations to deter and intercept drug plane landings.

Regionally, Belize collaborates with neighboring countries through the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area (referred to as the "Treaty of San Jose"). The United States and Belize have had a bilateral extradition treaty since 2001 and a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty since 2003.

2. Supply Reduction

Drug seizures at the borders remain low due to limited non-intrusive inspection equipment, reliance on manual inspections as the primary detection method, and challenges with remote border access. To address these challenges, Belize has maintained a small police canine program with one officer certified in narcotics canine handling that conducts joint operations with the ANU. However, Belize has struggled to expand the program, which was established with technical support, canines, and vehicles provided by the United States. Maritime interdiction is also expected to improve with the ISR drones.

Belize's multiagency approach to drug deterrence and improved in-country detection has resulted in a decrease in plane landings and an increase in narcotics seizures. From January to September 2024, law enforcement seized 50.17 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, 556.80 kg of cannabis, 20.97 kg of methamphetamine, and 5.37 kg of other drugs including crack cocaine. This represents a more than 290 percent increase compared to the same period in 2023. Authorities actively investigated possible small scale fentanyl distribution activity during the year, although there was no indication it was yet widespread.

Authorities found no evidence of precursor chemical or synthetic drug manufacturing in Belize. From January to September 2024, through intelligence and joint operations, law enforcement authorities eradicated several small-scale marijuana and coca growing operations located in remote forest areas. Authorities did not identify any clandestine laboratories or substantial cultivation.

Belize continued to improve the prosecution of drug-related crime, achieving a 90 percent countrywide conviction rate in cases related to possession of controlled drugs with the intent to supply from January to September 2024. The National Prosecution Branch reported 250 arrests and 393 convictions for drug-related crimes in Belize district alone, where authorities declared a State of Emergency in some areas for 90 days to reduce gang-related violence.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Cannabis is the most commonly used drug in Belize, while a small population use crack cocaine. The National Drug Abuse Control Council (NDACC) within the Ministry of Health and Wellness did not report any fentanyl users.

The NDACC manages drug treatment, prevention, and public awareness programs. With an annual budget of \$500,000, it has six intervention areas: (1) drug prevention; (2) public education, research, and information; (3) legal reform; (4) community empowerment; (5) rehabilitation; and (6) treatment.

In part due to underfunding, the NDACC partners with non-governmental and international organizations to manage four rehabilitation centers and provide school and community programs on drug education.

4. Corruption

The Government of Belize does not facilitate or encourage drug trafficking, or any illegal activities associated with drug trafficking. Allegations occasionally arise accusing senior government officials in Belize of drug trafficking, but these claims often lack evidence, and authorities have not conducted high-level investigations or prosecutions. In October 2024, police found over 400 grams of cocaine on a boat belonging to Minister of Blue Economy Andre Perez. Minister Perez denied any link to the incident, and authorities did not make any arrests.

The BPD has committed to training and policies to shift to a preventive approach to address public corruption and abuse of authority. In March 2024, the Commissioner of Police announced that six police officers were dismissed from the BPD for drug related offenses including facilitating narco-plane landings in 2022. Additionally, a U.S.-supported BPD unit arrested one police officer for narco-trafficking during a cocaine seizure.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Belize have a bilateral agreement to implement counter-narcotics initiatives and target transnational criminal organizations. U.S. Customs and Border

Protection and the Belize Customs and Excise Department maintain a Foreign Electronic Cargo Data Exchange Program for data sharing, identification, and targeting of high-risk cargo.

In 2024, over 130 Belize law enforcement officers received nine counter-drug related trainings as part of the United States and Belize bilateral agreement.

D. Conclusion

The United States and Belize have a strong partnership in counter-narcotics enforcement and disrupting TCOs. Further success will require more dedicated Belizean drug enforcement resources, stronger Belizean operational coordination between its Police and Defense forces, increased focus on countering corruption, and stronger prosecutions leading to convictions. Enhanced training programs and technical assistance will also be crucial in building the capacity of Belizean law enforcement agencies.

Bolivia

A. Introduction

Bolivia is the third-largest producer of cocaine globally, after Colombia and Peru, and is a significant transit hub for Peruvian cocaine, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Most of the cocaine produced in Bolivia is exported to other Latin American countries for either local use or further shipment to West Africa, Europe, and Asia.

The Bolivian government has failed to take adequate measures to safeguard the country's legal coca markets from criminal exploitation and to reduce illicit coca cultivation, which continues to exceed the legal limits set by Bolivia's domestic laws for medical and traditional use. On September 15, 2024, Bolivia was granted a national interest waiver allowing certain U.S. foreign assistance to continue through Fiscal Year 2025.

Since 2020, Bolivia has annually exceeded its own coca eradication objectives and made progress in supply reduction. However, it is unlikely to meet its coca eradication goals for 2024. Bolivia has limited law enforcement cooperation with neighboring countries.

There is a legal coca market in Bolivia, in recognition of coca's traditional significance in the country. In 2017, Bolivia passed legislation to increase the number of hectares (ha) of legal coca cultivation and saw an increase in legal coca cultivation from 12,000 to 22,000 hectares. UNODC estimated that cultivation exceeded the legal limit for the 2023 calendar year and was more than double the amount needed for traditional and medicinal usage. Many Bolivians consume coca tea and chew coca leaves. Illegal drug use in Bolivia is low compared to the United States; however, the use of synthetic recreational drugs and combining synthetics with coca leaf is increasing.

The Brazilian criminal organization Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and cartels from Mexico and Colombia have increased activity in Bolivia. These actors pose significant new challenges for controlling illicit drug trafficking in Bolivia. UNODC noted

the Chapare region in Cochabamba Department and several locations in the Departments of Beni and Santa Cruz were under the control of narcotraffickers.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Vice Minister for Social Defense and Controlled Substances (VMSD), under the Ministry of Government, is mandated to combat drug trafficking, regulate coca production, advance coca eradication and drug prevention, and execute rehabilitation programs. The Special Counter-Narcotics Police Force (FELCN) has 1,250 personnel and reports to the VMSD. The Joint Eradication Task Force conducts manual coca eradication with 1,700 personnel.

The Directorate of Support for the Prevention of Drug Use, Control of Illicit Traffic in Controlled Substances and Surplus Coca (DIPREVCON) coordinates and funds drug enforcement operations across all Ministry of Government offices.

DIPREVCON reports to VMSD. DIPREVCON had a budget of \$45 million in 2024, up from \$40 million in 2023, \$21.92 million in 2022 and \$30.65 million in 2021.

Bolivia currently receives most of its foreign counternarcotics financial support from the European Union (EU); however, the EU plans to end direct budgetary support in 2025.

Bolivia coordinates bilaterally and regionally on counternarcotics but has limited cooperation with the United States. During 2024, Bolivia increased international cooperation; it organized bilateral joint commissions and signed agreements with Brazil and Peru and held a law enforcement cooperation meeting with Paraguay in November 2024. The Brazilian police now have a permanent police attaché stationed in Santa Cruz. In 2024, Bolivia signed bilateral joint commissions with Spain, France, and Belgium. In February 2024, Bolivia hosted high-level Community of Latin American and Caribbean States meetings on drugs. In 2023, the Bolivian Minister of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Iran to increase border security and combat narcotrafficking.

In June 2023, Bolivia requested that the World Health Organization (WHO) remove coca leaf from the list of controlled substances. The final results of WHO's review

are expected in 2026, at which point a recommendation will be sent to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

The United States and Bolivia are parties to a 1995 extradition treaty that permits the extradition of nationals for the most serious offenses, including drug trafficking. Bolivia and the United States do not have a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty but can request assistance through various multilateral conventions to which both are signatories.

2. Supply Reduction

Through December 2024, FELCN reported that it had destroyed 91 cocaine hydrochloride processing labs and 1,407 rustic cocaine labs, a 7 percent decrease and 84 percent increase, respectively, from 2023. FELCN reported seizing 19.43 metric tons (MT) of cocaine base and 45.02 MT of cocaine in 2024, a 68 percent increase and 111 percent increase respectively from 2023. FELCN arrested 3,356 individuals on drug-related offenses through September 2024. In 2024, FELCN reported confiscating 52 aircraft involved in drug trafficking, compared to 51 seized in 2023. UNODC verifies FELCN drug seizures above 10 kilograms before their incineration. Contacts are concerned about increased cocaine transiting through Bolivia and increased efficiency in cocaine production in Bolivia.

On February 25, 2024, the government of Bolivia announced plans to eradicate 10,000 ha of excess coca by 2025. Some experts estimate that at least 11,000 ha of coca must be eradicated annually to see a net reduction in coca cultivation. As of December 2024, Bolivian authorities have reported eradication of 8,701 ha of coca.

While FELCN's primary focus remained cocaine seizures in 2024, it also seized small quantities of synthetic drugs including methamphetamine, LSD, and MDMA. Customs detected a single case of fentanyl with improper paperwork that it deemed an administrative infraction.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to UNODC, illicit drug consumption is low in Bolivia compared to other countries in the region. Bolivia has approximately 80 drug treatment and

rehabilitation centers, the majority of which are run by non-governmental organizations. Two public treatment centers are available in Tarija and in Santa Cruz.

4. Corruption

The Government of Bolivia does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, Senior Bolivian officials acknowledge serious corruption in the judiciary and police. Internal investigations of corruption on the part of FELCN police officers continued through 2024. In December 2024, Bolivian judges sentenced seven FELCN officers to 13 to 15 years of imprisonment for diversion of seized cocaine in 2020. On December 12, 2024, Bolivia extradited Maximiliano Davila to the United States on drug-related offenses and conspiring to use and carry firearms. Davila, known by the alias “Macho,” was the director of the Special Force for the Fight Against Drug Trafficking (FELCN) in 2019 under former president Evo Morales and is the designated target of the Department of State’s Narcotics Rewards Program with a reward offer of up to \$5 million for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction.

Following the Bolivian government's request for assistance in 2023, UNODC began implementing in 2024 an EU-funded, two-year program with the Ministry of Government to fight corruption in the FELCN.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Despite the lack of a U.S. counternarcotics presence in Bolivia, the United States had discussions with the Bolivian government in 2024 on how to improve counternarcotics information sharing and cooperation. Additionally, the United States and the EU fund UNODC to independently validate government eradication efforts. In 2024, Bolivia participated in eight courses at the U.S.-supported International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador to strengthen capacity in combating transnational crime.

The notable absence of prosecutions of high-profile traffickers and corrupt officials indicates a lack of capacity and perhaps of political will to conduct investigations and enforcement actions that disrupt criminal networks.

D. Conclusion

Bolivia remains the third-largest source of coca and cocaine in the world and a major transit country for Peruvian cocaine. More action is needed to adequately control coca cultivation and stop cocaine production and trafficking. While Bolivia has increased seizures and lab destruction, it should expand safeguards of the country's licit coca markets from criminal exploitation, reduce illicit coca cultivation that continues to exceed legal limits under Bolivia's domestic laws for medical and traditional use, improve efforts to locate and interdict chemicals diverted through black market channels for processing cocaine, investigate and prosecute cocaine traffickers, and further expand investigative cooperation with international partners to disrupt cocaine trafficking and transnational criminal networks.

Brazil

With a population of nearly 215 million people, Brazil is second to the United States in gross consumption of cocaine. Brazil shares borders with the three largest cocaine producing countries in the world, serving as both a destination and transit point for illegally trafficked narcotics. Brazilian authorities have interdicted aerial and maritime cocaine shipments destined for the United States, Africa, and Europe. Transnational drug trafficking organizations, especially the *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (PCC), are Brazil's primary national security threat. According to Brazil's Federal Police (PF), PCC operates in 22 of 27 Brazilian states and is active in at least 16 countries worldwide, including the United States.

In 2024, the federal budget for the National Antidrug Fund (which includes funds from taxes, the sale of seized assets, and fines) increased 22 percent from 2023. Seizures of cocaine and other illicit drugs decreased slightly in the first nine months of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023, with the PF seizing 50.9 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 361.6 MT of marijuana, and 485,771 units of synthetic drugs (including methamphetamine, LSD, ecstasy, and amphetamine). As of October, the PF had eradicated 1,177 hectares of cannabis plants in Paraguay, in coordination with the Paraguayan National Police, and 608 MT in Brazil.

The United States works closely with Brazilian law enforcement to counter transnational organized crime. In May, U.S.-trained PF officers seized approximately 2.2 MT of cocaine and 76 kilograms (kg) of cocaine in the state of Amazonas, approximately 200 miles west of its capital Manaus – the largest cocaine bulk seizure in the history of the Amazon region in Brazil. In October, U.S.-trained PF officers seized approximately 500 kg of cocaine from a boat in the Port of Sao Luis, state of Maranhao, Brazil, in the largest seizure to occur in Sao Luis.

In August 2024, U.S.-trained PF officers seized 114 kg of cocaine hidden in the sea chest of a ship bound to Europe in the Port of Santos. Drug seizures in sea chests of ships have increased substantially in Brazil, particularly in the Port of Santos, going from 2.4 percent of total seizures in 2019 to over 30 percent through the first nine months of 2024. PF-specialized divers conducted this operation after receiving U.S.-funded training on Public Safety Diving and underwater inspection of vessel hulls in July 2024 under the Global

Maritime Crime Program implemented by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime with U.S. funding.

In October 2024, Brazil announced efforts to strengthen regional and international cooperation to detect and control the emergence of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) and expand its pilot Early Warning System as a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Burma

A. Introduction

Burma is a major source of illicit methamphetamine and opiates. Burma's February 2021 military coup and the conflict that followed has been a driver of instability throughout much of the country. In October 2023, a grouping of three ethnic armed organizations (EAO) launched "Operation 1027," an armed offensive against military regime's forces that continued through the reporting period. Operation 1027 and other attacks by other EAOs and anti-regime groups resulted in the regime losing control of parts of the country, leading to increased lawlessness, including along much of Burma's borders with Thailand and the PRC. This in part allowed the increased illicit import of precursor chemicals and fueled surges in the production and trafficking of opiates and synthetic drugs to and from Burma.

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2024 World Drug report, the production of opium in Burma increased by 36 percent in 2023, overtaking Afghanistan to become the world's largest opium producer. The 2024 UNODC Myanmar Opium Survey: Cultivation, Production and Implications, reported Burma produced 995 metric tons (MT) of opium in 2024, 8 percent less than 1,080 MT in 2023. Law enforcement seized a record-breaking 190 MT of methamphetamine in the region in 2023, 73 percent of which was seized in the 'Golden Triangle' area of Burma, Thailand, and Laos, and most of which was produced in Burma, according to UNODC.

The military regime's Drug Enforcement Division (DED) of the Myanmar Police Force can only operate in areas the regime controls. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the DED reported some seizures of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals in 2024, but these seizures were generally executed at regime checkpoints in response to tips by rival gangs of traffickers rather than DED-instigated investigations and only resulted in the arrest of low-level traffickers.

Domestic drug consumption is substantial and widespread, with amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) common among migrant workers and internally displaced communities. Psychoactive substances, or "party drugs" including ketamine, MDMA, and polydrug mixtures are increasingly popular among Burma's youth.

Illicit drugs produced in Burma are trafficked throughout the region, with routes extending beyond Southeast Asia to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Burma is not a major source or transit country for drugs entering the United States.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) is the military regime's State Administration Council's designated inter-ministerial coordinating body for drugs. The regime minister for Home Affairs is the Committee's Chair and the Commander of Myanmar Police Force's Drug Enforcement Division (DED) is the Joint Secretary. The CCDAC includes representatives from ministries and justice sector institutions with drug enforcement authorities. At a CCDAC coordination meeting in March, the CCDAC Chair called for increased international cooperation on counternarcotics, even though since the 2021 coup many countries have limited engagement with regime law enforcement entities.

The DED is the primary narcotics interdiction unit, though joint interdiction operations with the military are common. The Myanmar Police Force, including DED, is understaffed. DED claims to have staffed only 1,400 of 3,000 authorized positions.

DED operates 65 anti-narcotics task forces (ANTF) and four specialized task forces, for a total of 69 anti-narcotics squads divided among 11 divisions nationwide. In August, the DED division in Lashio city, Shan State, fell under the control of EAOs. By October, EAOs had seized eight ANTF compounds and were fighting the regime in areas that had five other ANTF compounds.

The regime Ministry of Legal Affairs (MoLA) provides oversight of all criminal drug prosecutions in Burma. Internal conflict and political instability in Burma hinder the regime's ability to investigate and prosecute narcotics cases. Staffing of criminal justice institutions has also declined due to defectors joining the opposition Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).

The DED is unable to investigate and the MoLA is unable to prosecute EAO and regime military-affiliated criminal activity. In 2024, the expansion of EAO control over territory hindered the regime's ability to counter transnational crimes.

Burma's law enforcement and justice institutions lack experience in, and understanding of, extradition and mutual legal assistance mechanisms. Burma has a colonial-era extradition treaty with the United States, but Burma has not utilized the treaty for years. The DED maintains relationships with counterparts in regional countries, most notably Thailand, India, Australia, the Philippines, and the PRC.

2. Supply Reduction

Burma's political instability and internal conflict have caused widespread socio-economic decline that incentivized increased production of highly profitable synthetic drugs and increased poppy cultivation for opium and heroin production. The UNODC 2023 Southeast Asia Opium Survey reported that Burma was the world's top source of opium in 2023, a position previously held by Afghanistan. The 2024 UNODC Myanmar Opium Survey: Cultivation, Production and Implications survey reported a four percent decrease in poppy cultivation and with potential opium production of 995 MT, an eight percent decrease from 1,080 MT in 2023, which was the highest since 2021. With an estimated value of \$2.4 billion, this marked a significant expansion of Burma's opiate economy.

From January to June 2024, DED officers reported major seizures, including at least 23,393 kilograms (kg) of crystal methamphetamine, 239 million "yaba" tablets (caffeine-coated methamphetamine), and 2,178 kg of heroin.

On June 26, the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, the CCDAC destroyed approximately \$350 million in narcotics-related seizures, 21 percent less than the value of the \$446 million seizures destroyed in 2023. This included 77 types of narcotic drugs and precursor chemicals seized in the cities of Yangon, Mandalay, and Taunggyi.

From January to August, the Myanmar Police Force reported 3,832 drug-related cases and prosecution of 5,286 individuals. The DED-led "Operation 39/24",

launched in 2023, which seeks to prevent the importation and diversion of controlled precursor chemicals, continued through 2024.

Burma's primary narcotics trafficking routes originate in Shan State and run overland to Thailand, Lao PDR, the PRC, India, and Bangladesh and via sea to Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Pacific Island countries. Burma-based drug traffickers are not a significant source of fentanyl.

In May, the DED seized five MT of crystal methamphetamine worth approximately \$25 million, which as of October was the largest recorded seizure in 2024. The shipment originated in Shan State and was bound for international markets via Yangon port. Another 2.3 MT of crystal methamphetamine worth \$17 million, also from Shan State, was seized in August on a cargo motorboat in the Ayeyarwady region in Burma bound for Malaysia.

The regime did not implement the amended Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic Substance Law of 2018, which focuses on addiction as a public health issue.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

While domestic consumption of illicit drugs likely continued to grow, official statistics were not available. The Department of Rehabilitation (DOR), under the regime Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement, is responsible for providing rehabilitation, reintegration and follow up services to people with substance use disorders. The DOR listed 14 drug rehabilitation centers across the country, but centers in conflict areas are not operational.

The DOR is underfunded and understaffed. Less than 100 staff, out of 400 authorized positions, provide all social rehabilitation services including drug rehabilitation services. The DOR's capacity declined following the coup due to restrictions on capacity building assistance from the UN and other international organizations.

The Drug Dependency Treatment and Research Unit (DDTR), under the regime Ministry of Health (MOH), provides methadone maintenance therapy and buprenorphine maintenance treatment. The DDTR also provides drug detox services

and opioid substitution therapy at public hospitals. In 2023, the MOH provided dispensary services at 67 sites; as of September, only 50 percent of these sites remained functional. The MOH started to distribute naloxone through local non-governmental organizations to prevent opioid overdose. Due to the regime's lack of access to non-regime-controlled areas, civil society organizations filled the health care gap to provide services in collaboration with minority ethnic community leaders.

The MOH established 29 major drug treatment centers (DTC) and 56 minor drug treatment centers across the country over the past 20 years. As of 2024, only five of these DTCs, all located in larger cities, were still in operation; however, they were not assessed as capable of delivering quality public health care services.

The United States and Japan are the only donors supporting evidence-based drug prevention and treatment interventions.

4. Corruption

Burma does not as a matter of policy encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of proceeds from illicit transactions. Nonetheless, corruption is widespread in Burma and further facilitated by regime-amended laws targeting pro-democracy activists that require little evidence to prosecute individuals. The regime's Anti-Corruption Commission has focused exclusively on targeting the regime's political opponents with corruption charges to delegitimize them.

As illicit proceeds from the drug trade fuel corruption and conflict, the regime is drafting a Custody and Disposal of Exhibits Law to prevent misappropriation of assets seized during investigations.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States suspended most counternarcotics cooperation with Burma's authorities following the 2021 coup. Prior to the coup, the United States had partnered with the DED on law enforcement intelligence sharing, joint investigations, training, and material assistance. Burma has not attended the U.S.-supported International Law

Enforcement Academy program in Bangkok since 2021. The United States maintains a working relationship through DEA with Burma's DED, sharing information related to narcotics investigations and providing limited operational assistance on counter drug matters.

The United States continued to partner with the Colombo Plan and UNODC to promote evidence-based drug prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation services in Burma. Following the coup, these programs pivoted to supporting civil society-led communities, including marginalized internally displaced persons and minority ethnic communities in conflict affected areas.

The United States partnered with UNODC to conduct the annual opium poppy cultivation surveys and worked to develop a comprehensive assessment on Burma's chemical industry. These surveys serve as reliable baseline data to analyze the opium and synthetic drugs production and trafficking trends.

Through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the United States supports HIV testing, counseling, treatment, and care for people who inject drugs. Other U.S. programs support civil society organizations in engaging local stakeholders to promote sustainable responses to the drug use epidemic in conflict-affected areas.

D. Conclusion

Burma remains a major source of illicit drugs throughout Southeast Asia and illicit proceeds from the trade further threaten internal and regional stability. The ongoing conflict between the military regime, minority ethnic armed organizations, and the majority ethnic Bamar militias has contributed to increased illicit drug production and trafficking.

Domestic drug consumption is widespread and increasing, particularly as new psychoactive substances are now increasingly available in rural areas. ATS tablets such as yaba are commonly used among the internally displaced and migrant worker populations. The overall socio-economic climate has contributed to rising numbers of young adults experimenting with drugs. Civil society organizations are providing family-based drug use prevention interventions with the technical support of UNODC and

Colombo Plan, but resources are insufficient to meet the demand. In spite of these challenges, the United States remains a committed partner for the people of Burma as it confronts counternarcotics issues at the local level and with the assistance of the international community.

Cabo Verde

Cabo Verde's strategic mid-Atlantic location, extensive coastline, and vast maritime zone are exploited by drug traffickers based primarily in South America and Europe to transit cocaine, cannabis, and other drugs to Africa and Europe. The increasing number of drug seizures in recent years underscores Cabo Verde's growing role as a trafficking route. The United States and other international partners have been instrumental in supporting Cabo Verdean efforts to confront this challenge, providing comprehensive training to police and judicial forces in 2024 to enhance the government's capacity to interdict trafficking. Still, Cabo Verde lacks sufficient material and structural capability to effectively respond to and interdict maritime trafficking.

Cabo Verde has relatively low levels of corruption. The government has implemented an integrated policy on drugs and crime that encompasses security, justice, and health sectors. However, it lacks sufficient resources for demand reduction and the prevention and combatting of street crime. Additionally, recidivism rates for drug-related offenses remain high.

In Cabo Verde, drug trafficking primarily occurs through maritime conveyance, with the Atlantic route from Brazil to Cabo Verde to West Africa a significant concern. Cabo Verdean authorities estimate that only two percent of the drugs entering Cabo Verde each year remain in the country for consumption. Through the first nine months of 2024, authorities seized 1.5 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 4.1 MT of cannabis, and 500 grams of hashish. Cabo Verdean authorities estimate that these drugs originated from South America and were destined for Europe.

In 2024, approximately 15 individuals of Nigerian and Cabo Verdean nationality were successfully prosecuted for drug trafficking-related offenses, though authorities believe they may be part of larger, unidentified networks. In 2024, the Government of Cabo Verde also extradited four Spanish nationals arrested in Praia in December 2023 to face prosecution in Spain. In addition to the United States, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is a major assistance provider to Cabo Verde in the fight against drug trafficking.

To date, Cabo Verdean judicial authorities have not recorded any seizures of chemical precursors. Cabo Verdean authorities suspect that synthetic drugs are circulating in the

country, particularly on the more touristic islands of Sal, Boa Vista, and São Vicente, but lack the forensic resources to confirm this.

The Attorney General's Office reported 421 new drug crime cases nationwide, a 23.5 percent increase from the previous year. These were in addition to 741 cases carried over from 2023. After resolving some cases, 809 remain pending, a 9.2 percent increase from the previous year.

The United States and Cabo Verde do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance or extradition treaty. However, Cabo Verde can still extradite non-Cabo Verdean nationals to the United States and is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions that facilitate mutual legal assistance. Cabo Verde participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Cambodia

Cambodia faces ongoing challenges with narcotics consumption, trafficking, and production. It has become a key transshipment hub for Burma-sourced methamphetamine and heroin, as well as a major producer of ketamine. The manufacturing, trafficking, and use of methamphetamine, ketamine, and other amphetamine-type stimulants remain prevalent. Transnational criminal organizations involving a range of Asian and African nations use Cambodia as a transit point and destination country for illicit drugs. Precursor chemicals, mostly sourced from China, are used in domestic clandestine labs to produce synthetic drugs.

Statistics from Cambodia's National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD) show methamphetamine continued to dominate drug seizures in the first half of 2024, despite a sharp rise in ketamine seizures. Methamphetamine remains the primary concern of national authorities. There were 8,056 drug treatment admissions in 2024, including 501 female patients. Methamphetamine accounted for the vast majority (98.4 percent) of these admissions.

In the first half of 2024, Cambodian authorities seized slightly over three metric tons (MT) of crystal methamphetamine (a 462 percent increase from the previous year); 9.58 kilograms (kg) of methamphetamine tablets (a 1,420 percent increase); 1,435.23 kg of ketamine (a 1,211 percent increase); 244.21 kg of MDMA (a 53 percent increase); 26.96 kg of heroin (an 81 percent decrease); 110 grams of cocaine (a 93 percent decrease); 2.08 kg of nimetazepam (a 31 percent increase); and 222.27 kg of precursor chemicals (a 73 percent decrease). Notably, 1,513 kilograms of methamphetamine and ketamine were interdicted in one seizure in January. On June 14, 2024, authorities destroyed 4.1 MT of seized drugs and 3.2 MT of seized chemicals awaited destruction.

U.S. law enforcement training and increased efficiency within Cambodia's Anti-Drug Department have led to significant gains in drug-related investigations, arrests, and seizures. Although comprehensive figures covering 2024 were not available at the time of this report, authorities pursued over 8,000 drug-related cases and arrested over 20,000 suspects in 2023.

Cambodia does not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty or extradition agreement with the United States, although it has acceded to relevant multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation. Cambodia participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Canada

In 2023, Canada's Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Serious and Organized Crime and Border Integrity Unit, identified fentanyl production in Canada. Authorities estimate that in 2024, Canadian fentanyl production was primarily for domestic consumption, although fentanyl production capacity significantly exceeds domestic consumption rates. Law enforcement officials report high volumes of precursors arriving to Canada and the presence of large illicit drug laboratories. Canadian criminal elements also produce cannabis, methamphetamine, and MDMA (commonly known as ecstasy) that they have trafficked domestically and to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

On October 3, 2024, the RCMP announced they had dismantled the largest narcotics "superlab" in Canadian history, seizing firearms, ammunition, explosive devices and cash in addition to 55 kilograms (kg) of fentanyl, 390 kg of methamphetamine, 35 kg of cocaine, 15 kg of MDMA and six kg of cannabis. Investigators additionally cited the discovery at the facility of several metric tons (MT) of unregulated chemicals used to produce the methamphetamine precursor P2P (phenyl-2-propanone).

Canada and the United States cooperate on drug control through federal arrangements and interactions between provincial, municipal, and tribal entities. Bilateral collaboration includes the U.S.-Canada Joint Action Plan to Combat Opioids, the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, and the Cross Border Crime Forum. Trilateral cooperation with Mexico occurs via the North American Drug Dialogue and the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee. Canada is also a member of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Canada's 1996 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) establishes the regulatory regime for the possession, production, and distribution of controlled substances that offenders can use in the manufacture of illegal drugs. In 2024, Canada amended the CDSA to tighten ministerial authority for issuing or renewing supervised consumption site permits and to repeal alternative pharmaceutical therapy provisions. The amendments increased the range of activities requiring licenses or authorizations, such as for possession, transportation, and delivery of controlled substances, and extended existing cabinet authority to regulate licenses.

Canada committed approximately \$109 million in its 2024 budget to create an emergency overdose crisis treatment fund for municipalities and First Nations communities. This commitment is in addition to the \$261.3 million that Canada budgeted over five years in the 2023 federal budget for the Canadian Drug and Substances Strategy.

Canada legalized the production, distribution, sale, and possession of non-medical cannabis in 2018 but has criminal penalties for unlicensed cannabis possession. In 2024, Statistics Canada estimated that approximately two-thirds of cannabis purchases occurred in the legal market. During FY 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized 3.04 MT of marijuana on the U.S. northern border, compared to 7.85 MT during FY 2023.

On January 31, 2023, Health Canada granted the province of British Columbia an exemption under the CDSA. This allows for the possession of small amounts of illicit drugs (opioids, crack and powder cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA) for personal use by adults 18 and over. In lieu of law enforcement actions, under this exemption people will be provided with treatment and public health materials if needed. Public use remains illegal; as such people are legally permitted to possess in homes or shelters, supervised consumption sites, and treatment centers. The exemption will expire in 2026.

Health Canada made available a new drug early warning system to identify new and emerging psychoactive substances in the synthetic illegal drug supply. The Canadian Drug and Substance Watch integrates data from drug samples submitted by law enforcement, wastewater monitoring, and web monitoring to identify potentially harmful substances circulating across Canada.

In 2024, the United States and Canada used asset-sharing, mutual legal assistance, and extradition and customs treaties to exchange forfeited assets, conduct extraditions, and cooperate on law enforcement matters.

To further enhance bilateral counternarcotics cooperation, Canada could take additional measures, such as improved information sharing, deepening cooperation on drug trafficking investigations, aligning national import-export controls, and increasing assistance on money laundering probes. The United States also recommends Canada strengthen coordination on real estate transactions and cryptocurrency criminal transactions and enhance cyber investigations of dark net vendors.

People's Republic of China

A. Introduction

The People's Republic of China's (PRC) geographic location, large chemical industry, and expanding economy have all contributed to its status as a major source of precursor chemicals, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and synthetic drugs for global markets. The PRC shares borders with drug source countries in both Southeast and Southwest Asia and remains a destination and transit country for methamphetamine and heroin produced in these areas. Domestic PRC criminal organizations traffic illicit drugs within the PRC as well as to international markets, and PRC authorities have noted the presence of international drug trafficking organizations originating from Mexico and Southeast Asia operating in the country. In addition to its somewhat porous borders, its numerous coastal cities with high-volume seaports and vast network of international airports make the PRC an ideal hub for drug and precursor chemical production and trafficking.

The massive scope of the PRC's chemical and pharmaceutical industries provides opportunities for the illicit production and diversion of fentanyl precursors, methamphetamine, ketamine, and other drugs. While the PRC officially reports that drug use is on the decline, domestic use of these synthetic drugs continues and drug seizures reportedly increased in 2023 (the most recent year for which data is available) by 18 percent. According to U.S. and international law enforcement agencies, the PRC remains a major source of precursor chemicals sent to North America for the production of synthetic drugs. These are often purchased via the internet and shipped to overseas customers, often by unwitting chemical companies. Chemical alterations of scheduled drugs to circumvent existing anti-drug laws have hampered interdiction efforts.

Sustaining progress in the U.S. opioid crisis requires effective bilateral U.S.-PRC counterdrug and law enforcement cooperation, such as in 2019 when the PRC implemented class-wide controls of all forms of fentanyl. However, PRC traffickers then adapted their strategies, shifting to shipments of synthetic drug precursor chemicals to purchasers in Mexico and other countries.

Disrupting the supply of synthetic precursors from the PRC to third countries for fentanyl and methamphetamine manufacturing and eventual shipment to illicit U.S. markets presents formidable challenges. Sustained enforcement and regulatory actions are necessary to significantly reduce the PRC's role as a source of precursor chemicals used in the production, sale, and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs significantly impacting the United States. Trafficking by mislabeling cargo to bypass current laws and avoid detection is a challenge that tests law enforcement's adaptability to new trafficking techniques.

Since the United States and PRC announced the resumption of bilateral cooperation to combat global illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking in November 2023, the PRC has taken significant steps to reduce the flows of precursor chemicals to illicit drug producers known to be trafficking synthetic drugs into the United States. These steps included the PRC issuing a public notice to the PRC chemical industry warning against illicit trade in precursor chemicals and pill press equipment; taking law enforcement actions against illicit precursor chemical suppliers; removing web-based advertisements; and scheduling 55 synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals between June and September, some of which had been controlled internationally by the UN. On June 18, 2024, the PRC announced the arrest of an individual indicted in the United States for involvement in a money laundering scheme on behalf of the Sinaloa cartel. The United States and the PRC also launched the U.S.–PRC Counternarcotics Working Group, a valuable mechanism for sharing law enforcement information, tackling the illicit financing of illicit drugs, and ensuring ongoing coordination on shared challenges. Continued and sustained implementation and a coordinated effort by the United States, PRC law enforcement, and third countries is necessary to combat the trafficking of synthetic drug precursor chemicals and equipment for illicit drug production.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The PRC's drug control strategy focuses on prevention, education, illicit crop eradication, interdiction, rehabilitation, commercial regulation, and law enforcement. The National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) is the national drug control policy entity; the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and provincial public

security bureaus enforce NNCC policies and drug laws. The Anti-Smuggling Bureau within the General Administration of Customs is responsible for the enforcement of the PRC's drug control laws at seaports, airports, and land border checkpoints. The PRC maintains bilateral and multilateral drug control arrangements with many countries and international organizations, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and participates in a variety of international drug conferences and bilateral meetings. There is no extradition treaty between the PRC and the United States. The PRC and the United States are parties to a bilateral mutual legal assistance agreement that entered into force in 2001. Despite the existence of a mutual legal assistance agreement, many outstanding requests by both the United States and the PRC remained unfulfilled.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the NNCC's 2023 Annual Drug Report (published June 2024), there has been a "steady and gradual resurgence" in the PRC's drug situation after the COVID-19 pandemic, though it was "far less severe...generally controllable and stabilized." The report noted PRC law enforcement investigated 42,000 drug-related cases, made 65,000 drug-related arrests, and seized 25.9 metric tons (MT) of illegal drugs in 2023. Investigations and arrests increased from 2022. According to the report, PRC authorities also resolved 274 cases involving precursor chemicals with seizures amounting to 938.5 MT of precursor chemicals, representing a 42.2 percent year-on-year increase.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to the NNCC, synthetic drugs – primarily methamphetamine – have surpassed heroin and other opioids as the PRC's primary domestic drug threat. The NNCC noted continued concern over ketamine use. The NNCC also reported a trend of increased use of "substitute substances," such as narcotic and psychotropic medications, due to increased prices of heroin and methamphetamine. The NNCC particularly noted the consumption of etomidate, which the PRC scheduled in October 2023. The report also noted the trend of misuse of dextromethorphan and compound diphenoxylate, which are non-scheduled addictive substances.

The PRC has scheduled over 500 drugs and precursor chemicals as well as fentanyl-related substances as a class, but New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) remain a problem. According to the NNCC's 2023 Annual Drug Report, the total number of registered illegal drug users in the PRC was just over 896,000, a 20.3 percent decrease year-on-year, but the actual number of drug users was estimated to be at least 14 million, according to 2015 state media reports. Of the reported registered drug users, 455,000 used methamphetamine, a 22.6 percent decrease year-on-year; 305,000 reportedly used heroin, a 26.7 percent decrease year-on-year; and 30,000 used ketamine, a 6.3 percent decrease year-on-year.

4. Corruption

The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has stated it takes allegations of drug-related corruption seriously and launches investigations when deemed appropriate. Despite efforts to stem drug-related corruption, corruption among provincial, prefectural, county, and district government officials continues to be a concern. The PRC does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Based on publicly available information, no senior PRC official at the central government level is known to have facilitated the illicit production or distribution of drugs or precursor chemicals during this reporting period. In September 2024, the former deputy director of the NNCC, MPS Vice Minister Liu Yuejin, was arrested on corruption charges, but there is no public information that ties these charges to illicit drug-related activities. Similarly, no senior Chinese official from the central or provincial governments is known to have laundered proceeds from drug-related activities.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and the PRC have significant engagement on counterdrug matters. In January 2024, the United States and PRC inaugurated a Counter Narcotics Working Group (CNWG) as platform for policy and technical experts to discuss law enforcement efforts and exchange information on counternarcotics efforts. The United States and the PRC have held two sessions of the CNWG in 2024, conducting high-level and senior official level discussions.

Under the CNWG, the United States and the PRC participate in quarterly exchanges of scientific experts to share technical information on drug production and forensic chemistry. In June 2024, the two countries agreed to establish a direct line to notify one another of the presence of emerging drug threats. The two countries also work through regular technical law enforcement working groups to exchange views and information on trends in drug trafficking; discuss pertinent laws, regulations, policies, and procedures in the respective countries; address challenges in precursor chemical control; and identify mechanisms to cooperate on specific investigations and cases of mutual interest.

D. Conclusion

The United States and the PRC must sustain meaningful cooperation to tackle the global scourge of narcotics-related trafficking. Drug trafficking, manufacturing, diversion, drug-related money laundering, and other crimes remain significant problems in the PRC, and precursor chemicals originating in the PRC contribute directly to the synthetic drug crisis in the United States. The PRC should further strengthen enforcement of chemical control regulations and take other measures to prevent the supply of drug precursors to illicit drug manufacturers and shipment of NPS directly to other countries. PRC law enforcement should continue to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement in tackling these new trafficking challenges.

Colombia

A. Introduction

Colombia is the world's top cocaine producer and exporter and a source of heroin and marijuana. For nearly 25 years, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has identified Colombia as the primary source for cocaine in the United States.

Colombia set records for cocaine seizures in 2023 and according to Ministry of Defense figures exceeded those statistics in 2024. Colombian seizures of cocaine and cocaine base totaled 846 metric tons (MT) in 2023, 10 percent higher than in 2022. Statistics for 2024 interdictions show another 14 percent increase to 960 MT at the close of the year.

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in a report released in October 2024, Colombian coca cultivation increased by 10 percent from 2022 to 2023, from 230,000 hectares (ha) to 253,000 ha. While this absolute figure is a record high, it also represents a continued slowing in the growth in coca cultivation compared to an increase of 43 percent from 2020 to 2021 and 13 percent from 2021 to 2022. UNODC also reported potential cocaine production increased by 53 percent. The Colombian government significantly reduced its eradication target for 2024 to 10,000 ha, compared with approximately 20,000 ha eradicated in 2023.

The United States and Colombia continue to collaborate on a range of shared counternarcotics priorities, including drug and precursor chemical interdictions, judicial and security initiatives to dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), rural security and police professionalization, and efforts to deny TCOs their illicit revenue streams, including those derived from environmental crimes. Colombia participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Colombia historically struggles with security, governance, and economic challenges in rural regions. Insufficient police presence in rural Colombia weakens the rule of law and prevents the establishment of necessary security conditions for economic

development. Coca cultivation and illegal mining, which narcotraffickers use as an additional income source, thrive in rural areas in part due to a dearth of licit economic alternatives.

As part of its September 2023 national drug policy, the Government of Colombia aims to reduce coca cultivation by 40 percent and transition 50,000 small coca farmers to licit livelihoods by the end of President Petro's term in August 2026. As part of this effort, in June 2024 the Colombian government launched, with the United States, "Mission Cauca" to fund new security and development initiatives in a region plagued by drug trafficking and associated violence. On October 13, 2024, as a continuation of the focus on Cauca, President Petro sent 1,400 Colombian military and police forces into El Plateado, Cauca, to confront the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization People's Army (FARC-EP).

Colombia has an extradition treaty with the United States and, as one of the U.S. government's strongest partners globally, maintains robust bilateral cooperation on cases linked to drug trafficking and money laundering.

2. Supply Reduction

UNODC estimates coca cultivation in Colombia increased to 253,000 ha in 2023, compared to 230,000 ha in 2022 (10 percent increase) and potential cocaine production increased from 1,738 MT to 2,664 MT (53 percent increase). According to UNODC, potential cocaine production outpaced the growth in coca cultivation due to mature coca plants producing a higher concentration of alkaloid, as well as efficiency gains in cocaine production techniques in laboratories. UNODC's methodology for calculating cocaine production potential excludes the impact of laboratory destruction or precursor interdictions, which impact actual cocaine production. Colombian police data and open-source reporting indicate coca cultivation stabilized in 2024, but official UN statistics for 2024 are not expected until at least mid-2025.

The Colombian government set an eradication goal of 10,000 ha for 2024 and eradicated 9,403 ha according to Ministry of Defense figures at the close of the year. This number is a significant decrease from the 20,325 ha eradicated in 2023 and the 68,893 ha in 2022. The Government of Colombia intends to pair crop substitution

with voluntary eradication agreements for small coca farmers but has struggled to implement this program on a large scale.

Colombian forces and international partners relying on Colombian information seized a record 960 MT of cocaine and cocaine base in Colombia and abroad during 2024, according to Ministry of Defense figures at the close of the year. This represents a 14 percent increase from the then-record 846 MT interdicted in 2023. Colombian forces have made inroads in ensuring that estimates for potential cocaine production do not become actual cocaine production. In 2024, they destroyed two percent more cocaine laboratories than in 2023, maintaining near-record levels and hitting more sophisticated targets, and seized an increased amount of precursor chemicals compared to 2023.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to the Organization of American States (OAS) 2019 Report on Drug Use in the Americas (most recent available), Colombia has the fifth highest consumption rate of cocaine in the region. Colombia focuses treatment and prevention on youth, who exhibit the highest rates of cocaine use. Colombia expanded restorative justice programs and trained drug prevention and treatment professionals in evidence-based practices with U.S. assistance.

4. Corruption

The Colombian government does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sales of illicit drugs. However, illicit financial flows derived from organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal mining fuel significant corruption in Colombia. Bribery cases implicating high-level officials are ongoing. The Attorney General's Office prosecuted public officials for drug-related corruption, resulting in convictions, and Colombian government internal affairs units investigated drug-related corruption sometimes resulting in dismissal and criminal prosecutions.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The U.S. and Colombian governments continue to implement a September 2021 bilateral holistic counternarcotics strategy focused on supply reduction, rural security and development, and countering environmental crimes, and have reviewed progress and reaffirmed their commitment to the strategy at subsequent bilateral dialogues. In support of that strategy, the United States provides counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian police and military, the Ministry of Justice, the offices of the Attorney General and Inspector General, the financial intelligence unit, and the judiciary.

The United States works to strengthen Colombian institutions located in rural, conflict-affected areas. Areas of cooperation include supply reduction; citizen security; land titling; economic development; expansion of police and government presence; combatting environmental crime; strengthening rule of law; dismantling organized crime networks; fighting corruption; and protecting human rights.

The High-Level Dialogue (HLD) remains an important mechanism for discussing whole-of-government actions to reduce drug production and trafficking in Colombia. The agenda for the 2024 HLD held in Bogota included discussions on the disruption of drug trafficking and combatting illicit finance, rural security, environmental crimes, and rural development. An important outcome of the HLD was bilateral agreement on a revised set of metrics to measure the progress of the holistic strategy.

Colombia hosted the bilateral Counternarcotics Working Group (CNWG) in September 2023, which resulted in 39 bilateral counternarcotics pledges in areas such as interdiction and rural development. The Colombian government and U.S. interagency met over a period of months to coordinate, track, and execute the fulfillment of bilateral pledges, resulting in the fulfillment of 27 of the pledges with the remaining 12 in progress.

Through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, the United States and Colombia's police and navy trained over 6,000 regional counterparts from January-September in countering transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.

Inaugurated in 2023, the U.S.-supported Joint Group Against Organized Crime (Spanish acronym GCO), targets transnational criminal organization leaders across borders.

Analysts from seven countries gather and share criminal intelligence. Cooperation under GCO routinely allows governments to arrest and prosecute fugitives and also prevents criminals from entering the United States.

Colombia's navy coordinates the 62-country, semiannual interdiction operation Campaign Orion with U.S. support, which completed its 14th edition in November 2024. Combined, the two 2024 operations seized a record 422 MT of cocaine, demonstrating Colombia's role as an international leader in counternarcotics.

D. Conclusion

Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia continue to finance criminal economies and destabilize communities due in part to a lack of rural development and security. Despite record-setting interdictions, Colombia needs to control coca cultivation and cocaine production by dramatically expanding investment in rural areas to sustainably transition farmers to legal crops and by increasing effective eradication. U.S.-supported cooperation on security, such as the construction of police stations in rural areas, and development, such as land titling, has contributed to lower violence in priority areas. Nonetheless, narcotraffickers continue to threaten the authority of the state and exercise control over some areas. Based on current performance, Colombian voluntary crop substitution and rural development programs require stronger government commitment to achieve reductions in coca cultivation.

Costa Rica

A. Introduction

Costa Rica's location, maritime territory, and the small size of its security forces make the country vulnerable to illicit drug trafficking. In 2024, the country remained a primary first-stop transshipment point for cocaine en route from South America to the United States and Europe. Cocaine destined for Europe, and to a lesser extent the United States, transits Costa Rica's Caribbean port of Moin.

There are no indications traffickers are developing or seeking to develop large-scale operations of finished fentanyl from precursors in Costa Rica. However, in December 2024 law enforcement disrupted small-scale distribution of fentanyl pills destined for Costa Rican and international consumption.

As of September 30, 2024, Costa Rica had recorded 658 homicides, 23 less than during the same period in 2023, which was a record high. Costa Rica collaborates closely with the United States to professionalize its police forces, enhance citizen security, and improve drug interdiction to address its growing security challenges. While Costa Rica slightly increased law enforcement resources in 2024, resource constraints nevertheless limited Costa Rican law enforcement effectiveness and posed obstacles to expanding their capabilities.

Costa Rica is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In 2024, the United States supported Costa Rican police professionalization, including through leadership training, modernization of training facilities, expanded canine programs, refurbishment of patrol boats and interceptor vessels, and improved cooperation between national and local authorities. The Ministry of Public Security (MSP) budget increased by 7.8 percent in 2024, approximately three percent in real terms. With this increase in resources, the Costa Rican government filled 600 police vacancies and added 400 new police recruits.

In 2024, Costa Rica made progress addressing institutional capacity limitations by investing in police infrastructure, equipment control, monitoring and evaluation, and the safety of justice sector personnel. Also in 2024, the United States provided portable handheld scanners to the Ministry of Public Security (MSP) and fixed cargo scanners to combat drug trafficking throughout the country.

The U.S.-Costa Rica Bilateral Agreement to Suppress Illicit Traffic at Sea entered into effect in 1999 and remains the pillar for joint maritime counter-drug operations in Costa Rican waters. The U.S.-Costa Rica extradition treaty has been in force since 1991.

2. Supply Reduction

Drugs continued to flow through Costa Rica, though the government made concerted efforts to stop them. Maritime drug seizures off the Pacific and Caribbean coasts were a major component of Costa Rican cooperation with the United States. The United States also worked with Costa Rica to stem narcotics flows from South America through Costa Rica via clandestine air strips and land ports of entry with Panama and Nicaragua.

Costa Rican police have not seized precursors or large quantities of fentanyl powder, but transnational criminal organizations view Costa Rica as a viable transportation and distribution hub for fentanyl produced elsewhere. The U.S.-supported counternarcotics Vetted Unit, together with U.S. law enforcement, investigated traffickers and seized 1,100 fentanyl pills and approximately half of a kilogram (kg) of fentanyl powder. The United States hosted the first-ever fentanyl and precursor workshop for Central America in San Jose in May 2024.

Costa Rica remained committed to drug interdiction in 2024. Between January and September 2024, Costa Rica seized 32.1 metric tons (MT) of drugs, including 20.5 MT of cocaine and 11.5 MT of marijuana, working closely with the United States and regional partners. This represents a slight decrease from 36.4 MT during the same period in 2023, though changes in regional trends in maritime narcotics shipments may account for some of the decrease.

Costa Rica's Coast Guard is a successful partner in maritime interdiction, conducting joint operations with the United States. With only 570 personnel, the Coast Guard seized 21.7 MT of illicit narcotics from January to September 2024. The U.S.-supported aviation program strengthened Costa Rica's ability to conduct joint maritime operations and completed overwater certification for all crews.

In February 2024, with U.S. support, Costa Rica inaugurated its first joint Border Police and National Park Police forward operating base on the Sierpe River, a remote center of narcotics trafficking. Six months after opening, the base had its first major success with the Border Police seizing 2.5 MT of marijuana, 245 kg of cocaine, firearms, and ammunition.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Costa Rican Drug Institute (ICD) oversees national anti-drug strategy and drug prevention programs. That agency developed the National Strategy on Drugs and Related Crimes, covering 2020-2030. The Institute on Alcohol and Drug Abuse offers treatment and prevention programs. Together with the Ministry of Education and ICD, several programs focus on prevention within schools, including by training teachers and administrators to identify signs of drug use and provide support to families. Difficulty coordinating among government agencies, however, means that considerable gaps remain. Drug-related crimes are serious offenses in Costa Rica, although authorities rarely enforce laws against personal consumption.

4. Corruption

Costa Rica does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. There is no evidence that senior government officials are engaged in such activity. Despite advances in good governance, however, government corruption remains a pervasive problem at lower levels. In addition, the 2022-2026 National Assembly's 57 members include 23 with criminal corruption cases pending as of October 2024.

As a signatory to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, Costa Rica combats corruption on multiple fronts. In 2024, the

Judicial Investigative Police implemented an anti-corruption program to strengthen ethics controls in investigative, prosecutorial, and court systems. With U.S. assistance, the Public Ethics Prosecutor developed ethics training for Costa Rica's largest professional associations. The Attorney General's Office increased its investigations and prosecutions of governmental corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Costa Rica remains a strong U.S. partner. The United States supports capacity building for Costa Rica's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). CARSI funding supports fighting illicit drug production and trafficking, combating corruption and criminal activities, and investigating, dismantling, and prosecuting transnational criminal organizations.

The United States supports Costa Rican police professionalization through basic and specialized training, including at the National Police Academy and the International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. In February 2024, the United States provided Costa Rica's first police aquatic training facility to support curriculum and infrastructure development. In April 2024, the United States provided a new police station in Puerto Viejo, Limon, bringing law enforcement presence to a tourist area with increasing levels of crime.

The U.S.-Costa Rican citizen security program "Sembremos Seguridad" ("Let's Sow Security"), is a cornerstone of bilateral cooperation to prevent drug-related crime and is active in all 84 municipalities. A U.S.- and Costa Rica-supported program, "Plan Escudo" ("Plan Shield"), features collaborative approaches by community police and prosecutors to reduce drug demand and boost successful prosecutions.

The United States and Costa Rica implemented trainings for prosecutors, investigators, and judges on money laundering, organized crime, anticorruption, gender-based violence, and environmental crimes. The United States also helped develop a guide, in cooperation with Indigenous communities, for judicial personnel to improve restorative justice services.

In April 2023, the government introduced a constitutional reform bill to allow for the extradition of Costa Rican nationals on narcotrafficking and terrorism related charges.

In August 2024, the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly approved the bill unanimously in an initial vote, following a consultation with Costa Rican Constitutional Court, which provided a favorable opinion of the bill's constitutionality. However, the Executive branch must then reintroduce it, after which the Assembly must approve it by a two thirds majority.

D. Conclusion

Costa Rica's government sees fighting drug trafficking and organized crime as a top priority but suffers from resource and capacity constraints. Key priorities for Costa Rica should include further professionalizing police and judicial institutions, with an emphasis on anti-corruption measures; prioritizing an integrated, interagency approach to border and port security, including with technological investments; increasing Costa Rica's collaboration with regional partners to combat TCOs; and expanding citizen security best practices within Costa Rica and across the region.

Dominican Republic

A. Introduction

The Dominican Republic (DR) serves as a transit point for South American cocaine moving through the Caribbean to the United States and Europe. Traffickers rely on direct maritime routes from the Venezuelan and Colombian coasts, using “go-fast” boats to reach remote areas off the DR’s southern coast. The Dominican government works closely with the United States to intercept drug shipments, extradite offenders, and combat drug traffickers and transnational criminal organizations. Currently, there is no evidence of legal or illegal precursor chemicals being used in the DR to produce synthetic drugs. The DR is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Dominican institutions involved in narcotics investigations and interdiction continue to strengthen their capacity, as demonstrated by high-profile, long-term multinational investigations. In 2024, these efforts resulted in complex, multi-front raids, where authorities arrested high-level targets, seized valuable intelligence, and disrupted transnational criminal organizations. In late 2023, the Jamaican and Dominican navies signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen the operational cooperation in air and maritime law enforcement against transnational organized crime and aeronautical and maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). This memorandum of understanding has improved interoperability between the forces.

2. Supply Reduction

In the first ten months of 2024, Dominican authorities confiscated over 26 metric tons (MT) of narcotics, with cocaine accounting for 79 percent of the total. The total represents a 4 MT increase over the same period last year. They conducted most of these seizures at the Port of Caucedo, targeting transshipped containers from South American ports and intercepting go-fast boats. The confiscated drugs have an estimated U.S. street value of over \$900 million. The DR will surpass 20 MT of

drug interdictions for the fourth consecutive year, significantly higher than the annual average of 12 MT over the prior eight-year period.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Dominican Republic effectively uses U.S. support to enhance national prevention and treatment policies spearheaded by the National Drug Council (CND), which focuses on health, human rights, and gender equity. The United States provided a community grant to the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America, to be implemented by the DR National Council on Drugs, to reduce drug use in vulnerable regions and promote healthy communities.

4. Corruption

The Dominican Republic does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption within security and regulatory systems facilitates trafficking. The United States supports a program to train prosecutors and judges to promote the use of civil asset forfeiture in the fight against corruption. The specialized corruption prosecution unit continues to pursue high-profile cases, but convictions remain few despite thorough investigations.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U. S. Policy Initiatives

The United States strengthens Dominican security forces capabilities primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Through CBSI, the United States equips Dominican law enforcement agencies to disrupt narcotics trafficking routes and dismantle transnational criminal organizations. The United States supports the modernization and professionalization of the Dominican National Police (DNP), the National Directorate for Drug Control (DNCD), the Dominican Navy (Armada), and other specialized security units. The program uses the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation (USCAP) to conduct 50 trainings annually, benefiting over 1,500 Dominican security personnel.

To enhance management, oversight, and operations within the justice sector, the United States has helped modernize DR technology platforms, boosting the DNCD,

Armada, and Dominican Air Force's communication capabilities for patrol and joint maritime interdiction operations.

The U.S.-supported counter transnational organized crime program focuses on bolstering the DR's ability to investigate, prosecute, and sentence complex cases involving transnational organized crime. This program provides investigation training to the DNP, Attorney General's office, DNCD, and the Financial Intelligence Unit, while also improving Dominican forensic labs and cyber investigation capacities through training and equipment upgrades. Through the Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU), U.S. and Dominican law enforcement collaborate to interdict and prosecute individuals and organizations involved in transnational criminal activities in the Dominican Republic.

Although there is currently no strong evidence that synthetic drug use, production, and transshipment are major concerns in the DR, the government recognizes synthetic drugs as a potential threat. The DR began participating in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drugs at its inception in August 2023. At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024, President Abinader committed to regional leadership in combating synthetic drugs. The DR has since announced a "holistic" approach to the counter-synthetic drugs challenge and outlined a national plan to be implemented over the next two years.

The U.S.-DR extradition treaty entered into force in December 2016, updating a 1909 treaty. The DR is one of the United States' most active extradition partners. While the United States and the DR do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, requests for legal assistance take place under multilateral treaties or on the basis of reciprocity. Cooperation through law enforcement channels is robust. The DR has had an agreement on international narcotics control cooperation with the United States since 1985. The DR signed and ratified the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement (also known as the Treaty of San Jose) and has a maritime counter-drug agreement with the United States that entered into force in 1995.

D. Conclusion

The DR demonstrated a strong commitment to combat transnational criminal organizations in 2024. It has committed to be a regional leader in addressing drug

trafficking networks, widespread corruption, illicit maritime drug and migrant smuggling, and drug-related violence. The country's interdiction efforts show positive results, effectively reducing the flow of drugs through Dominican territory. Despite ongoing challenges such as internal corruption, resource allocation, established institutional practices, and interoperability, the Dominican government demonstrates political will and has taken concrete actions to continue to improve its narcotics interdiction capabilities. Dominican government efforts have resulted in increased cooperation among national and regional security forces.

Dutch Caribbean

A. Introduction

Drug trafficking in the six island nations of the Dutch Caribbean varies in scope; however, the overall area remains significant due to its location as an international drug transshipment point. Although often erroneously considered a unified political entity, the Dutch Caribbean – formerly known as the Dutch Antilles – is a group of island countries and island municipalities within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten are autonomous countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, whose locally elected governments exercise near complete control over domestic affairs. In contrast, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba are “special municipalities” of the Netherlands governed by locally elected councils presided over by governors appointed by The Hague.

Of strategic importance, Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao are located approximately 35-50 miles north of the Venezuelan coast and serve as northbound transshipment points for cocaine originating from Colombia and Venezuela. Sint Maarten is in the Eastern Caribbean and is a transshipment hub for cocaine and marijuana transiting onward to Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Europe. Cocaine and marijuana are primarily transported via different maritime vessels for transshipment to the U.S., other Caribbean islands, Africa, and Europe. In addition, traffickers routinely stage smaller airplanes on the islands for drug runs to Venezuela and Colombia.

The Dutch Caribbean does not produce plant-based or synthetic drugs currently. Illegal drug use is minimal on the islands.

The Dutch Caribbean countries and municipality islands participate in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats by virtue of their status as sub-entities within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which has the authority to conduct foreign policy.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The governments of the Dutch Caribbean, including all six islands, have a developed, legacy legal system from the Kingdom of the Netherlands aimed at combating crime and drug trafficking. Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten exercise independent decision-making in several counterdrug areas, while the Kingdom of the Netherlands is responsible for the islands' defense and foreign affairs. In addition, the Kingdom of the Netherlands assists the independent governments in their efforts to combat drug trafficking through its support for the Recherche Samenwerkings Team (RST or "Special Police Task Force") and the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard (DCCG). U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Teams frequently participate on Dutch Naval ships patrolling the area. U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties for the entire region are in place with the Netherlands and routed to the individual islands for execution. An extradition treaty is also in place with the Netherlands and the Dutch Caribbean has extradited to the United States. Since 2016, the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, including its constituent countries Aruba, Sint Maarten, and Curaçao, have been party to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enhance existing cooperation and strengthen law enforcement and the criminal justice system in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, making the fight against drug trafficking more effective.

Aruba

Aruba's police force, the Korps Politie Aruba (KPA), is a strong regional partner in addressing drug trafficking and combating international criminal organizations. The KPA collects and shares intelligence with regional law enforcement partners and is willing to collaborate on a case-by-case basis. Traffickers primarily transport cocaine to Aruba on go-fast vessels, cargo containers, and commercial flights. In 2024, KPA conducted several successful investigations, many in support of interdiction efforts with the DCCG. The Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee (KMAR) is a strong partner of U.S. law enforcement and now has permanent personnel stationed in Aruba. During 2024, the United States also strengthened collaboration with the Prosecutor's Office in Aruba.

Curaçao

Curaçao's police force, the Korps Politie Curaçao (KPC), is a longtime partner that works closely with the United States to diminish the flow of illicit drugs from Venezuela and Colombia to the Dutch Caribbean. KPC, RST, and KMAR collaborate well with U.S. law enforcement, particularly on private and commercial maritime and airborne smuggling investigations with a focus on groups operating in Curaçao.

Sint Maarten

Sint Maarten/Saint Martin is a major transshipment point for cocaine trafficked via maritime vessels from the Caribbean to the United States, given its proximity to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Colombian and Venezuelan drug trafficking organizations operating on the island employ Dominican boat captains to transport large, multi-ton quantities of cocaine monthly to Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In addition, drug trafficking through the commercial airport to and from Sint Maarten has been an ongoing problem in 2024. This small two-nation island encompassing "the Dutch side" and "the French side" is a challenging place for law enforcement.

French law enforcement partners based in Saint Martin have become significant allies in the fight against criminal organizations in addition to Dutch counterparts and the Korps Politie Sint Martin (KPSM). Originating in Sint Maarten, the Eastern Caribbean Law Enforcement Working Group is an unofficial group of investigators from Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and other nations in the island chain who meet throughout the year to share intelligence and best practices. In 2024, United States and Dutch personnel hosted the Eastern Caribbean Working Group on Curaçao for a conference discussing firearms, fentanyl, and other regional challenges.

Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba

The National Office for the Caribbean in the Netherlands oversees law enforcement, security, and other administrative functions on behalf of the government of the Netherlands for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba. None of these islands have high levels of detected drug trafficking. However, Bonaire continues to be a staging location for pilots and private planes planning illicit drug flights operating from Venezuela. U.S. law enforcement continues to partner with both Korps Politie Caribbean Netherlands (KPCN) and the Bonaire prosecutor's office to exchange information and enhance

international drug investigations. In 2024, the United States shared approximately \$300,000 in forfeiture proceeds with the Prosecutor's Office of Bonaire originating from the seizure of a yacht in Bonaire based on a U.S. drug investigation and assistance from Bonaire.

2. Supply Reduction

The United States continues to foster cooperation with Dutch Caribbean law enforcement organizations in efforts to thwart the use of the Dutch Caribbean as a transshipment route. During the first ten months of 2024, these joint efforts resulted in the seizure of approximately 18 metric tons of drugs destined for the United States and Europe. These seizures had an immediate impact on the supply chain utilized by drug trafficking organizations exploiting the Dutch Caribbean and further limited the quantity of drugs entering the United States.

Through ongoing collaboration between the United States and the Dutch Caribbean, the effectiveness of drug interdiction throughout the region provides new intelligence of trafficking methods, concealment, and routes used by drug trafficking organizations in attempts to avoid capture. In 2024, U.S. law enforcement and their counterparts on all the major islands documented private aircraft staged and prepared for movements to Venezuela or Colombia for future illicit drug flights. After traveling to cocaine production countries, the aircraft normally fly onward to Central America, Guyana, Suriname, or other Caribbean destinations including the U.S. Virgin Islands and The Bahamas. In addition, all major islands reported maritime vessels of varying sizes involved in the smuggling of narcotics originating from Venezuela with ultimate destination to the United States or Europe. This open cooperation ultimately allows the United States to deploy enforcement resources more effectively throughout the region to prevent the flow of drugs into the United States.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

While present, illicit drug use in the Dutch Caribbean is a minimal issue. Drug treatment and prevention are available through a combination of privately and publicly funded foundations on each of the islands. Sint Maarten/Saint Marten has one drug treatment foundation on the French side and one facility on the Dutch side.

Curaçao has a government-funded drug rehabilitation center focused on various forms of addiction including drugs, alcohol, and gambling. Although synthetic drugs including fentanyl are not prevalent on the islands, the United States provided several trainings to local police and foreign agencies regarding them.

4. Corruption

Although corruption is present in the Dutch Caribbean, regional law enforcement partners actively investigate and prosecute corruption. The governments of the Dutch Caribbean do not encourage nor facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking and there is no evidence senior government officials are engaged in such activity. The United States continues to evaluate the most effective partnerships to avoid potential corruption, while still building the necessary relationships for counternarcotics operations on a larger international scale.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The objectives of U.S. counternarcotics policy in the Dutch Caribbean are to promote cooperation between law enforcement and military partners as well as to reduce drug trafficking. The United States works with its island counterparts and Dutch colleagues to advance joint investigations, both within the Dutch Caribbean and the United States. Specifically, the Kingdom of the Netherlands supports counterdrug efforts by supporting the U.S. Air Force Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in Curaçao. U.S. military aircraft conduct narcotics detection and monitor flights from the CSL in Curaçao over the southern Caribbean Sea. In addition, the Dutch Navy is proactive and regularly conducts counternarcotics operations in the region as the lead for Task Group 4.4 under the Joint Interagency Task Force South. Activities to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations in the region are carried out on a regular basis with cooperation from the United States, the Netherlands, and Dutch Caribbean police forces.

D. Conclusion

Fourteen years after the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten all have limited counternarcotics organizational structures in place. These small agencies work with U.S. and Dutch authorities to increase their

growth and success disrupting drug trafficking. U.S. law enforcement continues to take a multi-pronged approach to counternarcotics in the region, including further training of counterparts, enhancing intelligence for interdiction operations, and collaborating on priority investigations. The United States encourages the Dutch Caribbean islands to embrace regional cooperation, intelligence sharing efforts, and increased prosecutions.

Eastern Caribbean

A. Introduction

The Eastern Caribbean, comprising the seven-island chain of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, faces significant challenges due to its geographical proximity to major drug production zones in South America. While these countries are not major producers of narcotics, they are vulnerable to exploitation by drug trafficking networks that use their territories as transshipment points for conveying illicit drugs to Europe and North America.

Despite facing limitations typical of small island nations, such as resource scarcity and geographic isolation, these governments continue to implement innovative measures to combat drug trafficking. Their efforts are bolstered by strong international partnerships, particularly with the United States, enabling a coordinated response to the transnational nature of drug-related crime.

Each of the Eastern Caribbean countries are participants in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In 2024, regional institutions such as the Regional Security System (RSS) and the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS) made significant strides in enhancing their operational capacities to counter drug trafficking. The United States has played a crucial role in supporting these organizations through the development of regional maritime domain awareness, border security screening, improved criminal investigations, and enhanced judicial proceedings.

Through U.S. assistance, the governments of the Eastern Caribbean continue to commit to moving from a single nation approach to countering drug trafficking toward a regional method of coordination across the law enforcement, intelligence, military,

diplomatic, and economic communities. The RSS and the CARICOM IMPACS, through advanced criminal data collection, maritime intelligence, and multi-agency task force collaboration, have revealed that decentralized, independent national actions against well organized and agile drug trafficking organizations allow for some tactical success but minimal strategic effect.

An indicative outcome of these initiatives was the successful execution of Operation Caribbean Combined Campaign in March 2024, when a multinational Eastern Caribbean counter-drug unit monitored a suspicious vessel from Venezuela. This operation culminated in the interception of over 1,500 kilograms (kg) of cocaine worth approximately \$12.3 million. Such real-time intelligence sharing highlighted the effectiveness of partnerships in combating drug trafficking.

2. Supply Reduction

The Eastern Caribbean's unique geography, characterized by numerous small harbors and remote coastlines, complicates efforts to monitor and control drug trafficking. Nonetheless, regional efforts in 2024 led to noteworthy achievements in reducing the flow of illicit drugs. Increased maritime patrols and targeted operations, supported by U.S. resources, have resulted in substantial drug seizures. In Grenada, authorities intercepted over 200 kg of cocaine in a joint operation, aided by intelligence from CARICOM IMPACS, and in Dominica, authorities facilitated the coordination of a drug investigation in Castle Bruce that uncovered 696 kg of cocaine.

The deployment of advanced technology, such as the United States Automated Targeting System-Global and the Windward Maritime Domain Awareness system, has proven invaluable. These systems enable the Eastern Caribbean to monitor maritime traffic effectively and provide actionable intelligence. In one instance, authorities intercepted a vessel bound for Europe carrying over 4.2 metric tons (MT) of cocaine. These technological advancements enhance the region's ability to combat drug trafficking effectively and demonstrate their institutional commitment to employing innovative solutions in the face of complex challenges.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Public awareness and drug prevention programs are essential elements of the Eastern Caribbean's drug control strategies. Antigua and Barbuda's Drug Awareness Month features various community outreach initiatives aimed at educating the youth about the dangers of drug use. The National Drug Council collaborates with schools, law enforcement, and community organizations to promote informed choices among the populace.

Despite these efforts, the region still faces significant gaps in drug treatment and rehabilitation services. The availability of public facilities is limited, and the capacity to address substance use disorders also remains limited. International organizations and donor countries, including the United States, have contributed funding to treatment programs, but countries still lack the investment needed to enhance the overall capacity to treat individuals with substance abuse conditions.

4. Corruption

Corruption within law enforcement and the judicial system poses a significant obstacle to effective anti-drug efforts in the Eastern Caribbean. While some progress has been made in investigating and prosecuting corruption cases, countries need more robust measures to ensure accountability and build public trust in law enforcement agencies.

To strengthen institutional integrity, the RSS Office of Professional Responsibility mechanism independently reviews indications of corruption within Eastern Caribbean member states. In 2024, this unit conducted complex investigations on police personnel and politicians who violated the law.

The United States supported the development of the International Law Enforcement Academy, Roswell, New Mexico Alumni Working Group, which comprises senior criminal justice officials from six Eastern Caribbean countries. This facilitated improved coordination in tackling corruption and fostered a more cohesive approach to addressing drug-related corruption issues and enhanced the overall effectiveness of law enforcement in the region.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Governments across the Eastern Caribbean, through the RSS and CARICOM, have established clear goals to curb drug trafficking. These goals include increasing maritime and air patrols, using data and technology, and expanding counternarcotics investigations in a more synchronized manner.

The United States continues to support a regional Criminal Justice Adviser to facilitate the development of modern-day counternarcotics laws and to improve the efficiency of drug trafficking court proceedings. In 2024, the Criminal Justice Advisor collaborated with key members of the criminal justice system throughout Eastern Caribbean on numerous counter drug reforms. In Barbados, this effort led to parliament passing, and the courts implementing, Criminal Procedure Rules in line with international standards. The rules address the performance of court officers, the efficiency of case management, the service of documents, and the time limits for trials. The time from drug arrest to drug court proceedings previously took multiple years, but the new rules placed a 180-day legal limit to initiate a drug trafficking trial. The Draft Rules (100 pages) represent the culmination of intense advocacy and significant technical assistance of the United States sponsored Criminal Justice advisor.

D. Conclusion

The Eastern Caribbean has made progress in counter-narcotics efforts, particularly through enhanced interdiction operations and improved institutional cooperation with the United States and other international partners. However, challenges remain, including corruption, resource limitations, and insufficient drug treatment services. Continued investment in regional criminal investigation competencies, counter-drug intelligence sharing, and public awareness will be crucial in maintaining and expanding these successes. The commitment of Eastern Caribbean governments to combating drug trafficking is evident, but sustaining progress will require ongoing collaboration. The focus must remain on scaling regional counter drug security institutions and modernizing the judicial processes.

Ecuador

A. Introduction

While Ecuador is not a major drug producing country, its extensive coastline on the Pacific Ocean, dollarized economy, and geographical position between major drug producers Colombia and Peru, renders Ecuador an attractive target for transnational and local criminal organizations to exploit its porous land, air, and sea ports of entry. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) ship illicit drugs – especially cocaine – through Ecuador to the United States, Europe, and Asia, among other international destinations.

Most drugs transiting Ecuador originate from cocaine produced in Colombia. Criminal groups also traffic cocaine precursor chemicals, firearms, and explosives across Ecuador's border with Peru. Ecuadorian authorities have indicated the presence of Colombian, Mexican, Albanian, and other TCOs in Ecuador, facilitating drug trafficking and other illicit crimes. TCOs and gangs fueling violent crime and insecurity are the Ecuadorian public's primary concerns. High-profile murders, such as the January 17, 2024, assassination of prosecutor Cesar Suarez, highlight the extreme challenge to the Ecuadorian government to reduce the country's record homicide rate.

The Ecuadorian Observatory of Organized Crime reported that drug trafficking is the primary form of organized crime in Ecuador. Other high-impact crimes increased, such as weapons trafficking, migrant smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal mining, extortion, and kidnapping, as TCOs seek to expand and diversify their income streams. In 2024, kidnapping cases increased 13 percent and extortion cases increased 20 percent compared to 2023.

The Ecuadorian government took significant actions against TCOs and related drug trafficking in 2024. After masked gunmen broke into a public television channel during a live broadcast on January 9, 2024, President Noboa declared a state of emergency and a non-international armed conflict, enabling him to use emergency powers to mobilize the armed forces to carry out security operations against the TCOs. The decree listed 22 TCOs and gangs as terrorist organizations, responsible for jail riots and street violence. Ecuadorians approved nine security questions in an April referendum permitting the state to carry out legal and constitutional reforms to deploy the army in support of the police to fight

TCOs and gangs, increase prison terms for gang-related crimes, and allow the extradition of Ecuadorians under international standards, among other changes. However, rival Ecuadorian gangs continue to fight for control of trafficking routes, contributing to an exponential increase in homicides, extortions, and other violent crimes.

Domestic drug consumption increased across Ecuador as local gangs exposed communities and youth to drug use and micro drug trafficking. The government directed limited resources towards public treatment facilities and programs to counter substance abuse.

Ecuador is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Ecuador's Ministry of Health oversees drug prevention and treatment programs and leads the Interinstitutional Committee for Drugs. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for countering the production, trafficking, sale, and use of illicit drugs; regulating the use of controlled substances; and destroying seized substances. The government's major challenges include securing financial resources and executing public procurement processes to equip the Ecuadorian National Police, the National Corrections Authority, and other key institutions.

The United States supported several units within the National Police, as well as the Ministry of Interior, Ecuadorian Coast Guard and Navy, National Court of Justice, Judicial Council, Comptroller General's Office, Financial Intelligence Unit, and Attorney General's Office. In 2024, U.S. and Ecuadorian maritime authorities conducted patrol flights to monitor and interdict maritime drug trafficking and engaged in operations to board vessels claiming Ecuadorian nationality, as well as stateless vessels in international waters.

The United States and Ecuador have a bilateral extradition treaty signed in 1872 and a supplemental extradition treaty from 1939. Ecuadorians voted in April to approve a constitutional reform that allows the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens. The United States works with Ecuador's National Court of Justice to facilitate extradition

requests. The United States and Ecuador do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty but cooperate under the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, as well as relevant UN conventions.

Ecuadorian President Noboa ratified two military cooperation agreements with the United States on February 15. These agreements allow U.S. military personnel to operate in Ecuador and conduct joint naval operations against illicit transnational maritime activities, including drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.

2. Supply Reduction

As of September 26, 2024, the Ecuadorian government seized 212.3 metric tons (MT) of illegal drugs, including 187.4 MT of cocaine – a 24 percent increase from the same period in 2023. Ecuadorian authorities seized 475 kilograms (kg) of heroin – a 124 percent increase from the same period in 2023. Seizures of marijuana totaled 24.41 MT – a 160 percent increase from the same period in 2023. The United States supported Ecuador's efforts to destroy stockpiled drugs. As of September, Ecuadorian authorities destroyed over 208 MT of seized narcotics, mostly cocaine. Ecuador destroyed most of these seized narcotics through encapsulation in cement, which is a faster, cheaper, and more environmentally friendly method than incineration.

As of October 14, 2024, the police seized 3,300 liters of liquid controlled precursor chemicals and 20.23 MT of solid controlled precursor chemicals for the production of plant-based and synthetic drugs compared with 18,427 liters and 62.49 MT in the first nine months of 2023. As of September 26, 2024, the police had arrested 8,971 individuals for drug-related crimes, compared to 9,067 during the same period in 2023. However, conviction rates remain low, and the prison population decreased during the same period. Maritime seizures of illicit drugs totaled over 84 MT during the first nine months of 2024, compared to 63.56 MT in all 2023. Ecuadorian authorities had detected eight clandestine airstrips as of September, compared to two airfields authorities encountered in the first ten months of 2023.

Drug trafficking organizations extensively exploited ports in the cities of Guayaquil, Machala, and Posorja to ship cocaine concealed in cargo containers to Europe, the

United States, and other destinations around the world. As of September 18, 2024, authorities inspected 17 percent of containerized exports from Guayaquil ports and nearby Posorja. In the same period, the National Police conducted 71,221 container inspections at Guayaquil's four port terminals, compared to 105,237 containers inspected in 2023 in Guayaquil. U.S. officials continued to work with Ecuadorian authorities to secure maritime cargo under the Container Security Initiative established in 2018, to include scanning all outgoing containers. All outbound export containers are currently scanned at the ports of Guayaquil (DP World, TPG, NAPORTEC, and CONTECON) and Machala (Yilport), though authorities lack capacity to analyze all images.

Ecuador is not a major drug-producing country. President Noboa announced on October 14, 2024 that, according to international cooperation experts, satellite images indicate 2,000 hectares of illicit coca crops and an increasing number of illegal mining sites exist in Ecuador along its border with Colombia. The United States has urged the government to verify coca growth with a monitoring program. As of September, the Ecuador National Police discovered and destroyed four cocaine processing labs in Esmeraldas (2), Carchi (1), and Sucumbíos (1) provinces on Ecuador's northern border with Colombia.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Ecuador has 70 publicly funded outpatient drug treatment facilities, 11 public inpatient facilities, and 50 licensed private in-patient facilities. As of September, the Interinstitutional Drug Committee and the Ministry of Health carried out 433 drug prevention activities nationwide with 19,421 beneficiaries who participated in prevention activities in schools and universities; prevention activities at the workplace; recreational and sports activities; and prevention activities involving families and communities. The Ministry of Health carried out 19 digital media campaigns, including eight on drug prevention.

The Ministry of Health, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior through the Project for the Development of the Strategy for the Comprehensive Approach to the Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Drugs and the Strengthening of Mental Health, is developing a strategy for the effective implementation of the Early Warning System

for Drugs in Ecuador (SAT) that aims to identify in a timely manner new drugs and emerging trends in consumption. The government has 135 professionals nationwide to support program development, drug consumption prevention planning, and other strategies and actions.

The United States supports the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America on drug demand reduction efforts in Ecuador, including through training women leaders to engage vulnerable youth on efforts for healthy communities. In 2024, the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and the Colombo Plan provided training to drug demand reduction professionals from the Ministry of Health, local municipalities, civil society, and other government institutions.

4. Corruption

The Government of Ecuador does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Ecuador's first-ever Specialized Court for Corruption and Organized Crime, inaugurated in 2022, continued operating in 2024 with nine additional judges. Twenty-three specialized judges worked on 1,137 cases, including 41 corruption cases. High-profile cases, such as the sweeping Ecuadorian government operations "Metastasis" and "Purga," which targeted over 50 members of the judiciary, legislature, and security forces, exemplify the government's efforts to combat impunity and prosecute high-level government and judicial officials involved in corruption and narcotrafficking crimes.

Government policy and laws forbid the illicit production or distribution of narcotics and other controlled substances, as well as the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Nevertheless, drug-related corruption remains a problem within Ecuador's public security forces and judicial system. The Judicial Council dismissed five judges and a secretary from the Provincial Court of Justice of Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas on October 3 for allegedly accepting bribes of up to USD \$60,000 to benefit individuals involved in the Plaga corruption case, which accused numerous judicial, police, prison, and government officials, as well as private attorneys, of assisting incarcerated TCO figures.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States enjoys a strong security partnership with Ecuador and provides training, equipment, and other capacity-building assistance to help Ecuadorian institutions counter corruption, drug trafficking, and other transnational crimes.

In 2024, the United States provided extensive support for Ecuador's crime and violence prevention efforts in high crime locations and provided technical assistance to facilitate cooperation between municipalities, the police, central government, and communities on citizen security. The United States also continued providing substantial support for Ecuador's antinarcotics efforts, including through equipment, technical assistance, and training for judges, prosecutors, the police, the military, financial analysts, and justice sector officials. The United States worked with Ecuadorian security officials to increase maritime, port, border, and land interdiction capacity, and to strengthen anti-corruption and anti-money laundering capabilities related to drug trafficking.

D. Conclusion

Ecuador's record homicide and violent crime levels, together with the exponential increase of other drug-fueled crimes such as extortion and kidnapping, propelled security issues to the top of public concerns in 2024. The Noboa administration's political will to strengthen police and military capabilities is positive but insufficient to reduce the impact of drug trafficking and organized crime on citizen security. While reported homicides decreased by 16 percent in the first half of 2024 relative to 2023, reported extortions increased 20 percent and reported kidnappings increased by 13 percent. According to Gallup's Global Safety Report for 2024, Ecuadorians are the least likely in the world to report feeling safe in their communities. Strengthening the fight against drug trafficking and other transnational crimes will require establishing and implementing informed policies, and dedicating more resources for counternarcotics, crime prevention, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and border security efforts.

El Salvador

A. Introduction

El Salvador is a transit country for illicit drugs. Bilateral cooperation remains robust for interdicting illicit drugs destined for the United States. Due to El Salvador's vigorous interdiction efforts, drug trafficking organizations largely avoid passing through El Salvador by land and rather attempt transit by sea. El Salvador has conducted large-scale drug seizures as far as 1,000 miles offshore, well outside of El Salvador's economic exclusive zone and exceeding the normal operational reach of many other Latin American navies. U.S. collaboration and assistance have maintained and enhanced these efforts. Despite the ongoing State of Exception since March 2022, and loss of judicial and prosecutorial independence in El Salvador, cooperation for interdicting illicit drugs remains positive and successful.

While there is no evidence of illicit synthetic drug production, El Salvador has a growing pharmaceutical industry. El Salvador doubled the size of the Chemical Unit of the National Civilian Police (PNC), enabling it to audit pharmaceutical companies to prevent chemical diversion or illicit production. An investigation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics Division (DAN) of the PNC in 2024 resulted in the seizure of 101 ampoules of pharmaceutical-grade fentanyl. Since August 2023, the National Anti-Drug Commission of El Salvador has led the Salvadoran government's participation in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Antinarcotics Division (DAN) within the National Civil Police (PNC) is the primary entity responsible for combatting drug-related crimes in El Salvador. Its interagency Chemical Unit investigates diversion of synthetic drugs and chemical precursors. The government increased the unit's resources in 2024, doubling its personnel and providing specialized training. It now conducts audits on pharmaceutical companies operating in El Salvador, which have not yet resulted in any cases of chemical diversion or illicit synthetics production.

The PNC has a vetted, full-time Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) working with the Attorney General's Office on high-level and international drug investigations. The SIU responds to drug trafficking alerts and conducts bilateral investigations with partner countries on cases with a Salvadoran nexus and often linked to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).

A Salvadoran Navy officer is assigned to a U.S. military joint task force focused on maritime drug interdiction, and the United States has a Tactical Analysis Team in El Salvador to coordinate and support maritime counternarcotics missions with El Salvador's Navy. El Salvador's National Electronic Monitoring Center (Spanish acronym "CITE") allows the Salvadoran law enforcement authorities to judicially intercept electronic communications for violations of Salvadoran law including drug and human trafficking. It supports U.S. partners in investigations targeting TCOs, including counternarcotics. The PNC's Special Technical Group (GET), a cellular telephone geo-locating mobile unit, with U.S.-donated equipment, identified human and narcotics traffickers in 2024.

El Salvador and the United States are party to a bilateral extradition treaty, as well as multilateral conventions addressing extraditions and mutual legal assistance. In February 2024, El Salvador amended its extradition law, potentially placing limits on the maximum sentence allowable for individuals extradited to the United States, which could affect some high-level narcotics extraditions.

The Salvadoran government showed renewed interest in improving border control administration and security in 2024, which is expected to benefit anti-smuggling efforts. The United States provides training, equipment, and mentorship to support this initiative.

2. Supply Reduction

From January through September 2024, the DAN seized 8.1 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 99.8 percent of which was encountered at sea. The DAN also seized 383 kilograms (kg) of marijuana, 1.78 kg of crack cocaine, 0.41 kg of methamphetamine, and 101 ampoules of fentanyl. The DAN seized more than \$371,000 in bulk cash and arrested 949 individuals for drug-related crimes. These data represent a 161 percent increase (by weight) in cocaine seizures over the previous year.

The Salvadoran Navy and the PNC's Maritime Tactical Operations Response Section (STORM) have been continuously increasing interdiction capabilities through fleet expansion, training, and facility renovation. The Salvadoran Navy aggressively patrolled beyond El Salvador's territory, and from January to September 2024 it executed eight seizures 490 to 1,004 nautical miles from the Salvadoran coast, seizing a total of 8.085 MT of cocaine. Seventy-three foreign nationals were arrested transporting the illegal narcotics.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

El Salvador has not conducted a drug use survey since 2014. Its National Anti-Drug Commission launched a drug use prevention program in 2024 directed at children aged 10 to 15.

4. Corruption

The Government of El Salvador does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds from illicit drug sales. Still, corruption presents a challenge. In April 2024, a CITE-led investigation resulted in the arrest of an official in the President's Office for Corruption. Separately, two police officers were arrested in 2024 for narcotrafficking and one prosecutor for other crimes. The United States supports programs aimed at curbing corruption, including vetting and polygraph testing for some units in El Salvador's security forces.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States provides capacity building for El Salvador's security and judicial institutions through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which is aimed at fighting illicit drug trafficking and combatting corruption and TCOs. CARSI funding complements other U.S. efforts focused on assisting vulnerable populations displaced by drug trafficking, violence, and crime.

U.S.-supported programs have enhanced Salvadoran capabilities to interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit drug trafficking and transnational crimes, implement prevention programs, and strengthen El Salvador's justice sector. To prevent illicit

synthetic drug production in El Salvador, the United States donated equipment and sponsored trainings for the DAN to increase capacity to identify and investigate chemical diversion cases and illicit synthetic drugs production. The United States sponsored training for the PNC canine unit to detect fentanyl; the unit now has two certified canines. The United States facilitated the signing of an information-sharing agreement for the Automated Fingerprint Identification System among Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to deepen regional security cooperation and enable a collective response to transnational criminal threats.

El Salvador hosts two programs focused on countering TCOs regionally: the Joint Border Information Group (GCIF) and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA). GCIF is a multinational law enforcement fusion center; ILEA San Salvador provides training to law enforcement professionals from across Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Cooperative Security Location Agreement signed by the United States and El Salvador (up for renewal in 2025) supports El Salvador as a hub for regional drug interdiction efforts. It allows U.S. access to airports and other governmental facilities connected to aerial detection, monitoring, and tracking illicit drug operations.

D. Conclusion

El Salvador continues its strong commitment and capacity to fight transnational drug trafficking, disrupt trafficking patterns, and improve its information sharing programs. The Salvadoran Navy has accomplished most of the large-scale interdictions along maritime routes, at distances often exceeding the reach of other Latin American navies. El Salvador continues to prepare for new threats posed by synthetic drugs while focusing on capacity building and new attention towards prevention. While not immune to corruption, El Salvador exhibits a commitment to identifying and prosecuting corruption within its police units.

El Salvador's economic challenges provide opportunities for transnational criminal organizations and drug traffickers. El Salvador needs to continue to strengthen its criminal justice institutions, enhance transparency, and support policy objectives with adequate funding and personnel.

Georgia

Georgia is a crucial transit point for drug trafficking as it is located along the 'Caucasus Route' used to smuggle opioids and synthetic drugs from Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan to Europe.

In 2024, the Ministry of Interior (MoIA) began participating with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (ONODC) Container Control Programme and now uses the program's ContainerCom data exchange system to identify and interdict drug transshipment. MoIA also established a new counterdrug police division in the Adjara region. The government has focused on drug supply reduction rather than demand reduction and prevention. Enforcement measures outweigh public health and inclusion approaches. Georgia supports evidence-based treatment for opioid use disorder but there are no institutionalized mechanisms or programs targeting early intervention or youth drug use prevention.

Georgia enacted a change in national law in 2024 that precisely defines small, large and 'especially large' quantities of six synthetic controlled substances, while amounts were defined for one new psychoactive substance- Gamma-Hydroxybutyric acid (GHB). The Ministry of Health further imposed restrictions on the use of substitution therapy drugs (methadone and buprenorphine) for the stated reason of reducing misuse. Health experts and associations believe these changes will substantially degrade health care access for disabled patients and those with chronic diseases. The Georgian Parliament also passed a large-scale amnesty act, which included drug offenders, and some offenders saw their sentences reduced or removed. The Interagency Coordinating Council on Combating Drug Abuse, the main policymaking body on drug issues, drafted an Action Plan for 2025-2027 for adoption by December 2024.

The National Drug Observatory (NDO) continued working to align Georgian drug monitoring with EU standards. The NDO submitted epidemiological indicators to the European Union Drugs Agency (formerly known as the European Monitoring Centre for Drug Use and Drug Addiction) in 2023 to help monitor drug-related issues in Georgia. Since March 2024, support from the associated EU4MD drug monitoring project has resulted in a more proactive approach to improved national data collection and reporting.

Georgia participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. Representatives have participated in 15 Coalition working groups including those on prevention of illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetics and promotion of public health interventions toward drug use reduction.

Rising prevalence and use of synthetic drugs, corruption, and limited health and law enforcement resources continue to be major obstacles. Law enforcement and public health institutions face institutional and operational limitations in countering the illegal drug trade. Political will, international cooperation, and institutional reforms remain key to reducing the flow of drugs in and through Georgia.

Ghana

Drug consumption remains a pressing concern in Ghana. Ghana is a source country for marijuana, and a major transit point for heroin and cocaine shipments to other countries in Africa, Europe, and the United States. Ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and tramadol are diverted from Ghana's legitimate pharmaceutical market to supply illicit drug markets in West Africa.

A U.S.-funded program to counter drug trafficking through the mail resulted in seizures of hashish and dihydrocodeine in 2024. U.S. law enforcement believes Ghana's seaports are the main entry and exit points for the movement of illicit drugs, as evidenced by two seizures at Tema Port during the reporting period.

With U.S. support, Ghana seized 14.7 metric tons (MT) of drugs in 2024, including: 10.97 metric tons (MT) of marijuana; 409 kilograms (kg) of cocaine; 3,263 kg of tramadol; 15.6 kg of amphetamines; 15 kg of khat; 12 kg of heroin; 1.5 kg of MDMA; one kg of ketamine; 15 grams of diazepam; and 1,057,000 bottles of 100 milliliters of cough syrup mixed with codeine. Precursor chemicals transiting Ghana are processed into synthetic drugs in neighboring countries such as Nigeria, according to U.S. law enforcement. Fentanyl precursors N-phenethyl-4-piperidine (NPP) and 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) are on the precursor chemical watch list for Ghana.

Government and private treatment centers offer rehabilitation programs to meet demand reduction and treatment needs.

The United States provides technical and logistical assistance to Ghana's Narcotics Control Commission as well as funding to increase capacity and cooperation among Ghana's other law enforcement agencies. The United States also funds a Sensitive Investigative Unit to collaborate on complex international investigations.

The government of Ghana is a strategic U.S. partner. With U.S. support, Ghana's law enforcement agencies continue to build capacity and strengthen interagency cooperation toward meeting anti-drug commitments.

An extradition treaty exists between the United States and Ghana. While no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty exists between the two countries, Ghana is a party to

multilateral law enforcement conventions enabling mutual legal assistance to the United States.

Ghana participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and in September 2024 joined 10 other member countries in committing to lead an initiative in the second year of the Coalition.

Guatemala

A. Introduction

Since the inauguration of President Bernardo Arevalo in January 2024, the Arevalo administration has overseen a threefold increase in narcotics seizures compared to 2023. However, Guatemala's weak institutions, archaic chemical import controls, and porous borders leave the country vulnerable to narcotics trafficking and synthetic drug and precursor chemical diversion. The U.S. and Guatemalan governments recognize that Guatemala is a major transit point for narcotics destined for the United States and requires improved counternarcotics activity and resulting seizures. Effective drug treatment and prevention programs are non-existent outside urban centers.

The Arevalo administration is a partner in the fight against international narcotics trafficking and has taken steps to address the above challenges. On March 8, 2024, President Arevalo signed an order that created efficiencies by reorganizing counternarcotics and border security functions under a single vice-ministry. On March 19, 2024, the Ministries of Interior, Health, and Defense, the Commission Against Addictions and Illicit Drug Trafficking, and the Superintendence of Tax Administration signed a protocol that improved investigative capacity by activating a U.S. government-mentored precursor chemicals investigations group. The group has conducted multiple seizures of chemicals capable of producing methamphetamine, including the June 11, 2024 seizure of 250 kilograms (kg) of solid controlled chemicals and 356 gallons of liquid controlled chemicals, as well as the November 23 seizure of fentanyl precursor 1-Boc-4-Piperdone at Guatemala's main airport. On October 2, 2024, Guatemala hosted the first U.S.-Guatemala High Level Security Dialogue, at which anti-narcotics cooperation was a central theme, and underscored its intention to remain an active participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Despite these advances, endemic corruption continues to limit Guatemala's ability to curb narcotics flows and associated transnational organized crime. As part of the reorganization cited above, Arevalo has called for the dissolution and reconstitution of Guatemala's notoriously corrupt border police (DIPAFRONT) – known more for extorting northbound migrants than patrolling Guatemala's borders. Guatemala is only beginning to create the legal framework to combat synthetic drugs, while weak inter-institutional

collaboration inhibits a more coordinated approach to controlled chemical diversion. U.S. government-supported vetted and trusted units continue to play an outsized role in counternarcotics efforts.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Guatemala's specialized counternarcotics police unit (SGAIA) is responsible for combating drug related activity in country and at ports of entry, including eradication of illicit cultivation. The United States provides training and logistical support to SGAIA, including funding a K9 detection unit historically responsible for the majority of drug seizures in country.

The Arevalo administration signed a memorandum of understanding on April 20 to re-activate Guatemala's participation in the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan (U.S.-supported capacity building activities implemented by the Colombian National Police and Colombian Navy which has trained thousands of law enforcement officials in the region), which former President Alejandro Giammattei had suspended. The United States subsequently facilitated a Colombian National Police delegation via the program to train Guatemalan canine handlers on modern detection techniques. The United States also supported a regional fentanyl detection training for Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran, and Costa Rican canine handlers in August. Guatemalan canine units were involved with 43 percent of narcotics seizures - 4.6 metric tons (MT) - in the first nine months of 2024.

Guatemala inspects containers that enter its Atlantic and Pacific ports but, historically, rarely identified illicit narcotics or precursor chemicals. However, in 2024 Guatemala showed some signs of improvement, achieving several significant seizures at air and sea ports, including the aforementioned seizures by the U.S.-government mentored precursor chemicals investigation group. A U.S.-mentored task force started operations at Puerto Quetzal on the Pacific Coast in 2023 to improve container inspection efforts and has since generated \$486,110 in tax revenue from undeclared contraband and participated in 2.4 MT of narcotics seizures. FBI and DEA-vetted units coordinated with the task force on February 9, 2024, to seize 605 kg of cocaine (valued at approximately \$8 million) from a cargo

ship arriving from Puerto Caldera, Costa Rica. Guatemala is working with the United States on plans to expand the task force to Puerto Santo Tomas on the Caribbean Coast and Guatemala's main international airport in Guatemala City.

Trafficking patterns in Guatemala involve predominately maritime deliveries from Colombia and Ecuador and land transports entering via the eastern border with El Salvador and Honduras. Guatemala has over 300 land entry points with no Guatemalan border control presence. The United States supports Guatemala's efforts to expand government presence and enhance border security by constructing interagency checkpoints along major transportation routes. In 2024, Guatemala activated the ninth and tenth of 12 checkpoints planned throughout the country, in the cities of Escuintla and Retalhuleu. In September 2024, SGAIA seized 300 grams of cocaine, 600 doses of tusi (a mixture of synthetic drugs also called "pink cocaine"), and 400 doses of methamphetamine during a random vehicle inspection at the Rio Dulce checkpoint.

Guatemala's Special Naval Forces (FEN) are responsible for maritime interdictions, with naval bases on the Pacific coast at Puerto Quetzal, the Atlantic coast at Puerto Barrios, and a riverine operation at a U.S.-supported forward operating base near the Mexican border. The U.S. government donated 12 outboard diesel motors to the FEN in 2024 to extend the useful life of its four U.S.-donated Midnight Express interceptor boats, which perform maritime operations in response to targeted U.S. intelligence. The U.S. government also supported Guatemala's maritime capacity in 2024 by donating a near coast patrol vessel, a logistical barge, and servers to expand the FEN's maritime vessel tracking system.

2. Supply Reduction

SGAIA reported seizing 10.8 MT of cocaine in the first nine months of the year, almost triple the amount seized in all of 2023. SGAIA reported 53 hectares of coca cultivations destroyed in the same period. Cultivations are typically found in the Izabal, Alta Verapaz, and Peten departments in northern Guatemala. The FEN reported 5,222 hours navigated and 4,820 packages of narcotics seized in the first nine months of 2024.

According to U.S. law enforcement and Guatemalan officials, a combination of factors likely resulted in a continued decrease in illicit drug flights in 2024. Primary factors include: 1) U.S. law enforcement investigation and interruption of illicit wholesale aircraft sales that were being used to fly through Guatemala; 2) streamlined cartel distribution networks which limited middlemen in Guatemala, and increased direct flights from Colombia to Mexico; and 3) enhanced law enforcement surveillance, prevention, and detection methods within Guatemala. Guatemalan aviation authorities identified five unauthorized aircraft in Guatemalan airspace between January and September 2024. None landed in Guatemala and thus no seizures were made. The Guatemalan military and SGAIA destroyed seven illicit landing strips in the first nine months of 2024, primarily in north and northwestern Guatemala.

U.S.-vetted units apprehended 14 individuals in the first nine months of 2024 with extradition warrants based upon charges for narcotrafficking. The Guatemalan government extradited 14 individuals charged with narcotrafficking and other crimes to the United States during that same period, including a high-level drug trafficker with links to the Sinaloa cartel and a former Guatemalan politician apprehended while still in office.

3. Public Information, Prevention and Treatment

Guatemala lacks a national treatment system for substance use disorders. The United States supported Guatemala's efforts in 2024 to launch an early warning system to identify emerging synthetic drug trends and develop public policies in response. Vice President Karin Herrera presided over an "extraordinary" session of the Commission Against Addiction and Illicit Drug Trafficking on October 8, 2024, when Guatemalan authorities approved a protocol that will provide the legal framework to issue alerts.

4. Corruption

Guatemala does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor launder the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs, but endemic corruption remains a significant problem and facilitates impunity including for drug trafficking organizations. Ex-Guatemalan President Jimmy

Morales expelled a UN-backed corruption commission in 2019. Under Attorney General (AG) Maria Consuelo Porras, the Public Ministry stalled, obstructed, or dismissed high-profile corruption investigations, resulting in the suspension of programmatic cooperation with the Public Ministry in 2021 and designation of Porras and other Public Ministry actors under the Section 353 List of Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors and under Section 7031(c).

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Guatemala have a bilateral agreement to jointly suppress illicit narcotics trafficking by sea and air which includes provisions for ship boarding, ship riders, entry to investigate, overflight of territorial seas, order to land, and interdiction support. Guatemala has an extradition treaty with the United States, and U.S. law enforcement agencies support several vetted units in country. The United States also supports sustainable law enforcement cooperation, citizen security initiatives, and efforts to strengthen the rule of law.

On October 2, 2024, Guatemala hosted the first U.S.-Guatemala High Level Security Dialogue, which advanced a number of shared priorities to strengthen citizen security and combat transnational crime, including a Guatemalan commitment to institutionalize the U.S.-government-mentored precursor chemicals investigation group. During the dialogue, the U.S. Government announced the “Guatemala Se Transforma” initiative, which aims to transform security institutions to combat transnational crime, and offers a roadmap for enhancing cooperation through alliances, good governance, and safe communities.

In November 2024, the United States completed a comprehensive capability gap analysis, which identified vulnerabilities and strengths throughout Guatemala’s ports of entries (POEs). The United States and Guatemala have agreed to work bilaterally to strengthen Guatemala’s POEs against drug trafficking activities.

D. Conclusion

Guatemala’s current government has demonstrated the will to collaborate with U.S. law enforcement on narcotics investigations, arrests, and extraditions, particularly via U.S.-vetted units. However, endemic corruption, weak institutions, and strained

relations with the legislative branch hinder the Arevalo administration's efforts to reform institutions and tackle transnational crime in Guatemala. While poor inter-institutional cooperation historically inhibited greater success on air and maritime interdictions and has frustrated a coordinated response to precursor chemical diversion and synthetic drugs, Guatemala achieved a significant increase in seizures and some improvements in interagency coordination in the context of U.S.-mentored groups in 2024.

Guyana

A. Introduction

Guyana is a close partner of the United States in combating narcotics trafficking. Traffickers increasingly use it as a transit country for South American cocaine destined for Europe, West Africa, and to a lesser extent the United States. Traffickers exploit Guyana's location along the northern coast of South America and its extensive river networks, dense rainforests, many illegal airstrips, and proximity to major drug-producing countries. They disguise cocaine in legitimate cargo and transport it by commercial and private aircraft, maritime vessels, human couriers, and postal systems. Guyana also has a growing domestic drug consumption problem.

In 2024, Guyana seized more than four metric tons (MT) of cocaine, in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement, at an airstrip near its border with Venezuela – the largest drug seizure in Guyana's history – and interdicted one semi-submersible off Guyana's coast with 2.3 MT of cocaine. Despite growing oil wealth and the government's increased efforts, the public sector – including law enforcement and customs officials – remains underpaid. Coupled with a lack of adequate resources and shortcomings in the legal system, this allows traffickers to exploit government systems and move illicit drugs through Guyana. Guyana joined the Regional Security System (RSS) in order to enhance its counternarcotics capacity and deepen its integration into regional security. Guyana will have national elections in 2025.

Guyana is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Several government agencies in Guyana, including the Ministries of Home Affairs (Customs Antinarcotic Unit and Guyana Police Force); Education; Health (Demand Reduction and Tobacco Control Units); and Human Services and Social Security address drug-related crime. Guyana has shown commitment to working with international partners to address the drug trafficking. In September 2024, the government launched the National Defense Institute to build security expertise

through its collaboration with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and U.S. security and defense institutions. The government collaborated with the United States to increase seizures in 2024, especially for cocaine. Guyana's National Drug Strategy 2022-2026 provides for strategic programs to guide the country's drug control efforts, with a focus on interdiction, prevention, treatment, and anti-money laundering efforts. However, the country's security infrastructure remains underdeveloped to effectively address drug trafficking.

Guyana continues to implement a 2001 bilateral agreement with the United States that enables joint maritime and aerospace patrols to counter narcotic trafficking. Guyana has been a member of the Regional Security System since 2022 but there has been no significant reporting on collaborations, especially in the area of combating drug trafficking. Guyana is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and is also signatory to several United Nations conventions, including the Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

2. Supply Reduction

Marijuana is the most used and produced drug in Guyana, and the country remains a major transshipment point for cocaine trafficking. In 2024, the United States and Guyana's Joint Interagency Task Force, including its Defense Force (GDF), collaborated to seize 4.4 MT of cocaine worth approximately \$195,000,000 – the country's largest ever drug seizure - and the interception of a self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) approximately 150 miles off the coast of Guyana with 2.3 MT of cocaine. Authorities also found a low-profile vessel (LPV), empty and abandoned in the waterways near Port Kaituma, near the Venezuelan border. As of October, no arrests had been made and the investigation was ongoing.

These two events resulted in a huge increase in cocaine seizures for the period of January through September 2024 – 6,700 kilograms (kg) versus 62 kg for the same period in 2023. Marijuana seizures for 2024 totaled 1.4 MT, versus 1.1 MT for the same period in 2023. Methamphetamine was a distant third for quantity of drugs seized in 2024 (.06 kg).

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Domestic drug use in Guyana centers around the use of marijuana, minimal use of synthetic drugs, and cocaine to a lesser extent. The country's National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2022-2026 outlines its drug demand and reduction strategies; seven ministries, eight additional government agencies, and select local NGOs execute the plan. The Organization of American States (OAS) and Guyana's Drug Information Network are evaluating the plan's effectiveness. Guyana reported significant activities from January to September aimed at reducing drug abuse. According to the Ministry of Health, the government and NGOs undertook initiatives to raise awareness and reduce drug abuse, including media campaigns; focus groups with youth and school aged children; dissemination of drug information within Indigenous communities in their local languages; establishing psychosocial support groups; and expansion of drug treatment services. However, Guyana continues to lack commitment and resources to achieve significant progress in reducing drug demand.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Government of Guyana does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Corruption in Guyana, however, poses a significant obstacle to its efforts to combat drug trafficking. Corruption within law enforcement, bribery, and nepotism in the public sector and political entities further complicate the fight against drug trafficking. Authorities often drop charges or never file them and do not conduct serious investigations; traffickers are able to evade prosecution. Additionally, the economic appeal of the drug trade in Guyana, with its high poverty rate and low-paying public sector jobs, leads individuals to become involved in illicit activities and hinders efforts to curb trafficking. In two separate incidents in July, four GDF officers were charged with trafficking a total of 213 kilograms of cannabis.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Guyana have a strong bilateral partnership and shared concern for combatting transnational crime and enhancing regional security. The United States provides law enforcement assistance through the Caribbean Security

Basin Initiative (CBSI) with training, technical assistance, capacity building, and justice sector reform. In 2024, the United States supported the GPF Training Academy's international accreditation and training partnerships, enhanced Guyana's counternarcotics case investigation mentorship, deepened regional port security programming, and modernized the Guyana judiciary's case management system to reduce case backlogs. Guyana and the United States share an extradition treaty and maritime counternarcotics agreement.

D. Conclusion

Guyana's deeply entrenched illicit drug trade contributes significantly to increased crime and corruption. The government can fight drug trafficking by enhancing law enforcement and customs capability through port security improvements, intelligence operations with regional and international partners, implementing stronger anti-corruption measures, and strengthening its legislation relating to drug trafficking sentencing, to make it less attractive.

Haiti

A. Introduction

Haiti remains in the grip of severe political, economic, and security crises driven by the continued expansion of gang control in Port-au-Prince, political instability, and weak state institutions. Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the country has been without elected officials at the upper levels of government. The current Haitian government, led by the seven-person Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) and Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, faces immense challenges in restoring order. Ongoing violence has crippled already-weak essential services, including law enforcement and the judicial system.

As of mid-2024, gang violence has continued to escalate, with criminal organizations controlling key areas of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and extending their influence across the country. Sustained gang violence continues to hinder the delivery of lifesaving assistance to food insecure populations, including more than 703,000 internally displaced persons. More than 5.4 million people, nearly half of Haiti's population, are projected to experience crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity across the country through February 2025. Corruption within law enforcement and a lack of effective governance have allowed armed groups to operate with impunity, undermining Haiti's efforts to combat drug trafficking.

Haiti remains a transit point for cocaine from South American and marijuana from Jamaica en route to the United States. Local drug production is minimal, primarily consisting of cannabis cultivation for domestic consumption. The Haitian National Police's (HNP) Counternarcotics Unit (BLTS) has decreased drug interdiction efforts as resources are diverted to address the overwhelming gang violence. Haiti's law enforcement agencies face ongoing challenges related to systemic corruption, poor funding, weak institutional structures, changing leadership, and emigration (primarily to the United States). Drug trafficking through Haiti also serves as a supplementary funding source for criminal gangs.

Haiti is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Haiti's institutional capacity to combat drug trafficking remains weak, with limited resources and a police force stretched thin by the security crisis. The HNP, which oversees counternarcotics operations, continues to be underfunded, affecting both staffing and operational capacity. As of late 2024, the HNP has approximately 11,200 active officers, which is insufficient given the country's security needs.

Due to attrition and reassignment, BLTS personnel went from 198 officers in 2023 to 151 in 2024. Because authorities prioritized anti-gang operations, officers were reassigned to non-counternarcotics duties, further straining the unit's capacity. The BLTS maintains close cooperation with other HNP units such as POLIFRONT (border police) and the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG), although poor funding, inadequate equipment, and fuel shortages hinder operational capacity.

2. Supply Reduction

During the first nine months of 2024, BLTS reported seizures of 365 kilograms (kg) of marijuana and 16 kg of cocaine and arrested 51 people for drug-related offenses. In comparison, in 2023, BLTS seized 1,801 kg of marijuana and 33 kg of cocaine and arrested 101 people for drug-related offenses. There is no significant evidence of synthetic drugs being trafficked through the country nor of synthetic drug production in the country. Efforts to interdict maritime drug trafficking remain challenging given Haiti's 1,100 miles of coastline and the HCG's small fleet of mostly non-operational vessels.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Haitian transition government's efforts to address drug prevention and public awareness remain severely constrained by the country's broader political instability and resource limitations. Haiti's National Commission for the Fight Against Drugs (CONALD), in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), has led public information campaigns on drug use prevention; however, these programs are sparse and of limited impact. MSPP, through donor support,

continues to work on strengthening the health system, which indirectly supports drug prevention by enhancing community resilience.

U.S. efforts focus on strengthening health leadership, governance, and primary health care services. U.S.-supported Global Health Security (GHS) initiatives aim at improving laboratory capacity, disease surveillance systems, and public health communication strategies. Through the United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the United States supports screening for drug use, with referrals to support groups or organizations for specific population groups. While drug abuse is not thought to be widespread, drug prevention is a concern due to limited studies, the lack of targeted prevention programs, and the larger security and humanitarian crises.

4. Corruption

Corruption is deeply embedded within all levels of government and law enforcement, severely undermining the judicial system. The transition government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Haiti's Anticorruption Unit (ULCC) has an ongoing investigation of three TPC members implicated in a bribery scandal involving former leadership of the National Credit Bank (BNC). However, resource shortages, political interference, and intimidation hinder anti-corruption efforts, resulting in few prosecutions for corruption-related offenses, despite international calls for reform. Widespread corruption and lack of accountability within the political and judicial systems continue to obstruct meaningful progress toward stamping out corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Haiti cooperates with the United States on counternarcotics efforts under the 1997 bilateral letter of agreement and other agreements that allow for U.S. intervention in Haitian airspace and waters. United States assistance remains critical in supporting the operational capabilities of BLTS, POLIFRONT, and the HCG. This assistance is focused on disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking networks. Firearms trafficking is also a significant concern.

On February 13, 2024, the United States and the Government of Haiti signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to formally establish the Haiti transnational criminal investigative unit (TCIU), which will facilitate the exchange of information between law enforcement partners in the United States and Haiti and enhance cross-border investigative capabilities to prosecute those involved in transnational criminal activities, particularly gang-related criminal activity such as firearms trafficking.

Bilateral cooperation, however, is often undermined by Haiti's political instability and corruption within its institutions. While the United States continues to provide support in the form of training and equipment, challenges remain in ensuring sustainable progress. As of November 2024, support from the transition Minister of Justice has been markedly better than with past ministers.

D. Conclusion

The HNP actively works to interdict illegal drugs and collaborate with neighboring countries to disrupt trafficking routes. However, limited resources and persistent challenges within law enforcement and the judicial system constrain their efforts. To more effectively combat drug trafficking, Haiti should prioritize strengthening the institutional capacities of both the HNP and the judiciary.

Enhanced collaboration with international partners can support intelligence-sharing, training, and technical assistance efforts, which are critical to dismantling drug trafficking networks. Continued focus on these initiatives will be essential for Haiti to achieve progress in reducing narcotics trafficking and improving national security.

Honduras

A. Introduction

Honduras remains a significant transit country for cocaine moving from South America to the United States and Europe. In 2024, drug interdictions increased from 2023 levels largely due to the success of the Honduran Navy, which seized over 19 metric tons (MT) of cocaine at sea in the first nine months of the year. The Honduran National Police (HNP) seized an additional three MT in land-based operations.

The HNP are eradicating expanding areas of coca cultivation in Colón and Olancho, where drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exploit deforestation and inconsistent law enforcement to expand operations. Corruption, combined with collaboration between transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and transnational gangs with a presence in Honduras – such as MS-13 and 18th Street – and external actors such as the Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel, Tren de Aragua, and Clan del Golfo, has worsened the drug trade. This growing complexity presents major challenges for the government's counternarcotics efforts.

Although domestic drug consumption has not risen significantly, the involvement of TCOs poses a substantial threat to Honduras' capacity to control drug trafficking. Insufficient interagency coordination, resource limitations, and corruption remain the most significant barriers.

Honduras is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The government's stated commitment to tackling narco trafficking is undermined by inadequate prosecutorial and police resources. Despite increased seizures in 2024, counternarcotics operations in the maritime and air domains suffer from inadequate interagency collaboration, malfunctioning police wire room equipment, and broken equipment on Honduras' only maritime patrol aircraft. Honduran government initiatives, including its national strategy against organized crime and efforts to

strengthen its Joint Interagency Operations Center (CCOI), made little progress in 2024 due to budgetary and political constraints.

Honduras has continued to renew and expand its state of exception, originally announced in December 2022, now in effect in 226 of the country's 298 municipalities. Under these authorities, warrantless searches have enabled the police to carry out more aggressive operations against drug traffickers, a key component of the government's strategy to target micro-traffickers.

The United States and Honduras maintain a bilateral maritime agreement, which includes a shiprider clause that enhances joint operations and improves capacity for interdictions.

Honduras participates in the Organization of American States' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and remains active in regional maritime counternarcotics agreements. The United States and Honduras have collaborated to suppress illicit drug trafficking, particularly in the maritime domain and through the U.S.-supported Special Investigations Unit (SIU).

On August 28, 2024, Honduras announced its intention to terminate its extradition treaty with the United States. Authorities arrested more extradition targets in 2024 than in 2023, underscoring the utility of the bilateral treaty and raising concerns about the long-term effects of this policy change on bilateral collaboration.

2. Supply Reduction

The first nine months of 2024 marked a significant increase in drug interdiction efforts compared to 2023. Working with information provided by U.S. law enforcement, the Honduran Navy seized over 19 MT of cocaine. The U.S.-supported SIU and Honduran Anti-Drug Police (DNPA) made 11 high-profile arrests in 2024. These operations underscore the importance of international cooperation to combat drug trafficking.

Significant portions of Honduras' eastern regions, particularly Colon and Gracias a Dios, remain vulnerable to TCO and gang exploitation, according to U.S. law enforcement and the DNPA. Beginning in 2023, the DNPA expanded its focus to

include micro-trafficking to control growing street-level crime and violence in urban areas. Government estimates indicate that 3 million coca plants were eradicated in 2024, a decline from the 4.7 million plants eradicated in 2023. U.S. experts attribute the decrease in eradication to limited personnel and air support and lack of an informant compensation program. Despite this, the DNPA destroyed eight base labs during 2024.

While the government has not reported concerns about synthetic drug or fentanyl production or use in the country, limited resources are available to test for such substances, thus it remains unknown whether illicit fentanyl manufacturing is taking place. In November 2023, Honduran authorities seized over 400 kilograms (kg) of illicit drugs, including 97 kg of medical-grade fentanyl (i.e., likely diverted from a legitimate medical source) in the port city of Puerto Cortés in Honduras. No land-based seizures of fentanyl or discoveries of synthetic drug laboratories were reported in 2024.

Go-fast vessels remained a common smuggling method in 2024, with five of the ten seized vessels from January-September being this type of high-speed watercraft. The lack of functional aerial surveillance capabilities has created gaps in interdiction efforts.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Drug use in Honduras is primarily concentrated on marijuana, cocaine hydrochloride, and crack cocaine. The Honduran government has expanded its focus on drug prevention through the U.S.-supported Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program. GREAT launched girls-only soccer leagues, promoting leadership and self-confidence, with female officers of the HNP serving as mentors. However, public information campaigns and partnerships with the private sector are limited, and prevention initiatives do not specifically target vulnerable populations. The government has yet to allocate significant resources for broader prevention programs. Treatment options for substance use in Honduras are scarce. Community-based residential centers provide most treatment services, but these facilities are under resourced. There are no widespread methadone maintenance programs or outreach centers, and prison-based treatment options are limited.

International support, particularly from the United States and the United Nations, remains focused on prevention rather than treatment, leaving a gap in care for substance use disorders

4. Corruption

Honduras does not, as a matter of official government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution. However, corruption within Honduran state institutions remains a significant issue. The 2024 conviction of former President Juan Orlando Hernández in the United States on drug trafficking charges exemplifies the deep-rooted and high-level corruption. While this conviction marks a major victory for anti-corruption efforts, corruption remains a widespread problem, hindering the ability to combat narcotrafficking.

At the urging of President Castro's administration in early 2022, the National Congress repealed a secrecy law they alleged prior governments abused. It also passed a law granting broad amnesty to former public officials who served during the administration of former President Manuel ("Mel") Zelaya (2006-2009), who is President Castro's husband. In 2024, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amnesty law, which has allowed former public officials convicted of corruption to return to public service. In 2024, very few senior officials faced criminal or civil prosecution for drug-related corruption, allowing impunity to weaken Honduras' legal framework.

On September 3, 2024, a U.S.-based non-governmental organization released a video of ex-Secretary of Congress Carlos Zelaya, brother-in-law of President Castro and brother of former President Mel Zelaya, meeting with known drug traffickers during President Castro's 2013 presidential campaign.

Negotiations with the United Nations to establish the International Commission Against Impunity and Corruption (CICIH), a campaign promise by President Castro, has been touted as a potential pathway to strengthen anti-corruption efforts. Although a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in December 2022 to outline necessary conditions and legal reforms, progress towards the creation of a CICIH remains stalled. Honduras established an implementation mechanism in October to

review recommendations from the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States remains a critical partner in Honduras' counternarcotics efforts. Through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the United States provides substantial assistance to strengthen Honduras' security institutions and disrupt the activities of TCOs. The U.S.-supported SIU plays a key role in high-profile drug arrests and seizures.

Bilateral cooperation between the United States and Honduras is governed by letters of agreement and memoranda of understanding, which outline mutual goals related to drug interdiction, eradication, and capacity building.

D. Conclusion

Maritime drug seizures saw a significant increase in 2024 compared to 2023, but critical challenges remain, including the need for stronger interagency coordination, more targeted resource allocation, and more effective anti-corruption measures. To address these issues, the Government of Honduras needs to prioritize strengthening institutional capacity, enhancing transparency and combatting corruption, and deepening interagency and international cooperation to dismantle drug trafficking networks. Additionally, legal reforms are necessary, particularly concerning offenses related to the diversion of precursor chemicals, as the current Penal Code makes it nearly impossible to charge individuals for such crimes. The government should also provide clear counternarcotics mandates for the various agencies responsible for counternarcotics efforts to ensure better coordination and accountability.

India

A. Introduction

As India's economy grows, the scale of the challenges it faces preventing the production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs is also increasing. India's world-class pharmaceutical manufacturing sector and licit opium production create opportunities for criminals to divert organic and synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals for illicit uses. Drug traffickers exploit India's busy ports and relatively porous land borders to smuggle shipments into and out of the country. Illicit shipments of pharmaceutical products and precursor chemicals to the United States via international shipping, express consignment channels, and within shipments of otherwise legitimate cargo pose increasing challenges. India itself is a large and growing market for opiates, according to a 2024 report by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Indian officials warn that proceeds from drug trafficking may be funding terrorism and armed groups.

While India boasts largely effective law enforcement institutions, legal regimes, and regulators, the comparatively small capacity of its agencies combined with resource constraints and gaps in legislation and regulations hamper India's ability to effectively respond to these growing challenges.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Drugs, Medical Devices, and Cosmetics Bill 2023, which would have imposed new regulations on drug manufacturing and online pharmacies, was not passed by the previous Indian parliament. The new coalition government that subsequently took office has not indicated whether it will continue to pursue this legislation.

The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), an organization reporting to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), is the lead law enforcement agency for drug-related crime. NCB has an authorized staff of only 1,500, and nearly half of its authorized positions are vacant, according to MHA budget documents. The Government of India has not budgeted for any increase in support to the agency.

The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), part of the Ministry of Finance, oversees the legal cultivation of poppies and opium used in the lawful production of narcotic medicines. In 2024, CBN announced plans to begin geographic information system (GIS) mapping surveys following a 2022 decision to expand licensing of licit opium cultivation to private pharmaceutical companies to meet growing market demand. Authorities destroyed a total of 12,863 hectares (ha) of illicit opium in 2023, the most recent period for which data is available.

The backlog of criminal cases in India's trial court system continues to grow, totaling over 45 million in 2024, hampering efforts to bring traffickers to justice. India struggles to effectively implement regulations to improve controls over online drug sales. Consumers in India, the United States, and elsewhere use India-based online portals to order synthetic opioids for delivery via post or consigned shipments. The division of authorities between state governments, responsible for most local law enforcement and business regulations, and federal authorities, responsible for the majority of narcotics-related policy and enforcement, complicates efforts to control the production, shipment, and consumption of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. Attempts to address these challenges have included efforts to strengthen interagency coordination, establishing a dedicated online portal for citizens to report drug-related concerns, and standing up a dedicated anti-narcotics task force in each state and union territory.

India has bilateral agreements with 45 countries on cooperation to reduce demand and illicit trafficking. India is a signatory to extradition treaties or arrangements with 60 countries, including the United States. The United States and India are parties to a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, under which there is regular cooperation. The NCB regularly shares law enforcement information and coordinates with a variety of regional organizations, including the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Drug Offences Monitoring Desk, the Colombo Plan, and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-Operation.

2. Supply Reduction

During the period June 2022-May 2023, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data show

Though data on seizures for 2024 are not available, the scale of illicit drug production, trafficking, and consumption appears to be increasing. Government seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants more than doubled in 2023, to 3.4 metric tons (MT), as did seizures of opium, to 8.5 MT, according to MHA data. Seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine held steady year-over-year, at 1 MT. Authorities destroyed 12,863 ha of illicit poppy cultivation in 2023, a 5 percent decrease from the prior year. Illicit cannabis cultivation of over 9,108 ha was destroyed in 2023, a 65 percent decrease from the previous year.

Traffickers move large quantities of drugs over India's borders with Pakistan and Burma, often by drone. The importation of cocaine and other illicit drugs for domestic consumption appears to be growing. In October, New Delhi police announced seizures of more than \$800 million in cocaine and marijuana, much of it trafficked via maritime conveyance, intended for local distribution and use.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

India has not published comprehensive data on drug usage since 2019. The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment administers a National Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction to provide financial assistance to the states for preventive education and awareness campaigns, rehabilitation centers, and addiction treatment facilities.

4. Corruption

India does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. There is no evidence that senior government officials are involved in such activity.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

President Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed the signing of a memorandum of understanding to establish a bilateral Drug Policy Framework for the 21st Century in September. The strengthened partnership will accelerate cooperation on drug control, public health, and pharmaceutical supply chain security.

The fifth bilateral Counternarcotics Working Group, and first under the new framework, took place in New Delhi in October. U.S. and Indian law enforcement agencies regularly exchange information on drug trafficking and regional trends and share best practices. India participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

D. Conclusion

Indian law enforcement agencies, regulatory authorities, and treatment facilities operate with a high degree of professionalism. Political leadership is committed to making progress against illicit drugs and increasingly willing to engage with international partners. Continued economic growth could make more resources available to increase state capacity.

India would benefit from updating its drug control regulation and closing loopholes that enable the illicit production and shipment of fentanyl analogues and other synthetic drugs, as well as continuing to strengthen controls to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals. Indian law enforcement should increase the scope and speed of information-sharing and work more closely with international partners to jointly target transnational drug trafficking organizations and the use of the postal system, consigned shipments, and containerized shipments to hide illicit drugs shipments.

Indonesia

A. Introduction

As a destination and transit country for illicit drugs, Indonesia faces complex challenges policing its maritime borders across more than 17,000 islands. Transnational organized crime groups traffic methamphetamine and other illicit drugs from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Burma to Indonesia for domestic consumption and transit to lucrative markets in Australia and New Zealand. While the vast majority of illicit drugs enter Indonesia by sea, a small but increasing amount of cannabis, methamphetamine, and other synthetic drugs are produced domestically.

Indonesia maintains some of the world's harshest drug-related laws, including the death penalty for trafficking. The overall prevalence of drug use in Indonesia declined in 2024 and is relatively low compared to industrialized countries. Supported by growing budgets, Indonesian authorities have demonstrated an increased interdiction capacity while intensifying prevention and rehabilitation efforts.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Indonesia adopted a comprehensive drug control strategy in 2020 focused on interdiction, prevention, community empowerment, and rehabilitation. The National Narcotics Agency (BNN) leads this effort in coordination with various law enforcement, military, health, and financial agencies. In September 2024, the parliament increased BNN's 2025 budget by 35 percent to \$157 million, reflecting increased political will to address narcotics challenges. As of August 2024, the Ministry of Health regulated 167 New Psychoactive Substances, compared to 159 in 2023.

Key challenges to drug control efforts include endemic corruption within the criminal justice system; reluctance of judges and prosecutors to implement alternatives to incarceration for low-level drug possession; and social stigmatization associated with drug rehabilitation.

Under a 2006 law, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights cooperates with foreign governments in combating drug trafficking with a nexus to transnational organized crime. Indonesia has signed mutual legal assistance treaties with ASEAN member states, Australia, the PRC, Hong Kong, South Korea, India, Vietnam, UAE, and Iran. Although Indonesia has not signed a mutual legal assistance or extradition treaty with United States, Indonesia does cooperate informally to some extent. For example, Indonesia's domestic extradition law provides for the possibility of extradition of non-Indonesian citizens with the approval of the President.

2. Supply Reduction

Eighty percent of all drugs trafficked to Indonesia arrive via sea, followed by air and land routes. In September 2024, BNN reported that drug traffickers are using drones to scout illegal routes and transport narcotics. Through September 2024, the Customs and Excise Agency (DGCE) reported seizures of 5.4 metric tons (MT) of narcotics, a pace likely to exceed 2023 seizures (six MT) by 15 percent.

For the fourth year in a row, Indonesian law enforcement authorities conducted successful operations to disrupt domestic production. In May 2024, INP and DGCE dismantled a clandestine lab in Bali that produced and sold methamphetamine, hydroponic marijuana, and mephedrone. In July 2024, the Indonesian National Police (INP) raided a clandestine laboratory (Indonesia's largest known to date) in Malang that produced synthetic marijuana, MDMA, and Xanax. In September 2024, police uncovered a laboratory in a Jakarta suburb leading to the seizure of 105 kilograms of synthetic marijuana produced there. In September 2024, authorities raided a house in Serang and seized 971,000 PCC pills and production equipment.

Indonesia has made strides in recent years to reduce cannabis plant cultivation. In 2024, BNN and INP used satellite imagery to detect and eradicate 6.5 hectares of cannabis fields in North Sumatra. Complementing enforcement efforts, BNN partnered with local communities to report cannabis cultivation and encourage crop substitution to coffee, cocoa, and fruit.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

In September 2024, BNN announced the results of a 2023 survey showing a national drug usage rate of 1.73 percent, down from a peak of 1.95 percent in 2021-22. The survey showed the 15-24 age group had the highest usage rate of 1.81 percent and that group's usage had remained steady since 2021 following an increase from 1.30 in 2019.

According to local media, BNN and the corrections authority intensified community-based and inmate drug rehabilitation programs in 2024. In October 2024, BNN inaugurated an outpatient rehabilitation center for drug addiction in Surabaya and launched a drug awareness campaign for 100 schools in East Java.

4. Corruption

The Indonesian government does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, high ranking officials from the INP and armed forces have been charged with involvement in drug smuggling and the distribution of confiscated drugs. In July 2024, a court sentenced a police officer and prosecutor to three years in prison for reducing narcotics-related charges in exchange for bribes. In September 2024, the Attorney General's Office announced an investigation into allegations that two prosecutors accepted bribes for reducing charges against a defendant accused of possessing 19 grams of methamphetamine.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Information, training, and equipment provided by the United States contributed to several significant narcotics seizures in 2024. In addition to supporting BNN and INP during the successful investigations listed above via intelligence analysis, U.S. law enforcement provided valuable investigative assistance and international coordination during the investigation of Fredy Pratama, Indonesia's most wanted narcotics trafficker who is currently a fugitive in Thailand. To date, INP has conducted multiple operations leading to the arrests of more than 40 members of the Pratama's organization and seized nearly one MT of illegal narcotics smuggled into Indonesia by Pratama's network.

In 2024, U.S.-funded counter-narcotics assistance trained over 250 Indonesian authorities on a wide range subjects including: evidence collection and handling; interview techniques; human rights; cooperation during multi-agency investigations; cooperation with prosecutors; intelligence collection and analysis; developing confidential informants; and surveillance techniques. Complementing enforcement training, U.S.-funded programs also focused on drug demand reduction including family-based prevention, evidenced-based treatment, and mental health services.

Indonesia participates in the Global Network Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and co-chairs two sub-working groups.

D. Conclusion

Indonesia is demonstrating increased political will and operational effectiveness in addressing evolving narcotics threats. Authorities are strengthening capacity to conduct joint operations to interdict traffickers while also developing a national capacity to treat addiction. U.S. assistance to these efforts is making meaningful contributions to improve the capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute offenders. The Indonesian government could further improve drug enforcement efforts by enhancing internal oversight focused on drug-related corruption.

Iran

Iran is a transit and destination country for opiates, cannabis products, and methamphetamine entering the country primarily from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and trafficked onward to Türkiye, the Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria, or via maritime routes to Africa and Asia. Considerable amounts of methamphetamine are produced and consumed within Iran or trafficked to international markets. Corrupt elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security reportedly facilitate and profit from illicit drug smuggling by maintaining close partnership with regional traffickers, such as the Zindashti criminal network. Per open-source reports, roughly 9,000 metric tons (MT) of drugs transit Iran annually, and Iranian authorities reportedly seize about 1,000 MT annually, mostly on Iran's eastern borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to Iranian government and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) data, opiates comprise 80 percent of the drugs seized in Iran. In February 2024, the Indian Navy seized nearly three MT of methamphetamine, hashish, and heroin on a vessel that had departed from Chabahar, Iran.

Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) coordinates the country's drug policy and reports to the president. The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) command Iran's uniformed police units, including the Anti-Narcotics Police and border interdiction forces. The Iranian government treats illicit drug consumption as a serious challenge. DCHQ authorities estimate that 2.8 to 4.4 million Iranians regularly use illicit drugs, and that 1.3 to 1.6 million people seek treatment at rehabilitation centers annually. Iranian authorities report opium is the most widely used illicit drug. The use of crystal methamphetamine has reportedly increased in recent years, particularly among women and younger adults, due to lower costs and wider availability. The Iranian Interior Ministry has admitted it cannot prevent the bult of illicit drugs from entering Iran and reaching vulnerable populations.

Most Iranian counternarcotics efforts are focused on interdiction and law enforcement, with fewer resources for prevention and rehabilitation. Since 1979, over 4,000 members of Iran's security forces have reportedly been killed during interdiction efforts. Non-governmental organizations and the private sector manage most of Iran's demand reduction efforts, including treatment centers.

Iran endeavors to expand law enforcement cooperation with neighboring countries. In July 2024, Iran attended the Second Baghdad International Conference on Drug Control, joining Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria, among other countries.

UNODC maintains a Tehran field office that provides support to Iran to build capacity on border management, counternarcotics operations, drug prevention and treatment, and sustainable job creation. In September 2024, UNODC conducted interdiction training for Iranian drug enforcement officials in Moscow. Drug control cooperation between Iran and European states has been limited, partially due to concerns over the Iranian government's widespread application of the death penalty for drug offenses.

Iraq

Iraq has experienced a sharp increase in methamphetamine and amphetamine trafficking, production, and consumption since 2019. Iraq's strategic location makes it a conduit for drug flows between Southwest Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Europe. Captagon seizures have increased by almost 3,380 percent in Iraq from 2019 to 2023, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and tripled from 2022 to 2023 alone, according to Iraq's Minister of Interior. UNODC has maintained a presence in Iraq since 2019, before which the Government of Iraq's collection of data on drug consumption and seizures was extremely limited. Iraq reportedly seized 4.1 metric tons of captagon tablets between January and December 2023. In 2023, Iraq reported the first cases of attempted captagon pill production in Iraq's southern provinces. According to the General Directorates of Anti-Narcotics in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, drugs may also be produced in clandestine laboratories near Iraq's mountainous borders and on the outskirts of cities, including Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu.

The Government of Iraq has expressed an eagerness to tackle the drivers and implications of drug trafficking. Iraq has taken some early steps to address drug trafficking but has significant room for growth. In 2024, Iraq hosted two conferences related to the escalating drug crisis – the National Project for Preventive Guidance Against Drug Abuse on September 29, and the Baghdad International Conference on Countering Narcotics on July 22. Iraqi officials also attended the Middle East Drug Dialogue in Budapest on 15-16 October 2024. Iraqi security forces regularly report arrests of drug traffickers and users, and frequently conduct drug seizure operations, sometimes in collaboration with regional partners. The Iraqi Parliament passed a law in 2016 that allows judges to direct drug users to treatment facilities instead of jail. In the first six months of 2024, Iraq claims to have rehabilitated 2,000 offenders.

Iraq participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats

Jamaica

A. Introduction

Jamaica is both a significant producer of illicit drugs and a key transit country for narcotics destined for North America and Europe. Jamaica is the Caribbean's largest producer of cannabis, which is cultivated in its expansive rural areas. The country is strategically located for cocaine transshipment between South America, especially Colombia, and the United States. Jamaican criminal networks are often linked to transnational organized crime and facilitate drug trafficking via air and maritime routes. Marijuana is widely consumed in Jamaica and the use of psychoactive drugs, such as MDMA, is increasing. Psilocybin is largely unregulated, and a growing commercial industry promotes its use.

Firearms trafficking remains a significant concern, with evidence of an active exchange of guns and drugs between Jamaica and Haiti. This trade exacerbates local crime and violence, fueling organized criminal activities on both islands. Jamaica's lack of adequate air and maritime assets limits the ability to effectively intercept these exchanges. Persistent operational challenges, including insufficient controls for safeguarding and monitoring seizures of drugs, illicit firearms, and other contraband, further hinder comprehensive interdiction efforts. Despite these obstacles, the Jamaican government continues to prioritize bilateral collaboration to address the critical security risks posed by both firearms and drug trafficking.

Jamaica is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The U.S. and Jamaican governments maintain strong law enforcement cooperation in countering drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The Jamaica Defense Force Coast Guard plays a key role in maritime interdiction, while the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) leads drug enforcement efforts. Both agencies face challenges related to equipment maintenance and corruption, which undermines their efficacy.

Jamaica established the Cannabis Licensing Authority following the 2015 decriminalization of marijuana. As of November 30, 2024, it issued 162 licenses for the regulated production and export of marijuana for medical and scientific purposes. However, the judicial system has resource shortages and case backlogs. Jamaica has extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States and has cooperated with the United States in numerous extraditions.

2. Supply Reduction

Narcotics trafficking through Jamaica's ports remains a critical challenge, with consistent reports of commercial containers disappearing each month. Leadership turnover and vacancies within the port authority exacerbate the problem. However, in 2024, the JCF Firearm & Narcotics Division made the largest cocaine seizure in the country's history—2.5 metric tons (MT) in Havendale. Overall, Jamaica confiscated over 3.18 MT of cocaine and 18.07 MT of marijuana in 2024.

Reports indicate a continuous flow of illegal firearms from Haiti to Jamaica, where they are frequently exchanged for drugs. This trafficking typically does not occur through official ports of entry but rather through clandestine routes and non-port locations. Jamaica faces significant challenges in intercepting these illicit transfers due to limited air and maritime resources. The small, agile vessels used in these operations often evade security measures. Jamaica lacks operational assets, including reliable air support, to effectively monitor and interdict these illegal exchanges.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Ministry of Health's National Council on Drug Abuse addresses Jamaica's domestic drug consumption. In 2024, it expanded its prevention programs, targeting at-risk populations, including adolescents. However, the country's treatment infrastructure remains underdeveloped, with only one detoxification center and limited drug treatment facilities, at Kingston's Bellevue Hospital.

4. Corruption

The government of Jamaica does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of

illicit drugs. However, corruption remains a significant barrier to effective drug enforcement. Internal conspiracies involving customs officials and law enforcement personnel allow traffickers to exploit vulnerabilities. In 2024, several high-profile corruption cases highlighted the complicity of public officials in drug trafficking operations. The Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) continues to investigate and prosecute individuals involved in such activities.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Jamaica maintain a strong cooperative relationship focused on combating drug trafficking and transnational crime. Through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), the United States provides training, technical assistance, equipment, and logistical support to enhance Jamaica's counter-drug capabilities. In 2024, this collaboration led to notable achievements, including significant drug seizures and improved maritime security.

D. Conclusion

Jamaica faces significant challenges in combating drug trafficking and corruption. However, strong bilateral cooperation with the United States has resulted in key successes. Jamaica needs to prioritize institutional accountability, leadership stability, and oversight at its ports. The U.S. partnership will remain crucial in dismantling organized crime networks and addressing Jamaica's role as a marijuana producer and significant transit country for cocaine and other illegal drugs.

Jordan

The Government of Jordan has identified illicit drugs as one of the top threats to the country's security and stability. Jordan is a transit country for drugs being trafficked from Syria and Lebanon to lucrative markets in the Gulf as well as a domestic consumer market. A relatively small amount of cannabis is grown illegally in Jordan. The United States works closely with Jordan to strengthen local port and border security and to counter narcotics smuggling through information sharing and capacity building.

According to the Jordan Anti-Narcotics Department (AND), for the first nine months of 2024, compared to the same period in 2023, there was a 17 percent increase in convictions for drug crimes, with drug trafficking convictions increasing from 5,133 to 6,003 and drug use/possession convictions increasing from 11,155 to 13,104.

Jordan and the United States have been party to a bilateral extradition treaty since 1995, although Jordan does not view the treaty as valid under Jordanian law. Additionally, while the United States and Jordan signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in 2013, the Jordanian Parliament has not ratified it.

In response to Jordanian law enforcement actions against drug trafficking, traffickers have continued to alter their smuggling patterns. Notably, while drug smuggling from Syria into Jordan primarily took place during the winter "smuggling season," when poor weather and visibility hampered Jordanian counter smuggling efforts, Jordan now observes that cross border drug smuggling occurs year-round. The smuggling of hashish into Jordan via drones from Israel is also a new phenomenon which started in mid-2024. In terms of overall seizures by Jordanian authorities, from October 1, 2023 to September 30, 2024, compared to the previous 12-month period, authorities seized higher volumes of captagon pills (36 million vs. 27 million), hashish (6.8 metric tons (MT) vs. 4.7 MT), crystal methamphetamine (73 kilograms (kg) vs. 65 kg), and marijuana (177 kg vs. 145 kg), while cocaine seizures were down (52 kg vs. 94 kg).

There is no definitive data available on illegal drug use in Jordan, but anecdotally, cannabis and captagon are the most widely consumed illegal drugs.

Jordan's Public Security Directorate conducts regular drug awareness and prevention campaigns, with a focus on schools and universities. The government operates three drug addiction treatment centers that provide free addiction treatment. There also are two private clinics in Jordan that offer drug treatment services for a fee.

The Government of Jordan does not encourage or facilitate illegal activities associated with drug trafficking, nor is there evidence that senior government officials are engaged in such activity. In 2024, the United States supported Jordan's Anti-Narcotics Department.

Jordan participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Kazakhstan

A. Introduction

Kazakhstan is located on a major drug trafficking route from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe (the “Northern Route”), and serves as a transit country for heroin, opium, and hashish and methamphetamine.

Chemical precursors used for manufacturing synthetic drugs are trafficked into and through Kazakhstan. Drugs are frequently sold online, and synthetic drugs are cheap and easily obtained. In addition to meeting domestic demand, synthetic drugs produced domestically in the country are now also exported to neighboring countries.

Pharmaceutical drug addiction is widespread, and pharmaceuticals can easily be obtained at pharmacies without prescriptions. Cannabis grows wild in the country’s south and is frequently trafficked into Russia.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments/Policies and Trends

1. Institutional Development

President Tokayev called for robust action against the spread of synthetic drugs several times in 2024 noting that the fight against the production and distribution of synthetic drugs must take on a national character. The Presidential Administration and the Prosecutor General’s Office now coordinate new counternarcotics initiatives proposed by the government and international organizations. The Prosecutor General established an Interagency Working Group to Prevent and Combat Drug Crime in April to study the feasibility of establishing a National Targeting Center for Control of Chemical Precursors and Synthetic Drugs.

Kazakhstan actively participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. Since July 7, 2023, Kazakhstan has co-chaired three sub-working groups and facilitated a discussion on synthetic drug solutions.

Kazakhstan participates in many international drug-control initiatives, including projects of the United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Container Control Programme, the

Border Liaison Initiative, and the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC).

The Prosecutor General's Office participates actively in international and national drug-related investigations. In 2024, the Prosecutor General's Office and the Agency for Financial Monitoring joined other Kazakh law enforcement agencies to cooperate with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) regional office on joint transnational counternarcotics operations. During 2024, the Prosecutor's Office in Shymkent included DEA in the national interagency investigative group to jointly investigate cases.

Kazakhstan has a mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

In 2024, illicit drugs continued to be produced in clandestine laboratories within Kazakhstan. Trafficking patterns included online drug sales, increasingly involving cryptocurrency, as well as smuggling of liquid methamphetamine, opium, and heroin contraband by human couriers. During the first nine months of 2024, law enforcement identified 64 clandestine laboratories, a decrease from the 74 identified in the corresponding period of 2023. Law enforcement seized a total of 1,091 kilograms (kg) of synthetic drugs, compared to 862 kg during the previous year.

According to the Agency for Financial Monitoring, there are four major online drug platforms in Kazakhstan with over 40,000 users. The volume of domestically manufactured drugs outpaces domestic demand and likely supplies illicit markets in neighboring countries, such as Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.

In the first nine months of 2024, Kazakh law enforcement agencies registered 6,772 drug-related criminal offenses, including 3,051 drug crimes (compared to 2,514 for the same period in 2023), 1,766 instances of drug sales (compared to 1,425 in 2023), and 247 smuggling cases. Law enforcement agencies have identified the exploitation of minors by trafficking groups to circumvent adult criminal penalties as a worrisome trend and detained approximately 30 juveniles for drug trafficking violations during this reporting period. Most seizures involve domestically cultivated cannabis. Law enforcement seized 22 metric tons (MT) of narcotics (compared to 36.1 MT in 2023), including 795 kg of heroin (compared to 73 kg in 2023); 653 kg of hashish (compared to

730 kg in 2023); 38 kg of opium (compared to 68 kg in 2023), and five metric tons (MT) of cannabis (compared to 6.5 MT in 2023).

The National Security Committee, jointly with European law enforcement agents, conducted several controlled deliveries of Afghanistan-origin drugs, including opium and methamphetamine, along the Northern Route with Europe as the final destination. Law enforcement agencies intercepted 50 parcels destined for Kazakhstan and originating from Europe, the United States, and Thailand.

Encrypted messaging platforms pose a problem to countering drug trafficking online. During the first nine months of 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs detected 7,122 instances of illicit drugs and psychotropic substances advertised online. The Ministry sent 109 warning letters to the owners of these platforms, and 2,868 advertisements were deleted.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

In 2024, the government registered 18,233 people for drug use treatment (compared to 18,328 for the same period in 2023), including 1,527 women (1,512 in 2023) and 59 juveniles (66 in 2023). The Ministry of Internal Affairs claims the actual number of persons with substance use disorders may be up to 200,000 people.

A total of 104 non-governmental organizations promote drug prevention and a healthy lifestyle and provide legal and social support to former drug users in Kazakhstan. The Ministry of Internal Affairs developed a multi-stage drug prevention program to train employees of educational institutions and school psychologists. The Kazakh government and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continue to jointly implement the program “Strong Family” for children 10-14 years old. The program trains parents, schoolchildren, and teachers on reducing conflict situations in families, increasing parent participation in school life and activities, and developing positive relations between children and parents.

The Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America continued its program for community based anti-drug programming in six regions of Kazakhstan with support from the United States. Kazakhstan received an International Champion of the Year Award for establishing the Association of NGOs, which utilize the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions

of America (CADCA) methodology, and for including the CADCA methodology into the National Anti-Drug Strategy for 2023-2025.

4. Corruption

The Government of Kazakhstan does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Combating public corruption is a priority for the Kazakh government.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. assistance aims to improve Kazakhstan's capacity to combat drug trafficking and demand, and is strongly supported by the Kazakh government. U.S. assistance in 2024 included a focus on countering drug-related money laundering, trafficking of synthetic narcotics, and strengthening drug treatment curriculum at medical schools. Specific training included law enforcement and prosecutorial training to investigate drug-related money laundering and cyber-enabled crimes, as well as safe identification and handling of precursor chemicals and synthetic drug smuggled through the mail and parcel system. Additional U.S. training programs improved canine interdiction training and the ability of Kazakh authorities to identify glassware used in the manufacture of synthetic drugs. The United States also continues to support the development of a targeting center to improve the ability of Kazakh law enforcement to identify illicit cargo and traffickers.

D. Conclusion

Recognizing it has gaps in controlling precursors and a weak forensic analysis capacity, Kazakhstan is in the process of developing a comprehensive approach to introduce internal diversion controls and strengthened control of contraband of precursors and drugs at the border.

Kazakhstan utilizes existing international tools for sharing information, such as those offered by the International Narcotics Board (INCB), to expand the reach of its investigations. Kazakhstan continues to implement its national counternarcotics strategy adopted last year, and the United States supports these efforts. Additional

efforts are needed to address increased domestic manufacture, trafficking and use of synthetic narcotics within the country, including by young people, and expand access to treatment.

Kenya

Kenya's location on the East African coast continues to be exploited by drug traffickers to transit illicit drugs from Latin America and Southwest Asia to Europe and the Arabian Peninsula. Kenya is neither a source nor transit country for drugs entering the United States. Domestic drug production in Kenya is growing.

According to the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA), a Kenyan demand reduction agency, the most used controlled substances in Kenya are cannabis and prescription drugs. Diazepam is the most used prescription drug, followed by artane, rohypnol, amitriptyline, largactil, codeine syrup, tramadol, piriton, biperiden, haloperidol, propofol (anesthetic), and olanzapine (anti-psychotic drug). NACADA reports increasing consumption of locally adulterated versions of methamphetamine alongside prescription drugs, especially by the affluent. Drugs entering Kenya are often consumed by the affluent who get treatment through private care, eluding detection by authorities, which makes prevalence difficult to ascertain. While not subject to domestic controls, there is significant khat use in Kenya as well, including in traditional practices.

A major accomplishment in 2024 was the multiagency seizure of a large-scale methamphetamine production lab in Namanga, Kenya in September. The lab was linked to the Mexican Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and was the first confirmed large-scale operation by a Mexican cartel operating in Kenya. On October 4, 2024, based on information passed from the United States, Kenyan officials arrested a CJNG member trying to depart Kenya for Mexico. Cannabis (marijuana) seizures in Kenya continue to see an upward trend. Hard drug seizures are declining and U.S. law enforcement sources attribute this to deliberate supply reduction efforts by drug trafficking organizations to drive up prices.

The United States helped Kenya establish a Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), a specialized drug investigative unit mentored by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The SIU continues to receive advanced training, equipment, and support in 2024, which has helped the Kenyan government achieve positive outcomes in counternarcotics, particularly the September 2024 seizure of the methamphetamine lab. The training and exposure in narcotics and transnational organized crime investigations makes the Kenyan

SIU officers sought-after professionals who are promoted to fill priority positions outside the counternarcotics mission.

Drug trafficking continues to be one of the drivers of corruption in Kenya. Despite a stringent anti-narcotics and anti-corruption legal regime, prosecution and conviction rates remain significantly low. Political will to fight corruption also remains a challenge.

An extradition treaty exists between Kenya and the United States. While no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty exists between the two countries, Kenya is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions enabling mutual legal assistance to the United States.

Kenya participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Kyrgyzstan

A. Introduction

Kyrgyzstan is situated on a key transit route for illegal drugs moving northward from neighboring countries to Russia and Europe. It shares a border with Tajikistan, which in turn borders Afghanistan. Most illicit drugs enter Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan via poorly marked or un-demarcated borders. The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 led to an increase in drug trafficking, and this trend of elevated drug trafficking out of Afghanistan continued in 2023-2024, according to national seizure data and UNODC reporting.

The Counter Narcotics Service (CNS) within the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior (MOI) is responsible for combating illegal drug trafficking and the distribution of psychotropic substances, while the Ministry of Health regulates the legal use of narcotics. Kyrgyzstan is actively working on identifying new psychoactive substances, enhancing law enforcement collaboration for better interdiction, and strengthening border security.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The law "On Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Their Analogues, and Precursors" was adopted on January 24, 2024. This law sets out regulations for the legal management of these substances in Kyrgyzstan. The foundation for the new legislation includes harmonizing terminology across various legal codes, such as the Civil and Criminal Codes. It seeks to establish standardized legal definitions and introduces stricter penalties for illegal activities involving powerful substances, particularly when minors are involved. These updates aim to enhance efforts against drug-related crimes and align with international conventions on narcotics and psychotropic substances.

Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), which promotes regional information sharing and cooperative operations to combat transnational drug trafficking. It also participates in other international initiatives, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) Container Control Programme (CCP), the Border Liaison Initiative, and the European Union-funded Central Asian Drug Action Programme (CADAP 7). The Kyrgyz Republic has been a member of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats since 2023 and is co-chairing a Sub-Working Group on "Detecting Emerging Drug Threats and Use Patterns."

Kyrgyzstan does not have an extradition agreement or mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States. It is a signatory to multilateral legal instruments that can be used to facilitate cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

The CNS reported that during the first eight months of 2024, the percentage of drug offenses decreased by 6.8 percent compared to the prior year. During the same period in 2024, law enforcement agencies of Kyrgyzstan registered 894 drug crimes and the seizure of three metric tons and 755 kilograms (kg) of psychotropic substances and precursors, a 47.6 percent decrease from last year. Authorities also reported seizing 172 kg of hashish, 1 kg of heroin, 1.6 kg of opium, 1 kg of marijuana, and 11 kg of other psychotropic substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The United States supports Kyrgyzstan through advocacy programs to improve access to quality drug use prevention and treatment services. These programs include organizing high-level advocacy meetings, supporting technical expert groups, reviewing legal documents, and building capacity of health care workers and civil society organizations to assist key populations.

Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA) works with a local NGO "Door-Eli" and the CNS on healthy and drug-free-lifestyle promotion programs in communities throughout the country. The United States, via the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), provides technical and financial support to the Kyrgyzstan Psychiatry and Narcology Center to provide evidence-based harm-reduction services, including opioid substitution therapy (OST) and integrated HIV and viral hepatitis services. As

of August 2024, there were 692 individuals receiving OST with U.S. support in Kyrgyzstan.

Drug harm reduction programming is also provided through grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria, a multistakeholder international organization that works in close collaboration and partnership with the CDC. PEPFAR also funds harm reduction programs, and the Kyrgyz government has continued to allocate funds from the state budget covering approximately 70 percent of the cost of opioid substitution therapy services.

Despite strong adherence to OST and antiretroviral therapy (ART), with over 95 percent viral suppression achieved among people living with HIV, OST coverage has declined over time. To address this, the United States, through the CDC, provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Health in revising and adopting new clinical guidelines and protocols for OST, aligning them with international best practices. The updated guidelines aim to enhance the recruitment and retention of new, particularly younger, participants in OST programs in both civilian and penitentiary environments.

Although injected opioid use has long been recognized as a key driver of the HIV epidemic, emerging data indicate an increase in synthetic substance use, particularly among younger drug users. These substances include cathinones, cannabinoids, and possibly amphetamine-type stimulants. The impact of these evolving drug use patterns on the HIV epidemic and the response remains uncertain, underscoring the need for continued monitoring and adaptation of intervention strategies.

4. Corruption

The Kyrgyzstan government does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, there are instances of corruption among law enforcement agencies and politicians in aiding in the transport of drugs.

Following the death of the U.S.-sanctioned organized crime boss and narcotics kingpin Kamchybek Kolbaev in October 2023, the authorities carried out an extensive crackdown on corruption and organized crime. However, despite this crackdown, contacts report that drug trafficking along the so-called “Northern Route” from Afghanistan through Central Asia remains largely unaffected. The government has publicly committed to combating corruption, but results are mixed, and corruption remains widespread. The Criminal Code contains provisions for corruption-related offenses, but the government has not implemented the law effectively. The payment of bribes to avoid investigation or prosecution is still pervasive. Kyrgyzstan updated the law “On Combating Corruption” and its Anti-Corruption Strategy from 2012 remained in place through the end of 2024. In 2024 the government also eliminated statutes of limitations for corruption-related crimes.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. policy objectives include enhancing the capacity of Kyrgyz law enforcement to investigate and prosecute criminal cases, as well as boosting cooperation in anti-corruption efforts by improving the ability to identify and seize assets derived from illegal activities. Another key objective is to support the development, implementation, and enhancement of law enforcement capabilities to address cybercrime, and data protection challenges. The MOI, the State Customs Service, and the State Border Service had minimal engagement with U.S. counterparts in efforts to combat narcotics trafficking in 2024. A new memorandum of cooperation intended to replace the previous agreement remains stalled.

D. Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan’s location and limited customs controls as part of its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union exposes the country to heightened vulnerability as a transshipment route for drugs destined to Kazakhstan, Russia, and the borders of the European Union. Kyrgyzstan’s longstanding border dispute with Tajikistan has impeded collective efforts to reduce the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. The CNS currently lacks the capacity to effectively address drug trafficking but has shown some willingness to work with international partners to address this issue.

Laos

A. Introduction

The Government of Laos continued efforts to counter narcotics trafficking in 2024, but insufficient resources and limited law enforcement capacity impeded effective interdiction. Landlocked and part of the infamous “Golden Triangle” region of Southeast Asia, Laos has been an historic source country of heroin and an essential transshipment route for generations of drug traffickers. In recent years, a deluge of methamphetamine manufactured in uncontrolled areas of Burma has made its way through Laos to its neighbours and beyond, with significant amounts reaching markets in Australia, New Zealand, and other Indo-Pacific countries, while only negligible amounts are believed to reach the United States. The precursor chemicals required for drug production followed a partially reversed pattern, originating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and entering Laos at various border crossing before moving to the border with Burma.

High inflation and an extended financial crisis have left law enforcement with scarce resources to conduct effective counternarcotics operations. Often lacking fuel for vehicles, police rely almost exclusively on well-known roadblocks to conduct ad hoc vehicle searches for drugs. Conversely, Customs officers rarely search vehicles at international border crossings and instead focus on revenue collection. The organizational culture of Lao law enforcement continues to prioritize drug seizures over more sophisticated investigations targeting high-level criminals that could disrupt or dismantle trafficking networks.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The legislative and regulatory framework for government efforts to combat narcotics trafficking is codified by the Law on Narcotics and the National Agenda for Drug and Precursor Chemical Control, with the latter extended by the National Assembly through 2025 after its original initial mandate expired at the end of 2023. The National Agenda identifies engagement in five areas: preventive education; alternative development; treatment and rehabilitation; law enforcement; and

international cooperation. The Lao Office of the Supreme People's Prosecutor (OSPP) is the government's focal point for mutual legal assistance, and in 2024 underwent internal restructuring to increase personnel to facilitate international cooperation. This, as well as improved receptivity to cooperation on this subject, has contributed to increased numbers of submitted mutual legal assistance requests as well as responses to requests from other countries. While the incidence of mutual legal assistance activity to and from the OSPP is increasing, information must still flow through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and opportunities for law enforcement actions are regularly missed as timely information makes its way through layers of bureaucracy and protocol.

2. Supply Reduction

Methamphetamine tablets, or "yaba" as it is called locally, continues to dominate Laos's drug market with prices for one tablet as low as 20 cents – cheaper than the cost of a local beer. The Lao government did not report the detection of any clandestine drug manufacturing in 2024 but acknowledged small-scale production was possible. International organizations and other observers generally share the view that illicit drug production occurs within the country, including in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) whose operating company and chairman – Zhao Wei – are sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for facilitating a range of transnational organized crimes, including narcotics trafficking. More recently, PRC and Vietnam-led law enforcement operations have uncovered massive cyber scam operations in the GTSEZ and surrounding areas that have contributed to billions of dollars in fraud and the presumed forced criminality of many workers.

The Lao Commission for Drug Control and Supervision (LCDC) reported that in the first nine months of 2024, law enforcement seized approximately 80 million methamphetamine tablets; 350 kilograms (kg) of heroin; 85 kg of opium; 3.6 metric tons (MT) of cannabis; 4.7 MT of crystal methamphetamine; 30 kg of ketamine; and 9.95 MT of unidentified powders. The seizures were undertaken as part of 2,978 cases in which 4,544 individuals were arrested. LCDC also reported that the government seized 510 MT of the precursor chemical aniline in June 2023, which originated in the PRC and per its manifest was bound for Thailand. International

experts suggest that transnational criminal organizations intentionally sacrifice some drug shipments to police seizure in order to distract from more significant routes/shipments and to satisfy the authorities' need for public results of efforts to counter narcotics trafficking, potentially with the complicity of some government officials.

The U.S.-funded UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Southeast Asia Opium Survey was published in December 2023, the first such survey in the Lao PDR since 2015. Results showed that country-wide poppy cultivation in 2023 encompassed approximately 5,000 hectares (ha), a 700 ha decrease from the last survey in 2015 – though it is impossible to know how cultivation levels may have fluctuated in the eight-year interregnum between surveys. The largest concentration of poppy cultivation was found in the northern province of Phongsaly, which borders China and Vietnam. LCDC last reported information on eradication in 2023, when the government eradicated 250 ha of opium poppy. Opium poppy is generally cultivated at a small scale in Laos by families in remote communities, with those caught receiving reprimands and corrective education in lieu of arrest and prosecution.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The government reported that, in the first nine months of 2024, officials from LCDC and their provincial counterparts organized 93 events to raise awareness on the dangers of drugs. These events reached 11,907 participants in schools and villages in border areas. Other outreach efforts included the use of billboards warning passersby that “drugs will make you crazy” and other similar slogans, and audible reminders reminding citizens that drug use is dangerous and illegal over village loudspeakers that also relay messages reminding the populace to adhere to communist ideological principles. The government also reported further progress in the establishment of “drug free” zones, and that in 2023 there were a total of 5,781 villages and 1,367 schools declared as such. The government did not specify the requirements for “drug free” zones.

The government estimated the country has approximately 75,000 habitual drug users, though international experts assess the true number is far larger. LCDC reported that, in 2023, 12,275 people received mandatory treatment for drug

addiction at its 14 Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers. According to the government, 9,396 individuals recovered and returned to their communities and 2,879 were held into 2024. Treatment at these centers is involuntary, and drug users can be remanded for treatment by the court, by village authorities, or by their parents. The centers are administered by the Ministry of Public Security utilizing debunked treatment methods and anecdotal evidence suggests that most users relapse soon after their release. The government has cooperated with UNODC on the establishment of 28 clinics in different parts of the country that utilize the Community Based Treatment model.

4. Corruption

The Government of Laos does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Corruption is generally assumed to be pervasive throughout the government sector, however. Anecdotes suggest that law enforcement officers are reluctant to detain illicit goods for fear that they could incur the displeasure of senior officials connected to the shipment. Some informal reports indicate that officers who seized illicit shipments were indeed subsequently ordered to release them.

Senior officials suspected of corruption have historically been dealt with quietly, with punishments comprised of reassignment or in very serious cases being stripped of communist party membership. In recent years, however, the government has publicly condemned corruption and held some officials accountable within the criminal justice system. Most notably, in 2024 the government announced that the former vice governor of Luang Namtha Province was convicted on charges of corruption and sentenced to life in prison. Eleven other officials were implicated in the case and received sentences ranging from ten years to life imprisonment. The adjudication of this matter in the criminal justice system, the high-level of the accused officials, the severity of the sentences, and the public sharing of information related to the case all point to a small but positive change in the government's stance towards corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The continued inclusion of countering narcotics as a National Agenda priority by the National Assembly through 2025 reflected continued political will on the part of the Lao government, as did Lao participation in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. The Lao Customs Department under the Ministry of Finance remained a willing partner of the United States on countering narcotics trafficking, but results were circumscribed by its inexperience and lack of capacity as a law enforcement agency and by its tertiary role in combatting narcotics. Lao Customs initiated structural internal reforms in 2024 that should improve its effectiveness in countering drug trafficking when completed. Assistance partnership with the Lao Office of the Supreme People's Prosecutor and People's Supreme Court has deepened, with both intuitions benefiting from U.S.-supported projects that seek to strengthen institutional capacity. The most significant new U.S.-funded project initiated in 2024 seeks to address transnational organized crime through multiple components, including building capacity to control drugs and precursor chemicals, counter cyber-crime, and enhance international cooperation through mutual legal assistance. These initiatives complement related lines of effort to combat money laundering, for which drug trafficking is often a predicate offence.

D. Conclusion

Countering narcotics trafficking remained a priority for the Lao government in 2024 but resource constraints, lack of capacity, and corruption continued as major impediments. The quantities of drugs seized by law enforcement continued to grow compared to previous years but are likely a small fraction of what moves through the country. Police under the Ministry of Public Security have shown little willingness to move towards complex investigations that can result in the dismantling of trafficking networks and instead continue to prioritize one-off seizures that can be reported in local media. To improve success in countering drug trafficking, the Lao government must move beyond simply participating in skills training supported by foreign partners and instead take steps to reform institutions and unhelpful organization culture. This will require more robust anti-corruption efforts and a significant easing of controls that currently limit information sharing and international cooperation.

Liberia

A. Introduction

Liberia's new administration in January, 2024, declared drugs and substance use a national public health emergency, given the alarming rate of illicit drug use in the country. Liberian officials worry Liberia could become a major transit point due to the porous nature of the country's borders.

Liberia's law enforcement agencies are chronically underfunded, with the Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA) one of the least funded, even though it is at the forefront in the country's counterdrug efforts. The United States works to enhance the LDEA's operational and administrative capacities but there is limited financial support from the host government. Liberia's weak border controls, high unemployment, and underpaid security personnel create a permissive environment for illicit activities and drug traffickers exploit these conditions.

Kush, the most commonly used drug in Liberia, typically contains cannabis, synthetic cannabinoids, and other substances including the psychedelic drug N-Dimethyltryptamine, known as DMT. Recent testing done in Sierra Leone, the likely point of origin of Kush, found protonitazene (a synthetic opioid stronger than fentanyl) and cocaine, rather than DMT. Authorities believe Sierra Leonian criminal networks are responsible for the excessive amount of Kush available across Liberia. Liberia is a growing transit country for cocaine and heroin but has a low consumption rate.

Liberia is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The LDEA is Liberia's lead agency in fighting drug trafficking and distribution. The Liberia National Police and National Security Agency play supportive roles by providing intelligence on criminal networks. The Liberia Coast Guard (under the Armed Forces of Liberia) provides limited monitoring along the coast.

In September 2024, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire initiated new collaboration to combat maritime piracy. This marks a significant step to enhance maritime security in the region to prevent criminal activities such as drug and human trafficking.

The United States has been an instrumental partner for Liberian law enforcement agencies, providing training, mentoring, and equipment support towards enhancing logistical, operational, and human resource capacities.

Despite the initial enthusiasm of the current government, law enforcement has continued to be impacted by a lack of resources and political wrangling. The LDEA's annual budget shrunk significantly from \$1.9 million to \$300,000, which potentially impacts the government's ability to counter drug trafficking and distribution.

Ministerial budgets for drug demand reduction were impacted as well, dropping from \$1.7 million to \$400,000 in fiscal year 2024. An armed confrontation within LDEA leadership spurred a government investigation that resulted in the suspension of its top three leadership positions and the appointment of an Officer in Charge. During the four-month tenure of the Officer in Charge, an uptick in interdictions resulted in increased workplace morale.

The U.S.-Liberia extradition treaty has been in effect since 1939. While no mutual legal assistance treaty between Liberia and the United States exists, both countries are nevertheless able to provide each other such assistance, and Liberia is a party to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

A series of drug raids led to some successful arrests and seizures in 2024. LDEA seized 83.9 kilograms (kg) of Kush through August 2024, almost three times the amount seized in 2023. Authorities also seized 32.43 kg of cocaine, a significant decrease from 2023, while there was also a drop in heroin seizures from 6.6kg to 5.92kg. Decreases in cocaine and heroin seizures can likely be attributed to many factors including changes in user preferences, change of leadership's priorities, and trafficking patterns. Through U.S.-funded operational mentoring implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), LDEA agents are learning to

more effectively carry out their duties at checkpoints and border crossings. This led to the discovery and investigation of two cases of abandoned drugs. Drug-related investigations and arrests also increased in 2024, with 266 cases forwarded to the courts and 24 convictions since June. Investigations also show that Nigerian and Sierra Leonian criminal networks continue to dominate the illicit drug market in Liberia.

In commemoration of World Drug Day, the LDEA conducted a drug burn to destroy a street value of \$1.3 million in illicit substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to the LDEA and UNODC, Kush has surpassed marijuana and opioids as the country's primary drug threat. Given the magnitude of substance use among young people, the government of Liberia and the One UN system initiated a 10-year "At-Risk Youth Empowerment Program" to address the growing drug problem. The emergency response phase of this program ended in February with 127 of 440 individuals with substance use disorder successfully completing the rehabilitation phase and transitioning into the integration phase with support of the ministries of Youth and Sports and Health. Additionally, the presidential task force on drugs and substance abuse in July this year developed the National Drug and Substance Abuse Program (NADSAP) and launched prevention campaigns. Liberia used U.S.-trained prevention, treatment, and recovery practitioners to implement their anti-drug efforts, and the United States supported a new, large-scale prevention project. Ministerial budgets for drug demand reduction dropped from \$1.7 million to \$400,000 in 2024.

4. Corruption

The Government of Liberia does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate the production or distribution of illicit drugs nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption remains a prevalent problem which increases Liberia's vulnerability to illicit activity, including drug trafficking. While some politicians, law enforcement officers, and other government officials might be beneficiaries of the drug trade in Liberia, solid evidence is lacking.

Lack of political will and resources, an ineffective judicial system, and inadequate salaries for law enforcement officers exacerbate corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Liberia and the United States share a long-lasting partnership. The United States supports Liberia through training, mentoring, equipment donations, operational capacity building, and other assistance to help host government institutions counter corruption, drug trafficking, and other transnational crime. In 2024, the United States continued drug demand reduction training and funded a new project to increase local capacity to conduct and improve access to science-based prevention and treatment options. This will buttress Liberian government efforts to support families and the most vulnerable populations at risk of substance use disorders.

D. Conclusion

Drug trafficking and substance use is a growing concern in Liberia. Efforts to combat drug trafficking and substance use will be difficult without increasing political will to reduce corruption, build institutional capacities, and direct sufficient resources towards programs to reduce supply and increase access to prevention and rehabilitation efforts. The justice and judicial sectors must commit to carrying out their independent roles in investigating and convicting suspects. The United States remains committed to supporting Liberia's efforts to strengthen its anti-drug law enforcement and drug demand reduction capacities, as well as to fulfill its international drug control obligations.

Malaysia

Malaysia is a transit country for illicit drugs destined primarily for Australia and New Zealand. Traffickers smuggle crystal methamphetamine, MDMA, cannabis, heroin, and ketamine into Malaysia. Malaysia not a source country for illicit drugs bound for the United States. The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) reported arresting 50,723 individuals for drug violations and 19,600 individuals for drug trafficking between January and September 2024, exceeding arrest numbers for the same period in 2023. The government struggles to successfully prosecute cases against drug trafficking organizations, in part due to inadequate conspiracy laws and the high burden of proof required for a conviction.

Between January and September 2024, Malaysian law enforcement agencies seized over 3.4 metric tons (MT) of methamphetamine, 1.1 MT of MDMA, 397 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 147 kg of ketamine, 47.8 kg of cocaine, and 5.4 kg of cannabis. MDMA, cocaine, and cannabis seizures increased from the same period in 2023. On October 9, 2024, the Royal Malaysian Customs seized approximately 200 kg of methamphetamine from a cargo shipment that originated in Monterey, Mexico. The RMP dismantled nine clandestine laboratories and disrupted the construction of a potential drug conversion laboratory being built by two Mexican nationals with suspected ties to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

The Malaysian government is committed to addressing the public health aspects of drug use. The RMP reported 109,117 new people with substance use disorders in Malaysia from January to September 2024. In August 2024, Malaysia's parliament passed the Drug Dependents Bill to improve treatment and rehabilitation of drug users and decriminalize some minor drug offenses.

In 2024, the United States and Malaysia marked the tenth anniversary of both countries' commitment to deepen ties across a swath of critical issues for the mutual benefit of both countries, commemorated as a Strategic Partnership. In August 2024, the United States and Malaysia signed a MOU on transnational crime cooperation, including counternarcotics. Malaysia works with the United States and other international partners on drug control issues and has extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States. Malaysia participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Malaysia actively participates in multilateral drug control efforts, including implementing commitments under ASEAN and the three major UN drug control treaties. The RMP has three Narcotics Nucleus Centers, which share intelligence and coordinate operations with neighboring countries, to enhance cross-border and maritime investigations.

Mexico

A. Introduction

Mexico is the principal source and transit country for illicit drugs trafficked to the United States, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Mexican suppliers are responsible for production of most fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine destined for the United States. Mexico is the largest source country of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues trafficked to the United States; Mexico-based Sinaloa and New Generation Jalisco cartels are the primary distributors of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues in North America. Companies in the People's Republic of China are the largest source of precursor chemicals and equipment used to manufacture illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs in Mexico.

U.S.-Mexico counterdrug collaboration is driven by national security interests in both countries to inhibit cross-border and in-country illicit movements of people, drugs, and arms. In October 2024, the new Sheinbaum administration issued a new National Security Strategy to strengthen intelligence collection and law enforcement investigations to dismantle organized criminal groups. The Government of Mexico has expressed the commitment to partner with the United States to enhance counterdrug cooperation, including to combat synthetic drugs.

Mexico is engaged in counternarcotics issues on a global level. Mexico participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, leading two of its working groups. Mexico also participates in the North American Drug Dialogue and the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

On October 1, 2024, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo became Mexico's president after winning the highest vote percentage of any president since Mexico's 2001 transition to democracy. Her political party, MORENA, effectively controls a two-thirds supermajority in congress and governs 24 of Mexico's 31 states, enough to ratify

constitutional reforms. MORENA and Sheinbaum have continued to advance former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador's constitutional reform proposals by rapidly enacting constitutional amendments to transform the judiciary and move the National Guard under control of the Defense Secretariat (Defensa).

The Sheinbaum administration announced a new National Security Strategy October 8, 2024. The strategy prioritizes reducing homicides and increasing investigations and intelligence sharing while continuing López Obrador's approach towards addressing root causes of insecurity. However, the November 15 release of Mexico's 2025 budget proposed cuts of 36 percent in security spending. Restoring state control in regions dominated by criminal organizations and overcoming eroding trust in public institutions continue to pose institutional challenges. Impunity rates remain high, including for high-impact crimes such as homicide, femicide, and extortion. An estimated 92 percent of crimes go unreported by the public or uninvestigated by security officials.

Through the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, the United States and Mexico have increased joint efforts to interdict drugs, dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations, and reduce the amount of illicit firearms, bulk cash, and other illicit goods crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The United States and Mexico have also established several drug-related law enforcement agreements to enhance collaboration in combating drug trafficking, including bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. Mexico actively participates in the North American Drug Dialogue (NADD) and hosted the eighth NADD in Mexico City on November 13-14, 2024, reinforcing the importance of cooperation among the United States, Mexico, and Canada to counter existing and emerging drug threats. Mexico also collaborates with the United States and Canada to combat fentanyl trafficking through the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee (TFC) and to improve maritime security through joint intelligence and operations through the North American Maritime Security Initiative. Mexico is a voting member of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and coordinates with the United States and the international community on scheduling decisions. Via the binational 21st Century Border Management Process, the United States and Mexico coordinate to improve border security and prevent the flow of illicit narcotics while facilitating licit movements of people and goods.

2. Supply Reduction

Mexican statistics indicate a significant shift in production and trafficking from plant-based drugs (marijuana and heroin) to synthetic drugs (methamphetamine and fentanyl). Relative to plant-based drugs, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl are cheap to produce, easily smuggled, highly lucrative, and extremely potent. Additionally, anecdotal reporting indicates clandestine lab seizures are shifting closer to the U.S. border from the Pacific coast state of Sinaloa.

The only drug seizure data that exist nationally are sourced from the Mexican President's Annual Report and biweekly Security Cabinet Reports. The Security Cabinet Report shows significant reductions in seizures and eradications during the first eight months of 2024, except in marijuana eradication, when compared to the same period in 2023. From January to August 2024, Mexico reportedly seized 136 kg of fentanyl (down 93 percent from the first eight months of 2023), 181 metric tons (MT) of methamphetamine (down 35 percent), and 43.46 MT of cocaine (down 43 percent); eradicated 8,207 ha of poppy (down 5 percent) and 1,618 ha of marijuana (up 40 percent); and dismantled 233 clandestine laboratories. U.S. law enforcement agencies frequently underscore the unreliability of Mexican reporting on seizures. Though the Sheinbaum administration has yet to publish official data, it confirmed the largest fentanyl seizure in Mexico's history, conducted on December 3, 2024 in Sinaloa state by the Secretariat of the Navy, in coordination with Defensa, the Attorney General's Office, the National Guard, and the Security and Citizen Protection Secretariat. The operation uncovered 1,100 kilograms of fentanyl pills – equivalent to more than 20 million doses – as part of a long-term investigation that benefited significantly from U.S. support, including equipment donations, infrastructure enhancements, and specialized training for the Navy and other agencies.

U.S.-donated canines and Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE) continued to assist illicit drugs seizures that occurred in 2024, particularly synthetic drugs, including fentanyl. During the first nine months of 2024, U.S.-donated canines and NIIE in Mexico assisted in the seizure of 2,505 kg of methamphetamine, 563 methamphetamine pills, \$512,384 in currency, and 410 illicit firearms. Fentanyl pill seizures substantially decreased in this period, with U.S.-donated canines assisting

in the seizures of 489,389 fentanyl pills (down 83 percent from the first nine months of 2023). Fentanyl powder seizures, however, increased to 62.71 kg (up 100 percent).

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Although Mexico has not published national drug use or addiction statistics since 2017, experts suggest that drug consumption is a growing concern in Mexico, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. In June 2023, the Mexican government began a new national survey to assess trends in addiction and mental health to provide insights into drug use statistics. Nationwide results were expected in July 2024 but have not yet been released.

In the absence of official statistics, government health network data on addiction treatment show a sustained trend toward methamphetamine. To address growing drug consumption among Mexico's youth, the Mexican government continued the anti-drug and health awareness campaign launched in 2022, targeting school-age populations. The United States supported the Mexican National Commission on Mental Health and Addiction in launching a National Early Warning System in July 2024 through the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. This system aims to significantly improve the strategic response to substance abuse issues.

U.S. counterdrug support to Mexico includes reducing drug demand through public health, training, and awareness programs. U.S. assistance has helped eight Mexican states to adopt alternative justice models, redirecting low-level drug offenders from overcrowded prisons into rehabilitation programs. Three more states are slated to join these efforts. U.S. assistance also supports a prevention-focused civic justice system, which directs low-level offenders toward services and treatment, including for substance use disorders, as necessary.

4. Corruption

The Mexican government does not officially endorse or facilitate the production or distribution of illegal drugs, nor does it engage in laundering the profits from such activities. Pervasive corruption, however, significantly hampers drug control efforts in

Mexico. Though laws such as the Federal Law Against Organized Crime exist, enforcement is inconsistent, hampered by a weak judicial system and a culture of impunity. Further, some high-profile cases have involved senior officials in corrupt practices related to organized crime. On October 16, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced former federal police chief, Genaro García Luna, to 38 years in U.S. prison on drug trafficking charges. Other efforts to prosecute corrupt officials, such as the arrest of former Veracruz Governor Javier Duarte, highlight ongoing challenges in combating corruption related to drug control.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. drug control initiatives in Mexico are part of a comprehensive strategy aimed at reducing the flow of illicit drugs to the United States and combating transnational criminal organizations. These initiatives are primarily embodied in the Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities, which the United States and Mexico launched in 2021 to enhance collaboration in addressing shared challenges, particularly in reducing violence, improving public safety, enhancing health systems, and fostering economic prosperity. The Bicentennial Framework builds on the security partnership between the United States and Mexico.

The United States also provides significant counterdrug assistance funding to support Mexican institutions, including Defensa, the Secretariat of the Navy, the National Guard, the Attorney General's Office, and other key institutions, providing resources such as canine units for drug detection, surveillance equipment, and training for handling synthetic drugs and evidence.

On the ongoing crisis of synthetic drug trafficking, particularly of fentanyl, the United States and Mexico collaborate bilaterally, regionally, and globally. In February 2024, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian high-level officials gathered in Mexico City for the third meeting of the TFC, committing to improve law enforcement cooperation and policy alignment to combat the production and trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. An April 2024 meeting brought together 420 U.S. and Mexican experts, policymakers, and law enforcement officials for the second annual Synthetic Drug Conference to discuss emerging drug trends. During the September 2024 Summit of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, Mexico committed to share their

recently established Interministerial Commission for the Traceability of Chemical Substances Susceptible to Diversion to Produce Illicit Drugs as a model to help countries strengthen their import and export regimes for chemical substances. The Eighth Meeting of the NADD in November 2024 brought together high-ranking officials and experts from the United States, Mexico, Canada, and the Netherlands to focus on synthetic drug challenges, public health coordination, and trafficking prevention.

D. Conclusion

Illicit drug production and trafficking from Mexico to the United States continue to threaten the safety and security of communities on both sides of the border. Through the Bicentennial Framework, United States and Mexico recommitted to better protecting the health and safety of U.S. and Mexican citizens and promoting the development of the most vulnerable communities in both countries, preventing criminal organizations from smuggling illicit drugs and weapons, and pursuing and bringing criminals to justice. The United States continues to build on this longstanding binational partnership as the Sheinbaum administration focuses on combating impunity, strengthening investigative and intelligence capabilities, and fostering economic development.

Morocco

Synthetic drugs are a concern for authorities in the Kingdom of Morocco. Seizures are regularly made at border crossings in the north including around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and via ferries from Europe. According to media reports, Moroccan authorities seized approximately half a million pills (98,000 clonazepam, 148,000 MDMA, and 250,000 unidentified) in the first half of 2024, slightly higher than the same period in 2023. The potential for abuse remains high for synthetic drugs, as they are easily smuggled, trafficked, and ingested, and have a lower stigma compared to some other drugs.

Cocaine smuggling in the Sahel region has resulted in a change in smuggling routes for cocaine trafficking worldwide. In years past, cocaine destined for Morocco largely entered through its northern borders from Europe. However, a recent uptick in seizures at Morocco's southern borders, including an increase in seizures of cocaine entering Morocco from Mauritania, indicate a change in smuggling routes. From January to August 2024, authorities seized 2.1 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in Morocco. The Sahel region and Gulf of Guinea have seen a massive increase in cocaine shipments originating from South America, with traffickers looking to take advantage of political instability, lack of government resources, and opportunities for corruption.

Morocco has begun producing legal cannabis products for medical, cosmetic, and industrial uses, with several licensed processing factories established in the north. Additionally, Moroccan farmers continue to produce illicit cannabis, accounting for 164 MT of hashish seized within the country from January through August 2024. This number is approximately 100 MT higher than during the same time period in 2023.

Morocco continues to be an important partner to the United States and the European Union in the fight against drug trafficking and drug trafficking networks. Targeting narcotics transiting through containerized shipments remains a strong point of Morocco's efforts to curb international drug smuggling. Morocco regularly interdicts cocaine, codeine and other narcotics transshipping through the Tanger-Med Port of Entry. Cocaine is often shipped from South America and transships through Moroccan ports bound for Europe. Codeine is largely shipped from India with a final destination of Nigeria or surrounding countries. Moroccan authorities work well with international partners to conduct arrest operations,

expel individuals with Interpol Red Notices, and seize narcotics entering and passing through their country.

The United States and Morocco have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty. Although no extradition treaty is in place between the two countries, Morocco has domestic legal authorities which allow it to extradite non-Moroccan nationals to the United States. Morocco participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Mozambique

Mozambique is a key transit country for drugs trafficked from Afghanistan and Iran and destined for South Africa and onward to other African and European markets. Challenges including limited resources to patrol a 1,600-mile coastline, weak law enforcement institutions, significant and growing corruption concerns, and porous borders have created a favorable operating environment for traffickers. Traffickers from South Asia transport opiates and methamphetamine in motorized dhows to the Mozambican coast, transfer the drugs to fishing vessels going to the mainland, and repackage them for transport and distribution to African and European markets. Drug traffickers also trade drugs with distributors of other illicit goods, such as illegally obtained wildlife products, gemstones, and exotic timber, which they ship to various parts of Asia. Cannabis is the primary drug produced locally, and consumption rates are high, especially among youth and in poorer regions. Mozambique is also increasingly being targeted by drug cartels aiming to produce synthetic drugs for distribution elsewhere. Mozambique is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

In 2024, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and counterparts in Mozambique's National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC) continued long-term, ongoing investigations to interdict drug shipments and discover, disrupt, and prosecute cartel-linked activity in the country. Although the Memorandum of Understanding establishing a vetted unit within SERNIC to combat large-scale drug trafficking organizations was dissolved in July 2023 and the DEA notified SERNIC of its decision to close its Maputo office in 2025, the DEA continued to conduct regular trainings for the unit and others in SERNIC on topics such as airport interdiction, undercover surveillance, and confidential informant handling and development. The United States also supported trilateral training on combating transnational organized crime linking Mozambique with Tanzania and Kenya.

In June 2024, SERNIC investigators identified and seized two suspicious air freight shipments that were found to contain a total of approximately 1,300 kilograms (kg) of cocaine. The investigators were former vetted unit members and were assisted in both cases by the DEA. Ten individuals were arrested between the two seizures, including airport employees.

In May 2024, an ongoing SERNIC investigation into Sinaloa Cartel activity in Mozambique led to the discovery of two methamphetamine labs in remote areas near the town of Moamba, near the border with South Africa. SERNIC investigators seized 75 kg of finished methamphetamine and are searching for Mexican nationals they believe were working at the labs.

The United States continued to provide maritime training and support to improve the capacity of the Mozambican Navy and improve port security, including embedding a maritime maintenance and logistics support advisor to repair existing patrol assets.

The United States has neither a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty nor an extradition treaty with Mozambique. Mozambique is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions enabling mutual legal assistance to the United States.

Netherlands

The Netherlands plays a key role in the global drug trade. Its strategic location and infrastructure connections make it a major hub for the distribution of illicit substances, especially cocaine and methamphetamine from the Americas and precursor chemicals from the PRC. Dutch ports and transportation infrastructure are integral to global trade, and criminal enterprises exploit them to distribute illicit substances often destined for other European markets. In December 2024, Dutch prosecutors announced the seizure of 25 kilograms of N-boc-4-piperidone, a key precursor chemical to produce fentanyl, which they did not believe was intended for pharmaceutical use. The seizure, enough to produce 15 million 2-mg doses of fentanyl, was unprecedented as synthetic opioids are rarely encountered in the Netherlands.

Drug seizures at seaports decreased in the first half of 2024 compared to 2023, continuing a 2022 trend. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe's largest seaport, houses the Hit and Run Cargo team (HARC), which focuses on illicit activities and includes Dutch Customs, the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service, the Seaport Police, and the Public Prosecution Service. HARC seized 45 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in Rotterdam in 2023, and 3.6 MT in Vlissingen in June 2024. Outside the Netherlands, 142 MT of cocaine being routed to or through the Netherlands were seized in 2023, primarily in Belgium, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador.

Netherlands continues to strengthen its drug trafficking enforcement through innovation and increasing cooperation with the business community. The government prioritizes public-private partnerships with shipping companies, focusing on tamper-proof shipping seals, employee screenings, and information sharing. Customs has worked to develop underwater robots, drones, and AI image enhancement tools.

Netherlands has expanded its cooperation with international partners in recent years, especially with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Ministry of Finance signed a customs treaty in 2023 with Ecuador, allowing information sharing and customs-related assistance. Dutch Customs has liaison officers in Panama and Costa Rica and plans to grow the program. In November 2024, the Netherlands again participated as an observer in the North American Drug Dialogue. In September 2024, the Netherlands signed the Global

Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats member pledge and will lead an initiative to train partners on identifying and dismantling illicit production sites.

The Netherlands Opium Act is the basis for current drug legislation and is periodically revised. A legislative revision strengthening New Psychoactive Substances regulation passed the lower house in 2024 and is expected to take effect in 2025, pending deliberations in the upper house.

Netherlands and the United States have fully operational extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. The National Police of the Netherlands collaborates closely with U.S. authorities to share information and conduct joint operations. The Dutch High Tech Crime Unit maintains strong partnerships with U.S. law enforcement.

Nicaragua

A. Introduction

Nicaragua's strategic location and lax enforcement attracts transnational drug trafficking organizations and other malign entities. These entities exploit Nicaragua's strained diplomatic relations with the United States and its permissive regulatory and political environment. Pervasive corruption and inadequate security infrastructure make Nicaragua a critical transit point for narcotics and irregular migrants destined for the United States. Drug smuggling operations primarily use terrestrial routes along the Pacific coast and maritime routes in the Caribbean Sea, with most narcotics originating from Colombia.

Nicaragua's human rights violations and rampant corruption have led the United States, the European Union, and others to impose economic sanctions and halt security assistance. As a result, Nicaragua has become less cooperative in combatting drug trafficking and often ignores routine information requests. The United States will terminate its Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Nicaragua in 2025, partly due to the lack of cooperation from Nicaragua's agencies. Inadequate security resources for both terrestrial and maritime operations severely hinder Nicaragua's drug interdiction capabilities. Reduced security assistance due to increased international isolation has further debilitated Nicaragua's capabilities.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) and the Nicaraguan military are the main entities tasked with countering drug trafficking. However, they lack non-partisan autonomy and follow executive branch directives. In June, a presidential proclamation published in the official gazette authorizing entry of foreign vessels, aircraft, and military personnel indicated an increase in cooperation with Russian and Venezuelan military counterparts on counternarcotics training and exchanges in maritime operations in the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua. Despite these exchanges and the substantial size of Nicaraguan security forces,

counternarcotics efforts are hindered by insufficient resources and partisan-driven objectives rather than institutional mandates. The lack of security cooperation and training engagements with the United States further weakens Nicaragua's operational capabilities.

International isolation has driven Nicaragua to strengthen its security and surveillance alliances with Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In March, Nicaragua formalized a new cooperation agreement with Russia to enhance existing training for security forces at the Russian Ministry of Interior's Training Center (RTC) in Managua. In May 2024 the United States imposed sanctions on the RTC, established in 2014, for supporting the regime's repression of civil society and unjust detention and imprisonment of protestors and opposition members, among others exercising their basic rights of peaceful dissent.

In September 2024, the NNP announced that the PRC would train police officers in advanced techniques and technologies to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and cybercrime. Despite strong political alliances with Russia and the PRC, those countries have not provided essential materiel assistance, such as vehicles and boats, to enhance Nicaragua's interdiction capabilities.

Nicaraguan cooperation with U.S. law enforcement remains limited. No bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty exists between the two countries, although both nations are signatories to the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. While a bilateral extradition treaty remains in place, the Nicaraguan constitution prohibits the extradition of Nicaraguan nationals, including dual nationals. Despite these policy limitations, the NNP continues to provide timely responses to security assistance requests related to U.S. Embassy operations and engages in limited coordination on criminal investigations.

2. Supply Reduction

Nicaragua has been reluctant to share information on drug and cash interdictions. Local media reports indicate that in the first nine months of 2024, Nicaragua seized 1.29 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, slightly down from the 1.43 MT in the same period of 2023. Cash seizures increased from \$1.5 million in 2023 to \$2.1 million in 2024.

The NNP executed the largest cash seizure in 2024, \$1.5 million on the southern Caribbean coast. However, as in recent years, the NNP did not report any arrests.

The Nicaragua government reported it seized 1.98 MT of marijuana in the first nine months of 2024, up from the 1.77 MT in 2023. Authorities also reportedly destroyed 180,096 marijuana plants, a significant increase from 23,534 in 2023 and 428 in 2022.

Nicaragua claims its “Containment Wall Strategy” consisting of land-based, air, and maritime patrolling from bases at key border crossings and transit routes, deters drug traffickers, but the lack of reliable data makes this difficult to assess. In January, Russian authorities seized one metric ton of cocaine in a shipment from Nicaragua, casting doubt on the effectiveness of the strategy.

There is no public information on the manufacture, production, transshipment, or trafficking of synthetic drugs or psychoactive substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The lack of comprehensive data on drug usage in Nicaragua hampers the evaluation of prevention and treatment programs. The Nicaraguan Institute Against Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, under the Ministry of Health (MINSAs), is responsible for the study, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of individuals with substance use disorders. However, MINSAs’s initiatives to address drug usage are not publicly available. The lack of transparency significantly obstructs the assessment of the efficacy of any prevention, treatment, or rehabilitation programs.

The government offers minimal services for individuals with substance use disorders. While several private rehabilitation centers operate in Nicaragua, they are too expensive for most people. Since 2018, the government has forcibly closed over 5,500 civil society organizations, including many that supported vulnerable youth and others affected by drug use. As a result, drug users now have significantly fewer support options.

4. Corruption

The Government of Nicaragua does not, as a matter of government policy, expressly support or facilitate illicit drug production, distribution, or laundering of the proceeds of illicit drugs sales. However, endemic corruption poses challenges at all levels of government, and Nicaragua has strengthened alliances with malign international actors. Over the past seven years, the United States has imposed economic sanctions on 57 Nicaraguan officials and six entities for their involvement in illicit activities, including corruption and human rights violations. .

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. foreign assistance to Nicaragua has decreased due to the country's worsening political and human rights situation. Nicaragua has become less willing to engage in joint investigations with foreign counterparts. However, the United States continues to support small-scale programs that benefit the Nicaraguan people.

A bilateral agreement remains in place to combat illicit maritime traffic, including provisions for ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry into territorial waters, overflight, orders to land, and international maritime interdiction support.

D. Conclusion

In 2024, Nicaragua's authoritarian regime restructured government entities to exert greater control over society and suppress freedom of association and expression. The reestablished Ministry of Interior mirrors the 1980s version under the then-revolutionary government. Nicaraguan government institutions lack autonomy, operating instead under edicts designed to protect President Daniel Ortega and his family's economic and political interests.

Nigeria

A. Introduction

Nigeria's counternarcotics efforts continued to improve in 2024 and achieved some success in both interrupting drug supplies and expanding demand reduction programming.

Nigeria is a major transit route for illicit drugs, particularly those originating from South America and destined for Europe and North America. In addition, Nigeria is experiencing growing drug use partly due to illicit production of cannabis and methamphetamine. According to Nigeria's most recent national drug use survey conducted in 2018 by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), in collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), an estimated 14.3 million people in Nigeria aged 15 - 64 years reported using a psychoactive substance in 2017 for non-medical purposes. Illicit drugs pose serious threats to public health, security, and economic development in Nigeria. Through collaboration with the United States and other international partners, Nigeria has intensified efforts under a multifaceted counternarcotics strategy aimed at drug supply and demand.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The NDLEA is Nigeria's federal agency responsible for tackling drug-related issues, including drug trafficking, abuse, and production within the country. Established in 1989, the NDLEA enforces Nigeria's drug laws, promotes anti-drug campaigns, and implements drug rehabilitation and reintegration programs. This dual approach covering both supply and demand sets the NDLEA apart from agencies focused primarily on enforcement. In response to growing drug trafficking and drug use, the NDLEA expanded its operational capabilities by establishing specialized units, training programs for law enforcement officers, and better integrating intelligence-led operations in 2024. In addition, U.S. sponsored inter-agency trainings have further

improved the NDLEA's coordination with other security agencies and relevant stakeholders, bolstering its effectiveness in addressing drug trafficking.

Among the NDLEA's major accomplishments in 2024 was establishing an Alternative Development Unit to promote sustainable alternatives to illicit drugs and introduce alternative economic opportunities for crime-free and profitable crops. The NDLEA also constructed additional barracks for officers to expand its presence across the country, additional forensic laboratories to facilitate evidence gathering for court prosecutions, and additional rehabilitation centers for persons suffering from substance use disorders. Finally, the NDLEA also acquired aerial drones to expand its surveillance capacity and strengthen enforcement.

2. Supply Reduction

The NDLEA's drug supply reduction efforts encompass a range of activities designed to intercept and dismantle drug trafficking networks, including increased surveillance at ports of entry and exit, intelligence sharing with international law enforcement agencies, and coordinated operations with U.S. law enforcement. Specialized units within the NDLEA, such as the Sensitive Investigative Unit, target high-profile trafficking cases and have bolstered Nigeria's capability to intercept criminal networks and reduce the flow of narcotics in and out of the country.

These strategies have led to significant seizures of illicit drugs, particularly cannabis, cocaine, opioids, and methamphetamine. Between November 1, 2023, and September 30, 2024, the NDLEA arrested a total of 15,274 suspected drug traffickers and 13 suspected leaders of drug trafficking organizations. Drug seizures over this period totaled 2,036.8 metric tons (MT) of all categories of drugs, including approximately: 858 MT of cannabis, 596 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, 370 kg of heroin, 325 kg of methamphetamine, 57.5 MT of tramadol, 92.54 kg of rohypnol, 977.9 MT of codeine, 5.6 MT of diazepam, and over 136 MT of new psychoactive substances and other controlled substances. Authorities destroyed cannabis farms totaling 208.92 hectares, froze 446 bank accounts worth \$156.6M in suspected illicit proceeds from drug trafficking, and seized 99 properties and buildings and 146 vehicles.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Nigeria, through the NDLEA, conducts anti-drug-abuse education and public awareness campaigns through various social media platforms. Additionally, the NDLEA publishes the quarterly “NDLEA Today” magazine, hosts regular press statements and media briefings, and produces documentaries to raise awareness and publicize drug control activities. The NDLEA introduced the “Narco Tales” podcast in 2024, incorporating short videos to educate the public on the effects of drug use. Under the War Against Drug Abuse (WADA) social advocacy campaign, the NDLEA has established collaborations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations to expand prevention programs.

The NDLEA has been expanding treatment services and ensuring their accessibility to individuals and groups with drug use disorders. The integration of drug use prevention education into school curricula is also proving to be a vital tool in addressing the increasing rates of drug-related problems among youth. The NDLEA has introduced a 24/7 toll-free call center to expand access to treatment. It collaborates with non-governmental and international organizations like the African Youths Initiative on Crime Prevention (AYICRIP) and the International Society of Substance Use Professionals (ISSUP) to launch anti-drug use campaigns targeting schools, out-of-school youth, communities, faith-based groups, workplaces, and military groups. Nigeria has also increased advocacy visits to stakeholders including traditional rulers, heads of organizations, and opinion leaders to educate them on engaging their community members in the fight against drugs.

4. Corruption

Nigeria does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sales of illicit drugs. However, drug-related corruption poses a formidable challenge to Nigeria's counternarcotics efforts. Corruption within law enforcement agencies can undermine the enforcement of drug laws, hinder effective prosecutions, and enable traffickers to operate with impunity. As a result, the Nigerian government has initiated several anti-corruption measures, such as enhanced monitoring, premium compensation to injured officers and family members of deceased officers, and the arrest of corrupt

officials. The United States has also trained law enforcement officers engaged in countering drug trafficking on implementation of standard operating procedures to promote transparency in counternarcotics operations. The establishment of a monitoring unit to enforce existing laws and policies has also proven to be effective, although the Nigerian government continues to work on anti-corruption efforts .

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiative

In collaboration with the United States, Nigeria instituted national development goals within its counternarcotics strategy to promote security by reducing drug use and related crimes. The United States has provided technical assistance, training for law enforcement officers, and resources for drug law enforcement, which have been instrumental in improving Nigeria's capacity to reduce drug trafficking. Nigeria has increased bilateral cooperation with countries and organizations, including through a draft Memorandum of Understanding to codify drug control cooperation with Brazil, Ghana, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The United States has also provided substantial support in building Nigeria's intelligence and operational capacities, including in surveillance and intelligence gathering, and expanded cooperation with both domestic and international law enforcement partners. U.S. training has included specialized courses in financial investigations; undercover cases; asset forfeiture and money laundering; synthetic opioid detection through the mail and small parcels; and alternatives to incarceration for drug cases. The United States also assisted in standardizing the NDLEA forensic laboratory and introduced "Law Pavilion," an online legal research platform available to judges, academics, and criminal justice practitioners to make drug-related laws more accessible. Nigeria has bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States. It participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

D. Conclusion

Nigeria's drug control efforts, supported by U.S. cooperation, are steadily building a more effective framework for reducing drug-trafficking activities while also addressing the health implications of drug use among the population. This partnership has grown over the years, enhancing Nigeria's operational capabilities and legal and policy

frameworks to respond to emerging drug trends. This strengthened partnership signifies a shared recognition of the complex nature of drug-related problems, affirming the importance of comprehensive strategies that involve law enforcement, health services, and community engagement.

Pakistan

A. Introduction

Given its geographic location and porous borders, Pakistan is one of the most significant drug trafficking corridors in the world. The country has historically been a supplier of the poppy plant used to create illicit narcotics and a key transshipment point for drugs destined for Europe and Asia. In recent years, seizures of synthetic drugs have increased markedly as the export and domestic markets have grown. Regional instability also has the potential to spur the drug trade, as extremist groups use trafficking profits to fund operations. The United States has collaborated for more than 40 years with Pakistan in the fight against illicit drug trafficking.

Pakistan faces multiple challenges as it combats narcotics trafficking, including a spike in violent extremism from the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Baloch separatist groups, instability in neighboring Afghanistan, and an ever-developing network of drug trafficking routes. The majority of narcotics produced in Afghanistan (namely heroin and opium) transit through Pakistan. While overland transit corridors link Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and India, officials assess that mass quantities of drugs transit Pakistan's maritime domain freely.

The Antinarcotics Force (ANF), the primary drug enforcement agency in Pakistan, has reported a significant increase in the flow of synthetic drugs through Pakistan. This surge includes precursors arriving from China and India en route to Afghanistan, along with the final products – namely methamphetamine – transiting Pakistan for export to global markets via ocean transport. Government officials publicly commit to drug interdiction efforts, but the ANF and other counternarcotic agencies compete for limited resources with other federal and provincial law enforcement priorities, especially in the face of sustained extremist violence.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Pakistan has addressed the issue of narcotics and related crimes through a series of legislative measures in recent years. These efforts aim to combat drug trafficking, drug abuse, and associated criminal activities. A 2022 amendment to the 1997 Control of Narcotics Substances Act (CNSA) provided Pakistan with a legal framework to more ably respond to the evolving nature of the narcotics trade.

In connection with the CNSA, the 1997 Anti-Narcotics Force Act gives the ANF substantive, procedural, and administrative guidelines to manage narcotics-related matters at the federal level. The 18th amendment to Pakistan's constitution, passed in 2010, complements the federal narcotics oversight. At the provincial level, legislative amendments defining authorities' roles and responsibilities started with 2019 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's CNSA and was followed by 2024's Sindh Province CNS Bill. The Balochistan government is currently working on its own version. In theory, these legislative measures grant specific counternarcotics authorities to provincial governments to promote a more localized approach in combatting illicit drugs. In practice, blurred jurisdictional division and the struggle for limited resources between the federal and provincial levels causes institutional friction and ineffectiveness.

While the United States and Pakistan do not have a bilateral treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, Pakistan acceded to the 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom following Pakistan's independence. Pakistan also participates in several multilateral law enforcement conventions which provide a framework for cooperation in criminal matters and bolster bilateral collaboration.

2. Supply Reduction

Drug production in Pakistan has revolved around opium poppy cultivation. Pakistan's opium poppy cultivation dropped to near-zero levels in 2000, down from approximately 32,000 hectares in 1978. Poppy cultivation jumped to 6,703 hectares (ha) in 2003 and fluctuated before falling to approximately 1,400 ha

in 2016. Since 1982, the United States has allocated more than \$84.9 million to support rural development programs encouraging alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation. A 2023 U.S. government-supported survey highlighted significant disparities in the impact of the poppy cultivation ban in the Khyber, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Tor Ghar districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Farmers in well-irrigated areas of Mohmand have successfully transitioned to high-value horticulture and non-farm income, showing little interest in returning to poppy cultivation due to reliable irrigation and improved infrastructure. Conversely, limited access to irrigation and insufficient development investments in the more mountainous and less developed areas of Bajaur and Mohmand have hindered livelihood diversification, leading to continued reliance on low-value crops and increased migration for non-farm income. Despite development efforts, poppy cultivation persists in remote parts of Mohmand and Bajaur, with the same report noting a resurgence of poppy over 1,800 ha in Khyber alone due to economic deterioration and insecurity. Economic pressures and rising opium prices following the Taliban's ban of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan are probably driving increased production within Pakistan.

Most drugs trafficked through Pakistan are destined for global markets, and law enforcement agencies only intercept a small fraction of them. From July 2023 to June 2024, Pakistan's law enforcement agencies reported national-level drug seizures including 1.58 metric tons (MT) of morphine, 11.1 MT of heroin, 16.8 MT of opium, 17.36 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, and 138.63 MT of hashish. Pakistan's government reported seizing 12.03 MT of methamphetamine and 3.3 MT of amphetamine, but no seizures of fentanyl. Notable trends in comparison to the July 2022 to June 2023 period include a 70 percent decrease in opium seizures, a 95 and 97 percent increase in methamphetamine and amphetamine seizures respectively, and a 20 percent decrease in heroin seizures. These downward trends in opium and heroin suggest a link to the drastic reduction in supply from Afghanistan following a drug ban announced by the Taliban in April 2022. The sharp increase in synthetic drug seizures is likely due to growing supplies, increased drug trafficking, and the enhanced capacity of Pakistan's drug enforcement agencies.

Over the twelve-month period from July 2023 to June 2024, Pakistan recorded roughly 93,440 drug-related arrests, predominantly involving low-level drug dealers. ANF disrupted 16 drug trafficking organizations and participated in 36 international intelligence-driven operations, seizing over 39 MT of illicit drugs. ANF reported a conviction rate of 78 percent in drug trafficking cases during this period. Despite the presence of conspiracy laws, authorities have rarely employed them successfully to prosecute leaders of drug trafficking organizations.

Coordination between U.S. and Pakistani law enforcement is key to Pakistan's interdiction efforts. This collaboration led to the seizures of over 63 MT of hashish, 12.5 MT of opium, 5.4 MT of heroin, 6.9 MT of methamphetamine, 200 liters of liquid methamphetamine and 8 kg of cocaine in 2024.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

In 2024, Pakistani authorities estimated that eight million Pakistanis have used drugs (excluding alcohol and tobacco), an increase over the 6.7 million people estimated to have used drugs by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2012. Cannabis has become the most popular drug, while the significant increase in the rates of injection drug use has raised authorities' concerns about a potential HIV epidemic.

The Pakistani government charges the ANF with providing drug rehabilitation care and services. From July 2023 to June 2024, the ANF's drug demand reduction unit provided no-cost treatment to over 3,100 patients at six drug addiction treatment and rehabilitation centers in the cities of Karachi, Islamabad, Sukkur, and Hyderabad. A significant lack of resources limits ANF's effectiveness, however, leaving millions with access to necessary care.

4. Corruption

As a matter of government policy, Pakistan does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking, and there is no evidence that any senior government officials are engaged in such activity. Pakistan is a signatory to multilateral treaties on transnational organized crime, including those related to drug trafficking and corruption. While there is no direct evidence of the government of Pakistan's facilitation of illicit drug production or distribution, corruption remains a

concern across all levels of government. The National Accountability Bureau and Federal Investigation Agency are the government of Pakistan's leading entities tasked with rooting out corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States has undertaken a comprehensive set of data-driven initiatives to counter drug trafficking and reduce drug demand in Pakistan. As of 2024, the United States has provided targeted assistance to the ANF, Pakistan Customs, Coast Guards, Maritime Security Agency, Airports Security Force, the Ministry of Narcotics Control, and the Excise, Taxation, and Narcotics Control Agencies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Balochistan provinces. The ANF reports that over 90 percent of their 2024 drug seizures relied on U.S.-funded equipment, training, and/or infrastructure, highlighting the impact of these efforts.

In response to Pakistan's desire to improve interagency coordination, the U.S. government is funding the establishment of a dedicated counternarcotics fusion center. This facility, housed at the ANF headquarters, will facilitate information sharing among Pakistani law enforcement agencies, ensure ample dissemination of time-sensitive data, allow for intelligence analysis, and improve the efficiency of joint planning and execution of drug interdiction operations. Pakistan participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

D. Conclusion

Pakistan remains a critical transit corridor for illicit drugs through land and maritime routes to global markets. The prevalence of synthetic drugs is on the rise. Although the Pakistan government did not report any seizures of fentanyl in 2024, U.S. law enforcement agencies assess it is probable that precursors used to produce fentanyl transit Pakistan's ports. All relevant agencies, including maritime entities such as the Coast Guards and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency, should actively participate in the counternarcotics fusion center as it is critical to the joint success and improved effectiveness for Pakistan to combat the illicit drug trade in a coordinated manner.

Panama

A. Introduction

Panama is a highly capable partner committed to limiting the transit of illegal drugs. Since 2020, Panamanian security forces have surpassed 100 metric tons (MT), primarily cocaine, in drug seizures. Panama is on track to exceed 100 MT in total drug seizures in 2024 as well, although seizure tonnage continues to slowly decline from the 2021 record of 145 MT despite sustained production of cocaine primarily from Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. Successful law enforcement operations by Panamanian security forces may be contributing to driving down trafficking through maritime and commercial trade routes and away from Panama's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Panama is not a major consumer or producer of illicit drugs, but over 1,500 miles of coastline, nearly 500 rivers, the Panama Canal, and a border with Colombia make the country a prime sea and land passage for drugs, primarily cocaine, flowing from South America to North America and Europe. Up to 40 percent of north-bound cocaine produced in neighboring Colombia passes through Panama's EEZ, which transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and their networks move through the maritime corridors off both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Traffickers continued to use maritime routes as the main avenues to move narcotics to the United States and Europe, taking advantage of the millions of transshipped containers passing through the Panama Canal each year to smuggle drugs out of South America.

In 2024, Panama's National Air and Naval Service (SENAN) maintained a high tempo of narcotics interdiction operations in the maritime environment, the U.S.-mentored Port Task Force (PTF) successfully seized drugs from container vessels, and inter-service collaboration strengthened at the U.S.-supported Joint Regional Air and Navy Operations Center (CROAN).

Panama is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino's administration continues to focus on fighting narco trafficking. Panama has no standing military; the Ministry of Public Security (MINSEG) oversees counternarcotics efforts through its three principal law enforcement agencies: SENAN, the National Border Service (SENAFRONT), and the Panamanian National Police (PNP).

MINSEG continues to improve the joint operations coordination platform (Spanish acronym CROAN), including by enhancing cross-service coordination through curriculum standardization and training under a Joint Maritime Force (JMF) concept intended to increase efficiency and safety for maritime operations. U.S. law enforcement agencies cooperate with the PNP, SENAN, and SENAFRONT in support of Panama's counternarcotics missions. SENAN and the United States also collaborate operationally on maritime interdictions under the 2002 Salas-Becker Agreement. The United States and Panama maintain strong bilateral relations through mutual assistance programs and extradition treaties.

2. Supply Reduction

Panama's geographic position as a bridge between South and Central America, along with its extensive Caribbean and Pacific coastlines, makes it vulnerable to high levels of sustained, illicit drug transit from Colombia and South America, the primary source of cocaine destined for the United States. Panama is a common first stop country for cocaine originating from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, and strengthening existing security measures is crucial for Panama's efforts to combat the challenges TCOs present.

In the first nine months of 2024, Panamanian authorities seized over 70 MT of narcotics. Cocaine seizures comprised approximately 70 percent of all seizures by weight; the remainder being marijuana. In keeping with previous years, SENAN conducted the majority of Panamanian narcotics seizures, about 70 percent, due to its maritime mission and asset capabilities, followed by the PNP (20 percent), which

operates across multiple environments, and SENAFRONT (10 percent), which is primarily tasked with border security.

Vessels transfer more than four million containers among themselves (transshipments) at Panamanian ports each year, a process that makes containers vulnerable to narcotics smuggling. The PTF seized over 14 MT of cocaine in the first nine months of 2024.

Despite facing resourcing, life cycle sustainment, and institutional capacity limitations, Panama has a high interdiction response rate, a solid track record of successful trafficker prosecutions, and remains an important and capable partner in combatting illicit drug trafficking. Because the quantity of drugs moving through Panamanian jurisdiction remains a challenge for authorities, continued U.S. interagency support will bolster the ability of Panama's security forces' to successfully combat the TCO networks that seek to exploit Panama's legal commerce and strategic trade route for illegal gains.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Drug abuse in Panama is not as common as it is in other Central and South American countries. According to the Organization of American States 2019 Report on Drug Use in the Americas, its most recent, Panama has the third lowest rate of marijuana consumption, and the lowest rate of cocaine consumption of 15 Central and South American countries studied. Panama has not updated its strategy on demand reduction since 2012 and has not conducted a drug demand study since 2015.

The United States supports anti-drug initiatives such as the Drug Awareness and Resistance Education (DARE) and the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) programs. Through September 2024, over 7,500 students participated in DARE and 16,000 students in GREAT.

4. Corruption

The government of Panama does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of

the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption and weak institutions pose systemic challenges at all levels of Panamanian government. The United States continues to build anti-corruption capacity within the government and civil society. This includes funding trainings for over 1,900 judges, prosecutors, journalists, and members of civil society on topics of judicial reform, trial procedures, legal English, investigatory techniques, and basic digital hygiene.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Panama shares U.S. national security goals, including dismantling transnational criminal organizations. Panama frequently leads the Central American region in U.S.-enabled interdictions and actively partners with U.S. law enforcement agencies.

The JMF has fully integrated the implementation of the Maritime Interdiction Case Package as a standard operating procedure for the presentation of evidence in maritime interdiction operations to Panama's judiciary.

D. Conclusion

Panama's security priorities include updating the penal code regarding asset forfeiture, increasing anticorruption efforts, building a robust citizen security strategy, and budgeting to sustain security-related assets. However, gaps still remain in deterring drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption, promoting the rule of law and transparency, reducing violence in crime-ridden communities, and maintaining the capacity to defeat transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and deter narcotics trafficking.

Efforts required to maintain this deterrent effect include continued force and infrastructure modernization to meet an adaptive threat, ongoing collaboration with the United States and regional partners, and sustained detection capability and comprehensive domain awareness in the air, at sea, and on land.

Peru

A. Introduction

Peru is the world's second-largest cocaine producer after Colombia. The United States and Peru collaborate closely on counternarcotics. Continuous turnover at both the cabinet and working levels in the Peruvian government continued to delay development and implementation of a cohesive strategy in 2024.

In 2023, Peru changed its crop measurement methodology, adding seven new areas for illicit crop monitoring. As a result, in 2024 it reported 92,784 hectares (ha) under coca cultivation for 2023, a slight decline from the 2022 estimate of 95,008 ha under cultivation. About 41 percent of this cultivation is concentrated in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) with the remaining cultivation primarily located in the regions of Loreto, Ucayali, and Puno. Peru produces approximately 805 metric tons (MT) of refined cocaine annually. Peru is poised to meet its 2024 eradication goal of 25,782 ha, which represents 27 percent of its total coca cultivation according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. Peruvian cocaine is trafficked throughout South America for shipment to East Asia, Mexico, Europe, and the United States.

The United States is Peru's principal counternarcotics partner. The United States supports aviation and eradication efforts through the Special Project for the Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in Upper Huallaga. The United States also supports alternative livelihood development for at-risk populations. With U.S. support, Peru intensified its focus on interdiction to target the entire cocaine supply chain, which led to more significant seizures. Shining Path remnants and other Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) still operate in the VRAEM, destabilizing the region through illegal mining, logging, and drug trafficking. Other regions, including northern Loreto, have seen an increase in coca cultivation and drug production. Although there is currently no evidence of fentanyl production in Peru, the United States collaborates with Peru to enhance interdiction capacities in order to minimize potential threats involving synthetic drugs. Peru increased its overall counternarcotics budget from \$99.3 million in 2023 to 113.8 million in 2024, representing a 14.6 percent increase.

Peru is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In 2024, Peru continued implementing its ten-year 2030 National Drug Control Policy. The policy addresses drug production and trade and drug use in vulnerable populations. Peru faces significant political and budgetary challenges to implement the policy. In May 2024, Peru and the United States held the first bilateral High-Level Dialogue, which included counternarcotics. Peru signed an international cooperation agreement with Ecuador to address drug trafficking and transnational organized crime; the agreement reinforced interagency efforts to combat human trafficking and inspect vehicles, river vessels, maritime ships, and aircraft.

Additionally, Peru entered into three agreements with Colombia and Chile focused on drug trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal mining. In order to enhance port security, the government also expanded the Container Control Program (CCP) to include new Joint Control Units in the ports of Paita and Matarani, alongside the existing unit in Callao.

Peru signed a joint declaration of intent with Germany to negotiate a security agreement to prevent Peruvian-sourced drugs from reaching European markets. Peru actively participates in the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

In 2024, Peru enacted stricter laws targeting drug-related environmental crimes and money laundering. These measures included new regulations for controlling precursor chemicals and initiatives to reduce illegal logging and mining, which often intersect with narcotics activities.

The United States and Peru first established a vetted Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) program in 1997 to coordinate counternarcotic efforts. The program has expanded to include two additional Vetted Units (VU), including one focused on the illicit trafficking of chemicals. In May 2024, Peru established, with U.S. support, a vetted Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit under the Peruvian National Police (PNP) that is authorized to investigate all transnational crimes. Additionally, Peru met the certification conditions required under the bilateral Non-Lethal Aerial

Interception Agreement signed in 2023, and radar information sharing restarted in October 2024. This will enhance counterdrug cooperation by resuming radar information sharing for the first time in a decade, along with granting Peru access to U.S. government systems and aerial interception training for the first time since 2015.

U.S.-Peru law enforcement collaboration, anchored by a 2002 bilateral extradition treaty, remains strong, especially with vetted units. However, Peruvian law enforcement and prosecutors do not prioritize long-term investigations for significant arrests. Critical gaps in drug identification and detection capabilities, particularly in first responder units and forensic laboratories, hinder Peru's ability to address synthetic drugs and other emerging threats.

U.S.-backed alternative development programs in coca-producing regions empower small farmers to shift towards sustainable and legal sources of income. These efforts complement work to strengthen Peru's National Commission for Development and Life Without Drugs (DEVIDA) as a key institution in the fight against narcotics and enable the provision of state services to remote and at-risk regions.

2. Supply Reduction

As of September 3, 2024, Peruvian authorities had confiscated 101 MT of illegal drugs, an increase of approximately 63 percent compared to the 62 MT seized in the same time frame in 2023. These seizures included 60.1 MT of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine paste (compared to 14.45 during the same period in 2023). Notably, marijuana seizures reached 40.8 MT during this timeframe (compared to 19 MT during the same period in 2023).

By the same date, law enforcement seized or destroyed 76,498 MT of precursor chemicals and the PNP arrested 7,972 suspects.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

DEVIDA leads Peru's "Comprehensive Strategy Against Drugs," with a focus on demand reduction through prevention, treatment, reintegration, and aftercare initiatives. Cocaine, cocaine paste, and marijuana remain the most prevalent drugs

in use. With U.S. support, DEVIDA conducted a national high school age drug use study in 2024, the first update since 2017. The last national general population drug use survey was conducted in 2010.

Peru's national prevention program reaches key sectors, including elementary school students, adults in community-based programs, and incarcerated populations. However, Indigenous communities and private-sector workplaces remain underserved. The United States supports targeted drug demand reduction efforts, offering specialized training to expand substance use treatment for rural and Indigenous populations.

4. Corruption

The Government of Peru does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or the laundering of proceeds from such activities. However, systemic deficiencies like limited resources, weak law enforcement, a dysfunctional judiciary, and low pay for civil servants enable pervasive corruption. Although Peru is a signatory to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, it has yet to fully enforce key provisions, such as asset confiscation from corrupt practices.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports Peru's drug control strategy through technical assistance, capacity building, intelligence sharing, and equipment donations. Peru co-funds coca eradication, interdiction, and alternative development initiatives; the United States provides aviation support. In 2024, the United States trained 1,459 PNP officers in various fields.

D. Conclusion

The U.S.-Peru partnership in combating drug trafficking and transnational crime continued to yield positive results in 2024. To address challenges with cocaine production and the threat of fentanyl, Peru should adopt a more comprehensive strategy. This includes intensifying interdiction efforts in maritime zones and border regions, combating money laundering and corruption, and emphasizing high-profile prosecutions to further strengthen the rule of law. Peru should also increase efforts to

transition to sustainable crop substitution programs and protect environmentally sensitive areas, including national parks and Indigenous communities; these efforts should involve the private sector and create market linkages for alternative crops. Strengthening border security through dynamic counternarcotics plans, specialized task forces, advanced investigative techniques, and expanding air and maritime support will modernize Peru's response to drug trafficking.

Philippines

A. Introduction

The Philippines faces ongoing challenges as both a destination and transit hub for the illegal drug trade. Despite government efforts to address the issue, drug trafficking continues to be a widespread and persistent problem. A complex network of local and international syndicates exploits the strategic position of the Philippines as a gateway to other Southeast Asian nations. The Philippines' geographical characteristics – such as relatively open borders and expansive maritime areas – exacerbate the problem, making the country a focal point for drug smuggling activities and presenting formidable challenges for law enforcement agencies to effectively stop the flow of illicit substances. Among the most trafficked and abused drugs in the country are crystal methamphetamine, locally known as "shabu," and cannabis.

During his 2024 State of the Nation Address, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. reiterated his administration's efforts to wage a bloodless war on dangerous drugs through a human rights-centered approach. Now in its second year of implementation, the Marcos administration's Philippine Development Plan (PDP) continues to prioritize the reduction of drug dependence in the country by addressing rehabilitation, recovery, and reintegration of drug offenders.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Launched in 2023, the PDP remains committed to promoting peace and security, with a particular emphasis on combating illegal drugs through the institutionalization of the Philippine Anti-Illegal Drugs Strategy (PADS). The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), the primary policymaking body for drug control, has introduced a new pillar to PADS, focusing on evidence-based public health interventions in addressing drug-related issues.

In 2024 the DDB, in collaboration with the Philippine Department of Justice, convened the inaugural Drug Policy and Law Reform Summit. The summit aimed to foster dialogue on reforming the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA 9165), a 22-year-old law. This event brought together key stakeholders from government, civil society, academia, and international partners to engage in collaborative discussions on drug policy reform. Although legislative reform to address drug policy has not taken place, under the Marcos administration the focus has shifted toward a public health-centered strategy to reduce drug dependence. This marks a significant departure from former President Rodrigo Duterte's war on drugs, operationalized through "Operation Double Barrel" that targeted suspected drug dealers and users for enforcement actions by members of the PNP and non-governmental groups, and resulted in an estimated 6,000 extra-judicial killings, according to the Philippine government.

The United States and the Philippines maintain active treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, with requests for these services regularly coordinated between the two nations. Despite the complexities of bureaucratic processes, both countries work in close collaboration. The Philippines continues to engage in international efforts to combat drug trafficking and reduce demand, including with the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

In the first nine months of 2024, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) conducted 26,184 anti-drug operations, leading to the arrest of 34,934 individuals. These operations also resulted in the seizure of 2.02 metric tons of crystal methamphetamine ("shabu") and 26.7 kilograms of cocaine. Most crystal methamphetamine available in the Philippines originates from Burma, though domestic production labs have also been detected and dismantled. PDEA continues to work closely with government agencies and international partners to enhance its drug interdiction efforts.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) has recalibrated its approach to combating illegal drugs by prioritizing the dismantling of drug supply networks. This strategy targets high-value leaders of trafficking groups and seeks to disrupt the flow of illegal

substances within the country. The PNP's renewed focus includes ramping up intelligence operations and fostering greater community engagement to tackle the drug problem more effectively.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Philippine government has reinforced its commitment to address drug addiction as a public health issue. The national anti-drug campaign focuses on advocacy and capacity-building initiatives aimed at fostering safe and healthy communities. The President's policy directives have guided the DDB in expanding the PADS, which takes a comprehensive, health-centered, human rights-based, and multi-sectoral approach to reducing drug demand.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), through the Buhay Ingatan, Droga'y Ayawan (BIDA) program, continues to assist local government units in efforts to combat illegal drugs outside of solely law enforcement operations. The BIDA program represents a holistic and intensified campaign to reduce drug demand, reflecting the government's commitment to eradicating illegal drugs within the framework of the law, with respect for human rights, and through the promotion of rehabilitation and socioeconomic development.

As part of the government's broader health-oriented strategy, the Department of Health (DOH) implemented a wide range of programs and services related to substance use disorder. The DOH's mental health division is also developing clinical practice guidelines for substance use disorders, set to be completed by 2025. The DOH treatment and rehabilitation centers initiated a residency training program for addiction medicine, aimed at developing qualified physicians to manage substance use disorders. Separately, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), a government-owned corporation responsible for managing the national health insurance program, has introduced a new benefits package specifically addressing members' mental health needs. This initiative includes substance use policies, now integrated into the broader Mental Health, Neurology, and Substance Use (MNS) framework.

4. Corruption

As a matter of government policy, the Philippines does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act outlines the penal remedies that are applicable to government officials involved in illicit drug-related operations. Despite these measures, corruption related to drugs in the Philippines exists, and law enforcement officers and government officials have been implicated in drug trafficking activities. Raids of Philippine offshore gaming operators in 2023 and 2024 uncovered evidence of online cyber scam operations, human trafficking, drug trafficking, torture, and murder. The crimes associated with these gaming operators prompted Philippine Senate and House inquiries resulting in the scrutiny of former senior government officials.

Between January and August 2024, counternarcotics operations resulted in the arrest of 24 elected officials, nine law enforcement officers, and 66 government workers who were connected to illegal drug-related activities. While the widespread campaign of extrajudicial killings carried out under the Duterte administration has ended, there are still numerous reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings by police in connection with antidrug operations.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States, in collaboration with international partners, has strengthened the capacity of Philippine institutions to address substance use disorders from a public health perspective. This includes working with the Philippine Department of Education to develop a local credentialing system for drug prevention professionals. A pilot training of trainers for the Universal Prevention Curriculum series is underway, focusing on school-based prevention programs for managers and supervisors. Additionally, the United States is collaborating with the DOH to develop a national training program for the globally recognized Universal Treatment Curriculum. This program includes international certification and accreditation, offering a comprehensive training framework from basic to advanced courses for treatment and rehabilitation center staff, who will manage severe substance use disorder cases.

D. Conclusion

The Philippine government's focus on drug prevention, rehabilitation, and judicial reform has gained significant momentum, moving beyond an enforcement-only approach. The government has prioritized expanding rehabilitation programs and community-based initiatives as alternatives to incarceration and punitive measures. Key components of this strategy include community outreach, drug education, and prevention efforts, all aimed at addressing the root causes of drug use. Additionally, the Philippines government is actively engaged with international partners to implement evidence-based programming to combat the drug crisis, including with a leadership role in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

The shift toward a more balanced approach – emphasizing judicial processes and rehabilitation – marks a positive step forward. However, long-standing issues such as human rights violations, corruption within law enforcement, and societal barriers linked to drug addiction remain significant challenges.

Spain

Combating drug trafficking is one of Spain's most important law enforcement priorities. Spain is one of several entry points into Europe for cocaine originating from Central and South America. It is also an entry point into Europe for, and a source of, cannabis and synthetic drugs. Spain's counterdrug efforts have resulted in high volumes of seizures using strong border control, coastal monitoring, sophisticated geospatial detection technology, police action, internal affairs investigations, and strong bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation with international partners including the United States. Spanish forces reportedly seized over 100 metric tons of cocaine in 2023, the most recent year for which data is available, and the largest amount seized by Spain in a single year.

On September 5, 2024, the Spanish Civil Guard seized over 700 kilograms (kg) of drugs, including 21 kg of "pink cocaine" (a mixture of various substances) and over one million MDMA pills in the largest confiscation of its kind in Spain's history, valued at over \$27 million. On October 8, the Spanish National Police (SNP), in cooperation with international partners including the United States, seized 250,000 ketamine pills in two shipments totaling 69 kg at the Madrid airport. The SNP reported finding minor traces of fentanyl in one of the two shipments. The SNP's seizure also uncovered a Colombian criminal organization attempting to establish a new drug route into Spain.

Spain remains vigilant to the fentanyl threat. U.S.-provided fentanyl field test kits are used to screen for fentanyl in drug seizures, while U.S. training provided to the Spanish National Testing Laboratory urged testing of opioid overdoses for fentanyl to ensure any presence of the drug on the market is caught early.

The Spanish government continues to implement its 2021-24 national strategy to fight addiction. The strategy prioritizes prevention, reduction of risk factors, and improved treatment options. Spain registered over 45,873 drug treatment admissions in 2022, the latest year for which data is available, with cocaine addiction representing 47.6 percent of cases. Spain reported 1,266 deaths related to the use of psychoactive substances in 2022.

Spain participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Suriname

A. Introduction

Suriname is a transit country for South American cocaine, the majority of which is likely destined for Europe. Criminals use maritime shipping containers to transport most illicit drugs, but they also use commercial and private air transport and human couriers. Suriname's sparsely populated coastal region and isolated jungle interior, together with deeply embedded corruption, weak border controls, and poorly equipped security forces, make illicit drug detection and interdiction efforts difficult. The Government of Suriname condemns drug trafficking, and the Santokhi administration has voiced the political will to combat it. However, a lack of credible law enforcement capacity, significant corruption, legislative reform challenges, lack of equipment, limited budget, and lack of intelligence support present challenges to effectively combatting drug trafficking. In 2023, the national drug authority received an annual budget of \$130,248 from the Ministry of Health.

The government has taken some actions to address money laundering, but criminals also reportedly smuggle the proceeds from Suriname's illicit drug trade, including cash and gold, into the United States. The Surinamese government has repeatedly requested a return of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to disrupt the transnational criminal organizations involved in the illicit drug trade.

Suriname is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Suriname Police Force (KPS) has four units primarily tasked with drug control activities. At the main port, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime supports the Container Control Unit. Additionally, the Judicial Intervention Team (JIT), a special police unit, operates directly under the authority of the Attorney General.

A newly appointed Chief of Police actively worked to restore public trust in the police force by replacing entire teams with new members. The French Gendarmerie--a

branch of the French Armed Forces with jurisdiction in smaller cities and towns-- trained and supports the new arrest team of 19 officers. The Chief of Police restructured the drug units within the police force.

Suriname signed the Cooperative Situational Information Integration agreement in 2023. The United States and Suriname concluded negotiations of an Aerial Interception Assistance Agreement (AIAA) on October 15, 2024, and are awaiting its entry into force. The United States and Suriname have had a ship rider agreement since 1998. The United States and Suriname do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty but do have a bilateral extradition treaty. Both are parties to the InterAmerican Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance and the UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropics.

2. Supply Reduction

Between February and April, 2024, authorities seized 29.9 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in eight separate incidents. Authorities working with the Maritime Analysis Operations Center also seized over 40 MT of cocaine coming from Suriname on go-fast boats offloading onto trawlers and fishing vessels, which the French Navy intercepted. These seizures underscore Suriname's role as a key transshipment point for drugs bound for Europe and West Africa. In each case, the drugs were either discovered by accident or intercepted by foreign officials, rather than through proactive efforts by the Surinamese government. Despite pledges from Surinamese officials to intensify anti-drug efforts, concrete results remain absent.

In 2024, the Judicial Intervention Team (JIT), with support from the National Army, destroyed seven illegal airfields used for illicit drug flights moving cocaine from Venezuela to the country. In April, the Minister of Justice and Police disclosed that between 400 and 600 cocaine airdrops or landings occur annually within Suriname, averaging one or two daily drug deliveries by airplane on illegal airstrips in the interior.

From January to October, 2024, the Suriname Police Force confiscated 798.83 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, 48.05 milliliters of liquid cocaine, 91.42 kg of marijuana, 32.37 kg of hashish, and 10,952 MDMA tablets during different raids and searches during arrests, according to official statistics.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Government representatives reported that the main illicit drug used is marijuana, followed by crack cocaine and synthetic drugs. The National Drug Council recognized the importance of working with the private sector, especially to address products imported from Europe. The National Drug Council worked to update the OAS Evaluation Report on Drug Policies: Measures of Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery beginning with a stakeholder meeting to update the National Action Plan. Suriname's Ministry of Health provided some treatment options, although resources remain limited. The limited forensics capacity hindered Suriname's ability to identify drugs.

4. Corruption

The Government of Suriname does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, there is evidence suggesting that senior government officials may be involved in corruption and drug trafficking. Widespread and credible allegations indicate that drug-related corruption impacts various government institutions, including the police. The lack of arrests and convictions in significant drug cases further exacerbates these concerns.

Integrity issues persist within government organizations. In May 2024, the Attorney General suspended a prosecutor who was identified as a suspect in a 2021 case in which authorities uncovered 490 kg of cocaine and a burned-out airplane.

Authorities also suspended five Police Arrest Team officers involved in the case.

In April, the Vice President's spokesperson confirmed the Vice President would comply with Dutch authorities' request for legal assistance in the case against convicted drug trafficker Piet Wortel in the Netherlands. The Vice President issued a signed statement reportedly confirming that gold bars valued at over \$6 million, seen in photos from a villa where Wortel was hiding in Suriname, belonged to him.

Despite two raids by Surinamese police, no gold was found. Other individuals closely associated with the Vice President have been implicated in major drug cases.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States cooperates with Suriname on drug control. With U.S. support, Suriname and the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) launched the Early Warning System on Drugs on July 18, 2024. The United States maintained bilateral cooperation programs focused on training the police, judiciary, and military to uphold the rule of law. U.S. assistance contributed to Suriname's anti-money laundering goals. Due to integrity issues within certain police units, authorities transferred some investigative authorities to the Department of National Security, leading international partners to collaborate with them instead of the Suriname Police Force. In response, the Chief of Police actively lobbied to bring these authorities and partnerships back under the jurisdiction of the Police Force.

D. Conclusion

U.S. assistance is critically important to help Suriname effectively control narcotics trafficking and sustain drug-control institutions. The Government of Suriname should adequately fund the police, Department of National Security, customs, attorney general's office, and military to stop narcotics trafficking.

Tajikistan

A. Introduction

Despite the Taliban's poppy ban in Afghanistan, opium production remains high in Afghanistan's Badakhshan Province, which shares the majority of Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. Narcotics seizures increased in 2024, and, according to contacts, drug use among labor migrants leaving or unable to return to Russia has increased the prevalence of drug use in Tajikistan, though it remains relatively rare. Prescription drug abuse remains a concern.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Tajikistan does not publish its national counternarcotics budget but has been a long-term recipient of international training and equipment. That support has not translated into sustainable capacity. Tajikistan cannot sustain training or maintain donated equipment and lacks the ability to conduct meaningful investigative and enforcement operations. The lack of political will to pursue investigations that may disrupt the interests of corrupt officials undercuts interdiction efforts. Working level enforcement is restrained and biased, authorized only at the highest levels.

Tajikistan's drug seizures increased in 2024 but lag behind neighboring Central Asian countries on transit routes for drugs originating in Afghanistan (the "Northern Route"). Seizures are not reflective of the volume transiting Tajikistan from Afghan suppliers en route to large European and Russian Federation consumer markets.

Tajikistan's Drug Control Agency (DCA) previously had a vetted unit that received salary supplements from the United States. The Russian Federation began providing salary supplements to the DCA in 2023, and what remained of the former vetted unit was moved from a U.S.-built facility in early 2024. The Russian Federation resumed a financial support package for the DCA in 2024.

There is no mutual legal assistance treaty or formalized extradition agreement between Tajikistan and the United States, although Tajikistan is party to multilateral

conventions that allow for law enforcement cooperation. Tajikistan is a member of the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center for Combatting Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and their Precursors (CARICC), which allows for the exchange of information and law enforcement intelligence and the pursuit of collaborative joint investigations. Funding and staffing issues limit its effectiveness.

2. Supply Reduction

During the first six months of 2024, Tajikistan law enforcement and security agencies collectively seized nearly four metric tons of narcotics, a 25 percent increase from the same period in 2023. Authorities seized 84 kilograms (kg) and 13,731 tablets of synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances, and nearly 81 kg of amphetamine and methamphetamine, an increase of 173 percent from the same period in 2023. MDMA seizures increased by 189 percent (1,749 tablets for the first six months of 2024 versus 605 tablets for the same period in 2023). Barbiturate seizures decreased 71 percent (50 tablets in 2024 versus 176 in 2023). Authorities seized 560 tablets of benzodiazepines in the first six months of 2024; no benzodiazepines were seized during the same period in 2023. Authorities tracked pregabalin and Lyrica seizures separately, though Lyrica is a brand name form of pregabalin. Combining the two, pregabalin seizures increased 423 percent from 2,174 tablets in the first six months of 2023 to 11,372 tablets in the first six months of 2024.

Authorities also solved and registered 419 crimes related to illegal drug trafficking, a seven percent increase over the same period in 2023. The government tried 60 people for illegal drug trafficking, a nine percent decrease from the same period in 2023. The DCA's Forensic Department conducted 225 forensic examinations of nearly 730 kilograms (kg) of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and their precursors, a 25 percent decrease from the same period in 2023.

To ensure compliance with the rules for legal circulation of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and their precursors, DCA conducted 34 inspections of medical institutions, pharmacies, and industrial enterprises. During the first six months of 2024 the licensing commission held three meetings to consider six

appeals. As a result, three licenses and three certificates for the import of precursors were issued. No licenses or certificates were canceled.

Tajikistan does not have legal domestic production of synthetic drugs or other pharmaceuticals. Although clandestine laboratories exist in all neighboring countries, Tajikistan did not identify any illicit production of synthetic drugs during the reporting period. Drug control authorities insist Tajikistan is only a transit state for synthetics and other illicit substances, and not a source. Nevertheless, a small but growing digitally-based market for synthetics and new psychoactive substances exists. Narcotraffickers use social media applications to sell synthetic drugs. Customers pay with cryptocurrency, and the transactions are completed through a complex system of cutouts and dead drops to maintain anonymity of all parties. Authorities have arrested some couriers, but have been unable to identify or arrest suppliers. Tajikistan's agent provocateur laws and lack of training and equipment further complicate investigations.

Off label use of prescription tropicamide and pregabalin, particularly by schoolchildren, is the main concern for authorities in terms of synthetic drug use. These substances are inexpensive and widely available.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Multiple government ministries and committees collaborated to develop and approve prevention plans and strategies. As part of this effort, the Government of Tajikistan organized meetings with different demographic groups to share anti-drug messages. During the first six months of 2024, the DCA organized 112 print and broadcast media appearances; held 226 meetings and discussions on anti-drug topics (an increase from 198 meetings and discussions held during the same period in 2023); 28 round tables, six seminars; and 34 anti-drug cultural and sports events. The DCA and other websites published 142 informational articles (the agency published 133 articles in the same period of 2023).

Treatment is only available in state clinics to registered drug users. Due to stigma and the rights lost when people enter treatment, the numbers of registered drug users are not reflective of the actual population. Few non-governmental

organizations offer harm reduction services to those who want help without being officially registered.

4. Corruption

In stated policy, the Government of Tajikistan does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. Corruption is nevertheless pervasive in Tajikistan and negatively influences the nation's counternarcotics efforts. In recent years, the Government of Tajikistan has charged senior counternarcotics officers with corruption, reflecting limited readiness to tackle high-level corruption. There were no reports of significant arrests, prosecutions, or convictions related to corruption involving illicit drugs in 2024.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

In 2024, the United States provided \$900,000 to support Tajikistan's counternarcotics efforts through training, equipment, institutional development, and operational support. The DCA, Tajikistan's principal counternarcotics organization, is the historical beneficiary of U.S. funding, though support is beginning to flow to border security forces and the counternarcotics directorate of the Ministry of Interior (UBNON). Both agencies have broader reach and more direct engagement with growing threats from Afghanistan.

Tajikistan's cooperation on investigations with U.S. counternarcotics agencies has been limited in the past, but the United States has worked to deepen cooperation with DCA and UBNON. Tajikistan participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

D. Conclusion

The smuggling routes traversing Tajikistan have long been used by malign actors to move drugs, arms, and people. For several years, Tajik officials have noted an increase in drug trafficking from Afghanistan and have noted concerns about the potential for extremists to cross into Tajikistan from Afghanistan.

Tanzania

Tanzania is a significant transit country and increasingly a destination country for illicit drugs. Drug traffickers move illicit drugs from Asia and southern Africa to Europe, North America, Asia, and the Middle East. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) transport primarily heroin and methamphetamine into and through Tanzania via maritime vessels, air travel, and parcel services. Tanzania produces marijuana and khat for domestic consumption, and Tanzanians have increasingly developed substance use disorders including heroin addiction.

The United States promotes interdiction operations through law enforcement cooperation. In 2024, Tanzania's Drug Control and Enforcement Authority (DCEA), Zanzibar's ZDCEA, and the Tanzania Police Force Airport Interdiction Unit received training on investigative strategies, precursor chemicals, and synthetic drugs.

Tanzanian investigations in the 12 months ending September 2024 led to 65 arrests and the seizure of approximately \$20 million in real estate and vehicle assets (compared to \$100,000 in 2023), 2.5 metric tons (MT) of marijuana, compared to 310 kilograms (kg) in 2023; 1.5 MT of heroin (compared to 146 kg in 2023; 2.25 MT of methamphetamine, and 7.3 kilograms of cocaine, and the eradication of 1,175 hectares of cannabis.

Tanzania is historically not a producer of illicit drugs for export, although DCEA seized 16,532 liters of diverted pharmaceutical precursor chemicals as of September 2024. In March 2024, DCEA seized 5.53 kilograms of synthetic stimulants from the Netherlands, identified as MDPV (Methylenedioxypropylvalerone), known as "bath salts."

In June 2024, Tanzania launched its National Drug Control and Enforcement Policy. The DCEA has an annual budget of approximately \$4.6 million, inadequate to meet expenses without support. In 2024, DCEA dedicated \$375,000 to reduction and treatment activities. As of October 2024, Tanzania partnered with the United States to support 17 Medication Assisted Treatment clinics serving over 6,600 people who use opiates.

The Tanzanian government does not encourage or facilitate the production or trafficking of illicit drugs as a matter of policy, although traffickers seek to influence politicians, law enforcement, and others in power. Extradition between Tanzania and the United States is governed by the 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty and Tanzania's domestic Extradition Act.

While no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty exists, Tanzania is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions enabling mutual legal assistance to the United States.

Tanzania is a willing partner in drug enforcement. It has expanded its investigation and interdiction capacity, as well as its capacity to arrest lower level TCO members. It could strengthen legislation by adding conspiracy laws to enable the prosecution of TCO leadership. Tanzania has a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States. It is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address the Threat of Synthetic Drug Threats.

Thailand

The United States partners with Thailand's law enforcement agencies across a range of issues, including counternarcotics. Thailand and the United States closely cooperate on law enforcement matters, including on investigations and through bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties. The United States provides specialized training and equipment, including support to a DEA Sensitive Investigative Unit and remains Thailand's partner of choice across a range of law enforcement and security matters.

Thailand does not cultivate or produce significant quantities of opiates, methamphetamine, or other illicit drugs, nor is it a significant source or transit country for drugs entering the United States. Thailand's foremost drug control challenges are addressing the flow of precursor chemicals used to manufacture synthetic methamphetamine and heroin in neighboring Burma and targeting supplies of finished methamphetamine in the form of methamphetamine tablets ("yaba") and crystal methamphetamine from Burma. The majority of Burma-sourced methamphetamine transits through Thailand to other markets in the Indo-Pacific region, but some is consumed domestically. Heroin, largely from Burma, and ketamine, mainly from Cambodia, continues to threaten Thailand and the region, and was subject to heightened interest from former Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin in mid-2024.

In 2022, Thailand removed most forms of cannabis and their extracts containing no more than 0.2 percent tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) from the list of controlled substances in the Narcotics Act, but left intact that there is no THC limit on the sale of cannabis flowers. Cannabis cannot be sold to pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers, and persons under 20 years of age, or be smoked in public places, consumed for recreational purposes, or imported. The Thai government continues to consider whether to revisit the cannabis laws, but has yet to act on further restricting cannabis sales.

During fiscal year 2024, Thai authorities seized approximately 1 billion methamphetamine tablets; 25.8 metric tons (MT) of crystal methamphetamine; 5.63 MT of ketamine; 1.73 MT of heroin; 37 kilograms (kg) of cocaine; 16 kg of sodium cyanide; and 664 MT of non-specific precursor chemicals. Criminal penalties vary by narcotics classification, ranging from monetary fines to life imprisonment. The death penalty exists but is rarely imposed.

Substance use has been a significant social and public health problem in Thailand for decades. “Yaba,” a tablet containing methamphetamine, caffeine, and other stimulants, is the most widely abused drug in Thailand. A single “yaba” pill is sold for approximately \$0.50 in Bangkok, Thailand. Thailand carries out demand reduction, drug treatment, and rehabilitation programs. Thailand participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

Trinidad and Tobago

A. Introduction

Trinidad and Tobago (TT) is a transshipment point for illegal drugs destined for the United States, Europe, and the rest of the Caribbean. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) exploit the country's proximity to Venezuela, porous borders, vulnerable ports of entry, limited law enforcement capacity and resources, and corruption to traffic illicit drugs through TT and its territorial waters. During the first nine months of 2024, drug trafficking increased significantly, particularly cocaine and marijuana, due to oversupply in the drug market and advancements in technology used by TCOs. Weak enforcement and corruption in Customs and Excise Division (TTC&ED), the TT Coast Guard (TTCG), and other border security units undermine efforts to combat drug trafficking, but TT continued to make progress in its efforts to dismantle drug networks and was as a more collaborative partner with the United States in 2024.

Trinidad and Tobago is a participant in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

TT's drug control institutions face challenges in staffing, equipment, coordination, and funding. However, TT law enforcement and the United States have improved counternarcotics coordination. TT and the United States are collaborating to develop investigative and information-sharing capacity, including creating a multi-agency Vetted Unit (VU) to investigate serious crimes. The United States is working with TT Prison Services and the Public Defender's Office on a plea-bargaining assessment to reduce case backlogs. In the first nine months of 2024, the United States funded training for 171 law enforcement personnel.

The National Drug Council (NDC), which coordinates TT's antidrug policy, received \$44,776 in the proposed budget for 2023-2024. The National Alcohol and Drug

Abuse Prevention Program (NADAPP) continued building capacity on drug demand reduction and focused on increased collaboration with the Ministries of Youth Development and National Service, Education, and Sport and Community Development. NADAPP continued outreach activities in schools, communities, and workplaces, including drug education sessions and information booths.

TT implemented four new mobile scanners at the port in Port of Spain for full operation in 2024, and is training 24 officers on their operation, in coordination with the vendor. The government plans to appoint 40 additional officers to the ports at either Port of Spain or Point Lisas.

TT has mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties with the United States. It is party to a drug control and law enforcement letter of agreement with the United States, a maritime law enforcement agreement enables the United States to patrol TT waters and detain vessels suspected of trafficking drugs, a ship rider agreement that allows U.S. law enforcement detachments aboard TTCG vessels, and a customs mutual assistance agreement.

2. Supply Reduction

Due to a robust partnership with the TT Police Service (TTPS) Special Investigations Unit and the Transnational Organized Crime Unit, total seizures in the first nine months of 2024 by TT law enforcement were 44 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 2.9 metric tons (MT) of marijuana, compared to 2023 seizures of 226 kg and 1.5 MT respectively.

In March 2024, a law enforcement operation in southwest Trinidad led to the seizure of 1.5 MT of marijuana with an estimated value of \$7.6 million and 13.8 kg of cocaine with an estimated value of \$420,000. The operation involved Task Forces from the South-Western Division, Southern Division, National Operations, and the Coastal and Riverine Patrol Unit, TTCG, the Air Support Unit, the Multi-Operations Police Section and the Canine Unit, all of which share a working relationship with the United States. Marijuana is the only known locally produced illicit drug in TT. While not a significant focus, TT authorities periodically eradicate cannabis farms.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Drug Information Network of TT, managed by the Ministry of National Security through the NDC, serves as the primary portal for national drug-related data. It is a multi-disciplinary platform for sharing drug supply and control information and improving data collection and trend analysis, while guiding policy and demand reduction efforts. There are several drug treatment programs in TT, primarily managed by the Ministry of Health and programs administered and privately funded by NGOs, religious groups, and hospitals.

4. Corruption

TT law prohibits illegal activity associated with drug trafficking or the laundering of proceeds from illicit drug transactions. TT does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, drug-related corruption is persistent within law enforcement, border security entities, and the postal system, with allegations that these entities facilitate the transshipment and distribution of illicit drugs. TT has passed several laws to address corruption, including a Proceeds of Crime Act and the partial adoption of a Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, but has not yet operationalized a civil asset management agency.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and TT law enforcement maintain a cooperative relationship, including collaborating closely on improving security at legal ports of entry and helping to expand the role of TT law enforcement in regional narcotics interdiction efforts. The United States supports efforts designed to address crime and violence affecting TT citizens, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Through CBSI, the United States provides counternarcotics training and capacity building for government institutions.

The United States and TT maintain a bilateral agreement to suppress illicit traffic by sea, which includes ship boarding, expedited operations center communications, ship rider operations, and operations within territorial seas. The TT Ministry of Finance signed a \$150 million letter of interest with Export-Import Bank of the US (EXIM) to finance

maritime vessels and aircraft to support border security and search and rescue operations.

With U.S. support, TT made significant progress in enhancing its canine capacity, acquiring six drug detection canines. The United States also supported TT's canine fentanyl detection capability ahead of the Cricket World Cup, and narcotics detection in the TT's Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU).

The U.S.-funded VU being developed will provide a significant investigative capability and allow greater information sharing between the United States and TT. The United States also supports the Ministries of National Security and Finance in exchanging biometric information in real time, enhancing TT's screening and vetting capabilities.

D. Conclusion

Cooperation between the United States and TT on drug trafficking and transnational crime strengthened in 2024. TT should continue to strengthen border security, including expanding the use of technology to aid interdiction efforts at ports of entry. It should also increase its efforts to combat public corruption that facilitates transnational crime, including the establishment of strong oversight and accountability mechanisms within the TT Customs and Excise Division, and use its civil asset forfeiture law and unexplained wealth order provisions.

Türkiye

Türkiye's location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and its inadequate controls against illicit finance make it a significant transit country for drug trafficking. According to Turkish authorities, terrorist groups operating in and around Türkiye provide logistics, protection, and other support to drug smugglers. Large volumes of heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs transit Türkiye for further distribution across Europe and Asia. Iranian-origin drug traffickers play a significant role in Türkiye's drug trade. Türkiye participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

According to the Turkish government's 2024 "National Drug Report," in 2023 the Turkish National Police seized approximately 3.31 metric tons (MT) of heroin; 77.9 MT of marijuana; 21.4 MT of hashish; 2.5 MT of cocaine; 5,227,853 MDMA tablets; 13,760,337 captagon tablets; 157,343,758 cannabis plants; and 28,870,284 tablets of synthetic pharmaceuticals. The report also highlighted operations against major international drug smuggling groups, notably the "Comanchero" and "Leijdekkers" groups. On June 2, 2024 Turkish authorities announced the seizure of 373 kilograms (kg) of cocaine shipped from Latin America hidden in a container at the port of Gemlik and detained nine suspects. On April 11, authorities announced the seizure of 608 kg of cocaine, the third-largest cocaine seizure in Türkiye's history. Security forces also detained 13 individuals, including a Lebanese-Venezuelan national alleged to be the leader of the "Dani Talal Awad Abushanap" international drug syndicate. In November 2023, Istanbul police captured several suspects alleged to be involved in an international organized crime ring that has also been pursued by U.S. and New Zealand authorities, including Hakan Ayik, a top fugitive wanted in Australia for drug smuggling.

The Interior Ministry has identified the fight against drugs as a top priority. In practice, authorities have prioritized enforcement efforts against terrorist groups involved in narcotics trafficking, particularly from Afghanistan and Iran, rather than large Turkish criminal organizations. Illegal drug use in Türkiye is relatively low compared to countries in the region, although both the TNP and Turkish Customs have reported a large increase in illegal drug use within Türkiye, specifically methamphetamine and cocaine. Cannabis is imported or grown domestically for local consumption. According to the 2024 TNP Drugs

Report, legal cannabis production in Türkiye expanded to 20 provinces and increased due to regulatory changes enacted in 2023.

U.S.-supported professional development exchanges and equipment has strengthened the capacity of Turkish border enforcement and Turkish customs authorities and has had a positive effect on seizures. Türkiye strictly controls licit opium poppy cultivation and pharmaceutical morphine production, with no apparent diversion into the illicit market. No Turkish government officials was charged with complicity in drug trafficking or the laundering of drug proceeds in 2023 or 2024; however, several Turkish law enforcement officers were charged for involvement in narcotics. Turkish media on August 23, 2024, reported two police officers in southern Gaziantep province were arrested for trafficking around 19 kg of hashish.

Ukraine

This report addresses the drug situation within the territory currently controlled by the Government of Ukraine. Historically, Ukraine has been a major transit country for illicit drugs destined for the European Union and Russian markets; however, Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine has altered trafficking routes and impacted internal drug use. Russian forces continue to blockade southern Black Sea ports that once served as the key entry points for illicit drugs. Additionally, martial law restrictions have increased risks to overland transit, prompting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to shift operations to neighboring countries.

Domestically produced amphetamine, methadone, Alpha-PVP, and new psychoactive substances are Ukraine's primary drug threats. Russia's invasion of Ukraine caused the internal displacement of approximately 3.7 million Ukrainians and simultaneously scattered clandestine laboratory production within Ukraine toward smaller operations for which distribution is facilitated through online marketplaces, taxi and postal deliveries, and "dead drops."

The National Police of Ukraine's Counternarcotics Department and the State Border Guard Service's Investigative Activities Department continue to lead the country's counterdrug efforts. Ukrainian law enforcement amplified efforts to confront illicit drug production and use in 2024, as reflected by an increased volume in charged offenses, arrests, and seizures related to synthetic drugs. From January through September 2024, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies identified over 38,000 offenses related to the illegal trafficking of drugs, psychotropic substances, their analogues, and chemical precursors. Drug-related investigations resulted in over 15,500 formal charges, including arrests of nearly 2,000 individuals. Drug seizures included over 2.3 metric tons (MT) of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and over 8,000 liters of chemical precursors, which includes a 100 percent increase in seizures of Alpha-PVP to 309 kilograms (kg) and a 336 percent increase in seizures of methadone (25.2 kg) in 2023. Additionally, law enforcement seized 1.9 MT of cannabis, 58 kg of amphetamine, 2.0 kg of cocaine, and 88,600 cannabis and opium poppy plants.

Ukrainian law enforcement authorities reported dismantling 130 DTOs, an annual increase of 60.5 percent. Including a high-profile operation conducted on October 15, Ukrainian

authorities dismantled 79 clandestine drug laboratories and arrested 145 clandestine laboratory organizers and co-organizers. Efforts to target illicit drug proceeds resulted in the initiation of 52 money laundering investigations, a 10.6 percent increase from 2023. Law enforcement seized assets valued at approximately \$3 million, more than double the value of assets seized during the same period of 2023.

Ukraine participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) is a major consumer and transshipment country for illicit drugs. As a transit point, the UK primarily receives illicit drugs originating in Central and South America bound for third-country markets. According to the UK National Crime Agency's (NCA) 2024 National Strategic Assessment, consumption rates for cocaine and heroin in the UK are among the highest in Europe. In England and Wales, the number of cocaine-related deaths rose by 30.5 percent in 2023 (the most recent data available). Users in the UK are increasingly able to purchase drugs online via social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps.

The UK remains vigilant on the synthetic opioid threat, and the Home Office established a Synthetic Opioid Taskforce in 2023 with representatives from the NCA, the National Police Chiefs' Councils, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Border Force, the Ministry of Justice, and the Joint Intelligence Organization. Authorities increasingly are concerned with the rise of xylazine and of nitazenes, a group of synthetic opioids. Nitazenes were linked to 230 deaths in the UK between June 2023 and June 2024 and often were found mixed within other illegal substances, increasing the risk to unsuspecting drug users. In 2023, the UK Home Office classified isotonitazene, along with 25 other synthetic opioids, as Class A drugs following a 2021 report on increased overdoses and deaths resulting from the use of isotonitazene. The possession of Class A drugs, including these synthetic opioids, is illegal, and anyone who supplies the drugs will face sentences of up to life in prison, an unlimited fine, or both.

Cannabis continues to be the most used drug in the UK, with approximately 2.5 million people between 16-59 years old reporting cannabis usage between March 2022-March 2023. Cannabis cultivation operates at an industrial scale and is often linked to other offenses including human trafficking, robbery, and violence. In early 2023, UK law enforcement began increasing scrutiny of air travelers from the United States in response to cannabis seizures in luggage on flights between the United States and the UK. Overall, cannabis seizures at the UK border more than doubled in 2023 compared to 2022.

The United States and the UK cooperate closely on multilateral drug enforcement efforts. U.S. law enforcement agencies, as part of the Heroin Signature Program, work closely with UK authorities on laboratory testing for drugs. Further, the United States

continues to conduct coordinated drug trafficking and money laundering investigations with UK law enforcement agencies. The UK is an active member of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and will lead its new effort to disrupt the supply of synthetic drugs.

Uzbekistan

A. Introduction

The government of Uzbekistan faces rising challenges from traffickers moving synthetic drugs and chemical precursors through its territory. Traditional drugs, including opium and heroin from Afghanistan, continue to enter Uzbekistan along the rugged land border with Tajikistan. As Afghanistan's ban on poppy cultivation continues, methamphetamine and synthetic drugs originating from Afghanistan are a growing concern. Uzbekistani authorities claim that synthetic drugs and new psychoactive substances also enter through Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan recorded a rise in the quantity of clandestine synthetics labs seized in 2024. While government officials report domestic consumption of illicit narcotics is rising, especially among youth, Uzbekistan is primarily a transit country for illicit narcotics from Afghanistan bound for Russia and Europe (the "Northern Route").

The government approved its first ever National Strategy to Combat Illicit Narcotics in 2024. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also elevated the National Center for Drug Control (NCDC) from an entity under the Cabinet of Ministers to a center within the Presidential Administration, a move that gives NCDC a stronger mandate. The country implemented several drug prevention activities in 2024, but data on their long-term impact is unavailable.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In May, President Mirziyoyev approved the National Strategy to Fight Drug Addiction and Drug Crimes 2024–2028. The first National Drug Control Strategy in Uzbekistan's history, the document covers measures to prevent illicit drug trafficking, eliminate online drug distribution, enhance border security and law-enforcement efforts, and improve drug dependency treatment. The NCDC coordinates the implementation of the strategy and was elevated to a state body under the Presidential Administration in May.

In June, 2024, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution, initiated by Central Asian member states, encouraging Central Asian countries to act as a united front and cooperate to effectively resolve and eliminate drug-related problems.

The government of Uzbekistan noted an expansion in drug trafficking in 2024. Significant challenges include the sale and distribution of illicit narcotics via online messaging applications that are difficult for law enforcement to interdict. Limited cyber capabilities continue to hamper effective law enforcement investigations. Inadequate law enforcement cooperation in narcotics investigations with the United States and neighboring countries hindered drug control efforts. Data quantifying both rising drug trafficking and drug consumption was insufficient.

Uzbekistan is a member of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. The country is also a party to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 2004 Agreement on Cooperation among SCO Member States in Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors. Uzbekistan is also a member of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) and will assume the rotating chair of this organization in 2024.

2. Supply Reduction

Tajikistan remains the primary transit route for opiates, methamphetamine, and other illicit narcotics originating from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan. Open-source data from the first half of 2024 shows an increase in drug related crimes compared to the same period in 2023. Law enforcement officials carried out drug seizures throughout 2024, including a seizure of 46.7 kilograms (kg) of hashish in May.

According to data from CARICC, authorities identified 9,209 drug crimes during the first nine months of 2024 and arrested over 6,200 persons for drug offenses during the same period. CARICC data indicates authorities seized 1,558.63 kg of drugs during the first nine months of 2024, including: 94.5 kg of heroin; 135 kg of opium; 429 kg of hashish; 552 kg of marijuana; 130 kg of synthetic drugs; and 86.1 kg of psychotropic substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Uzbekistan has limited data on drug demand and treatment. Rehabilitation centers often lack modern treatment programs and are generally not equipped to provide treatment to children aged 10 to 16. The government of Uzbekistan conducted drug prevention activities, facilitating over 10,000 meetings and events at schools, community centers, and workplaces during drug prevention month, involving nearly 1,300,000 youth. Government agencies also conducted outreach campaigns on the negative effects of drug abuse via traditional and social media platforms. There is insufficient data to measure the effectiveness of these interventions. The Republican Specialized Scientific and Practical Medical Center for Mental Health oversees 14 drug treatment centers and two specialized hospitals across the country. These centers lack capacity and sufficient funding.

4. Corruption

The government of Uzbekistan does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking and there is no evidence that senior government officials are engaged in illicit narcotics trafficking. Although corruption remains pervasive, the government of Uzbekistan continues to make progress in combating corruption at national and local levels. There are no laws specifically covering drug-related corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports Uzbekistan in strengthening the capacity of law enforcement personnel, securing borders, and enhancing regional cooperation to disrupt narcotics traffickers and organized crime.

Counternarcotics cooperation with the United States remains limited, although the government of Uzbekistan is requesting more assistance as it seeks to implement its newly passed national strategy. Although the country does not have extradition or mutual legal assistance agreements with the United States, assistance is accomplished on the basis of domestic law and multilateral treaties. Memoranda of Understanding between the United States and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, NCDC, and the Prosecutor General's Office remain in effect.

In September 2024, Uzbekistan and the United States signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement. The agreement will facilitate information sharing and further strengthen bilateral cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, money laundering, customs evasion, human trafficking, and transnational criminal groups.

Uzbekistan actively participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. The United States is currently supporting Uzbekistan's counternarcotics and prevention efforts via three projects. The United States is also currently funding the third phases of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's Interagency Mobile Teams (IMTs) and Forensics projects. This assistance aims to strengthen Uzbekistani law enforcement and forensic laboratories' capacities to combat drug trafficking through enhanced coordination and investigation techniques. Additionally, the United States is beginning a new partnership with Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America to develop community coalitions to prevent substance abuse in conjunction with civil society organizations and the Government of Uzbekistan.

D. Conclusion

Passage of the country's first national counternarcotics strategy and the elevation of the NCDC to the Presidential Administration are important signals of the government's commitment to combating illicit narcotics challenges. The government's renewed focus on prevention and treatment is also a sign of its willingness to address growing drug consumption trends. However, limited cyber capabilities, unreliable drug use data, and under-resourced law enforcement agencies continue to hinder progress. Uzbekistan should invest in research to understand the scope and trends of drug use and trafficking and increase transnational and national surveillance and intelligence-sharing to dismantle drug trafficking networks. More efficient and effective collaboration with the United States, as well as regional and international organizations, will be critical to Uzbekistan's efforts to mitigate illicit narcotics trafficking and increasing domestic consumption trends.

Venezuela

A. Introduction

Political instability, economic turmoil, and rampant corruption in Venezuela have created conditions that allow transnational criminal organizations, including drug traffickers, to operate with impunity. Venezuela is a major drug-transit country and key trafficking route in the Western Hemisphere for illegal drugs, predominantly cocaine. Ongoing economic crises have resulted in Nicolas Maduro's representatives increasingly depending on rents from narcotrafficking, along with other illicit activities, to maintain their de facto control. Their lack of international drug control cooperation; usurpation of the judicial system, military, and security services for illicit ends; public corruption; and cooperation with non-state armed actors and criminal elements provide ideal conditions for drug trafficking operations and associated violence.

Growing evidence of modest coca cultivation, and of cocaine production in domestic drug laboratories, suggests Venezuela is now an illicit drug-producing country as well as a transit country. Evidence also suggests Venezuela has a significant domestic drug consumption problem, though accurate data is unavailable.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Venezuela and the United States have had a Bilateral Counter-narcotics Memorandum of Understanding since 1978, but Venezuela declined to sign a negotiated addendum to this arrangement in 2005. There was no cooperation with Maduro and his representatives on extradition and mutual legal assistance in 2024.

The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution bars the extradition of Venezuelan nationals. Maduro representatives do not share information on counternarcotics activity with U.S. officials. In February 2021, Maduro created the National Anti-Drug Superintendency (SUNAD) via the Organic Drug Law of 2010, replacing the National Anti-Drug Office (ONA). In 2021, Maduro appointed the former head of the ONA as the first National Anti-Drug Superintendent. Maduro representatives stated the

reform of the Organic Drug Law was to reinforce the control mechanisms against drug trafficking in the national territory, as well as to prevent drug consumption, but reports of some officials' direct involvement in both trafficking and drug misuse continued throughout the year.

2. Supply Reduction

Venezuela remains a major transit country for cocaine shipments via aerial, terrestrial, and maritime routes. Most shipments originate in Colombia and transit through Venezuela and are then trafficked north through Central America or the Caribbean islands - eventually ending up in the United States - or southeast to Brazil, Guyana, or Suriname, either for consumption in South America or transit to Europe. In March 2020, the United States estimated that between 200 and 250 metric tons (MT) of cocaine were trafficked through Venezuela annually, representing roughly 10 to 13 percent of estimated global production. Furthermore, various sources have indicated that Maduro-aligned officials lead drug trafficking operations in addition to taking bribes from drug cartels.

UNODC's 2023 Global Report on Cocaine identified Venezuela as a major point of departure for illicit drug flights transporting cocaine from South America toward Mexico. In May 2022, researchers reported evidence of coca cultivation and cocaine processing in Zulia and Apure states by Colombian guerilla groups, and an August 2023 research report cited evidence of coca cultivation in Amazonas state. In August 2023, news media reported that local indigenous people confirmed the presence of drug laboratories and clandestine airstrips in Amazonas state.

Maduro representatives continued to make unconfirmed claims about their counter-narcotics efforts. SUNAD reported in July that it had seized 25 MT of drugs during the first six months of 2024, which represented an increase of five percent compared to the same timeframe in 2023. SUNAD also stated that 6,196 individuals were detained in connection to drug activities in Venezuela in 2024. SUNAD said information exchanges with Colombia, France, Italy, and the Netherlands were key to detecting illegal activities. Maduro's former vice president for citizen security stated in early July that the largest operations were conducted in Apure, Tachira, Falcon, and Carabobo states. On August 27, 2024, state media said the National

Guard (GNB) seized three MT of drugs at Simon Bolivar Airport in La Guaira. The drugs were allegedly being transported in a plane belonging to state-owned airline Emtrasur bound for Russia and Afghanistan. Authorities claimed the drugs were hidden in coffee bags and came from Colombia and detained ten individuals in connection to the case.

Maduro's attorney general in early July 2024 said that, from August 2017 to June 2024, Venezuela had seized 233.76 MT of cocaine, 69.7 MT of marijuana, and an unspecified number of other drugs, such as heroin or synthetic drugs. Experts were unable to independently verify these claims. Statistics remained unreliable, and experts assessed that authorities often apprehended drug traffickers who failed to bribe or work with the de facto authorities and the military.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Maduro's attorney general reported in July 2024 that authorities had charged 15,974 individuals in connection to drug cases, but he did not identify a timeframe. He said that from September 2022 to June 2024, the attorney general's office and national prosecutors conducted drug prevention outreach benefitting over 35,149 children and adolescents and 23,169 adults; he also said the "Drugs Destroy Your Family" public awareness campaign had reached 13,138 children and 7,796 adults since it was launched in September 2022.

4. Corruption

Corruption, including among the security services and senior Maduro representatives, is endemic in Venezuela, facilitating drug-trafficking. Armed neighborhood gangs known as "colectivos" allied with Maduro's United Socialist Party of Venezuela, armed Venezuelan-origin gangs, and Colombian guerilla factions dominate drug trafficking routes inside Venezuela.

Along the border region with Colombia, Maduro representatives continued to allow safe havens for U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations including the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP), and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - Segunda Marquetalia, which control the drug trafficking routes in the border region and

maintain close ties to de facto authorities. Tren de Aragua, the largest criminal organization in Venezuela, originated at least a decade ago in Venezuela's prison system as a result of low-level corruption and lack of state control. It has since become influential both within and outside the prison system and has continued to recruit new members and carry out criminal operations including micro-drug trafficking. The group has expanded its operations to Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, among others, through the exodus of Venezuelans due to the country's crisis. There are increasing reports of Tren de Aragua presence and activity through Central America, Mexico, and into the United States, although the extent of its command and control across borders remains unknown. The United States designated Tren de Aragua as a significant Transnational Criminal Organization in July 2024.

Maduro representatives took no action against officials, individuals, or companies designated as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers or indicted by the United States for playing a significant role in international drug trafficking. Since 2017, the United States has made over 350 Venezuelan-related designations, pursuant to various Executive Orders, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. In March 2020, the United States charged Maduro and 14 other current and former Venezuelan officials with offenses related to narco-terrorism, corruption, and drug trafficking, and other criminal charges. Overall, as of July 2023, the United States had charged dozens of Venezuelan military leaders, politicians, and businessmen with corruption and drug trafficking.

On September 11, 2024, Maduro's interior minister responded to reports that Guinea-Bissau and Brazil seized a plane and helicopter with drugs from Venezuela by saying the helicopter belonged to "international crime" and the plane had not been in Venezuela in the past. He also downplayed drug production within Venezuela and said that 80 MT of illegal substances had been seized by Venezuelan officials.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Drug control cooperation between Venezuela and the United States has been limited since 2005.

D. Conclusion

Despite Maduro's claimed efforts in countering drug trafficking, the country's role in the global supply chain of illicit drugs has expanded from being a drug transit zone to becoming a cocaine-producing nation. Maduro representatives failed to meaningfully prosecute suspected drug traffickers, and Venezuela's use as a transit and origin point for illegal drugs has continued to grow.

Vietnam

A. Introduction

Vietnam is a transshipment point and destination country for illegal drugs of all types. Traffickers send large quantities of synthetic drugs and heroin produced primarily in Burma to Vietnam for domestic consumption and onward transport to consumer markets in East Asia and Oceania. Lesser volumes of illicit drugs entering Vietnam may also originate from Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Vietnam has long, porous borders with the PRC, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as a vast maritime exclusive economic zone that traffickers exploit to smuggle drugs into and through Vietnam. Vietnamese police and border management agencies lack necessary equipment and human resources, making counternarcotics enforcement challenging both on land and at sea.

Vietnam participates in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and the Permanent Deputy Prime Minister attended the high-level summit meeting in September 2024.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Vietnam Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Counternarcotics Department is the main agency charged with combating narcotics. The Ministry of National Defense and General Department of Vietnam Customs also have counternarcotics law enforcement mandates.

Vietnam has strong political will to address narcotics trafficking, although Vietnamese enforcement agencies rarely engage in complex narcotics investigations or related financial investigations. In an annual policy address in June, MPS Director General Nguyen Van Vien highlighted the threat of synthetic drugs, including the potential threat of fentanyl and the diversion of precursor chemicals, as a priority for enforcement agencies. The use of online marketplaces and virtual currencies to complete narcotics transactions present additional challenges for Vietnam law

enforcement. Vietnam is currently revising its Chemical Control Law to better prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals.

MPS memoranda of understanding with U.S. law enforcement agencies facilitate case-based cooperation on counternarcotics. Vietnam and the United States do not share a mutual legal assistance (MLA) treaty or extradition treaty; MLA requests are handled based on reciprocity.

2. Supply Reduction

According to MPS, in the first half of 2024 Vietnam enforcement agencies conducted 17,129 narcotics-related investigations and arrested 27,905 suspects. Reported seizures included more than 330 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 975 kg of cannabis, 1,700 kg of synthetic drug powder, and 1,800,840 synthetic drug tablets. Compared to the same period in 2023, the number of investigations increased by 14; seizures of heroin, cannabis, and synthetic drugs increased in weight by more than 8 percent, 300 percent, and 85 percent respectively.

Major trafficking routes into Vietnam's territory include via the PRC in the north, Laos in the north and west, Cambodia in the south and west, and maritime routes from Southeast Asia to regional consumer markets. U.S. assistance has improved Vietnam's capacity to use technology in counternarcotics investigations and understand the threats posed by synthetic drugs and precursor chemical diversion.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Vietnam recognizes the need to address the public health aspects of drug use. MPS, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs manage drug demand reduction efforts in Vietnam. Vietnam is currently drafting a National Youth Prevention Strategy for 2025-2030. Vietnam established an International Society of Substance Use Professionals national chapter in 2024 that will support efforts to train and deploy evidence-based prevention and treatment services. The Ministry of Health also operates an effective methadone maintenance program for people who use heroin. With assistance from the United States, Vietnam will develop a pilot project to deploy community-based treatment and prevention services with a particular focus on women and children.

4. Corruption

The Vietnam government does not as a matter of policy encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking and there is no evidence that any senior government officials are engaged in such activity.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Vietnam actively participates in multilateral drug control efforts, including under ASEAN and the three major UN drug control treaties. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration partnered with MPS to co-host a regional International Drug Enforcement Conference in Danang in March. Vietnam also hosted the inaugural U.S.-Vietnam Law Enforcement and Security Dialogue in July. As one part of the dialogue, senior leaders and law enforcement from both countries discussed how to deepen counternarcotics cooperation with a particular focus on timely case-based cooperation and capacity building.

Counternarcotics cooperation is one component of bilateral cooperation in the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The United States continues to partner with Vietnam law enforcement agencies via investigative training and equipment donations. From January to September, the United States trained more than 306 counternarcotics police officers, customs officers, and other criminal justice personnel on identification of precursor chemicals, new psychoactive substances, and tactical medical skills. According to MPS, recent U.S. equipment donations led directly to the seizure of more than five kg of heroin, three kg of crystal methamphetamine, and 62,000 synthetic drug tablets in northwest Vietnam from September 2023 through September 2024.

D. Conclusion

Vietnam is an important partner for the United States on counternarcotics efforts in Southeast Asia. As transnational narcotics trafficking becomes increasingly complex, Vietnamese law enforcement agencies can continue to deepen regional information sharing on trafficking patterns, work with international partners toward timely case-based cooperation, and share seized drug and precursor chemical samples.

Law Enforcement Units

**Law Enforcement Units Funded by the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961**

Abbreviations of the U.S. agencies that mentor, advise, or train the units listed below refer to the following agencies:

- CBP: Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
- DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration
- DOD: Department of Defense
- DOJ: Department of Justice
- FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
- HSI: Homeland Security Investigations (Department of Homeland Security)
- ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, DOJ
- ILEA: International Law Enforcement Academy
- INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Department of State
- LEGATT: Legal Attache, FBI
- ODC: Office of Defense Cooperation, Department of Defense
- OPDAT: Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training, DOJ
- USCG: U.S. Coast Guard
- USMS: U.S. Marshalls Service

Table 7: Albania

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| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Specialized Anticorruption Body (SPAK) – National Bureau of Investigations (NBI) | DEA, FBI, ICITAP |
| SPAK – Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) | OPDAT |
| Ministry of Interior, Police Oversight Agency (POA) | ICITAP |
| Albanian State Police | DEA, FBI |

Table 8: Bahamas

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Royal Bahamian Police Force – Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) | DEA, OPBAT |
| Royal Bahamian Police Force – Maritime Patrol Units | DEA, OPBAT |
| Royal Bahamian Police Force - Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) | Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) |
| Royal Bahamian Defense Force – (RBDF) | DOD/ODC, DEA, OPBAT, USCG |
| Caribbean Crime & Gun Intelligence Unit – (CGIU) | ATF, HSI |

Table 9: Belize

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| | |
| Belize Police Department Anti-Narcotics Unit | DEA |

| | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| Belize Police Department Mobile Interdiction Team | CBP/DEA |
| Joint Intelligence Operations Center | SCO/INL |
| Belize Coast Guard | SCO |
| Financial Intelligence Unit | INL/ATSG Financial Crime Advisor |

Table 10: Colombia

| | |
|---|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Colombian National Police, Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN) | DEA |
| Colombian National Police, Rural Security Directorate (DICAR) | HSI |
| Colombian National Police, Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DIJIN) | DEA, FBI, HSI |
| Colombian Prosecutors Office (CTI) | DEA |
| Colombian Army (COLAR) | DEA |
| Customs and National Taxes Directorate (DIAN) | HSI |
| Colombian Navy (COLNAV) | DEA |

Table 11: Costa Rica

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Coast Guard Marine Interdiction Unit | DOD, DEA, USCG, State |
| DEA Vetted Counternarcotics Unit | DEA, State |

Table 12: Dominican Republic

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD) Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) | DEA |
| Joint Dominican National Police (DNP), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and General Customs Directorate (DGA) Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) | DHS |
| DNCD Fugitive Investigative Unit (FIU) | USMS |
| DNP Organized Crime Special Investigative Unit | FBI |
| DNP Specialized Investigation Division Against Immigration Crimes (DEIDEM) | Department of State Overseas Criminal Investigation Unit |
| National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD) Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) | DEA |

Table 13: Ecuador

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Ecuador National Police Antinarcotics National Directorate (DNIA) | INL, DEA, and CBP |
| Sub-Units of the Ecuador National Police Antinarcotics National Directorate (DNIA): | |
| Antidrug Investigations Unit (UIAN) | DEA and INL |
| Ports and Airports Investigations Unit (UNIPA) | INL, DEA, and CBP |
| Chemical Investigations Unit | INL and DEA |
| Investigations Unit against Drug Trafficking for Internal Consumption (UCTCI) | INL and DEA |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Integrated Analysis Center of Ports and Airports (CIAPA) | CBP |
|--|-----|

Table 14: El Salvador

| | |
|---|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) | DEA |
| National Electronic Monitoring Center (CITE) | INL, DEA, DOJ |
| Tactical Maritime Operations Response Section (STORM) | INL, DEA |

Table 15: Guatemala

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) – PNC /SGAIA | DEA |
| Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) – PNC, Public Ministry | FBI/DOJ |
| Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) – PNC/SGAIA, PNC/Criminal Investigation Division (DEIC), customs (SAT), migration (IGM), national registry (RENAP), Public Ministry | DHS/HSI |
| Mobile Tactical Interdiction Unit (MTIU) – SGAIA, border police (DIPAFRONT) | DHS/CBP |
| Narcotics and Money Laundering Prosecutors (UNILAT) – Public Ministry, PNC | DEA |
| Maritime Intelligence Center (MIC) – PNC | DEA |
| FEN – Guatemalan Navy | DEA, DoD |
| Seaport Trade Facilitation Task Force | DHS/CBP |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Interinstitutional Precursor Chemicals Investigation Group | DEA |
|--|-----|

Table 16: Haiti

| Host Country Units | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
|--|--|
| Haitian National Police (HNP) | INL, DEA, DOD (SCO), and CBP |
| Host Country Sub-Units of the Haitian National Police: | |
| Counternarcotics Unit (BLTS) | INL, DEA |
| POLIFRONT (Border Police) | INL, CBP, DEA |
| Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) | INL, DoD (Security Cooperation Office) |

Table 17: Honduras

| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
|--|--|
| HNP Anti-Drug Directorate (DNPA) | INL |
| Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) | DEA/INL |
| HNP Special Operations Command (COE) | INL |
| Honduran Naval Special Forces (FEN) | USCG, INL, SCO |
| Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) | HIS, INL |
| Special Tactical Operations Group (GOET) | CBP, INL |
| Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) Unit | FBI, INL |

Table 18: Indonesia

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| BNN Directorate of Enforcement and Pursuit | INL, DEA |

Table 19: Laos

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Lao Customs Department | CBP, DEA |

Table 20: Mexico

| | |
|---|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit - Fiscalía General de la República | HSI |
| Agency for International Cooperation Vetted Unit - Fiscalía General de la República | FBI |

Table 21: Pakistan

| | |
|---|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Antinarotics Force/Special Investigation Cell | DEA |

Table 22: Panama

| | |
|---|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Sensitive Investigations Unit | DEA |
| Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit | HSI |

| | |
|--|-----------------------|
| National Border Service Anti-Narcotics Directorate | DEA |
| Port Task Force | DEA, HSI, and CBP/CSI |
| Border Information and Analysis Targeting Unit | CBP |

Table 23: Peru

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) | DEA |
| Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit (TCIU) | INL, HSI |

Table 24: Tanzania

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Drug Control and Enforcement Agency (DCEA) | DEA, DOD OSC |

Table 25: Thailand

| | |
|--|--|
| Host Country Units | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Royal Thai Police – Narcotics Suppression Bureau (RTP-NSB) | DEA |
| RTP-NSB (North) | DEA |

Table 30: Vietnam

| | |
|---|--|
| Host Country Unit | U.S. Agencies that mentor, advise, or train the unit |
| Ministry of Public Security, Counternarcotics Police Department | DEA, INL |